/*
* Store private key
*/
static int pkcs11_store_key(PKCS11_TOKEN *token, EVP_PKEY *pk,
unsigned int type, char *label, unsigned char *id, size_t id_len,
PKCS11_KEY ** ret_key)
{
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = TOKEN2SLOT(token);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = TOKEN2CTX(token);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[32];
unsigned int n = 0;
int rv;
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_p, *rsa_q;
/* First, make sure we have a session */
if (!spriv->haveSession && PKCS11_open_session(slot, 1))
return -1;
/* Now build the key attrs */
pkcs11_addattr_int(attrs + n++, CKA_CLASS, type);
if (label)
pkcs11_addattr_s(attrs + n++, CKA_LABEL, label);
if (id && id_len)
pkcs11_addattr(attrs + n++, CKA_ID, id, id_len);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_TOKEN, TRUE);
if (type == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) {
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_PRIVATE, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_SENSITIVE, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_DECRYPT, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_SIGN, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_UNWRAP, TRUE);
} else { /* CKO_PUBLIC_KEY */
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_ENCRYPT, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_VERIFY, TRUE);
pkcs11_addattr_bool(attrs + n++, CKA_WRAP, TRUE);
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100003L
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
#else
if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
RSA *rsa = pk->pkey.rsa;
#endif
pkcs11_addattr_int(attrs + n++, CKA_KEY_TYPE, CKK_RSA);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100005L
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
#else
rsa_n=rsa->n;
rsa_e=rsa->e;
rsa_d=rsa->d;
rsa_p=rsa->p;
rsa_q=rsa->q;
#endif
pkcs11_addattr_bn(attrs + n++, CKA_MODULUS, rsa_n);
pkcs11_addattr_bn(attrs + n++, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, rsa_e);
if (type == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) {
pkcs11_addattr_bn(attrs + n++, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, rsa_d);
pkcs11_addattr_bn(attrs + n++, CKA_PRIME_1, rsa_p);
pkcs11_addattr_bn(attrs + n++, CKA_PRIME_2, rsa_q);
}
} else {
pkcs11_zap_attrs(attrs, n);
PKCS11err(type == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY ?
PKCS11_F_PKCS11_STORE_PRIVATE_KEY :
PKCS11_F_PKCS11_STORE_PUBLIC_KEY,
PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return -1;
}
/* Now call the pkcs11 module to create the object */
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_CreateObject(spriv->session, attrs, n, &object));
/* Zap all memory allocated when building the template */
pkcs11_zap_attrs(attrs, n);
CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_STORE_PRIVATE_KEY, rv);
/* Gobble the key object */
return pkcs11_init_key(ctx, token, spriv->session, object, type, ret_key);
}
/*
* Get the key type
*/
int pkcs11_get_key_type(PKCS11_KEY *key)
{
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
return kpriv->ops->type;
}
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey
* i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE
* and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token
* The secret key object is deleted
*
* In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS
* could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned.
*/
int pkcs11_ecdh_derive_internal(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism,
const void * ec_params,
void *outnewkey,
PKCS11_KEY * key)
{
int rv;
int ret = -1;
unsigned char * buf = NULL;
size_t buflen;
PKCS11_KEY_private *priv;
PKCS11_SLOT *slot;
PKCS11_CTX *ctx;
PKCS11_TOKEN *token;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = {
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */
{CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
priv = PRIVKEY(key);
token = KEY2TOKEN(key);
slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
CHECK_KEY_FORK(key);
session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session;
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism;
mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params;
switch (ecdh_mechanism) {
case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
// case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS:
// mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS);
// break;
default:
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
CRYPTO_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism, priv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey));
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
goto err;
}
/* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */
/* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */
if (out && outlen) {
/* get size of secret key value */
if (!pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, NULL, &buflen)
&& buflen > 0) {
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen);
if (buf == NULL) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_HOST_MEMORY));
goto err;
}
} else {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID));
goto err;
}
pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, buf, &buflen);
*out = buf;
*outlen = buflen;
buf = NULL;
}
/* not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey for future use */
if (tmpnewkey) {
*tmpnewkey = newkey;
newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (buf)
OPENSSL_free(buf);
if (newkey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(session, newkey));
return ret;
}
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey
* i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE
* and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token
* The secret key object is deleted
*
* In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS
* could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned.
*/
static int pkcs11_ecdh_derive(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen,
const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism,
const void * ec_params,
void *outnewkey,
PKCS11_KEY * key)
{
PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key);
PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
PKCS11_TOKEN *token = KEY2TOKEN(key);
PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key);
PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot);
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
int rv;
CK_BBOOL true = TRUE;
CK_BBOOL false = FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = {
{CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */
{CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)},
{CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
{CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism;
mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params;
switch (ecdh_mechanism) {
case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
#if 0
/* TODO */
case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS:
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS);
break;
#endif
default:
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED));
return -1;
}
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey));
CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, rv);
/* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */
if (out && outlen) { /* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */
if (pkcs11_getattr_alloc(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, out, outlen)) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY,
pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID));
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey));
return -1;
}
}
if (tmpnewkey) /* For future use (not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey) */
*tmpnewkey = newkey;
else /* Destroy the temporary key */
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey));
return 0;
}
int
PKCS11_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
PKCS11_KEY * key, int padding)
{
PKCS11_KEY_private *priv;
PKCS11_SLOT *slot;
PKCS11_CTX *ctx;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
int rv;
int sigsize;
CK_ULONG ck_sigsize;
if (key == NULL)
return -1;
sigsize=PKCS11_get_key_size(key);
ck_sigsize=sigsize;
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
switch (padding) {
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_X_509;
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
if ((flen + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) > sigsize) {
return -1; /* the size is wrong */
}
mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
break;
default:
printf("pkcs11 engine: only RSA_NO_PADDING or RSA_PKCS1_PADDING allowed so far\n");
return -1;
}
ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
priv = PRIVKEY(key);
slot = TOKEN2SLOT(priv->parent);
CHECK_KEY_FORK(key);
session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session;
pkcs11_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid);
/* API is somewhat fishy here. *siglen is 0 on entry (cleared
* by OpenSSL). The library assumes that the memory passed
* by the caller is always big enough */
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(session, &mechanism, priv->object)) ||
CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Sign(session, (CK_BYTE *) from, flen, to, &ck_sigsize));
pkcs11_w_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid);
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
return -1;
}
if ((unsigned)sigsize != ck_sigsize)
return -1;
return sigsize;
}
