krb5_error_code krb5int_hmacmd5_checksum(const struct krb5_cksumtypes *ctp,
krb5_key key, krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data,
krb5_data *output)
{
krb5_keyusage ms_usage;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock ks, *keyblock;
krb5_crypto_iov *hash_iov = NULL, iov;
krb5_data ds = empty_data(), hashval = empty_data();
char t[4];
if (key == NULL || key->keyblock.length > ctp->hash->blocksize)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
if (ctp->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR) {
/* Compute HMAC(key, "signaturekey\0") to get the signing key ks. */
ret = alloc_data(&ds, ctp->hash->hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = make_data("signaturekey", 13);
ret = krb5int_hmac(ctp->hash, key, &iov, 1, &ds);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ks.length = key->keyblock.length;
ks.contents = (krb5_octet *) ds.data;
keyblock = &ks;
} else /* For md5-hmac, just use the key. */
keyblock = &key->keyblock;
/* Compute the MD5 value of the input. */
ms_usage = krb5int_arcfour_translate_usage(usage);
store_32_le(ms_usage, t);
hash_iov = k5alloc((num_data + 1) * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov), &ret);
if (hash_iov == NULL)
goto cleanup;
hash_iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
hash_iov[0].data = make_data(t, 4);
memcpy(hash_iov + 1, data, num_data * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov));
ret = alloc_data(&hashval, ctp->hash->hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = ctp->hash->hash(hash_iov, num_data + 1, &hashval);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Compute HMAC(ks, md5value). */
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = hashval;
ret = krb5int_hmac_keyblock(ctp->hash, keyblock, &iov, 1, output);
cleanup:
zapfree(ds.data, ds.length);
zapfree(hashval.data, hashval.length);
free(hash_iov);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code krb5int_confounder_verify(const struct krb5_cksumtypes *ctp,
krb5_key key, krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data,
const krb5_data *input,
krb5_boolean *valid)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
unsigned char *plaintext = NULL;
krb5_key xorkey = NULL;
krb5_data computed = empty_data();
krb5_crypto_iov *hash_iov = NULL, iov;
size_t blocksize = ctp->enc->block_size, hashsize = ctp->hash->hashsize;
plaintext = k5memdup(input->data, input->length, &ret);
if (plaintext == NULL)
return ret;
ret = mk_xorkey(key, &xorkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt the input checksum. */
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = make_data(plaintext, input->length);
ret = ctp->enc->decrypt(xorkey, NULL, &iov, 1);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Hash the confounder, then the input data. */
hash_iov = k5alloc((num_data + 1) * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov), &ret);
if (hash_iov == NULL)
goto cleanup;
hash_iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
hash_iov[0].data = make_data(plaintext, blocksize);
memcpy(hash_iov + 1, data, num_data * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov));
ret = alloc_data(&computed, hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = ctp->hash->hash(hash_iov, num_data + 1, &computed);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Compare the decrypted hash to the computed one. */
*valid = (memcmp(plaintext + blocksize, computed.data, hashsize) == 0);
cleanup:
zapfree(plaintext, input->length);
zapfree(computed.data, hashsize);
free(hash_iov);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, xorkey);
return ret;
}
void
krb5_dbe_free(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry)
{
krb5_tl_data * tl_data_next;
krb5_tl_data * tl_data;
int i, j;
if (entry == NULL)
return;
free(entry->e_data);
krb5_free_principal(context, entry->princ);
for (tl_data = entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data = tl_data_next) {
tl_data_next = tl_data->tl_data_next;
free(tl_data->tl_data_contents);
free(tl_data);
}
if (entry->key_data) {
for (i = 0; i < entry->n_key_data; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < entry->key_data[i].key_data_ver; j++) {
if (entry->key_data[i].key_data_length[j]) {
zapfree(entry->key_data[i].key_data_contents[j],
entry->key_data[i].key_data_length[j]);
}
entry->key_data[i].key_data_contents[j] = NULL;
entry->key_data[i].key_data_length[j] = 0;
entry->key_data[i].key_data_type[j] = 0;
}
}
free(entry->key_data);
}
free(entry);
}
/*
* Marshal a KRB-PRIV message into der_out, encrypted with key. Store the
* ciphertext in enc_out. Use the timestamp and sequence number from rdata and
* the addresses from local_addr and remote_addr (the second of which may be
* NULL). der_out and enc_out should be freed by the caller when finished.
*/
static krb5_error_code
create_krbpriv(krb5_context context, const krb5_data *userdata,
krb5_key key, const krb5_replay_data *rdata,
krb5_address *local_addr, krb5_address *remote_addr,
krb5_data *cstate, krb5_data *der_out, krb5_enc_data *enc_out)
{
krb5_enctype enctype = krb5_k_key_enctype(context, key);
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_priv privmsg;
krb5_priv_enc_part encpart;
krb5_data *der_encpart = NULL, *der_krbpriv;
size_t enclen;
memset(&privmsg, 0, sizeof(privmsg));
privmsg.enc_part.kvno = 0;
privmsg.enc_part.enctype = enctype;
encpart.user_data = *userdata;
encpart.s_address = local_addr;
encpart.r_address = remote_addr;
encpart.timestamp = rdata->timestamp;
encpart.usec = rdata->usec;
encpart.seq_number = rdata->seq;
/* Start by encoding the to-be-encrypted part of the message. */
ret = encode_krb5_enc_priv_part(&encpart, &der_encpart);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* put together an eblock for this encryption */
ret = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, enctype, der_encpart->length,
&enclen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_data(&privmsg.enc_part.ciphertext, enclen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_k_encrypt(context, key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_PRIV_ENCPART,
(cstate->length > 0) ? cstate : NULL, der_encpart,
&privmsg.enc_part);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = encode_krb5_priv(&privmsg, &der_krbpriv);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*der_out = *der_krbpriv;
free(der_krbpriv);
*enc_out = privmsg.enc_part;
memset(&privmsg.enc_part, 0, sizeof(privmsg.enc_part));
cleanup:
zapfree(privmsg.enc_part.ciphertext.data,
privmsg.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
zapfreedata(der_encpart);
return ret;
}
/*
* Compute a derived key into the keyblock outkey. This variation on
* krb5int_derive_key does not cache the result, as it is only used
* directly in situations which are not expected to be repeated with
* the same inkey and constant.
*/
krb5_error_code
krb5int_derive_keyblock(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_keyblock *outkey,
const krb5_data *in_constant)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data rawkey = empty_data();
/* Allocate a buffer for the raw key bytes. */
ret = alloc_data(&rawkey, enc->keybytes);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Derive pseudo-random data for the key bytes. */
ret = krb5int_derive_random(enc, inkey, &rawkey, in_constant);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Postprocess the key. */
ret = enc->make_key(&rawkey, outkey);
cleanup:
zapfree(rawkey.data, enc->keybytes);
return ret;
}
/*
* Decrypt and decode the enc_part of a krb5_cred using the receiving subkey or
* the session key of authcon. If neither key is present, ctext->ciphertext is
* assumed to be unencrypted plain text (RFC 6448).
*/
static krb5_error_code
decrypt_encpart(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_data *ctext,
krb5_auth_context authcon, krb5_cred_enc_part **encpart_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data plain = empty_data();
krb5_boolean decrypted = FALSE;
*encpart_out = NULL;
if (authcon->recv_subkey == NULL && authcon->key == NULL)
return decode_krb5_enc_cred_part(&ctext->ciphertext, encpart_out);
ret = alloc_data(&plain, ctext->ciphertext.length);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (authcon->recv_subkey != NULL) {
ret = krb5_k_decrypt(context, authcon->recv_subkey,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_CRED_ENCPART, 0, ctext, &plain);
decrypted = (ret == 0);
}
if (!decrypted && authcon->key != NULL) {
ret = krb5_k_decrypt(context, authcon->key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_CRED_ENCPART, 0, ctext, &plain);
decrypted = (ret == 0);
}
if (decrypted)
ret = decode_krb5_enc_cred_part(&plain, encpart_out);
zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_k_decrypt(krb5_context context, krb5_key key,
krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
const krb5_enc_data *input, krb5_data *output)
{
const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp;
krb5_crypto_iov iov[4];
krb5_error_code ret;
unsigned int header_len, trailer_len, plain_len;
char *scratch = NULL;
ktp = find_enctype(key->keyblock.enctype);
if (ktp == NULL)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
if (input->enctype != ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN && ktp->etype != input->enctype)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
/* Verify the input and output lengths. */
header_len = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
trailer_len = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (input->ciphertext.length < header_len + trailer_len)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
plain_len = input->ciphertext.length - header_len - trailer_len;
if (output->length < plain_len)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
scratch = k5alloc(header_len + trailer_len, &ret);
if (scratch == NULL)
return ret;
iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER;
iov[0].data = make_data(scratch, header_len);
memcpy(iov[0].data.data, input->ciphertext.data, header_len);
iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[1].data = make_data(output->data, plain_len);
memcpy(iov[1].data.data, input->ciphertext.data + header_len, plain_len);
/* Use empty padding since tokens don't indicate the padding length. */
iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING;
iov[2].data = empty_data();
iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER;
iov[3].data = make_data(scratch + header_len, trailer_len);
memcpy(iov[3].data.data, input->ciphertext.data + header_len + plain_len,
trailer_len);
ret = ktp->decrypt(ktp, key, usage, ivec, iov, 4);
if (ret != 0)
zap(output->data, plain_len);
else
output->length = plain_len;
zapfree(scratch, header_len + trailer_len);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_derive_random(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
const krb5_data *in_constant)
{
size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
krb5_crypto_iov iov;
krb5_error_code ret;
blocksize = enc->block_size;
keybytes = enc->keybytes;
if (blocksize == 1)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
/* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
ret = alloc_data(&iov.data, blocksize);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Initialize the input block. */
if (in_constant->length == blocksize) {
memcpy(iov.data.data, in_constant->data, blocksize);
} else {
krb5int_nfold(in_constant->length * 8,
(unsigned char *) in_constant->data,
blocksize * 8, (unsigned char *) iov.data.data);
}
/* Loop encrypting the blocks until enough key bytes are generated. */
n = 0;
while (n < keybytes) {
ret = enc->encrypt(inkey, 0, &iov, 1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if ((keybytes - n) <= blocksize) {
memcpy(outrnd->data + n, iov.data.data, (keybytes - n));
break;
}
memcpy(outrnd->data + n, iov.data.data, blocksize);
n += blocksize;
}
cleanup:
zapfree(iov.data.data, blocksize);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_mk_priv(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context authcon,
const krb5_data *userdata, krb5_data *der_out,
krb5_replay_data *rdata_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_key key;
krb5_replay_data rdata;
krb5_data der_krbpriv = empty_data();
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_address *local_addr, *remote_addr, lstorage, rstorage;
*der_out = empty_data();
memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
memset(&lstorage, 0, sizeof(lstorage));
memset(&rstorage, 0, sizeof(rstorage));
if (!authcon->local_addr)
return KRB5_LOCAL_ADDR_REQUIRED;
ret = k5_privsafe_gen_rdata(context, authcon, &rdata, rdata_out);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_privsafe_gen_addrs(context, authcon, &lstorage, &rstorage,
&local_addr, &remote_addr);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
key = (authcon->send_subkey != NULL) ? authcon->send_subkey : authcon->key;
ret = create_krbpriv(context, userdata, key, &rdata, local_addr,
remote_addr, &authcon->cstate, &der_krbpriv, &enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_privsafe_check_replay(context, authcon, NULL, &enc, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*der_out = der_krbpriv;
der_krbpriv = empty_data();
if ((authcon->auth_context_flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) ||
(authcon->auth_context_flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE))
authcon->local_seq_number++;
cleanup:
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &der_krbpriv);
zapfree(enc.ciphertext.data, enc.ciphertext.length);
free(lstorage.contents);
free(rstorage.contents);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_dk_cmac_encrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
{
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer, *padding;
krb5_data cksum = empty_data();
krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL;
/* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */
/* Validate header and trailer lengths, and zero out padding length. */
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL || header->data.length < enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length < enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
padding = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING);
if (padding != NULL)
padding->data.length = 0;
/* Derive the encryption and integrity keys. */
ret = derive_keys(enc, key, usage, &ke, &ki);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Generate confounder. */
header->data.length = enc->block_size;
ret = krb5_c_random_make_octets(NULL, &header->data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Checksum the plaintext. */
ret = krb5int_cmac_checksum(enc, ki, data, num_data, &trailer->data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Encrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding) */
ret = enc->encrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki);
zapfree(cksum.data, cksum.length);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
k5_arcfour_docrypt(krb5_key key, const krb5_data *state, krb5_crypto_iov *data,
size_t num_data)
{
ArcfourContext *arcfour_ctx = NULL;
ArcFourCipherState *cipher_state = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t i;
if (key->keyblock.length != 16)
return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE;
if (state != NULL && (state->length != sizeof(ArcFourCipherState)))
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
if (state != NULL) {
cipher_state = (ArcFourCipherState *)state->data;
arcfour_ctx = &cipher_state->ctx;
if (cipher_state->initialized == 0) {
ret = k5_arcfour_init(arcfour_ctx, key->keyblock.contents,
key->keyblock.length);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
cipher_state->initialized = 1;
}
} else {
arcfour_ctx = (ArcfourContext *)malloc(sizeof(ArcfourContext));
if (arcfour_ctx == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ret = k5_arcfour_init(arcfour_ctx, key->keyblock.contents,
key->keyblock.length);
if (ret != 0) {
free(arcfour_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
krb5_crypto_iov *iov = &data[i];
if (ENCRYPT_IOV(iov))
k5_arcfour_crypt(arcfour_ctx, (unsigned char *)iov->data.data,
(const unsigned char *)iov->data.data, iov->data.length);
}
if (state == NULL)
zapfree(arcfour_ctx, sizeof(ArcfourContext));
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_k_make_checksum(krb5_context context, krb5_cksumtype cksumtype,
krb5_key key, krb5_keyusage usage,
const krb5_data *input, krb5_checksum *cksum)
{
const struct krb5_cksumtypes *ctp;
krb5_crypto_iov iov;
krb5_data cksum_data;
krb5_octet *trunc;
krb5_error_code ret;
if (cksumtype == 0) {
ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, key->keyblock.enctype,
&cksumtype);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
ctp = find_cksumtype(cksumtype);
if (ctp == NULL)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
ret = verify_key(ctp, key);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
ret = alloc_data(&cksum_data, ctp->compute_size);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
iov.flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov.data = *input;
ret = ctp->checksum(ctp, key, usage, &iov, 1, &cksum_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
cksum->magic = KV5M_CHECKSUM;
cksum->checksum_type = cksumtype;
cksum->length = ctp->output_size;
cksum->contents = (krb5_octet *) cksum_data.data;
cksum_data.data = NULL;
if (ctp->output_size < ctp->compute_size) {
trunc = realloc(cksum->contents, ctp->output_size);
if (trunc != NULL)
cksum->contents = trunc;
}
cleanup:
zapfree(cksum_data.data, ctp->compute_size);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_c_string_to_key_with_params(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype enctype,
const krb5_data *string,
const krb5_data *salt,
const krb5_data *params, krb5_keyblock *key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp;
size_t keylength;
ktp = find_enctype(enctype);
if (ktp == NULL)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
keylength = ktp->enc->keylength;
/*
* xxx AFS string2key function is indicated by a special length in
* the salt in much of the code. However only the DES enctypes can
* deal with this. Using s2kparams would be a much better solution.
*/
if (salt && salt->length == SALT_TYPE_AFS_LENGTH) {
switch (enctype) {
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
break;
default:
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
}
}
key->contents = malloc(keylength);
if (key->contents == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
key->magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
key->enctype = enctype;
key->length = keylength;
ret = (*ktp->str2key)(ktp, string, salt, params, key);
if (ret) {
zapfree(key->contents, keylength);
key->length = 0;
key->contents = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_dk_cmac_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
{
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
krb5_data cksum = empty_data();
krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL;
/* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */
/* Validate header and trailer lengths. */
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL || header->data.length != enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length != enc->block_size)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
/* Derive the encryption and integrity keys. */
ret = derive_keys(enc, key, usage, &ke, &ki);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding). */
ret = enc->decrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Verify the hash. */
ret = alloc_data(&cksum, enc->block_size);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5int_cmac_checksum(enc, ki, data, num_data, &cksum);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (k5_bcmp(cksum.data, trailer->data.data, enc->block_size) != 0)
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
cleanup:
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki);
zapfree(cksum.data, cksum.length);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_derive_key(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_key *outkey,
const krb5_data *in_constant)
{
krb5_keyblock keyblock;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_key dkey;
*outkey = NULL;
/* Check for a cached result. */
dkey = find_cached_dkey(inkey->derived, in_constant);
if (dkey != NULL) {
*outkey = dkey;
return 0;
}
/* Derive into a temporary keyblock. */
keyblock.length = enc->keylength;
keyblock.contents = malloc(keyblock.length);
/* Set the enctype as the krb5_k_free_key will iterate over list
or derived keys and invoke krb5_k_free_key which will lookup
the enctype for key_cleanup handler */
keyblock.enctype = inkey->keyblock.enctype;
if (keyblock.contents == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ret = krb5int_derive_keyblock(enc, inkey, &keyblock, in_constant);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Cache the derived key. */
ret = add_cached_dkey(inkey, in_constant, &keyblock, &dkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
*outkey = dkey;
cleanup:
zapfree(keyblock.contents, keyblock.length);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_c_string_to_key_with_params(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype enctype,
const krb5_data *string,
const krb5_data *salt,
const krb5_data *params, krb5_keyblock *key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data empty = empty_data();
const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp;
size_t keylength;
ktp = find_enctype(enctype);
if (ktp == NULL)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
keylength = ktp->enc->keylength;
/* For compatibility with past behavior, treat a null salt as empty. */
if (salt == NULL)
salt = ∅
/* Fail gracefully if someone is using the old AFS string-to-key hack. */
if (salt->length == SALT_TYPE_AFS_LENGTH)
return EINVAL;
key->contents = malloc(keylength);
if (key->contents == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
key->magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
key->enctype = enctype;
key->length = keylength;
ret = (*ktp->str2key)(ktp, string, salt, params, key);
if (ret) {
zapfree(key->contents, keylength);
key->length = 0;
key->contents = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_derive_key(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_key *outkey,
const krb5_data *in_constant, enum deriv_alg alg)
{
krb5_keyblock keyblock;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_key dkey;
*outkey = NULL;
/* Check for a cached result. */
dkey = find_cached_dkey(inkey->derived, in_constant);
if (dkey != NULL) {
*outkey = dkey;
return 0;
}
/* Derive into a temporary keyblock. */
keyblock.length = enc->keylength;
keyblock.contents = malloc(keyblock.length);
keyblock.enctype = inkey->keyblock.enctype;
if (keyblock.contents == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
ret = krb5int_derive_keyblock(enc, inkey, &keyblock, in_constant, alg);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Cache the derived key. */
ret = add_cached_dkey(inkey, in_constant, &keyblock, &dkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
*outkey = dkey;
cleanup:
zapfree(keyblock.contents, keyblock.length);
return ret;
}
/* Derive a key by XOR with 0xF0 bytes. */
static krb5_error_code
mk_xorkey(krb5_key origkey, krb5_key *xorkey)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned char *xorbytes;
krb5_keyblock xorkeyblock;
size_t i = 0;
xorbytes = k5memdup(origkey->keyblock.contents, origkey->keyblock.length,
&retval);
if (xorbytes == NULL)
return retval;
for (i = 0; i < origkey->keyblock.length; i++)
xorbytes[i] ^= 0xf0;
/* Do a shallow copy here. */
xorkeyblock = origkey->keyblock;
xorkeyblock.contents = xorbytes;
retval = krb5_k_create_key(0, &xorkeyblock, xorkey);
zapfree(xorbytes, sizeof(xorbytes));
return retval;
}
/* Construct an AP-REQ message for a TGS request. */
static krb5_error_code
tgs_construct_ap_req(krb5_context context, krb5_data *checksum_data,
krb5_creds *tgt, krb5_keyblock *subkey,
krb5_data **ap_req_asn1_out)
{
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_checksum checksum;
krb5_authenticator authent;
krb5_ap_req ap_req;
krb5_data *authent_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_enc_data authent_enc;
*ap_req_asn1_out = NULL;
memset(&checksum, 0, sizeof(checksum));
memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req));
memset(&authent_enc, 0, sizeof(authent_enc));
/* Determine the authenticator checksum type. */
switch (tgt->keyblock.enctype) {
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP:
cksumtype = context->kdc_req_sumtype;
break;
default:
ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, tgt->keyblock.enctype,
&cksumtype);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/* Generate checksum. */
ret = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, &tgt->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, checksum_data,
&checksum);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Construct, encode, and encrypt an authenticator. */
authent.subkey = subkey;
authent.seq_number = 0;
authent.checksum = &checksum;
authent.client = tgt->client;
authent.authorization_data = tgt->authdata;
ret = krb5_us_timeofday(context, &authent.ctime, &authent.cusec);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = encode_krb5_authenticator(&authent, &authent_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, &tgt->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH, authent_asn1,
&authent_enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = decode_krb5_ticket(&tgt->ticket, &ticket);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encode the AP-REQ. */
ap_req.authenticator = authent_enc;
ap_req.ticket = ticket;
ret = encode_krb5_ap_req(&ap_req, ap_req_asn1_out);
cleanup:
free(checksum.contents);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &authent_enc.ciphertext);
if (authent_asn1 != NULL)
zapfree(authent_asn1->data, authent_asn1->length);
free(authent_asn1);
return ret;
}
/* Construct a cookie pa-data item using the cookie values from state, or a
* trivial "MIT" cookie if no values are set. */
krb5_error_code
kdc_fast_make_cookie(krb5_context context, struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt,
krb5_const_principal client_princ,
krb5_pa_data **cookie_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_secure_cookie cookie;
krb5_pa_data **contents = state->out_cookie_padata, *pa;
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_data *der_cookie = NULL;
krb5_kvno kvno;
size_t ctlen;
*cookie_out = NULL;
memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
/* Make a trivial cookie if there are no contents to marshal or we don't
* have a TGT entry to encrypt them. */
if (contents == NULL || *contents == NULL || local_tgt == NULL)
return make_padata(KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "MIT", 3, cookie_out);
ret = get_cookie_key(context, local_tgt, 0, client_princ, &key, &kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encode the cookie. */
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
cookie.time = now;
cookie.data = contents;
ret = encode_krb5_secure_cookie(&cookie, &der_cookie);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encrypt the cookie in key. */
ret = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, key->enctype, der_cookie->length,
&ctlen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_data(&enc.ciphertext, ctlen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_c_encrypt(context, key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_FX_COOKIE, NULL,
der_cookie, &enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Construct the cookie pa-data entry. */
ret = alloc_padata(KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, 8 + enc.ciphertext.length, &pa);
memcpy(pa->contents, "MIT1", 4);
store_32_be(kvno, pa->contents + 4);
memcpy(pa->contents + 8, enc.ciphertext.data, enc.ciphertext.length);
*cookie_out = pa;
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
if (der_cookie != NULL) {
zapfree(der_cookie->data, der_cookie->length);
free(der_cookie);
}
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &enc.ciphertext);
return ret;
}
/*
* Locate and decode the FAST cookie in req, storing its contents in state for
* later access by preauth modules. If the cookie is expired, return
* KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED if its contents are relevant to req, and ignore
* it if they aren't.
*/
krb5_error_code
kdc_fast_read_cookie(krb5_context context, struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *req, krb5_db_entry *local_tgt)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_secure_cookie *cookie = NULL;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_pa_data *pa;
krb5_kvno kvno;
krb5_data plain = empty_data();
pa = krb5int_find_pa_data(context, req->padata, KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE);
if (pa == NULL)
return 0;
/* If it's not an MIT version 1 cookie, ignore it. It may be an empty
* "MIT" cookie or a cookie generated by a different KDC implementation. */
if (pa->length <= 8 || memcmp(pa->contents, "MIT1", 4) != 0)
return 0;
/* Extract the kvno and generate the corresponding cookie key. */
kvno = load_32_be(pa->contents + 4);
ret = get_cookie_key(context, local_tgt, kvno, req->client, &key, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt and decode the cookie. */
memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
enc.enctype = key->enctype;
enc.ciphertext = make_data(pa->contents + 8, pa->length - 8);
ret = alloc_data(&plain, pa->length - 8);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_c_decrypt(context, key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_FX_COOKIE, NULL, &enc,
&plain);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = decode_krb5_secure_cookie(&plain, &cookie);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Check if the cookie is expired. */
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (now - COOKIE_LIFETIME > cookie->time) {
/* Don't accept the cookie contents. Only return an error if the
* cookie is relevant to the request. */
if (is_relevant(cookie->data, req->padata))
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Steal the pa-data list pointer from the cookie and store it in state. */
state->in_cookie_padata = cookie->data;
cookie->data = NULL;
cleanup:
zapfree(plain.data, plain.length);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
k5_free_secure_cookie(context, cookie);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_c_combine_keys(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key1,
krb5_keyblock *key2, krb5_keyblock *outkey)
{
unsigned char *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *combined = NULL, *rnd = NULL;
unsigned char *output = NULL;
size_t keybytes, keylength;
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc;
krb5_data input, randbits;
krb5_keyblock tkeyblock;
krb5_key tkey = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp;
krb5_boolean myalloc = FALSE;
if (!enctype_ok(key1->enctype) || !enctype_ok(key2->enctype))
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
if (key1->length != key2->length || key1->enctype != key2->enctype)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
/* Find our encryption algorithm. */
ktp = find_enctype(key1->enctype);
if (ktp == NULL)
return KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE;
enc = ktp->enc;
keybytes = enc->keybytes;
keylength = enc->keylength;
/* Allocate and set up buffers. */
r1 = k5alloc(keybytes, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
r2 = k5alloc(keybytes, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
rnd = k5alloc(keybytes, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
combined = k5alloc(keybytes * 2, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
output = k5alloc(keylength, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Get R1 and R2 (by running the input keys through the DR algorithm.
* Note this is most of derive-key, but not all.
*/
input.length = key2->length;
input.data = (char *) key2->contents;
ret = dr(enc, key1, r1, &input);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
input.length = key1->length;
input.data = (char *) key1->contents;
ret = dr(enc, key2, r2, &input);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Concatenate the two keys together, and then run them through
* n-fold to reduce them to a length appropriate for the random-to-key
* operation. Note here that krb5int_nfold() takes sizes in bits, hence
* the multiply by 8.
*/
memcpy(combined, r1, keybytes);
memcpy(combined + keybytes, r2, keybytes);
krb5int_nfold((keybytes * 2) * 8, combined, keybytes * 8, rnd);
/*
* Run the "random" bits through random-to-key to produce a encryption
* key.
*/
randbits.length = keybytes;
randbits.data = (char *) rnd;
tkeyblock.length = keylength;
tkeyblock.contents = output;
ret = (*ktp->rand2key)(&randbits, &tkeyblock);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &tkeyblock, &tkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Run through derive-key one more time to produce the final key.
* Note that the input to derive-key is the ASCII string "combine".
*/
input.length = 7;
input.data = "combine";
/*
* Just FYI: _if_ we have space here in the key, then simply use it
* without modification. But if the key is blank (no allocated storage)
* then allocate some memory for it. This allows programs to use one of
* the existing keys as the output key, _or_ pass in a blank keyblock
* for us to allocate. It's easier for us to allocate it since we already
* know the crypto library internals
*/
if (outkey->length == 0 || outkey->contents == NULL) {
outkey->contents = k5alloc(keylength, &ret);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
outkey->length = keylength;
outkey->enctype = key1->enctype;
myalloc = TRUE;
}
ret = krb5int_derive_keyblock(enc, tkey, outkey, &input, DERIVE_RFC3961);
if (ret) {
if (myalloc) {
free(outkey->contents);
outkey->contents = NULL;
}
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
zapfree(r1, keybytes);
zapfree(r2, keybytes);
zapfree(rnd, keybytes);
zapfree(combined, keybytes * 2);
zapfree(output, keylength);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, tkey);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
process_chpw_request(krb5_context context, void *server_handle, char *realm,
krb5_keytab keytab, const krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *req,
krb5_data *rep)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
char *ptr;
unsigned int plen, vno;
krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep = empty_data();
krb5_data cipher = empty_data(), clear = empty_data();
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_principal changepw = NULL;
krb5_principal client, target = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_replay_data replay;
krb5_error krberror;
int numresult;
char strresult[1024];
char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t clen;
char *cdots;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t salen;
char addrbuf[100];
krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address;
*rep = empty_data();
if (req->length < 4) {
/* either this, or the server is printing bad messages,
or the caller passed in garbage */
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
ptr = req->data;
/* verify length */
plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (plen != req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request length was inconsistent",
sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
/* verify version number */
vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ;
vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION;
snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult),
"Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno);
goto bailout;
}
/* read, check ap-req length */
ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff);
ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff);
if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ",
sizeof(strresult));
goto bailout;
}
/* verify ap_req */
ap_req.data = ptr;
ptr += ap_req.length;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab,
NULL, &ticket);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* construct the ap-rep */
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */
cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr;
cipher.data = ptr;
/*
* Don't set a remote address in auth_context before calling krb5_rd_priv,
* so that we can work against clients behind a NAT. Reflection attacks
* aren't a concern since we use sequence numbers and since our requests
* don't look anything like our responses. Also don't set a local address,
* since we don't know what interface the request was received on.
*/
ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
client = ticket->enc_part2->client;
/* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
krb5_data *clear_data;
ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
clear = *clear_data;
free(clear_data);
if (target != NULL) {
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr);
if (ret != 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
}
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */
if (vno == 1 &&
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED;
strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password",
sizeof(strresult));
goto chpwfail;
}
/* change the password */
ptr = k5memdup0(clear.data, clear.length, &ret);
ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target,
(ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0,
ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult));
if (ret)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
/* zap the password */
zapfree(clear.data, clear.length);
zapfree(ptr, clear.length);
clear = empty_data();
clen = strlen(clientstr);
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
switch (addr->addrtype) {
case ADDRTYPE_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss);
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin);
break;
}
case ADDRTYPE_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss);
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length);
sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port);
salen = sizeof(*sin6);
break;
}
default: {
struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss);
sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC;
salen = sizeof(*sa);
break;
}
}
if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen,
addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0)
strlcpy(addrbuf, "<unprintable>", sizeof(addrbuf));
if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) {
size_t tlen;
char *tdots;
const char *targetp;
if (target == NULL) {
tlen = clen;
tdots = cdots;
targetp = targetstr;
} else {
tlen = strlen(targetstr);
trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots);
targetp = clientstr;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for "
"%.*s%s: %s"), addrbuf, (int) clen,
clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s"),
addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots,
errmsg ? errmsg : "success");
}
switch (ret) {
case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED;
break;
case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT:
case KADM5_PASS_REUSE:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT:
case KADM5_PASS_Q_GENERIC:
case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR;
break;
case 0:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS;
strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult));
break;
default:
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
break;
}
chpwfail:
ret = alloc_data(&clear, 2 + strlen(strresult));
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = clear.data;
*ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = numresult & 0xff;
memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult));
cipher = empty_data();
if (ap_rep.length) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context,
local_faddr->address, NULL);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult,
"Failed storing client and server internet addresses",
sizeof(strresult));
} else {
ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher,
&replay);
if (ret) {
numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR;
strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply",
sizeof(strresult));
}
}
}
/* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR.
if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */
if (cipher.length == 0) {
/* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the
reply */
if (ap_rep.length) {
free(ap_rep.data);
ap_rep = empty_data();
}
krberror.ctime = 0;
krberror.cusec = 0;
krberror.susec = 0;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
/* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers
to mk_error do. */
krberror.error = ret;
krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > KRB_ERR_MAX)
krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krberror.client = NULL;
ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server,
strlen(realm), realm,
"kadmin", "changepw", NULL);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
krberror.text.length = 0;
krberror.e_data = clear;
ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher);
krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
}
/* construct the reply */
ret = alloc_data(rep, 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length);
if (ret)
goto bailout;
ptr = rep->data;
/* length */
*ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff;
/* version == 0x0001 big-endian */
*ptr++ = 0;
*ptr++ = 1;
/* ap_rep length, big-endian */
*ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff;
*ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff;
/* ap-rep data */
if (ap_rep.length) {
memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length);
ptr += ap_rep.length;
}
/* krb-priv or krb-error */
memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length);
bailout:
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
krb5_free_principal(context, changepw);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
free(ap_rep.data);
free(clear.data);
free(cipher.data);
krb5_free_principal(context, target);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr);
krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg);
return ret;
}
/*
* NIST SP800-108 KDF in feedback mode (section 5.2).
* Parameters:
* - CMAC (with enc as the enc provider) is the PRF.
* - A block counter of four bytes is used.
* - Label is the key derivation constant.
* - Context is empty.
* - Four bytes are used to encode the output length in the PRF input.
*/
static krb5_error_code
derive_random_sp800_108_cmac(const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc,
krb5_key inkey, krb5_data *outrnd,
const krb5_data *in_constant)
{
size_t blocksize, keybytes, n;
krb5_crypto_iov iov[6];
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data prf;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char ibuf[4], Lbuf[4];
blocksize = enc->block_size;
keybytes = enc->keybytes;
if (inkey->keyblock.length != enc->keylength || outrnd->length != keybytes)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
/* Allocate encryption data buffer. */
ret = alloc_data(&prf, blocksize);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* K(i-1): the previous block of PRF output, initially all-zeros. */
iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[0].data = prf;
/* [i]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the block counter */
iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[1].data = make_data(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf));
/* Label: the fixed derived-key input */
iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[2].data = *in_constant;
/* 0x00: separator byte */
iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[3].data = make_data("", 1);
/* Context: (unused) */
iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[4].data = empty_data();
/* [L]2: four-byte big-endian binary string giving the output length */
iov[5].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[5].data = make_data(Lbuf, sizeof(Lbuf));
store_32_be(outrnd->length * 8, Lbuf);
for (i = 1, n = 0; n < keybytes; i++) {
/* Update the block counter. */
store_32_be(i, ibuf);
/* Compute a CMAC checksum, storing the result into K(i-1). */
ret = krb5int_cmac_checksum(enc, inkey, iov, 6, &prf);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Copy the result into the appropriate part of the output buffer. */
if (keybytes - n <= blocksize) {
memcpy(outrnd->data + n, prf.data, keybytes - n);
break;
}
memcpy(outrnd->data + n, prf.data, blocksize);
n += blocksize;
}
cleanup:
zapfree(prf.data, blocksize);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_arcfour_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
{
const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = ktp->hash;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
krb5_keyblock *usage_keyblock = NULL, *enc_keyblock = NULL;
krb5_data checksum, header_data, comp_checksum = empty_data();
header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL ||
header->data.length != hash->hashsize + CONFOUNDERLENGTH)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
header_data = header->data;
trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->data.length != 0)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
/* Allocate buffers. */
ret = alloc_data(&comp_checksum, hash->hashsize);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5int_c_init_keyblock(NULL, key->keyblock.enctype, enc->keybytes,
&usage_keyblock);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5int_c_init_keyblock(NULL, key->keyblock.enctype, enc->keybytes,
&enc_keyblock);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
checksum = make_data(header->data.data, hash->hashsize);
/* Adjust pointers so confounder is at start of header. */
header->data.length -= hash->hashsize;
header->data.data += hash->hashsize;
/* We may have to try two usage values; see below. */
do {
/* Derive a usage key from the session key and usage. */
ret = usage_key(enc, hash, &key->keyblock, usage, usage_keyblock);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Derive the encryption key from the usage key and checksum. */
ret = enc_key(enc, hash, usage_keyblock, &checksum, enc_keyblock);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Decrypt the ciphertext. */
ret = keyblock_crypt(enc, enc_keyblock, ivec, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Compute HMAC(usage key, plaintext) to get the checksum. */
ret = krb5int_hmac_keyblock(hash, usage_keyblock, data, num_data,
&comp_checksum);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (k5_bcmp(checksum.data, comp_checksum.data, hash->hashsize) != 0) {
if (usage == 9) {
/*
* RFC 4757 specifies usage 8 for TGS-REP encrypted parts
* encrypted in a subkey, but the value used by MS is actually
* 9. We now use 9 to start with, but fall back to 8 on
* failure in case we are communicating with a KDC using the
* value from the RFC. ivec is always NULL in this case.
* We need to re-encrypt the data in the wrong key first.
*/
ret = keyblock_crypt(enc, enc_keyblock, NULL, data, num_data);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
usage = 8;
continue;
}
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
goto cleanup;
}
break;
} while (1);
cleanup:
header->data = header_data; /* Restore header pointers. */
krb5int_c_free_keyblock(NULL, usage_keyblock);
krb5int_c_free_keyblock(NULL, enc_keyblock);
zapfree(comp_checksum.data, comp_checksum.length);
return ret;
}
static void
aes_key_cleanup(krb5_key key)
{
zapfree(key->cache, sizeof(struct aes_key_info_cache));
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_hmac_keyblock(const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash,
const krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
const krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data,
krb5_data *output)
{
unsigned char *xorkey = NULL, *ihash = NULL;
unsigned int i;
krb5_crypto_iov *ihash_iov = NULL, ohash_iov[2];
krb5_data hashout;
krb5_error_code ret;
if (keyblock->length > hash->blocksize)
return KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
if (output->length < hash->hashsize)
return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
/* Allocate space for the xor key, hash input vector, and inner hash */
xorkey = k5alloc(hash->blocksize, &ret);
if (xorkey == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ihash = k5alloc(hash->hashsize, &ret);
if (ihash == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ihash_iov = k5calloc(num_data + 1, sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov), &ret);
if (ihash_iov == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* Create the inner padded key. */
memset(xorkey, 0x36, hash->blocksize);
for (i = 0; i < keyblock->length; i++)
xorkey[i] ^= keyblock->contents[i];
/* Compute the inner hash over the inner key and input data. */
ihash_iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
ihash_iov[0].data = make_data(xorkey, hash->blocksize);
memcpy(ihash_iov + 1, data, num_data * sizeof(krb5_crypto_iov));
hashout = make_data(ihash, hash->hashsize);
ret = hash->hash(ihash_iov, num_data + 1, &hashout);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Create the outer padded key. */
memset(xorkey, 0x5c, hash->blocksize);
for (i = 0; i < keyblock->length; i++)
xorkey[i] ^= keyblock->contents[i];
/* Compute the outer hash over the outer key and inner hash value. */
ohash_iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
ohash_iov[0].data = make_data(xorkey, hash->blocksize);
ohash_iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
ohash_iov[1].data = make_data(ihash, hash->hashsize);
output->length = hash->hashsize;
ret = hash->hash(ohash_iov, 2, output);
if (ret != 0)
memset(output->data, 0, output->length);
cleanup:
zapfree(xorkey, hash->blocksize);
zapfree(ihash, hash->hashsize);
free(ihash_iov);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
krb5int_dk_string_to_key(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp,
const krb5_data *string, const krb5_data *salt,
const krb5_data *parms, krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t keybytes, keylength, concatlen;
unsigned char *concat = NULL, *foldstring = NULL, *foldkeydata = NULL;
krb5_data indata;
krb5_keyblock foldkeyblock;
krb5_key foldkey = NULL;
/* keyblock->length is checked by krb5int_derive_key. */
keybytes = ktp->enc->keybytes;
keylength = ktp->enc->keylength;
concatlen = string->length + salt->length;
concat = k5alloc(concatlen, &ret);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
foldstring = k5alloc(keybytes, &ret);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
foldkeydata = k5alloc(keylength, &ret);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* construct input string ( = string + salt), fold it, make_key it */
if (string->length > 0)
memcpy(concat, string->data, string->length);
if (salt->length > 0)
memcpy(concat + string->length, salt->data, salt->length);
krb5int_nfold(concatlen*8, concat, keybytes*8, foldstring);
indata.length = keybytes;
indata.data = (char *) foldstring;
foldkeyblock.length = keylength;
foldkeyblock.contents = foldkeydata;
foldkeyblock.enctype = ktp->etype;
ret = ktp->rand2key(&indata, &foldkeyblock);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &foldkeyblock, &foldkey);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* now derive the key from this one */
indata.length = kerberos_len;
indata.data = (char *) kerberos;
ret = krb5int_derive_keyblock(ktp->enc, NULL, foldkey, keyblock, &indata,
DERIVE_RFC3961);
if (ret != 0)
memset(keyblock->contents, 0, keyblock->length);
cleanup:
zapfree(concat, concatlen);
zapfree(foldstring, keybytes);
zapfree(foldkeydata, keylength);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, foldkey);
return ret;
}
