int
setgid(gid_t gid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error;
int do_nocd = 0;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
zone_t *zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if (!VALID_GID(gid, zone))
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (gid > MAXUID) {
if (ksid_lookupbygid(zone, gid, &ksid) != 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
ksp = &ksid;
} else {
ksp = NULL;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex. We cannot hold the mutex across the
* secpolicy functions.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry:
cr = p->p_cred;
crhold(cr);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if ((gid == cr->cr_rgid || gid == cr->cr_sgid) &&
secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_TRUE) != 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry;
error = 0;
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
newcr->cr_gid = gid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_GROUP);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
} else if ((error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry;
/*
* A privileged process that makes itself look like a
* set-gid process must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if (cr->cr_gid != gid ||
cr->cr_rgid != gid ||
cr->cr_sgid != gid)
do_nocd = 1;
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
newcr->cr_gid = gid;
newcr->cr_rgid = gid;
newcr->cr_sgid = gid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_GROUP);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
} else {
crfree(newcr);
crfree(cr);
if (ksp != NULL)
ksid_rele(ksp);
}
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
return (0);
}
return (set_errno(error));
}
/*
* This function is based on setreuid in common/syscall/uid.c and exists
* because Solaris does not have a way to explicitly set the saved uid (suid)
* from any other system call.
*/
long
lx_setresuid(l_uid_t ruid, l_uid_t euid, l_uid_t suid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error = 0;
int do_nocd = 0;
int uidchge = 0;
uid_t oldruid = ruid;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
zoneid_t zoneid = getzoneid();
if ((ruid != -1 && (ruid > MAXUID)) ||
(euid != -1 && (euid > MAXUID)) ||
(suid != -1 && (suid > MAXUID))) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
retry:
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
cr = p->p_cred;
if (ruid != -1 &&
ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_uid &&
ruid != cr->cr_suid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, ruid, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else if (euid != -1 &&
euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_uid &&
euid != cr->cr_suid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, euid, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else if (suid != -1 &&
suid != cr->cr_ruid && suid != cr->cr_uid &&
suid != cr->cr_suid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, suid, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else {
if (!uidchge && ruid != -1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) {
/*
* The ruid of the process is going to change. In order
* to avoid a race condition involving the
* process count associated with the newly given ruid,
* we increment the count before assigning the
* credential to the process.
* To do that, we'll have to take pidlock, so we first
* release p_crlock.
*/
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
uidchge = 1;
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_inc(ruid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
/*
* As we released p_crlock we can't rely on the cr
* we read. So retry the whole thing.
*/
goto retry;
}
crhold(cr);
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
if (euid != -1)
newcr->cr_uid = euid;
if (suid != -1)
newcr->cr_suid = suid;
if (ruid != -1) {
oldruid = newcr->cr_ruid;
newcr->cr_ruid = ruid;
ASSERT(ruid != oldruid ? uidchge : 1);
}
/*
* A process that gives up its privilege
* must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if ((cr->cr_uid != newcr->cr_uid ||
cr->cr_ruid != newcr->cr_ruid ||
cr->cr_suid != newcr->cr_suid))
do_nocd = 1;
crfree(cr);
}
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
/*
* We decrement the number of processes associated with the oldruid
* to match the increment above, even if the ruid of the process
* did not change or an error occurred (oldruid == uid).
*/
if (uidchge) {
ASSERT(oldruid != -1 && ruid != -1);
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_dec(oldruid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
}
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
goto done;
}
crfree(newcr);
done:
if (error)
return (set_errno(error));
else
return (0);
}
/*
* Buy-back from SunOS 4.x
*
* Like setgid() and setegid() combined -except- that non-root users
* can change cr_rgid to cr_gid, and the semantics of cr_sgid are
* subtly different.
*/
int
setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error = EPERM;
int do_nocd = 0;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
zone_t *zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if ((rgid != -1 && !VALID_GID(rgid, zone)) ||
(egid != -1 && !VALID_GID(egid, zone)))
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (egid != -1 && egid > MAXUID) {
if (ksid_lookupbygid(zone, egid, &ksid) != 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
ksp = &ksid;
} else {
ksp = NULL;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
cr = p->p_cred;
if ((rgid == -1 ||
rgid == cr->cr_rgid || rgid == cr->cr_gid || rgid == cr->cr_sgid) &&
(egid == -1 || egid == cr->cr_rgid || egid == cr->cr_gid ||
egid == cr->cr_sgid) ||
(error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
crhold(cr);
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
if (egid != -1) {
newcr->cr_gid = egid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_GROUP);
}
if (rgid != -1)
newcr->cr_rgid = rgid;
/*
* "If the real gid is being changed, or the effective gid is
* being changed to a value not equal to the real gid, the
* saved gid is set to the new effective gid."
*/
if (rgid != -1 ||
(egid != -1 && newcr->cr_gid != newcr->cr_rgid))
newcr->cr_sgid = newcr->cr_gid;
/*
* A privileged process that makes itself look like a
* set-gid process must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if ((cr->cr_gid != newcr->cr_gid ||
cr->cr_rgid != newcr->cr_rgid ||
cr->cr_sgid != newcr->cr_sgid) && error == 0)
do_nocd = 1;
error = 0;
crfree(cr);
}
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
return (0);
}
crfree(newcr);
if (ksp != NULL)
ksid_rele(ksp);
return (set_errno(error));
}
/*
* This function is based on setregid in common/syscall/gid.c
*/
long
lx_setresgid(l_gid_t rgid, l_gid_t egid, l_gid_t sgid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error = 0;
int do_nocd = 0;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
if ((rgid != -1 && (rgid > MAXUID)) ||
(egid != -1 && (egid > MAXUID)) ||
(sgid != -1 && (sgid > MAXUID))) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
cr = p->p_cred;
if (rgid != -1 &&
rgid != cr->cr_rgid && rgid != cr->cr_gid &&
rgid != cr->cr_sgid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else if (egid != -1 &&
egid != cr->cr_rgid && egid != cr->cr_gid &&
egid != cr->cr_sgid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else if (sgid != -1 &&
sgid != cr->cr_rgid && sgid != cr->cr_gid &&
sgid != cr->cr_sgid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) {
error = EPERM;
} else {
crhold(cr);
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
if (egid != -1)
newcr->cr_gid = egid;
if (sgid != -1)
newcr->cr_sgid = sgid;
if (rgid != -1)
newcr->cr_rgid = rgid;
/*
* A process that gives up its privilege
* must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if ((cr->cr_gid != newcr->cr_gid ||
cr->cr_rgid != newcr->cr_rgid ||
cr->cr_sgid != newcr->cr_sgid))
do_nocd = 1;
crfree(cr);
}
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
goto done;
}
crfree(newcr);
done:
if (error)
return (set_errno(error));
else
return (0);
}
int
setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t *gidset)
{
proc_t *p;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
int i;
int n = gidsetsize;
int error;
int scnt = 0;
ksidlist_t *ksl = NULL;
zone_t *zone;
struct credgrp *grps = NULL;
/* Perform the cheapest tests before grabbing p_crlock */
if (n > ngroups_max || n < 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if (n != 0) {
const gid_t *groups;
grps = crgrpcopyin(n, gidset);
if (grps == NULL)
return (set_errno(EFAULT));
groups = crgetggroups(grps);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (!VALID_GID(groups[i], zone)) {
crgrprele(grps);
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
}
if (groups[i] > MAXUID)
scnt++;
}
if (scnt > 0) {
ksl = kcrsid_gidstosids(zone, n, (gid_t *)groups);
if (ksl == NULL) {
crgrprele(grps);
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
}
}
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before acquiring
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry:
cr = p->p_cred;
crhold(cr);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if ((error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, -1, B_FALSE)) != 0) {
if (grps != NULL)
crgrprele(grps);
if (ksl != NULL)
ksidlist_rele(ksl);
crfree(newcr);
crfree(cr);
return (set_errno(error));
}
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry;
crdup_to(cr, newcr);
crsetsidlist(newcr, ksl);
crsetcredgrp(newcr, grps);
p->p_cred = newcr;
crhold(newcr); /* hold for the current thread */
crfree(cr); /* free the old one */
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
/*
* Broadcast new cred to process threads (including the current one).
*/
crset(p, newcr);
return (0);
}
int
setuid(uid_t uid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error;
int do_nocd = 0;
int uidchge = 0;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
uid_t oldruid = uid;
zoneid_t zoneid = getzoneid();
ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
zone_t *zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if (!VALID_UID(uid, zone))
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (uid > MAXUID) {
if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, uid, &ksid) != 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
ksp = &ksid;
} else {
ksp = NULL;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex. We can't hold on to the p_crlock for most
* if this though, now that we allow kernel upcalls from the
* policy routines.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
retry:
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry_locked:
cr = p->p_cred;
crhold(cr);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if ((uid == cr->cr_ruid || uid == cr->cr_suid) &&
secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_TRUE) != 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry_locked;
error = 0;
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
newcr->cr_uid = uid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
} else if ((error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry_locked;
if (!uidchge && uid != cr->cr_ruid) {
/*
* The ruid of the process is going to change. In order
* to avoid a race condition involving the
* process-count associated with the newly given ruid,
* we increment the count before assigning the
* credential to the process.
* To do that, we'll have to take pidlock, so we first
* release p_crlock.
*/
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
uidchge = 1;
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_inc(uid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
/*
* As we released p_crlock we can't rely on the cr
* we read. So retry the whole thing.
*/
goto retry;
}
/*
* A privileged process that gives up its privilege
* must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if (cr->cr_uid != uid ||
cr->cr_ruid != uid ||
cr->cr_suid != uid)
do_nocd = 1;
oldruid = cr->cr_ruid;
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
newcr->cr_ruid = uid;
newcr->cr_suid = uid;
newcr->cr_uid = uid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
priv_reset_PA(newcr, B_TRUE);
ASSERT(uid != oldruid ? uidchge : 1);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
} else {
crfree(newcr);
crfree(cr);
if (ksp != NULL)
ksid_rele(ksp);
}
/*
* We decrement the number of processes associated with the oldruid
* to match the increment above, even if the ruid of the process
* did not change or an error occurred (oldruid == uid).
*/
if (uidchge) {
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_dec(oldruid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
}
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
return (0);
}
return (set_errno(error));
}
/*
* Buy-back from SunOS 4.x
*
* Like setuid() and seteuid() combined -except- that non-root users
* can change cr_ruid to cr_uid, and the semantics of cr_suid are
* subtly different.
*/
int
setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error = 0;
int do_nocd = 0;
int uidchge = 0;
uid_t oldruid = ruid;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
zoneid_t zoneid = getzoneid();
ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
zone_t *zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if ((ruid != -1 && !VALID_UID(ruid, zone)) ||
(euid != -1 && !VALID_UID(euid, zone)))
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (euid != -1 && euid > MAXUID) {
if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, euid, &ksid) != 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
ksp = &ksid;
} else {
ksp = NULL;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
retry:
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry_locked:
crhold(cr = p->p_cred);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if (ruid != -1 && ruid != cr->cr_ruid && ruid != cr->cr_uid &&
secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, ruid, B_FALSE) != 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry_locked;
error = EPERM;
} else if (euid != -1 &&
euid != cr->cr_ruid && euid != cr->cr_uid &&
euid != cr->cr_suid && secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, euid, B_FALSE)) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry_locked;
error = EPERM;
} else {
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry_locked;
if (!uidchge && ruid != -1 && cr->cr_ruid != ruid) {
/*
* The ruid of the process is going to change. In order
* to avoid a race condition involving the
* process-count associated with the newly given ruid,
* we increment the count before assigning the
* credential to the process.
* To do that, we'll have to take pidlock, so we first
* release p_crlock.
*/
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
uidchge = 1;
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_inc(ruid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
/*
* As we released p_crlock we can't rely on the cr
* we read. So retry the whole thing.
*/
goto retry;
}
crhold(cr);
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
if (euid != -1) {
newcr->cr_uid = euid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
}
if (ruid != -1) {
oldruid = newcr->cr_ruid;
newcr->cr_ruid = ruid;
ASSERT(ruid != oldruid ? uidchge : 1);
}
/*
* "If the real uid is being changed, or the effective uid is
* being changed to a value not equal to the real uid, the
* saved uid is set to the new effective uid."
*/
if (ruid != -1 ||
(euid != -1 && newcr->cr_uid != newcr->cr_ruid))
newcr->cr_suid = newcr->cr_uid;
/*
* A process that gives up its privilege
* must be marked to produce no core dump.
*/
if ((cr->cr_uid != newcr->cr_uid ||
cr->cr_ruid != newcr->cr_ruid ||
cr->cr_suid != newcr->cr_suid))
do_nocd = 1;
priv_reset_PA(newcr, ruid != -1 && euid != -1 && ruid == euid);
crfree(cr);
}
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
/*
* We decrement the number of processes associated with the oldruid
* to match the increment above, even if the ruid of the process
* did not change or an error occurred (oldruid == uid).
*/
if (uidchge) {
ASSERT(oldruid != -1 && ruid != -1);
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
upcount_dec(oldruid, zoneid);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
}
if (error == 0) {
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
return (0);
}
crfree(newcr);
if (ksp != NULL)
ksid_rele(ksp);
return (set_errno(error));
}
int
seteuid(uid_t uid)
{
proc_t *p;
int error = EPERM;
int do_nocd = 0;
cred_t *cr, *newcr;
ksid_t ksid, *ksp;
zone_t *zone = crgetzone(CRED());
if (!VALID_UID(uid, zone))
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (uid > MAXUID) {
if (ksid_lookupbyuid(zone, uid, &ksid) != 0)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
ksp = &ksid;
} else {
ksp = NULL;
}
/*
* Need to pre-allocate the new cred structure before grabbing
* the p_crlock mutex.
*/
newcr = cralloc_ksid();
p = ttoproc(curthread);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
retry:
crhold(cr = p->p_cred);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if (uid == cr->cr_ruid || uid == cr->cr_uid || uid == cr->cr_suid ||
(error = secpolicy_allow_setid(cr, uid, B_FALSE)) == 0) {
/*
* A privileged process that makes itself look like a
* set-uid process must be marked to produce no core dump,
* if the effective uid did changed.
*/
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
if (cr != p->p_cred)
goto retry;
if (cr->cr_uid != uid && error == 0)
do_nocd = 1;
error = 0;
crcopy_to(cr, newcr);
p->p_cred = newcr;
newcr->cr_uid = uid;
crsetsid(newcr, ksp, KSID_USER);
priv_reset_PA(newcr, B_FALSE);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
if (do_nocd) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
}
crset(p, newcr); /* broadcast to process threads */
return (0);
}
crfree(newcr);
crfree(cr);
if (ksp != NULL)
ksid_rele(ksp);
return (set_errno(error));
}