static int
gotoStateStaKeySet(tSuppRsnFsm *fsm,
tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *data,
v_BOOL_t retransmit)
{
int retVal=0;
tAniEapolRsnKeyDesc txDesc;
tAniEapolRsnKeyDesc *rxDesc = NULL;
fsm->currentState = STA_KEY_SET;
if (data == NULL)
{
// We don't need to do anything
return ANI_OK;
}
// Create a new EAPOL frame if we don't have to retransmit
if (!retransmit)
{
// First check the IE that the AP sent
retVal = checkInfoElement(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
{
//FIX_RSN aagSetSuppFailureAndCleanup(fsm->suppCtx);
// FSM does not exist after this...
return retVal;
}
// Create a new EAPOL frame
rxDesc = data->keyDesc;
if( NULL == rxDesc )
return ANI_E_NULL_VALUE;
aniAsfPacketEmptyExplicit(fsm->lastEapol,
EAPOL_TX_HEADER_SIZE );
vos_mem_zero( &txDesc, sizeof(txDesc) );
// The Key Information bits...
if (fsm->suppCtx->pwCipherType == eCSR_ENCRYPT_TYPE_AES)
{
txDesc.info.keyDescVers = ANI_EAPOL_KEY_DESC_VERS_AES;
}
txDesc.info.unicastFlag = eANI_BOOLEAN_TRUE;
txDesc.info.micFlag = eANI_BOOLEAN_TRUE;
txDesc.info.secureFlag = eANI_BOOLEAN_TRUE;
txDesc.keyLen = 0; //RSN_80211_KEY_LEN;
// Send back the same replayCtr that the authenticator sent
vos_mem_copy(txDesc.replayCounter,
rxDesc->replayCounter,
sizeof(txDesc.replayCounter));
retVal = aniEapolWriteKey(fsm->cryptHandle,
fsm->lastEapol,
fsm->suppCtx->authMac,
fsm->suppCtx->suppMac,
ANI_EAPOL_KEY_DESC_TYPE_RSN_NEW,
&txDesc,
fsm->suppCtx->ptk,
CSR_AES_KEY_LEN);
if( !ANI_IS_STATUS_SUCCESS( retVal ) )
{
return retVal;
}
}
gReadToSetKey = BAP_SET_RSN_KEY;
if( !VOS_IS_STATUS_SUCCESS( bapRsnSendEapolFrame( fsm->ctx->pvosGCtx, fsm->lastEapol ) ) )
{
/* making it global to access in bapTxRx file */
#if 0
tCsrRoamSetKey setKeyInfo;
vos_mem_zero( &setKeyInfo, sizeof( tCsrRoamSetKey ) );
setKeyInfo.encType = eCSR_ENCRYPT_TYPE_AES;
setKeyInfo.keyDirection = eSIR_TX_RX;
vos_mem_copy( setKeyInfo.peerMac, fsm->suppCtx->authMac, sizeof( tAniMacAddr ) );
setKeyInfo.paeRole = 0; //this is a supplicant
setKeyInfo.keyId = 0; //always
setKeyInfo.keyLength = CSR_AES_KEY_LEN;
vos_mem_copy( setKeyInfo.Key, (v_U8_t *)fsm->suppCtx->ptk + (2 * CSR_AES_KEY_LEN ), CSR_AES_KEY_LEN );
//fsm->suppCtx->ptk contains the 3 16-bytes keys. We need the last one.
/*
We will move the Set key to EAPOL Completion handler. We found a race condition betweem
sending EAPOL frame and setting Key */
if( !VOS_IS_STATUS_SUCCESS( bapSetKey( fsm->ctx->pvosGCtx, &setKeyInfo ) ) )
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR, " Supp: gotoStateStaKeySet fail to set key\n" );
retVal = ANI_ERROR;
}
#endif
gReadToSetKey = BAP_RESET_RSN_KEY;
retVal = ANI_ERROR;
}
return retVal;
}
static
int checkTransition(tAuthRsnFsm *fsm, void *arg)
{
int retVal;
tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *data;
tAniEapolRsnKeyDesc *rxDesc;
tSirMicFailureInfo *micFailureInfo;
if (fsm->disconnect)
{
stopAllTimers(fsm);
gotoStateDisconnect(fsm);
return ANI_OK;
}
if (fsm->authReq)
{
stopAllTimers(fsm);
gotoStateAuthentication(fsm);
return ANI_OK;
}
switch (fsm->currentState)
{
case INITIALIZE:
break;
case AUTHENTICATION:
gotoStateAuthentication2(fsm);
break;
case AUTHENTICATION_2:
gotoStateGetPsk( fsm );
break;
case GET_PSK:
//We always have PMK otherwise BAP won't let us here
gotoStatePtkStart(fsm);
break;
case PTK_START:
if ( fsm->eapolAvail )
{
fsm->eapolAvail = eANI_BOOLEAN_FALSE;
if (NULL == arg)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"arg is NULL, exiting checkTransition()");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
data = (tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *) arg;
retVal = checkLocalReplayCounter(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
return ANI_OK; // Caller should not fail
retVal = derivePtk(fsm, data);
if( !ANI_IS_STATUS_SUCCESS( retVal ) )
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Auth derivePtk failed with code %d!\n", retVal);
return retVal;
}
retVal = checkMic(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
{
bapAuthDisconnect( fsm->ctx );
return retVal;
}
retVal = gotoStatePtkInitNego(fsm, arg);
}
else if ( fsm->msg2TimeOut )
{
if (fsm->numTries <= authConsts.maxTries)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Auth Retransmitting EAPOL-Key Msg1\n");
// Stay in the same state but repeat actions
gotoStatePtkStart(fsm);
}
else {
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Auth failed to recv EAPOL-Key Msg2 "
"Disconnecting...\n");
gotoStateDisconnect(fsm);
}
}
break;
case PTK_INIT_NEGO:
if (NULL == arg)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"arg is NULL, exiting checkTransition()");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
data = (tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *) arg;
retVal = checkInfoElement(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
{
gotoStateDisconnect(fsm);
}
else {
gotoStatePtkInitNegoTx(fsm);
}
break;
case PTK_INIT_NEGO_TX:
if (fsm->eapolAvail)
{
fsm->eapolAvail = eANI_BOOLEAN_FALSE;
if (NULL == arg)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"arg is NULL, exiting checkTransition()");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
data = (tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *) arg;
retVal = checkLocalReplayCounter(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
return ANI_OK; // Caller should not fail
retVal = checkMic(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
{
bapAuthDisconnect( fsm->ctx );
return retVal;
}
retVal = gotoStatePtkInitDone(fsm, data);
} else if ( fsm->msg4TimeOut )
{
if (fsm->numTries <= authConsts.maxTries)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Auth retransmitting EAPOL-Key Msg3 \n");
// Stay in the same state but repeat actions
gotoStatePtkInitNegoTx(fsm);
}
else {
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Auth failed to recv EAPOL-Key Msg4 "
"Disconnecting...\n" );
gotoStateDisconnect(fsm);
}
}
break;
case PTK_INIT_DONE:
if (fsm->eapolAvail) {
fsm->eapolAvail = eANI_BOOLEAN_FALSE;
if (NULL == arg)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"arg is NULL, exiting checkTransition()");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
data = (tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *) arg;
rxDesc = (tAniEapolRsnKeyDesc *) data->keyDesc;
if (rxDesc->info.requestFlag)
{
retVal = checkPeerReplayCounter(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
return ANI_OK; // Caller should not fail
retVal = checkMic(fsm, data);
if (retVal != ANI_OK)
{
bapAuthDisconnect( fsm->ctx->pvosGCtx );
return retVal;
}
retVal = gotoStateUpdateKeysReq(fsm, arg);
}
}
else if (fsm->integFailed) {
micFailureInfo = (tSirMicFailureInfo *) arg;
gotoStateIntegFailure(fsm, arg);
}
break;
case UPDATE_KEYS_REQ:
if (NULL == arg)
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"arg is NULL, exiting checkTransition()");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
data = (tAniEapolKeyAvailEventData *) arg;
rxDesc = (tAniEapolRsnKeyDesc *) data->keyDesc;
if (rxDesc->info.errorFlag)
{
/*
* This was generated by a unicast packet sent from the AP to the STA/BP.
* The TX address is the AP's address. The src address is lost.
* If the STA is a BP, then the true dst is lost. We will treat
* the dst field as the address of the reporter of the MIC failure.
*/
micFailureInfo = (tSirMicFailureInfo *) vos_mem_malloc( sizeof(tSirMicFailureInfo) );
if( NULL == micFailureInfo )
{
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Fail to allocate memory for AuthRsnFsm: %d\n",
fsm->currentState);
return ANI_E_MALLOC_FAILED;
}
vos_mem_copy(micFailureInfo->taMacAddr, fsm->staCtx->authMac, sizeof(tAniMacAddr));
vos_mem_copy(micFailureInfo->dstMacAddr, fsm->staCtx->suppMac, sizeof(tAniMacAddr));
micFailureInfo->multicast = eANI_BOOLEAN_FALSE;
// Copy whatever sequence number came in the EAPOL-key message
vos_mem_copy(micFailureInfo->TSC, rxDesc->keyRecvSeqCounter, SIR_CIPHER_SEQ_CTR_SIZE);
gotoStateIntegFailure(fsm, micFailureInfo);
vos_mem_free(micFailureInfo);
}
else {
// TBD: Untested. Why are local aNonce and local replyCtr not incremented in spec?
gotoStatePtkStart(fsm);
}
break;
case INTEG_FAILURE:
gotoStateKeyUpdate(fsm);
break;
case KEY_UPDATE:
gotoStatePtkStart(fsm);
break;
default:
VOS_TRACE( VOS_MODULE_ID_BAP, VOS_TRACE_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Nothing to do in this state for AuthRsnFsm: %d\n",
fsm->currentState);
// Catch all for states that need no change:
// assert(eANI_BOOLEAN_FALSE && "Illegal AuthRsnFsm state!");
return ANI_E_FAILED;
}
return ANI_OK;
}
