Exemplos de buf_compare_ct em C++ (Cpp)

Exemplo n.º 1

Arquivo: tee_api_operations.c Projeto: AIdrifter/optee_os

TEE_Result TEE_MACCompareFinal(TEE_OperationHandle operation,
			       void *message, uint32_t messageLen,
			       void *mac, uint32_t macLen)
{
	TEE_Result res;
	uint8_t computed_mac[TEE_MAX_HASH_SIZE];
	uint32_t computed_mac_size = TEE_MAX_HASH_SIZE;

	if (operation->info.operationClass != TEE_OPERATION_MAC) {
		res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
		goto out;
	}

	if ((operation->info.handleState & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
		res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
		goto out;
	}

	if (operation->operationState != TEE_OPERATION_STATE_ACTIVE) {
		res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
		goto out;
	}

	res = TEE_MACComputeFinal(operation, message, messageLen, computed_mac,
				  &computed_mac_size);
	if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
		goto out;

	if (computed_mac_size != macLen) {
		res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

	if (buf_compare_ct(mac, computed_mac, computed_mac_size) != 0) {
		res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID;
		goto out;
	}

	operation->operationState = TEE_OPERATION_STATE_INITIAL;

out:
	if (res != TEE_SUCCESS &&
	    res != TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID)
		TEE_Panic(res);

	return res;
}

Exemplo n.º 2

Arquivo: tee_authenc.c Projeto: prz999/optee_os

TEE_Result tee_authenc_dec_final(
	void *ctx, uint32_t algo, const uint8_t *src_data,
	size_t src_len, uint8_t *dst_data, const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_len)
{
	TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
	struct tee_ccm_state *ccm;
	struct tee_gcm_state *gcm;
	int ltc_res;
	uint8_t dst_tag[TEE_xCM_TAG_MAX_LENGTH];
	size_t dst_len, init_len;
	unsigned long ltc_tag_len = tag_len;

	res = tee_cipher_get_block_size(algo, &dst_len);
	if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
		return res;
	if (tag_len == 0)
		return TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
	if (tag_len > TEE_xCM_TAG_MAX_LENGTH)
		return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;

	switch (algo) {
	case TEE_ALG_AES_CCM:
		ccm = ctx;

		init_len = ccm->current_payload_len;
		if (src_len) {
			memcpy(ccm->payload + ccm->current_payload_len,
			       src_data, src_len);
			ccm->current_payload_len += src_len;
		}

		if (ccm->payload_len != ccm->current_payload_len)
			return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;

		ltc_res = ccm_memory(
			ccm->ltc_cipherindex,
			ccm->key, ccm->key_len,
			0,	/* not previously scheduled */
			ccm->nonce,  ccm->nonce_len,
			ccm->header, ccm->header_len,
			ccm->res_payload,
			ccm->current_payload_len, ccm->payload,
			dst_tag, &ltc_tag_len, CCM_DECRYPT);
		if (ltc_res != CRYPT_OK)
			return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;

		if (src_len)
			memcpy(dst_data, ccm->res_payload + init_len, src_len);
		break;


	case TEE_ALG_AES_GCM:
		/* Process the last buffer, if any */
		gcm = ctx;
		res = tee_authenc_update_payload(
			&gcm->ctx, algo, TEE_MODE_DECRYPT,
			src_data, src_len, dst_data);
		if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
			return res;

		/* Finalize the authentication */
		ltc_res = gcm_done(&gcm->ctx, dst_tag, &ltc_tag_len);
		if (ltc_res != CRYPT_OK)
			return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
		break;

	default:
		return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
	}

	if (buf_compare_ct(dst_tag, tag, tag_len) != 0)
		res = TEE_ERROR_MAC_INVALID;
	else
		res = TEE_SUCCESS;
	return res;
}