static struct scache_entry *
find_or_add(const char *name)
{
int hash_index;
struct scache_entry *ptr;
ptr = scache_hash[hash_index = sc_hash(name)];
for (; ptr; ptr = ptr->next)
{
if(!irccmp(ptr->name, name))
return ptr;
}
ptr = (struct scache_entry *) rb_malloc(sizeof(struct scache_entry));
s_assert(0 != ptr);
rb_strlcpy(ptr->name, name, sizeof(ptr->name));
ptr->info[0] = '\0';
ptr->flags = 0;
ptr->known_since = rb_current_time();
ptr->last_connect = 0;
ptr->last_split = 0;
ptr->next = scache_hash[hash_index];
scache_hash[hash_index] = ptr;
return ptr;
}
/*******************************************************************-o-******
* hash_engineID
*
* Parameters:
* *engineID
* engineID_len
*
* Returns:
* >0 etimelist index for this engineID.
* SNMPERR_GENERR Error.
*
*
* Use a cheap hash to build an index into the etimelist. Method is
* to hash the engineID, then split the hash into u_int's and add them up
* and modulo the size of the list.
*
*/
int hash_engineID (const u_char * engineID, u_int engineID_len)
{
int rval = SNMPERR_GENERR;
size_t buf_len = SNMP_MAXBUF;
u_int additive = 0;
u_char *bufp, buf[SNMP_MAXBUF];
void *context = NULL;
/*
* Sanity check.
*/
if (!engineID || (engineID_len <= 0))
{
QUITFUN (SNMPERR_GENERR, hash_engineID_quit);
}
/*
* Hash engineID into a list index.
*/
#ifndef NETSNMP_DISABLE_MD5
rval = sc_hash (usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol,
sizeof (usmHMACMD5AuthProtocol) / sizeof (oid), engineID, engineID_len, buf, &buf_len);
#else
rval = sc_hash (usmHMACSHA1AuthProtocol,
sizeof (usmHMACSHA1AuthProtocol) / sizeof (oid), engineID, engineID_len, buf, &buf_len);
#endif
QUITFUN (rval, hash_engineID_quit);
for (bufp = buf; (bufp - buf) < (int) buf_len; bufp += 4)
{
additive += (u_int) * bufp;
}
hash_engineID_quit:
SNMP_FREE (context);
memset (buf, 0, SNMP_MAXBUF);
return (rval < 0) ? rval : (int) (additive % ETIMELIST_SIZE);
} /* end hash_engineID() */
const char *
find_or_add(const char *name)
{
int hash_index;
SCACHE *ptr;
ptr = scache_hash[hash_index = sc_hash(name)];
for (; ptr; ptr = ptr->next)
{
if(!irccmp(ptr->name, name))
return (ptr->name);
}
ptr = (SCACHE *) MyMalloc(sizeof(SCACHE));
s_assert(0 != ptr);
strlcpy(ptr->name, name, sizeof(ptr->name));
ptr->next = scache_hash[hash_index];
scache_hash[hash_index] = ptr;
return ptr->name;
}
_KEYTOOLS_NOT_AVAILABLE
#endif /* internal or openssl */
/*******************************************************************-o-******
* decode_keychange
*
* Parameters:
* *hashtype MIB OID of the hash transform to use.
* hashtype_len Length of the hash transform MIB OID.
* *oldkey Old key that is used to encode the new key.
* oldkey_len Length of oldkey in bytes.
* *kcstring Encoded KeyString buffer containing the new key.
* kcstring_len Length of kcstring in bytes.
* *newkey Buffer to hold the extracted new key.
* *newkey_len Length of newkey in bytes.
*
* Returns:
* SNMPERR_SUCCESS Success.
* SNMPERR_GENERR All errors.
*
*
* Decodes a string of bits encoded according to the KeyChange TC described
* in RFC 2274, Section 5. The new key is extracted from *kcstring with
* the aid of the old key.
*
* Upon successful return, *newkey_len contains the length of the new key.
*
*
* ASSUMES Old key is exactly 1/2 the length of the KeyChange buffer,
* although this length may be less than the hash transform
* output. Thus the new key length will be equal to the old
* key length.
*/
/* XXX: if the newkey is not long enough, it should be freed and remalloced */
int
decode_keychange( oid *hashtype, u_int hashtype_len,
u_char *oldkey, size_t oldkey_len,
u_char *kcstring, size_t kcstring_len,
u_char *newkey, size_t *newkey_len)
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_INTERNAL_MD5)
{
int rval = SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
size_t properlength = 0;
u_int nbytes = 0;
u_char *bufp,
tmp_buf[SNMP_MAXBUF];
size_t tmp_buf_len = SNMP_MAXBUF;
void *context = NULL;
u_char *tmpbuf = NULL;
/*
* Sanity check.
*/
if ( !hashtype || !oldkey || !kcstring || !newkey || !newkey_len
|| (oldkey_len<=0) || (kcstring_len<=0) || (*newkey_len<=0)
|| (hashtype_len != USM_LENGTH_OID_TRANSFORM) )
{
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, decode_keychange_quit);
}
/*
* Setup for the transform type.
*/
properlength = sc_get_properlength(hashtype, hashtype_len);
if (properlength == SNMPERR_GENERR)
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, decode_keychange_quit);
if ( ((oldkey_len*2) != kcstring_len) || (*newkey_len < oldkey_len) )
{
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, decode_keychange_quit);
}
properlength = oldkey_len;
*newkey_len = properlength;
/*
* Use the old key and the given KeyChange TC string to recover
* the new key:
* . Hash (oldkey | random_bytes) (into newkey),
* . XOR hash and encoded (second) half of kcstring (into newkey).
*/
tmpbuf = (u_char *)malloc(properlength*2);
if (tmpbuf) {
memcpy(tmpbuf, oldkey, properlength);
memcpy(tmpbuf+properlength, kcstring, properlength);
rval = sc_hash(hashtype, hashtype_len, tmpbuf, properlength*2,
tmp_buf, &tmp_buf_len);
QUITFUN(rval, decode_keychange_quit);
memcpy(newkey, tmp_buf, properlength);
bufp = kcstring+properlength;
nbytes = 0;
while ((int)(nbytes++) < properlength) {
*newkey++ = *newkey ^ *bufp++;
}
}
decode_keychange_quit:
if (rval != SNMPERR_SUCCESS) {
memset(newkey, 0, properlength);
}
memset(tmp_buf, 0, SNMP_MAXBUF);
SNMP_FREE(context);
if (tmpbuf != NULL) SNMP_FREE(tmpbuf);
return rval;
} /* end decode_keychange() */
_KEYTOOLS_NOT_AVAILABLE
#endif /* internal or openssl */
/*******************************************************************-o-******
* encode_keychange
*
* Parameters:
* *hashtype MIB OID for the hash transform type.
* hashtype_len Length of the MIB OID hash transform type.
* *oldkey Old key that is used to encodes the new key.
* oldkey_len Length of oldkey in bytes.
* *newkey New key that is encoded using the old key.
* newkey_len Length of new key in bytes.
* *kcstring Buffer to contain the KeyChange TC string.
* *kcstring_len Length of kcstring buffer.
*
* Returns:
* SNMPERR_SUCCESS Success.
* SNMPERR_GENERR All errors.
*
*
* Uses oldkey and acquired random bytes to encode newkey into kcstring
* according to the rules of the KeyChange TC described in RFC 2274, Section 5.
*
* Upon successful return, *kcstring_len contains the length of the
* encoded string.
*
* ASSUMES Old and new key are always equal to each other, although
* this may be less than the transform type hash output
* output length (eg, using KeyChange for a DESPriv key when
* the user also uses SHA1Auth). This also implies that the
* hash placed in the second 1/2 of the key change string
* will be truncated before the XOR'ing when the hash output is
* larger than that 1/2 of the key change string.
*
* *kcstring_len will be returned as exactly twice that same
* length though the input buffer may be larger.
*
* XXX FIX: Does not handle varibable length keys.
* XXX FIX: Does not handle keys larger than the hash algorithm used.
*/
int
encode_keychange( oid *hashtype, u_int hashtype_len,
u_char *oldkey, size_t oldkey_len,
u_char *newkey, size_t newkey_len,
u_char *kcstring, size_t *kcstring_len)
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_INTERNAL_MD5)
{
int rval = SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
size_t properlength;
size_t nbytes = 0;
u_char *tmpbuf = NULL;
void *context = NULL;
/*
* Sanity check.
*/
if ( !hashtype || !oldkey || !newkey || !kcstring || !kcstring_len
|| (oldkey_len<=0) || (newkey_len<=0) || (*kcstring_len<=0)
|| (hashtype_len != USM_LENGTH_OID_TRANSFORM) )
{
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, encode_keychange_quit);
}
/*
* Setup for the transform type.
*/
properlength = sc_get_properlength(hashtype, hashtype_len);
if (properlength == SNMPERR_GENERR)
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, encode_keychange_quit);
if ( (oldkey_len != newkey_len) || (*kcstring_len < (2*oldkey_len)) )
{
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, encode_keychange_quit);
}
properlength = SNMP_MIN((int)oldkey_len, properlength);
/*
* Use the old key and some random bytes to encode the new key
* in the KeyChange TC format:
* . Get random bytes (store in first half of kcstring),
* . Hash (oldkey | random_bytes) (into second half of kcstring),
* . XOR hash and newkey (into second half of kcstring).
*
* Getting the wrong number of random bytes is considered an error.
*/
nbytes = properlength;
#if defined(SNMP_TESTING_CODE) && defined(RANDOMZEROS)
memset(kcstring, 0, nbytes);
DEBUGMSG(("encode_keychange",
"** Using all zero bits for \"random\" delta of )"
"the keychange string! **\n"));
#else /* !SNMP_TESTING_CODE */
rval = sc_random(kcstring, &nbytes);
QUITFUN(rval, encode_keychange_quit);
if ((int)nbytes != properlength) {
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, encode_keychange_quit);
}
#endif /* !SNMP_TESTING_CODE */
tmpbuf = (u_char *)malloc(properlength*2);
if (tmpbuf) {
memcpy(tmpbuf, oldkey, properlength);
memcpy(tmpbuf+properlength, kcstring, properlength);
*kcstring_len -= properlength;
rval = sc_hash(hashtype, hashtype_len, tmpbuf, properlength*2,
kcstring+properlength, kcstring_len);
QUITFUN(rval, encode_keychange_quit);
*kcstring_len = (properlength*2);
kcstring += properlength;
nbytes = 0;
while ((int)(nbytes++) < properlength) {
*kcstring++ = *kcstring ^ *newkey++;
}
}
encode_keychange_quit:
if (rval != SNMPERR_SUCCESS) memset(kcstring, 0, *kcstring_len);
SNMP_FREE(tmpbuf);
SNMP_FREE(context);
return rval;
} /* end encode_keychange() */
_KEYTOOLS_NOT_AVAILABLE
#endif /* internal or openssl */
/*******************************************************************-o-******
* generate_kul
*
* Parameters:
* *hashtype
* hashtype_len
* *engineID
* engineID_len
* *Ku Master key for a given user.
* ku_len Length of Ku in bytes.
* *Kul Localized key for a given user at engineID.
* *kul_len Length of Kul buffer (IN); Length of Kul key (OUT).
*
* Returns:
* SNMPERR_SUCCESS Success.
* SNMPERR_GENERR All errors.
*
*
* Ku MUST be the proper length (currently fixed) for the given hashtype.
*
* Upon successful return, Kul contains the localized form of Ku at
* engineID, and the length of the key is stored in kul_len.
*
* The localized key method is defined in RFC2274, Sections 2.6 and A.2, and
* originally documented in:
* U. Blumenthal, N. C. Hien, B. Wijnen,
* "Key Derivation for Network Management Applications",
* IEEE Network Magazine, April/May issue, 1997.
*
*
* ASSUMES SNMP_MAXBUF >= sizeof(Ku + engineID + Ku).
*
* NOTE Localized keys for privacy transforms are generated via
* the authentication transform held by the same usmUser.
*
* XXX An engineID of any length is accepted, even if larger than
* what is spec'ed for the textual convention.
*/
int
generate_kul( oid *hashtype, u_int hashtype_len,
u_char *engineID, size_t engineID_len,
u_char *Ku, size_t ku_len,
u_char *Kul, size_t *kul_len)
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_INTERNAL_MD5)
{
int rval = SNMPERR_SUCCESS;
u_int nbytes = 0;
size_t properlength;
u_char buf[SNMP_MAXBUF];
void *context = NULL;
#ifdef SNMP_TESTING_CODE
int i;
#endif
/*
* Sanity check.
*/
if ( !hashtype || !engineID || !Ku || !Kul || !kul_len
|| (engineID_len<=0) || (ku_len<=0) || (*kul_len<=0)
|| (hashtype_len != USM_LENGTH_OID_TRANSFORM) )
{
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, generate_kul_quit);
}
properlength = sc_get_properlength(hashtype, hashtype_len);
if (properlength == SNMPERR_GENERR)
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, generate_kul_quit);
if (((int)*kul_len < properlength) || ((int)ku_len < properlength) ) {
QUITFUN(SNMPERR_GENERR, generate_kul_quit);
}
/*
* Concatenate Ku and engineID properly, then hash the result.
* Store it in Kul.
*/
nbytes = 0;
memcpy(buf, Ku, properlength);
nbytes += properlength;
memcpy(buf+nbytes, engineID, engineID_len);
nbytes += engineID_len;
memcpy(buf+nbytes, Ku, properlength);
nbytes += properlength;
rval = sc_hash(hashtype, hashtype_len, buf, nbytes, Kul, kul_len);
#ifdef SNMP_TESTING_CODE
DEBUGMSGTL(("generate_kul", "generating Kul (from Ku): "));
for(i=0; i < *kul_len; i++)
DEBUGMSG(("generate_kul", "%02x",Kul[i]));
DEBUGMSG(("generate_kul", "keytools\n"));
#endif /* SNMP_TESTING_CODE */
QUITFUN(rval, generate_kul_quit);
generate_kul_quit:
SNMP_FREE(context);
return rval;
} /* end generate_kul() */