int
ikev2_pld_payloads(struct iked *env, struct iked_message *msg,
off_t offset, size_t length, u_int payload, int quick)
{
struct ikev2_payload pld;
u_int e;
int ret;
u_int8_t *msgbuf = ibuf_data(msg->msg_data);
/* Check if message was decrypted in an E payload */
e = msg->msg_e ? IKED_E : 0;
if (quick)
print_debug("%s: %spayloads", __func__,
e ? "decrypted " : "");
else
ikev2_pld_payloads(env, msg, offset, length, payload, 1);
while (payload != 0 && offset < (off_t)length) {
memcpy(&pld, msgbuf + offset, sizeof(pld));
if (quick)
print_debug(" %s",
print_map(payload, ikev2_payload_map));
else
log_debug("%s: %spayload %s"
" nextpayload %s critical 0x%02x length %d",
__func__, e ? "decrypted " : "",
print_map(payload, ikev2_payload_map),
print_map(pld.pld_nextpayload, ikev2_payload_map),
pld.pld_reserved & IKEV2_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD,
betoh16(pld.pld_length));
offset += sizeof(pld);
ret = 0;
if (quick)
goto next;
switch (payload | e) {
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SA:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SA | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_sa(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_KE:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_KE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_ke(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_IDi | IKED_E:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_IDr | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_id(env, &pld, msg, offset, payload);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERT | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_cert(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERTREQ:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERTREQ | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_certreq(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_AUTH | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_auth(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NONCE:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NONCE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_nonce(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_notify(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_DELETE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_delete(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TSi | IKED_E:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TSr | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_ts(env, &pld, msg, offset, payload);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SK:
ret = ikev2_pld_e(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CP | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_cp(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_EAP | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_eap(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
default:
print_hex(msgbuf, offset,
betoh16(pld.pld_length) - sizeof(pld));
break;
}
if (ret != 0 && ikev2_msg_frompeer(msg)) {
(void)ikev2_send_informational(env, msg);
return (-1);
}
/* Encrypted payload must appear last */
if (payload == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SK)
return (0);
next:
payload = pld.pld_nextpayload;
offset += betoh16(pld.pld_length) - sizeof(pld);
}
if (quick)
print_debug("\n");
return (0);
}
int
ikev2_pld_payloads(struct iked *env, struct iked_message *msg,
size_t offset, size_t length, u_int payload)
{
struct ikev2_payload pld;
u_int e;
int ret;
u_int8_t *msgbuf = ibuf_data(msg->msg_data);
size_t left;
/* Check if message was decrypted in an E payload */
e = msg->msg_e ? IKED_E : 0;
while (payload != 0 && offset < length) {
/* Bytes left in datagram. */
left = length - offset;
if (ikev2_validate_pld(msg, offset, left, &pld))
return (-1);
log_debug("%s: %spayload %s"
" nextpayload %s critical 0x%02x length %d",
__func__, e ? "decrypted " : "",
print_map(payload, ikev2_payload_map),
print_map(pld.pld_nextpayload, ikev2_payload_map),
pld.pld_reserved & IKEV2_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD,
betoh16(pld.pld_length));
/* Skip over generic payload header. */
offset += sizeof(pld);
left -= sizeof(pld);
ret = 0;
switch (payload | e) {
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SA:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SA | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_sa(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_KE:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_KE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_ke(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_IDi | IKED_E:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_IDr | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_id(env, &pld, msg, offset, left,
payload);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERT | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_cert(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERTREQ:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CERTREQ | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_certreq(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_AUTH | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_auth(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NONCE:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NONCE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_nonce(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_NOTIFY | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_notify(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_DELETE | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_delete(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TSi | IKED_E:
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_TSr | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_ts(env, &pld, msg, offset, left,
payload);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SK:
ret = ikev2_pld_e(env, &pld, msg, offset);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_CP | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_cp(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
case IKEV2_PAYLOAD_EAP | IKED_E:
ret = ikev2_pld_eap(env, &pld, msg, offset, left);
break;
default:
print_hex(msgbuf, offset,
betoh16(pld.pld_length) - sizeof(pld));
break;
}
if (ret != 0 && ikev2_msg_frompeer(msg)) {
(void)ikev2_send_informational(env, msg);
return (-1);
}
/* Encrypted payload must appear last */
if (payload == IKEV2_PAYLOAD_SK)
return (0);
payload = pld.pld_nextpayload;
offset += betoh16(pld.pld_length) - sizeof(pld);
}
return (0);
}
