int s2n_client_ccs_recv(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
uint8_t type;
GUARD(s2n_prf_client_finished(conn));
struct s2n_blob seq = {.data = conn->secure.client_sequence_number,.size = sizeof(conn->secure.client_sequence_number) };
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&seq));
/* Update the client to use the cipher-suite */
conn->client = &conn->secure;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read_uint8(&conn->handshake.io, &type));
S2N_ERROR_IF(type != CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_TYPE, S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
/* Flush any partial alert messages that were pending */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe(&conn->alert_in));
return 0;
}
int s2n_client_ccs_send(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint8(&conn->handshake.io, CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC_TYPE));
return 0;
}
struct s2n_connection *s2n_connection_new(s2n_mode mode)
{
struct s2n_blob blob;
struct s2n_connection *conn;
GUARD_PTR(s2n_alloc(&blob, sizeof(struct s2n_connection)));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_blob_zero(&blob));
if (mode == S2N_CLIENT) {
/* At present s2n is not suitable for use in client mode, as it
* does not perform any certificate validation. However it is useful
* to use S2N in client mode for testing purposes. An environment
* variable is required to be set for the client mode to work.
*/
if (getenv("S2N_ENABLE_CLIENT_MODE") == NULL) {
s2n_free(&blob);
S2N_ERROR_PTR(S2N_ERR_CLIENT_MODE_DISABLED);
}
}
/* Cast 'through' void to acknowledge that we are changing alignment,
* which is ok, as blob.data is always aligned.
*/
conn = (struct s2n_connection *)(void *)blob.data;
conn->mode = mode;
conn->blinding = S2N_BUILT_IN_BLINDING;
conn->config = &s2n_default_config;
/* Allocate the fixed-size stuffers */
blob.data = conn->alert_in_data;
blob.size = S2N_ALERT_LENGTH;
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_init(&conn->alert_in, &blob));
blob.data = conn->reader_alert_out_data;
blob.size = S2N_ALERT_LENGTH;
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_init(&conn->reader_alert_out, &blob));
blob.data = conn->writer_alert_out_data;
blob.size = S2N_ALERT_LENGTH;
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_init(&conn->writer_alert_out, &blob));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_alloc(&conn->out, S2N_DEFAULT_RECORD_LENGTH));
/* Initialize the growable stuffers. Zero length at first, but the resize
* in _wipe will fix that
*/
blob.data = conn->header_in_data;
blob.size = S2N_TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_init(&conn->header_in, &blob));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&conn->in, 0));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_stuffer_growable_alloc(&conn->handshake.io, 0));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_connection_wipe(conn));
GUARD_PTR(s2n_timer_start(conn->config, &conn->write_timer));
return conn;
}
int s2n_kem_free(struct s2n_kem_keypair *kem_keys)
{
if (kem_keys != NULL){
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&kem_keys->private_key));
if (kem_keys->private_key.allocated) {
GUARD(s2n_free(&kem_keys->private_key));
}
if (kem_keys->public_key.allocated) {
GUARD(s2n_free(&kem_keys->public_key));
}
}
return 0;
}
static int s2n_map_embiggen(struct s2n_map *map, uint32_t capacity)
{
struct s2n_blob mem;
struct s2n_map tmp;
if (map->immutable) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_MAP_IMMUTABLE);
}
GUARD(s2n_alloc(&mem, (capacity * sizeof(struct s2n_map_entry))));
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&mem));
tmp.capacity = capacity;
tmp.size = 0;
tmp.table = (void *) mem.data;
tmp.immutable = 0;
tmp.sha256 = map->sha256;
for (int i = 0; i < map->capacity; i++) {
if (map->table[i].key.size) {
GUARD(s2n_map_add(&tmp, &map->table[i].key, &map->table[i].value));
GUARD(s2n_free(&map->table[i].key));
GUARD(s2n_free(&map->table[i].value));
}
}
/* Free the old memory */
mem.data = (void *) map->table;
mem.size = map->capacity * sizeof(struct s2n_map_entry);
GUARD(s2n_free(&mem));
/* Clone the temporary map */
map->capacity = tmp.capacity;
map->size = tmp.size;
map->table = tmp.table;
map->immutable = 0;
map->sha256 = tmp.sha256;
return 0;
}
int s2n_client_finished_send(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
uint8_t *our_version;
GUARD(s2n_prf_key_expansion(conn));
GUARD(s2n_prf_client_finished(conn));
struct s2n_blob seq = {.data = conn->pending.client_sequence_number, .size = sizeof(conn->pending.client_sequence_number) };
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&seq));
our_version = conn->handshake.client_finished;
/* Update the client to use the pending cipher suite */
conn->client = &conn->pending;
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&conn->handshake.io, our_version, S2N_SSL_FINISHED_LEN));
} else {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&conn->handshake.io, our_version, S2N_TLS_FINISHED_LEN));
}
conn->handshake.next_state = SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
return 0;
}
static int s2n_prf(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *secret, struct s2n_blob *label, struct s2n_blob *seed_a,
struct s2n_blob *seed_b, struct s2n_blob *seed_c, struct s2n_blob *out)
{
/* seed_a is always required, seed_b is optional, if seed_c is provided seed_b must also be provided */
S2N_ERROR_IF(seed_a == NULL, S2N_ERR_PRF_INVALID_SEED);
S2N_ERROR_IF(seed_b == NULL && seed_c != NULL, S2N_ERR_PRF_INVALID_SEED);
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
return s2n_sslv3_prf(&conn->prf_space, secret, seed_a, seed_b, seed_c, out);
}
/* We zero the out blob because p_hash works by XOR'ing with the existing
* buffer. This is a little convoluted but means we can avoid dynamic memory
* allocation. When we call p_hash once (in the TLS1.2 case) it will produce
* the right values. When we call it twice in the regular case, the two
* outputs will be XORd just ass the TLS 1.0 and 1.1 RFCs require.
*/
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(out));
/* Ensure that p_hash_hmac_impl is set, as it may have been reset for prf_space on s2n_connection_wipe.
* When in FIPS mode, the EVP API's must be used for the p_hash HMAC.
*/
conn->prf_space.tls.p_hash_hmac_impl = s2n_is_in_fips_mode() ? &s2n_evp_hmac : &s2n_hmac;
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_TLS12) {
return s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, conn->secure.cipher_suite->tls12_prf_alg, secret, label, seed_a, seed_b,
seed_c, out);
}
struct s2n_blob half_secret = {.data = secret->data,.size = (secret->size + 1) / 2 };
GUARD(s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, S2N_HMAC_MD5, &half_secret, label, seed_a, seed_b, seed_c, out));
half_secret.data += secret->size - half_secret.size;
GUARD(s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, S2N_HMAC_SHA1, &half_secret, label, seed_a, seed_b, seed_c, out));
return 0;
}
int s2n_tls_prf_master_secret(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *premaster_secret)
{
struct s2n_blob client_random = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.client_random), .data = conn->secure.client_random};
struct s2n_blob server_random = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.server_random), .data = conn->secure.server_random};
struct s2n_blob master_secret = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret), .data = conn->secure.master_secret};
uint8_t master_secret_label[] = "master secret";
struct s2n_blob label = {.size = sizeof(master_secret_label) - 1, .data = master_secret_label};
return s2n_prf(conn, premaster_secret, &label, &client_random, &server_random, NULL, &master_secret);
}
int s2n_hybrid_prf_master_secret(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *premaster_secret)
{
struct s2n_blob client_random = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.client_random), .data = conn->secure.client_random};
struct s2n_blob server_random = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.server_random), .data = conn->secure.server_random};
struct s2n_blob master_secret = {.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret), .data = conn->secure.master_secret};
uint8_t master_secret_label[] = "hybrid master secret";
struct s2n_blob label = {.size = sizeof(master_secret_label) - 1, .data = master_secret_label};
return s2n_prf(conn, premaster_secret, &label, &client_random, &server_random, &conn->secure.client_key_exchange_message, &master_secret);
}
static int s2n_sslv3_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn, uint8_t prefix[4], struct s2n_hash_state *md5, struct s2n_hash_state *sha1, uint8_t * out)
{
uint8_t xorpad1[48] =
{ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
uint8_t xorpad2[48] =
{ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};
uint8_t *md5_digest = out;
uint8_t *sha_digest = out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
lte_check(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(conn->handshake.client_finished));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, prefix, 4));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, xorpad1, 48));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, xorpad2, 48));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, prefix, 4));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, xorpad1, 40));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(sha1));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, xorpad2, 40));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(sha1));
return 0;
}
static int s2n_sslv3_client_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
uint8_t prefix[4] = { 0x43, 0x4c, 0x4e, 0x54 };
lte_check(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(conn->handshake.client_finished));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha1));
return s2n_sslv3_finished(conn, prefix, &conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, conn->handshake.client_finished);
}
static int s2n_sslv3_server_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
uint8_t prefix[4] = { 0x53, 0x52, 0x56, 0x52 };
lte_check(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(conn->handshake.server_finished));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha1));
return s2n_sslv3_finished(conn, prefix, &conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, conn->handshake.server_finished);
}
int s2n_prf_client_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
struct s2n_blob master_secret, md5, sha;
uint8_t md5_digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t sha_digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t client_finished_label[] = "client finished";
struct s2n_blob client_finished = {0};
struct s2n_blob label = {0};
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
return s2n_sslv3_client_finished(conn);
}
client_finished.data = conn->handshake.client_finished;
client_finished.size = S2N_TLS_FINISHED_LEN;
label.data = client_finished_label;
label.size = sizeof(client_finished_label) - 1;
master_secret.data = conn->secure.master_secret;
master_secret.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret);
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_TLS12) {
switch (conn->secure.cipher_suite->tls12_prf_alg) {
case S2N_HMAC_SHA256:
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha256));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH));
sha.size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA384:
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha384));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH));
sha.size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
default:
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_PRF_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
}
sha.data = sha_digest;
return s2n_prf(conn, &master_secret, &label, &sha, NULL, NULL, &client_finished);
}
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha1));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
md5.data = md5_digest;
md5.size = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sha.data = sha_digest;
sha.size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
return s2n_prf(conn, &master_secret, &label, &md5, &sha, NULL, &client_finished);
}
int s2n_prf_server_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
struct s2n_blob master_secret, md5, sha;
uint8_t md5_digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t sha_digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint8_t server_finished_label[] = "server finished";
struct s2n_blob server_finished = {0};
struct s2n_blob label = {0};
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
return s2n_sslv3_server_finished(conn);
}
server_finished.data = conn->handshake.server_finished;
server_finished.size = S2N_TLS_FINISHED_LEN;
label.data = server_finished_label;
label.size = sizeof(server_finished_label) - 1;
master_secret.data = conn->secure.master_secret;
master_secret.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret);
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_TLS12) {
switch (conn->secure.cipher_suite->tls12_prf_alg) {
case S2N_HMAC_SHA256:
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha256));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH));
sha.size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
case S2N_HMAC_SHA384:
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha384));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_tls12_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH));
sha.size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
break;
default:
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_PRF_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
}
sha.data = sha_digest;
return s2n_prf(conn, &master_secret, &label, &sha, NULL, NULL, &server_finished);
}
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_copy(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, &conn->handshake.sha1));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_md5_hash_copy, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(&conn->handshake.prf_sha1_hash_copy, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
md5.data = md5_digest;
md5.size = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sha.data = sha_digest;
sha.size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
return s2n_prf(conn, &master_secret, &label, &md5, &sha, NULL, &server_finished);
}
static int s2n_prf_make_client_key(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_stuffer *key_material)
{
struct s2n_blob client_key = {0};
client_key.size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->key_material_size;
client_key.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(key_material, client_key.size);
notnull_check(client_key.data);
if (conn->mode == S2N_CLIENT) {
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->set_encryption_key(&conn->secure.client_key, &client_key));
} else {
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->set_decryption_key(&conn->secure.client_key, &client_key));
}
return 0;
}
static int s2n_prf_make_server_key(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_stuffer *key_material)
{
struct s2n_blob server_key = {0};
server_key.size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->key_material_size;
server_key.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(key_material, server_key.size);
notnull_check(server_key.data);
if (conn->mode == S2N_SERVER) {
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->set_encryption_key(&conn->secure.server_key, &server_key));
} else {
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->set_decryption_key(&conn->secure.server_key, &server_key));
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_prf_key_expansion(struct s2n_connection *conn)
{
struct s2n_blob client_random = {.data = conn->secure.client_random,.size = sizeof(conn->secure.client_random) };
struct s2n_blob server_random = {.data = conn->secure.server_random,.size = sizeof(conn->secure.server_random) };
struct s2n_blob master_secret = {.data = conn->secure.master_secret,.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret) };
struct s2n_blob label, out;
uint8_t key_expansion_label[] = "key expansion";
uint8_t key_block[S2N_MAX_KEY_BLOCK_LEN];
label.data = key_expansion_label;
label.size = sizeof(key_expansion_label) - 1;
out.data = key_block;
out.size = sizeof(key_block);
struct s2n_stuffer key_material = {{0}};
GUARD(s2n_prf(conn, &master_secret, &label, &server_random, &client_random, NULL, &out));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&key_material, &out));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&key_material, &out));
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->init(&conn->secure.client_key));
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->init(&conn->secure.server_key));
/* Check that we have a valid MAC and key size */
uint8_t mac_size;
if (conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_COMPOSITE) {
mac_size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.mac_key_size;
} else {
GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest_size(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->hmac_alg, &mac_size));
}
/* Seed the client MAC */
uint8_t *client_mac_write_key = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(&key_material, mac_size);
notnull_check(client_mac_write_key);
GUARD(s2n_hmac_reset(&conn->secure.client_record_mac));
GUARD(s2n_hmac_init(&conn->secure.client_record_mac, conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->hmac_alg, client_mac_write_key, mac_size));
/* Seed the server MAC */
uint8_t *server_mac_write_key = s2n_stuffer_raw_read(&key_material, mac_size);
notnull_check(server_mac_write_key);
GUARD(s2n_hmac_reset(&conn->secure.server_record_mac));
GUARD(s2n_hmac_init(&conn->secure.server_record_mac, conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->hmac_alg, server_mac_write_key, mac_size));
/* Make the client key */
GUARD(s2n_prf_make_client_key(conn, &key_material));
/* Make the server key */
GUARD(s2n_prf_make_server_key(conn, &key_material));
/* Composite CBC does MAC inside the cipher, pass it the MAC key.
* Must happen after setting encryption/decryption keys.
*/
if (conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_COMPOSITE) {
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.set_mac_write_key(&conn->secure.server_key, server_mac_write_key, mac_size));
GUARD(conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.set_mac_write_key(&conn->secure.client_key, client_mac_write_key, mac_size));
}
/* TLS >= 1.1 has no implicit IVs for non AEAD ciphers */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_TLS10 && conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type != S2N_AEAD) {
return 0;
}
uint32_t implicit_iv_size = 0;
switch (conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type) {
case S2N_AEAD:
implicit_iv_size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.fixed_iv_size;
break;
case S2N_CBC:
implicit_iv_size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.cbc.block_size;
break;
case S2N_COMPOSITE:
implicit_iv_size = conn->secure.cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.block_size;
break;
/* No-op for stream ciphers */
default:
break;
}
struct s2n_blob client_implicit_iv = {.data = conn->secure.client_implicit_iv,.size = implicit_iv_size };
struct s2n_blob server_implicit_iv = {.data = conn->secure.server_implicit_iv,.size = implicit_iv_size };
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read(&key_material, &client_implicit_iv));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_read(&key_material, &server_implicit_iv));
return 0;
}
static int s2n_drbg_bits(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *out)
{
struct s2n_blob value = {.data = drbg->v, .size = sizeof(drbg->v) };
int block_aligned_size = out->size - (out->size % S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Per NIST SP800-90A 10.2.1.2: */
for (int i = 0; i < block_aligned_size; i += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE) {
GUARD(s2n_increment_sequence_number(&value));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_block_encrypt(&drbg->ctx, drbg->v, out->data + i));
drbg->bytes_used += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
if (out->size <= block_aligned_size) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t spare_block[S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE];
GUARD(s2n_increment_sequence_number(&value));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_block_encrypt(&drbg->ctx, drbg->v, spare_block));
drbg->bytes_used += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE;
memcpy_check(out->data + block_aligned_size, spare_block, out->size - block_aligned_size);
return 0;
}
static int s2n_drbg_update(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *provided_data)
{
uint8_t temp[32];
struct s2n_blob temp_blob = {.data = temp, .size = sizeof(temp) };
eq_check(provided_data->size, sizeof(temp));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_bits(drbg, &temp_blob));
/* XOR in the provided data */
for (int i = 0; i < provided_data->size; i++) {
temp[i] ^= provided_data->data[i];
}
/* Update the key and value */
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&drbg->ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, temp, NULL) != 1) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DRBG);
}
memcpy_check(drbg->v, temp + S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE, S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_seed(struct s2n_drbg *drbg)
{
uint8_t seed[32];
struct s2n_blob blob = {.data = seed, .size = sizeof(seed) };
if (drbg->entropy_generator) {
GUARD(drbg->entropy_generator(&blob));
}
else {
GUARD(s2n_get_urandom_data(&blob));
}
for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(drbg->ps); i++) {
blob.data[i] ^= drbg->ps[i];
}
GUARD(s2n_drbg_update(drbg, &blob));
drbg->bytes_used = 0;
drbg->generation += 1;
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_instantiate(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *personalization_string)
{
struct s2n_blob value = {.data = drbg->v, .size = sizeof(drbg->v) };
struct s2n_blob ps = {.data = drbg->ps, .size = sizeof(drbg->ps) };
/* Start off with zerod data, per 10.2.1.3.1 item 4 */
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&value));
/* Start off with zerod key, per 10.2.1.3.1 item 5 */
(void) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&drbg->ctx);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&drbg->ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, drbg->v, NULL) != 1) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DRBG);
}
/* Copy the personalization string */
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&ps));
memcpy_check(ps.data, personalization_string->data, MIN(ps.size, personalization_string->size));
/* Seed / update the DRBG */
GUARD(s2n_drbg_seed(drbg));
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_generate(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *blob)
{
uint8_t all_zeros[32] = { 0 };
struct s2n_blob zeros = {.data = all_zeros, .size = sizeof(all_zeros) };
if (blob->size > S2N_DRBG_GENERATE_LIMIT) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DRBG_REQUEST_SIZE);
}
if (drbg->bytes_used + blob->size + S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE >= S2N_DRBG_RESEED_LIMIT) {
GUARD(s2n_drbg_seed(drbg));
}
GUARD(s2n_drbg_bits(drbg, blob));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_update(drbg, &zeros));
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_wipe(struct s2n_drbg *drbg)
{
struct s2n_blob state = {.data = (void *) drbg, .size = sizeof(struct s2n_drbg) };
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&drbg->ctx) != 1) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_DRBG);
}
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&state));
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_bytes_used(struct s2n_drbg *drbg)
{
return drbg->bytes_used;
}
static int s2n_drbg_bits(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *out)
{
struct s2n_blob value = {.data = drbg->v,.size = sizeof(drbg->v) };
int block_aligned_size = out->size - (out->size % S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Per NIST SP800-90A 10.2.1.2: */
for (int i = 0; i < block_aligned_size; i += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE) {
GUARD(s2n_increment_sequence_number(&value));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_block_encrypt(drbg->ctx, drbg->v, out->data + i));
drbg->bytes_used += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE;
}
if (out->size <= block_aligned_size) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t spare_block[S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE];
GUARD(s2n_increment_sequence_number(&value));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_block_encrypt(drbg->ctx, drbg->v, spare_block));
drbg->bytes_used += S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE;
memcpy_check(out->data + block_aligned_size, spare_block, out->size - block_aligned_size);
return 0;
}
static int s2n_drbg_update(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *provided_data)
{
uint8_t temp[32];
struct s2n_blob temp_blob = {.data = temp,.size = sizeof(temp) };
eq_check(provided_data->size, sizeof(temp));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_bits(drbg, &temp_blob));
/* XOR in the provided data */
for (int i = 0; i < provided_data->size; i++) {
temp[i] ^= provided_data->data[i];
}
/* Update the key and value */
GUARD_OSSL(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(drbg->ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, temp, NULL), S2N_ERR_DRBG);
memcpy_check(drbg->v, temp + S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE, S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_seed(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *ps)
{
uint8_t seed[32];
struct s2n_blob blob = {.data = seed,.size = sizeof(seed) };
lte_check(ps->size, sizeof(seed));
if (drbg->entropy_generator) {
GUARD(drbg->entropy_generator(&blob));
} else {
GUARD(s2n_get_urandom_data(&blob));
}
for (int i = 0; i < ps->size; i++) {
blob.data[i] ^= ps->data[i];
}
GUARD(s2n_drbg_update(drbg, &blob));
drbg->bytes_used = 0;
drbg->generation += 1;
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_instantiate(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *personalization_string)
{
struct s2n_blob value = {.data = drbg->v,.size = sizeof(drbg->v) };
uint8_t ps_prefix[32];
struct s2n_blob ps = {.data = ps_prefix,.size = sizeof(ps_prefix) };
/* Start off with zeroed data, per 10.2.1.3.1 item 4 */
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&value));
drbg->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
S2N_ERROR_IF(!drbg->ctx, S2N_ERR_DRBG);
(void)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(drbg->ctx);
/* Start off with zeroed key, per 10.2.1.3.1 item 5 */
GUARD_OSSL(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(drbg->ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, drbg->v, NULL), S2N_ERR_DRBG);
/* Copy the personalization string */
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&ps));
memcpy_check(ps.data, personalization_string->data, MIN(ps.size, personalization_string->size));
/* Seed / update the DRBG */
GUARD(s2n_drbg_seed(drbg, &ps));
/* After initial seeding, pivot to RDRAND if available and not overridden */
if (drbg->entropy_generator == NULL && s2n_cpu_supports_rdrand()) {
drbg->entropy_generator = s2n_get_rdrand_data;
}
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_generate(struct s2n_drbg *drbg, struct s2n_blob *blob)
{
uint8_t all_zeros[32] = { 0 };
struct s2n_blob zeros = {.data = all_zeros,.size = sizeof(all_zeros) };
S2N_ERROR_IF(blob->size > S2N_DRBG_GENERATE_LIMIT, S2N_ERR_DRBG_REQUEST_SIZE);
/* If either the entropy generator is set, for prediction resistance,
* or if we reach the definitely-need-to-reseed limit, then reseed.
*/
if (drbg->entropy_generator || drbg->bytes_used + blob->size + S2N_DRBG_BLOCK_SIZE >= S2N_DRBG_RESEED_LIMIT) {
GUARD(s2n_drbg_seed(drbg, &zeros));
}
GUARD(s2n_drbg_bits(drbg, blob));
GUARD(s2n_drbg_update(drbg, &zeros));
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_wipe(struct s2n_drbg *drbg)
{
struct s2n_blob state = {.data = (void *)drbg,.size = sizeof(struct s2n_drbg) };
if (drbg->ctx) {
GUARD_OSSL(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(drbg->ctx), S2N_ERR_DRBG);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->ctx);
drbg->ctx = NULL;
}
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(&state));
return 0;
}
int s2n_drbg_bytes_used(struct s2n_drbg *drbg)
{
return drbg->bytes_used;
}
static int s2n_prf(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *secret, struct s2n_blob *label, struct s2n_blob *seed_a, struct s2n_blob *seed_b, struct s2n_blob *out)
{
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_SSLv3) {
return s2n_sslv3_prf(&conn->prf_space, secret, seed_a, seed_b, out);
}
/* We zero the out blob because p_hash works by XOR'ing with the existing
* buffer. This is a little convuloted but means we can avoid dynamic memory
* allocation. When we call p_hash once (in the TLS1.2 case) it will produce
* the right values. When we call it twice in the regular case, the two
* outputs will be XORd just ass the TLS 1.0 and 1.1 RFCs require.
*/
GUARD(s2n_blob_zero(out));
if (conn->actual_protocol_version == S2N_TLS12) {
return s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, conn->secure.cipher_suite->tls12_prf_alg, secret, label, seed_a, seed_b, out);
}
struct s2n_blob half_secret = {.data = secret->data,.size = (secret->size + 1) / 2 };
GUARD(s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, S2N_HMAC_MD5, &half_secret, label, seed_a, seed_b, out));
half_secret.data += secret->size - half_secret.size;
GUARD(s2n_p_hash(&conn->prf_space, S2N_HMAC_SHA1, &half_secret, label, seed_a, seed_b, out));
return 0;
}
int s2n_prf_master_secret(struct s2n_connection *conn, struct s2n_blob *premaster_secret)
{
struct s2n_blob client_random, server_random, master_secret;
struct s2n_blob label;
uint8_t master_secret_label[] = "master secret";
client_random.data = conn->secure.client_random;
client_random.size = sizeof(conn->secure.client_random);
server_random.data = conn->secure.server_random;
server_random.size = sizeof(conn->secure.server_random);
master_secret.data = conn->secure.master_secret;
master_secret.size = sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret);
label.data = master_secret_label;
label.size = sizeof(master_secret_label) - 1;
return s2n_prf(conn, premaster_secret, &label, &client_random, &server_random, &master_secret);
}
static int s2n_sslv3_finished(struct s2n_connection *conn, uint8_t prefix[4], struct s2n_hash_state *md5, struct s2n_hash_state *sha1, uint8_t *out)
{
uint8_t xorpad1[48] =
{ 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
uint8_t xorpad2[48] =
{ 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};
uint8_t *md5_digest = out;
uint8_t *sha_digest = out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
lte_check(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(conn->handshake.client_finished));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, prefix, 4));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, xorpad1, 48));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, xorpad2, 48));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(md5, md5_digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(md5));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, prefix, 4));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, xorpad1, 40));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(sha1));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, conn->secure.master_secret, sizeof(conn->secure.master_secret)));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, xorpad2, 40));
GUARD(s2n_hash_update(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_digest(sha1, sha_digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH));
GUARD(s2n_hash_reset(sha1));
return 0;
}
