/* Derive a usage key from a session key and krb5 usage constant. */
static krb5_error_code
usage_key(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
const krb5_keyblock *session_keyblock, krb5_keyusage usage,
krb5_keyblock *out)
{
char salt_buf[14];
unsigned int salt_len;
krb5_data out_data = make_data(out->contents, out->length);
krb5_crypto_iov iov;
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
/* Generate the salt. */
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage(usage);
if (session_keyblock->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP) {
memcpy(salt_buf, l40, 10);
store_32_le(ms_usage, salt_buf + 10);
salt_len = 14;
} else {
store_32_le(ms_usage, salt_buf);
salt_len = 4;
}
/* Compute HMAC(key, salt) to produce the usage key. */
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = make_data(salt_buf, salt_len);
return krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, session_keyblock, &iov, 1, &out_data);
}
krb5_error_code krb5int_hmacmd5_checksum(const struct krb5_cksumtypes *ctp,
krb5_key key, krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data,
krb5_data *output)
{
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock ks, *keyblock;
krb5_crypto_iov *hash_iov = NULL, iov;
krb5_data ds = empty_data(), hashval = empty_data();
char t[4];
if (key == NULL || key->keyblock.length > ctp->hash->blocksize)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
if (ctp->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR) {
/* Compute HMAC(key, "signaturekey\0") to get the signing key ks. */
ret = alloc_data(&ds, ctp->hash->hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = make_data("signaturekey", 13);
ret = krb5int_hmac(ctp->hash, key, &iov, 1, &ds);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ks.length = key->keyblock.length;
ks.contents = (krb5_octet *) ds.data;
keyblock = &ks;
} else /* For md5-hmac, just use the key. */
keyblock = &key->keyblock;
/* Compute the MD5 value of the input. */
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage(usage);
store_32_le(ms_usage, t);
hash_iov = k5alloc((num_data + 1) * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov), &ret);
if (hash_iov == NULL)
goto cleanup;
hash_iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
hash_iov[0].data = make_data(t, 4);
memcpy(hash_iov + 1, data, num_data * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov));
ret = alloc_data(&hashval, ctp->hash->hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = ctp->hash->hash(hash_iov, num_data + 1, &hashval);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Compute HMAC(ks, md5value). */
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = hashval;
ret = krb5int_hmac_keyblock(ctp->hash, keyblock, &iov, 1, output);
cleanup:
zapfree(ds.data, ds.length);
zapfree(hashval.data, hashval.length);
free(hash_iov);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5_make_fulladdr(krb5_context context, krb5_address *kaddr,
krb5_address *kport, krb5_address *raddr)
{
register krb5_octet * marshal;
krb5_int32 tmp32;
krb5_int16 tmp16;
if (kaddr == NULL || kport == NULL)
return EINVAL;
raddr->length = kaddr->length + kport->length + (4 * sizeof(krb5_int32));
if (!(raddr->contents = (krb5_octet *)malloc(raddr->length)))
return ENOMEM;
raddr->addrtype = ADDRTYPE_ADDRPORT;
marshal = raddr->contents;
tmp16 = kaddr->addrtype;
*marshal++ = 0x00;
*marshal++ = 0x00;
store_16_le(tmp16, marshal);
marshal += 2;
tmp32 = kaddr->length;
store_32_le(tmp32, marshal);
marshal += 4;
(void) memcpy(marshal, kaddr->contents, kaddr->length);
marshal += kaddr->length;
tmp16 = kport->addrtype;
*marshal++ = 0x00;
*marshal++ = 0x00;
store_16_le(tmp16, marshal);
marshal += 2;
tmp32 = kport->length;
store_32_le(tmp32, marshal);
marshal += 4;
(void) memcpy(marshal, kport->contents, kport->length);
marshal += kport->length;
return 0;
}
/* in-place encoding of PAC header */
static krb5_error_code
k5_pac_encode_header(krb5_context context, krb5_pac pac)
{
size_t i;
unsigned char *p;
size_t header_len;
header_len = PACTYPE_LENGTH +
(pac->pac->cBuffers * PAC_INFO_BUFFER_LENGTH);
assert(pac->data.length >= header_len);
p = (unsigned char *)pac->data.data;
store_32_le(pac->pac->cBuffers, p);
p += 4;
store_32_le(pac->pac->Version, p);
p += 4;
for (i = 0; i < pac->pac->cBuffers; i++) {
PAC_INFO_BUFFER *buffer = &pac->pac->Buffers[i];
store_32_le(buffer->ulType, p);
p += 4;
store_32_le(buffer->cbBufferSize, p);
p += 4;
store_64_le(buffer->Offset, p);
p += 8;
assert((buffer->Offset % PAC_ALIGNMENT) == 0);
assert(buffer->Offset + buffer->cbBufferSize <= pac->data.length);
assert(buffer->Offset >= header_len);
if (buffer->Offset % PAC_ALIGNMENT ||
buffer->Offset + buffer->cbBufferSize > pac->data.length ||
buffer->Offset < header_len)
return ERANGE;
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
k5_insert_checksum(krb5_context context,
krb5_pac pac,
krb5_ui_4 type,
const krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_cksumtype *cksumtype)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t len;
krb5_data cksumdata;
ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, key->enctype, cksumtype);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
ret = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, *cksumtype, &len);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
ret = k5_pac_locate_buffer(context, pac, type, &cksumdata);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* If we're resigning PAC, make sure we can fit checksum
* into existing buffer
*/
if (cksumdata.length != PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH + len)
return ERANGE;
memset(cksumdata.data, 0, cksumdata.length);
} else {
/* Add a zero filled buffer */
cksumdata.length = PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA_LENGTH + len;
cksumdata.data = NULL;
ret = k5_pac_add_buffer(context, pac,
type, &cksumdata,
TRUE, &cksumdata);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
/* Encode checksum type into buffer */
store_32_le((krb5_ui_4)*cksumtype, cksumdata.data);
return 0;
}
int main ()
{
/* Test some low-level assumptions the Kerberos code depends
on. */
union {
uint64_t n64;
uint32_t n32;
uint16_t n16;
unsigned char b[9];
} u;
static unsigned char buf[9] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
assert(load_64_be(buf+1) == 0x0102030405060708LL);
assert(load_64_le(buf+1) == 0x0807060504030201LL);
assert(load_32_le(buf+2) == 0x05040302);
assert(load_32_be(buf+2) == 0x02030405);
assert(load_16_be(buf+3) == 0x0304);
assert(load_16_le(buf+3) == 0x0403);
u.b[0] = 0;
assert((store_64_be(0x0102030405060708LL, u.b+1), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
u.b[1] = 9;
assert((store_64_le(0x0807060504030201LL, u.b+1), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
u.b[2] = 10;
assert((store_32_be(0x02030405, u.b+2), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
u.b[3] = 11;
assert((store_32_le(0x05040302, u.b+2), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
u.b[4] = 12;
assert((store_16_be(0x0304, u.b+3), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
u.b[4] = 13;
assert((store_16_le(0x0403, u.b+3), !memcmp(buf, u.b, 9)));
/* Verify that load_*_n properly does native format. Assume
the unaligned thing is okay. */
u.n64 = 0x090a0b0c0d0e0f00LL;
assert(load_64_n((unsigned char *) &u.n64) == 0x090a0b0c0d0e0f00LL);
u.n32 = 0x06070809;
assert(load_32_n((unsigned char *) &u.n32) == 0x06070809);
u.n16 = 0x0a0b;
assert(load_16_n((unsigned char *) &u.n16) == 0x0a0b);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
k5_md5_hmac_hash (const krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_data *iv,
const krb5_data *input, krb5_data *output)
{
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
krb5_MD5_CTX ctx;
unsigned char t[4];
krb5_data ds;
krb5_MD5Init(&ctx);
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage (usage);
store_32_le(ms_usage, t);
krb5_MD5Update(&ctx, t, sizeof(t));
krb5_MD5Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)input->data, input->length);
krb5_MD5Final(&ctx);
ds.magic = KV5M_DATA;
ds.length = 16;
ds.data = (char *)ctx.digest;
return krb5_hmac ( &krb5int_hash_md5, key, 1, &ds, output);
}
static krb5_error_code
krb5int_arcfour_encrypt_iov(const struct krb5_aead_provider *aead,
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
const krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
krb5_keyblock k1, k2, k3;
krb5_data d1, d2, d3;
krb5_data checksum, confounder, header_data;
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
char salt_data[14];
krb5_data salt;
size_t i;
d1.length = d2.length = d3.length = 0;
d1.data = d2.data = d3.data = NULL;
/*
* Caller must have provided space for the header, padding
* and trailer; per RFC 4757 we will arrange it as:
*
* Checksum | E(Confounder | Plaintext)
*/
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL ||
header->data.length < hash->hashsize + CONFOUNDERLENGTH)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
header_data = header->data;
/* Trailer may be absent */
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL)
trailer->data.length = 0;
/* Ensure that there is no padding */
for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
if (data[i].flags == KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING)
data[i].data.length = 0;
}
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k1, &d1, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k2, &d2, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k3, &d3, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Begin the encryption, compute K1 */
salt.data = salt_data;
salt.length = sizeof(salt_data);
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage(usage);
if (key->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP) {
strncpy(salt.data, krb5int_arcfour_l40, salt.length);
store_32_le(ms_usage, salt.data + 10);
} else {
salt.length = 4;
store_32_le(ms_usage, salt.data);
}
ret = krb5_hmac(hash, key, 1, &salt, &d1);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(k2.contents, k1.contents, k2.length);
if (key->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP)
memset(k1.contents + 7, 0xAB, 9);
header->data.length = hash->hashsize + CONFOUNDERLENGTH;
confounder.data = header->data.data + hash->hashsize;
confounder.length = CONFOUNDERLENGTH;
ret = krb5_c_random_make_octets(0, &confounder);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
checksum.data = header->data.data;
checksum.length = hash->hashsize;
/* Adjust pointers so confounder is at start of header */
header->data.length -= hash->hashsize;
header->data.data += hash->hashsize;
ret = krb5int_hmac_iov(hash, &k2, data, num_data, &checksum);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_hmac(hash, &k1, 1, &checksum, &d3);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = enc->encrypt_iov(&k3, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
header->data = header_data; /* restore header pointers */
if (d1.data != NULL) {
memset(d1.data, 0, d1.length);
free(d1.data);
}
if (d2.data != NULL) {
memset(d2.data, 0, d2.length);
free(d2.data);
}
if (d3.data != NULL) {
memset(d3.data, 0, d3.length);
free(d3.data);
}
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
krb5int_arcfour_decrypt_iov(const struct krb5_aead_provider *aead,
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
const krb5_keyblock *key,
krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
krb5_keyblock k1, k2, k3;
krb5_data d1, d2, d3;
krb5_data checksum, header_data;
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
char salt_data[14];
krb5_data salt;
d1.length = d2.length = d3.length = 0;
d1.data = d2.data = d3.data = NULL;
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL ||
header->data.length != hash->hashsize + CONFOUNDERLENGTH)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
header_data = header->data;
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->data.length != 0)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k1, &d1, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k2, &d2, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_derived_key(enc, &k3, &d3, key);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Begin the decryption, compute K1 */
salt.data = salt_data;
salt.length = sizeof(salt_data);
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage(usage);
if (key->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP) {
strncpy(salt.data, krb5int_arcfour_l40, salt.length);
store_32_le(ms_usage, (unsigned char *)salt.data + 10);
} else {
salt.length = 4;
store_32_le(ms_usage, (unsigned char *)salt.data);
}
ret = krb5_hmac(hash, key, 1, &salt, &d1);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(k2.contents, k1.contents, k2.length);
if (key->enctype == ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP)
memset(k1.contents + 7, 0xAB, 9);
checksum.data = header->data.data;
checksum.length = hash->hashsize;
/* Adjust pointers so confounder is at start of header */
header->data.length -= hash->hashsize;
header->data.data += hash->hashsize;
ret = krb5_hmac(hash, &k1, 1, &checksum, &d3);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = enc->decrypt_iov(&k3, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5int_hmac_iov(hash, &k2, data, num_data, &d1);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (memcmp(checksum.data, d1.data, hash->hashsize) != 0) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
header->data = header_data; /* restore header pointers */
if (d1.data != NULL) {
memset(d1.data, 0, d1.length);
free(d1.data);
}
if (d2.data != NULL) {
memset(d2.data, 0, d2.length);
free(d2.data);
}
if (d3.data != NULL) {
memset(d3.data, 0, d3.length);
free(d3.data);
}
return ret;
}