/*
* @returns: the number of bytes sent, if succeeds
* -1, if fails
*/
int _condorOutMsg::sendMsg(const int sock,
const condor_sockaddr& who,
_condorMsgID msgID,
unsigned char * mac)
{
_condorPacket* tempPkt;
int seqNo = 0, msgLen = 0, sent;
int total = 0;
unsigned char * md = mac;
//char str[10000];
if(headPacket->empty()) // empty message
return 0;
while(headPacket != lastPacket) {
tempPkt = headPacket;
headPacket = headPacket->next;
tempPkt->makeHeader(false, seqNo++, msgID, md);
msgLen += tempPkt->length;
sent = condor_sendto(sock, tempPkt->dataGram,
tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE,
0, who);
if(sent != tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "sendMsg:sendto failed - errno: %d\n", errno);
headPacket = tempPkt;
clearMsg();
return -1;
}
//int i;
//str[0] = 0;
//for (i=0; i<tempPkt->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
// sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", tempPkt->dataGram[i]);
//}
//dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);
dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n",
who.to_sinful().Value());
total += sent;
delete tempPkt;
md = 0;
}
// headPacket = lastPacket
if(seqNo == 0) { // a short message
msgLen = lastPacket->length;
lastPacket->makeHeader(true, 0, msgID, md);
// Short messages are sent without initial "magic" header,
// because we don't need to specify sequence number,
// and presumably for backwards compatibility with ancient
// versions of Condor. The crypto header may still
// be there, since that is in the buffer starting at
// the position pointed to by "data".
sent = condor_sendto(sock, lastPacket->data, lastPacket->length,
0, who);
if(sent != lastPacket->length) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS,
"SafeMsg: sending small msg failed. errno: %d\n",
errno );
headPacket->reset();
return -1;
}
//str[0] = 0;
//for (i=0; i<lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
// sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", lastPacket->dataGram[i]);
//}
//dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);
dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n", who.to_sinful().Value());
total = sent;
}
else {
lastPacket->makeHeader(true, seqNo, msgID, md);
msgLen += lastPacket->length;
sent = condor_sendto(sock, lastPacket->dataGram,
lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE,
0, who);
if(sent != lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "SafeMsg: sending last packet failed. errno: %d\n", errno );
headPacket->reset();
return -1;
}
//str[0] = 0;
//for (i=0; i<lastPacket->length + SAFE_MSG_HEADER_SIZE; i++) {
// sprintf(&str[strlen(str)], "%02x,", lastPacket->dataGram[i]);
//}
//dprintf(D_NETWORK, "--->packet [%d bytes]: %s\n", sent, str);
dprintf( D_NETWORK, "SEND [%d] %s ", sent, sock_to_string(sock) );
dprintf( D_NETWORK|D_NOHEADER, "%s\n", who.to_sinful().Value());
total += sent;
}
headPacket->reset();
noMsgSent++;
if(noMsgSent == 1)
avgMsgSize = msgLen;
else
avgMsgSize = ((noMsgSent - 1) * avgMsgSize + msgLen) / noMsgSent;
return total;
}
int
IpVerify::Verify( DCpermission perm, const condor_sockaddr& addr, const char * user, MyString *allow_reason, MyString *deny_reason )
{
perm_mask_t mask;
in6_addr sin6_addr;
const char *thehost;
const char * who = user;
MyString peer_description; // we build this up as we go along (DNS etc.)
if( !did_init ) {
Init();
}
/*
* Be Warned: careful about parameter "sin" being NULL. It could be, in
* which case we should return FALSE (unless perm is ALLOW)
*
*/
switch ( perm ) {
case ALLOW:
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
break;
}
sin6_addr = addr.to_ipv6_address();
mask = 0; // must initialize to zero because we logical-or bits into this
if (who == NULL || *who == '\0') {
who = TotallyWild;
}
if ( perm >= LAST_PERM || !PermTypeArray[perm] ) {
EXCEPT("IpVerify::Verify: called with unknown permission %d\n",perm);
}
// see if a authorization hole has been dyamically punched (via
// PunchHole) for this perm / user / IP
// Note that the permission hierarchy is dealt with in
// PunchHole(), by punching a hole for all implied levels.
// Therefore, if there is a hole or an implied hole, we will
// always find it here before we get into the subsequent code
// which recursively calls Verify() to traverse the hierarchy.
// This is important, because we do not want holes to find
// there way into the authorization cache.
//
if ( PunchedHoleArray[perm] != NULL ) {
HolePunchTable_t* hpt = PunchedHoleArray[perm];
MyString ip_str_buf = addr.to_ip_string();
const char* ip_str = ip_str_buf.Value();
MyString id_with_ip;
MyString id;
int count;
if ( who != TotallyWild ) {
id_with_ip.sprintf("%s/%s", who, ip_str);
id = who;
if ( hpt->lookup(id, count) != -1 ) {
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
PermString(perm), id.Value() );
}
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
if ( hpt->lookup(id_with_ip, count) != -1 ) {
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
PermString(perm), id_with_ip.Value() );
}
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
}
id = ip_str;
if ( hpt->lookup(id, count) != -1 ) {
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
PermString(perm), id.Value() );
}
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
}
if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_ALLOW ) {
// allow if no HOSTALLOW_* or HOSTDENY_* restrictions
// specified.
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy allows access by anyone",
PermString(perm));
}
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_DENY ) {
// deny
if( deny_reason ) {
deny_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy denies all access",
PermString(perm));
}
return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
if( LookupCachedVerifyResult(perm,sin6_addr,who,mask) ) {
if( deny_reason && (mask&deny_mask(perm)) ) {
deny_reason->sprintf(
"cached result for %s; see first case for the full reason",
PermString(perm));
}
else if( allow_reason && (mask&allow_mask(perm)) ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"cached result for %s; see first case for the full reason",
PermString(perm));
}
}
else {
mask = 0;
// if the deny bit is already set, skip further DENY analysis
perm_mask_t const deny_resolved = deny_mask(perm);
// if the allow or deny bit is already set,
// skip further ALLOW analysis
perm_mask_t const allow_resolved = allow_mask(perm)|deny_mask(perm);
// check for matching subnets in ip/mask style
char ipstr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = { 0, };
addr.to_ip_string(ipstr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);
peer_description = addr.to_ip_string();
if ( !(mask&deny_resolved) && lookup_user_ip_deny(perm,who,ipstr)) {
mask |= deny_mask(perm);
if( deny_reason ) {
deny_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy denies IP address %s",
PermString(perm), addr.to_ip_string().Value() );
}
}
if ( !(mask&allow_resolved) && lookup_user_ip_allow(perm,who,ipstr)) {
mask |= allow_mask(perm);
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy allows IP address %s",
PermString(perm), addr.to_ip_string().Value() );
}
}
std::vector<MyString> hostnames;
// now scan through hostname strings
if( !(mask&allow_resolved) || !(mask&deny_resolved) ) {
hostnames = get_hostname_with_alias(addr);
}
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < hostnames.size(); ++i) {
thehost = hostnames[i].Value();
peer_description.append_to_list(thehost);
if ( !(mask&deny_resolved) && lookup_user_host_deny(perm,who,thehost) ) {
mask |= deny_mask(perm);
if( deny_reason ) {
deny_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy denies hostname %s",
PermString(perm), thehost );
}
}
if ( !(mask&allow_resolved) && lookup_user_host_allow(perm,who,thehost) ) {
mask |= allow_mask(perm);
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy allows hostname %s",
PermString(perm), thehost );
}
}
}
// if we found something via our hostname or subnet mactching, we now have
// a mask, and we should add it into our table so we need not
// do a gethostbyaddr() next time. if we still do not have a mask
// (perhaps because this host doesn't appear in any list), create one
// and then add to the table.
// But first, check our parent permission levels in the
// authorization heirarchy.
// DAEMON and ADMINISTRATOR imply WRITE.
// WRITE, NEGOTIATOR, and CONFIG_PERM imply READ.
bool determined_by_parent = false;
if ( mask == 0 ) {
if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_ONLY_DENIES ) {
dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: %s at %s not matched to deny list, so allowing.\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value());
if( allow_reason ) {
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy does not deny, so allowing",
PermString(perm));
}
mask |= allow_mask(perm);
} else {
DCpermissionHierarchy hierarchy( perm );
DCpermission const *parent_perms =
hierarchy.getPermsIAmDirectlyImpliedBy();
bool parent_allowed = false;
for( ; *parent_perms != LAST_PERM; parent_perms++ ) {
if( Verify( *parent_perms, addr, user, allow_reason, NULL ) == USER_AUTH_SUCCESS ) {
determined_by_parent = true;
parent_allowed = true;
dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: allowing %s at %s for %s because %s is allowed\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value(),PermString(perm),PermString(*parent_perms));
if( allow_reason ) {
MyString tmp = *allow_reason;
allow_reason->sprintf(
"%s is implied by %s; %s",
PermString(perm),
PermString(*parent_perms),
tmp.Value());
}
break;
}
}
if( parent_allowed ) {
mask |= allow_mask(perm);
}
else {
mask |= deny_mask(perm);
if( !determined_by_parent && deny_reason ) {
// We don't just allow anyone, and this request
// did not match any of the entries we do allow.
// In case the reason we didn't match is
// because of a typo or a DNS problem, record
// all the hostnames we searched for.
deny_reason->sprintf(
"%s authorization policy contains no matching "
"ALLOW entry for this request"
"; identifiers used for this host: %s, hostname size = %lu, "
"original ip address = %s",
PermString(perm),
peer_description.Value(),
(unsigned long)hostnames.size(),
ipstr);
}
}
}
}
if( !determined_by_parent && (mask&allow_mask(perm)) ) {
// In case we are allowing because of not matching a DENY
// entry that the user expected us to match (e.g. because
// of typo or DNS problem), record all the hostnames we
// searched for.
if( allow_reason && !peer_description.IsEmpty() ) {
allow_reason->sprintf_cat(
"; identifiers used for this remote host: %s",
peer_description.Value());
}
}
// finally, add the mask we computed into the table with this IP addr
add_hash_entry(sin6_addr, who, mask);
} // end of if find_match is FALSE
// decode the mask and return True or False to the user.
if ( mask & deny_mask(perm) ) {
return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
if ( mask & allow_mask(perm) ) {
return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
}