/*
* Because contexts contain tagged capabilities, we can't just use memcpy()
* on the data structure. Once the C compiler knows about capabilities, then
* direct structure assignment should be plausible. In the mean time, an
* explicit capability context copy routine is required.
*
* XXXRW: Compiler should know how to do copies of tagged capabilities.
*
* XXXRW: Compiler should be providing us with the temporary register.
*/
void
cheri_capability_copy(struct chericap *cp_to, struct chericap *cp_from)
{
cheri_capability_load(CHERI_CR_CTEMP0, cp_from);
cheri_capability_store(CHERI_CR_CTEMP0, cp_to);
}
/*
* If a signal is delivered while in a sandbox, forceably unwind the trusted
* stack simulating a CReturn. Clear the regular and capability register
* files.
*
* When a signal is thrown in a sandbox, one option is for the kernel to
* forceably unwind the stack by a frame.
*
* Note that the callee has not had a chance to clean up the mess -- and
* particular, can't clear the register file before returning. We therefore
* have to do that for the callee or information/rights may leak!.
*
* XXXRW: Really we want to delegate this to userspace via SIGSANDBOX or
* similar, but in the mean time.
*
* XXXRW: We don't yet handle floating point.
*/
int
cheri_stack_sandboxexception(struct thread *td, struct trapframe *tf,
int signum)
{
struct cheri_stack_frame *csfp;
struct pcb *pcb = td->td_pcb;
register_t s, sr, badvaddr, cause;
f_register_t fsr;
if (pcb->pcb_cheristack.cs_tsp == CHERI_STACK_SIZE)
return (0);
printf("%s: processing sandbox exception signal %d, pid %d\n",
__func__, signum, td->td_proc->p_pid);
#if DDB
if (security_cheri_debugger_on_sandbox_exception)
kdb_enter(KDB_WHY_CHERI, "CHERI sandbox exception");
#endif
/*
* XXXRW: It is my belief that the trap frame in a thread is always a
* pointer to the PCB. Check this is true, however, because I rely on
* it.
*/
KASSERT(td->td_frame == &pcb->pcb_regs,
("%s: td_frame != pcb_regs", __func__));
KASSERT(td->td_frame == tf, ("%s: td_frame != tf", __func__));
/*
* XXXRW: It would actually be quite nice to print out some exception
* information here. Otherwise all the state required to debug the
* sandbox failure will be lost.
*
* XXXRW: Or, has it all been sent to printf?
*
* XXXRW: Or, maybe that is actually a bad thing, since printf is
* quite slow and noisy, and not something we want to do on every
* sandbox failure.
*/
/*
* Clear the regular and capability register files to ensure no state
* (information, rights) is returned to the caller that shouldn't be
* when the callee exits unexpectedly. Save and restore kernel-side
* registers, however.
*
* XXXRW: What about floating-point registers?
*/
sr = pcb->pcb_regs.sr;
badvaddr = pcb->pcb_regs.badvaddr;
cause = pcb->pcb_regs.cause;
fsr = pcb->pcb_regs.fsr;
bzero(&pcb->pcb_regs, sizeof(pcb->pcb_regs));
bzero(&pcb->pcb_cheriframe, sizeof(pcb->pcb_cheriframe));
pcb->pcb_regs.sr = sr;
pcb->pcb_regs.badvaddr = badvaddr;
pcb->pcb_regs.cause = cause;
pcb->pcb_regs.fsr = fsr;
/*
* Reproduce CReturn.
*/
csfp = &pcb->pcb_cheristack.cs_frames[pcb->pcb_cheristack.cs_tsp /
CHERI_FRAME_SIZE];
pcb->pcb_cheristack.cs_tsp += CHERI_FRAME_SIZE;
/*
* Pop IDC, PCC.
*/
s = intr_disable();
cheri_capability_load(CHERI_CR_CTEMP, &csfp->csf_idc);
cheri_capability_store(CHERI_CR_CTEMP, &pcb->pcb_cheriframe.cf_idc);
cheri_capability_load(CHERI_CR_CTEMP, &csfp->csf_pcc);
cheri_capability_store(CHERI_CR_CTEMP, &pcb->pcb_cheriframe.cf_pcc);
intr_restore(s);
/*
* Pop SP, PC (+4 already done).
*/
pcb->pcb_regs.sp = csfp->csf_sp;
pcb->pcb_regs.pc = csfp->csf_pc;
/*
* Set 'v0' to -1, and 'v1' to the signal number so that the consumer
* of CCall can handle the error.
*
* XXXRW: That isn't really quite what we want, however. What about
* CCall failures themselves, and what if CReturn returns a -1 -- how
* should the caller interpret that?
*/
pcb->pcb_regs.v0 = -1;
pcb->pcb_regs.v1 = signum;
return (1);
}
