RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
if (pool == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->min_len = min_len;
pool->max_len = max_len;
pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->requested_entropy = entropy;
return pool;
err:
OPENSSL_free(pool);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
* the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
* The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ?
OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
NULL, NULL))
goto err;
return drbg;
err:
if (drbg->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg);
else
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and
* initializes it with default settings.
* A global lock for the DRBG is created with the given name.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(const char *name, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
if (name == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
drbg = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(RAND_DRBG));
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_glock_new(name);
if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
goto err;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg,
RAND_DRBG_NID, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) != 1)
goto err;
if (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, NULL, NULL) != 1)
goto err;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
} else {
drbg->parent = parent;
drbg->reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
}
/* enable seed propagation */
drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
/*
* Ignore instantiation error so support just-in-time instantiation.
*
* The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
* an automatic recovery is attempted.
*/
RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
(const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
return drbg;
err:
drbg_cleanup(drbg);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
* the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
* The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ?
OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
#endif
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
/*
* Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
* obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
*/
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
if (parent != NULL) {
rand_drbg_lock(parent);
if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
/*
* We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
* 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
*/
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
goto err;
}
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
return drbg;
err:
if (drbg->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg);
else
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
