krb5_error_code
_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
const krb5_data *req_buffer,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
int datagram_reply)
{
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
AS_REP rep;
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
HDB *clientdb;
krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype;
krb5_data e_data;
EncTicketPart et;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
const char *e_text = NULL;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Key *ckey, *skey;
EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key;
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
#ifdef PKINIT
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
#endif
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
ALLOC(rep.padata);
rep.padata->len = 0;
rep.padata->val = NULL;
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->sname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No server in request";
} else{
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&server_princ,
*(b->sname),
b->realm);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No client in request";
} else {
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&client_princ,
*(b->cname),
b->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
client_name, from, server_name);
/*
*
*/
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
} else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
"anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/*
*
*/
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
&clientdb, &client);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
NULL, NULL, &server);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name);
goto out;
} else if(ret){
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
/*
* Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
* supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
* the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
*
* The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
* to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
* enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
* decrypt.
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
NULL);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
"to use for the session key",
client_name, from);
goto out;
}
/*
* But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not
* the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
* the client list and hope that that will work for any other
* KDCs.
*/
/*
* Pre-auth processing
*/
if(req->padata){
int i;
const PA_DATA *pa;
int found_pa = 0;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
#ifdef PKINIT
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
if (pa == NULL) {
i = 0;
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
}
if (pa) {
char *client_cert = NULL;
ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto ts_enc;
}
if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
goto ts_enc;
ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
config,
clientdb,
client,
pkp,
&client_cert);
if (ret) {
e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
"impersonate principal";
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
pkp = NULL;
goto out;
}
found_pa = 1;
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, client_cert);
free(client_cert);
if (pkp)
goto preauth_done;
}
ts_enc:
#endif
if (client->entry.flags.locked_out) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
client_name);
i = 0;
e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
krb5_data ts_data;
PA_ENC_TS_ENC p;
size_t len;
EncryptedData enc_data;
Key *pa_key;
char *str;
found_pa = 1;
if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
goto out;
}
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&len);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
if(ret){
char *estr;
e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
estr = NULL;
if(estr == NULL)
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
enc_data.etype, client_name);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
estr, client_name);
free(estr);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
try_next_key:
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
&enc_data,
&ts_data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
/*
* Since the user might have several keys with the same
* enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
* the keys with the same enctype.
*/
if(ret){
krb5_error_code ret2;
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
free(str);
if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
goto try_next_key;
e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
(clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client, HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
continue;
}
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
ts_data.length,
&p,
&len);
krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
if(ret){
e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
kdc_log(context, config,
5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
client_name);
continue;
}
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
char client_time[100];
krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Too large time skew, "
"client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
client_time,
(unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
context->max_skew,
client_name);
/*
* The following is needed to make windows clients to
* retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
* there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
*/
e_text = NULL;
goto out;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt);
reply_key = &pa_key->key;
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret)
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 2,
"ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
free(str);
break;
}
#ifdef PKINIT
preauth_done:
#endif
if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
goto use_pa;
/* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
e_text = NULL;
goto out;
}
}else if (config->require_preauth
|| b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
METHOD_DATA method_data;
PA_DATA *pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
use_pa:
method_data.len = 0;
method_data.val = NULL;
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
if (ret) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
}
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
#ifdef PKINIT
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
if (ret) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
}
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
if (ret) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
}
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
#endif
/*
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
if (ret == 0) {
/*
* RFC4120 requires:
* - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
*
* Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
* the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
* that instead.
*/
if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
&method_data, ckey);
if (ret) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
}
}
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
&method_data, ckey);
if (ret) {
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
goto out;
}
}
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
e_data.data = buf;
e_data.length = len;
e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
/*
* Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
* with in a preauth mech.
*/
ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
server, server_name,
req, &e_data);
if(ret)
goto out;
if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
(clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS);
/*
* Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
* the client since the client never needs to read that data.
*/
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
server, server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
|| (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
e_text = "Bad KDC options";
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
if (ret)
goto out;
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
server->entry.principal);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types. */
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
#undef CNT
et.flags.initial = 1;
if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
else if (f.forwardable) {
e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
e_text = "Bad address list in requested";
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(et.starttime);
start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
et.flags.invalid = 1;
et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
}
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
if(client->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
if(server->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
#endif
et.endtime = t;
if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
f.renewable = 1;
if(b->rtime == NULL){
ALLOC(b->rtime);
*b->rtime = 0;
}
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
*b->rtime = *b->till;
}
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
t = *b->rtime;
if(t == 0)
t = MAX_TIME;
if(client->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
if(server->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
#endif
ALLOC(et.renew_till);
*et.renew_till = t;
et.flags.renewable = 1;
}
}
if (f.request_anonymous)
et.flags.anonymous = 1;
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
}
et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
*
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
*
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (client->entry.pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
ek.nonce = b->nonce;
if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
if (client->entry.pw_end)
*ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
*client->entry.pw_end);
else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
} else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
} else
ek.key_expiration = NULL;
ek.flags = et.flags;
ek.authtime = et.authtime;
if (et.starttime) {
ALLOC(ek.starttime);
*ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
}
ek.endtime = et.endtime;
if (et.renew_till) {
ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
*ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
}
copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
if(et.caddr){
ALLOC(ek.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
}
#if PKINIT
if (pkp) {
e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
&reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
config,
pkp,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
} else
#endif
{
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (reply_key == NULL) {
e_text = "Client have no reply key";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
goto out;
}
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
free(rep.padata);
rep.padata = NULL;
}
/* Add the PAC */
if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data data;
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
client->entry.principal,
&skey->key, /* Server key */
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
&data);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
&data);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
server,
setype,
client->entry.principal,
NULL,
NULL,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b);
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
&skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* */
if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(reply);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
e_text = "Reply packet too large";
}
out:
free_AS_REP(&rep);
if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE){
krb5_mk_error(context,
ret,
e_text,
(e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
client_princ,
server_princ,
NULL,
NULL,
reply);
ret = 0;
}
#ifdef PKINIT
if (pkp)
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
#endif
if (e_data.data)
free(e_data.data);
if (client_princ)
krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
free(client_name);
if (server_princ)
krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
free(server_name);
if(client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
if(server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
return ret;
}
krb5_error_code
_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
const krb5_data *req_buffer,
krb5_data *reply,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
int datagram_reply)
{
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
AS_REP rep;
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
krb5_enctype cetype, setype, sessionetype;
krb5_data e_data;
EncTicketPart et;
EncKDCRepPart ek;
krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
const char *e_text = NULL;
krb5_crypto crypto;
Key *ckey, *skey;
EncryptionKey *reply_key;
int flags = 0;
#ifdef PKINIT
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
#endif
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
if (f.canonicalize)
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
if(b->sname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No server in request";
} else{
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&server_princ,
*(b->sname),
b->realm);
if (ret == 0)
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
if(b->cname == NULL){
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
e_text = "No client in request";
} else {
if (b->cname->name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
if (b->cname->name_string.len != 1) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed canon request from %s, "
"enterprise name with %d name components",
from, b->cname->name_string.len);
ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, b->cname->name_string.val[0],
&client_princ);
if (ret)
goto out;
} else {
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
&client_princ,
*(b->cname),
b->realm);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
}
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
goto out;
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
client_name, from, server_name);
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL, &client);
if(ret){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name,
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT,
NULL, &server);
if(ret){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name,
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_windc_client_access(context, client, req);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_check_flags(context, config,
client, client_name,
server, server_name,
TRUE);
if(ret)
goto out;
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
if(req->padata){
int i;
const PA_DATA *pa;
int found_pa = 0;
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
#ifdef PKINIT
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
i = 0;
if ((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ)))
;
if (pa == NULL) {
i = 0;
if((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN)))
;
}
if (pa) {
char *client_cert = NULL;
ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, &pkp);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto ts_enc;
}
if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
goto ts_enc;
ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
config,
client,
pkp,
&client_cert);
if (ret) {
e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
"impersonate principal";
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
pkp = NULL;
goto out;
}
found_pa = 1;
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, client_cert);
free(client_cert);
if (pkp)
goto preauth_done;
}
ts_enc:
#endif
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
client_name);
i = 0;
e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
krb5_data ts_data;
PA_ENC_TS_ENC p;
size_t len;
EncryptedData enc_data;
Key *pa_key;
char *str;
found_pa = 1;
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&enc_data,
&len);
if (ret) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
if(ret){
char *estr;
e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
estr = NULL;
if(estr == NULL)
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
enc_data.etype, client_name);
else
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
estr, client_name);
free(estr);
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
try_next_key:
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
continue;
}
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
crypto,
KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
&enc_data,
&ts_data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(ret){
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret2)
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
"Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
"(enctype %s) error %s",
client_name,
str ? str : "unknown enctype",
krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
free(str);
if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
goto try_next_key;
e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
continue;
}
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
ts_data.length,
&p,
&len);
krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
if(ret){
e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
kdc_log(context, config,
5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
client_name);
continue;
}
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
char client_time[100];
krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Too large time skew, "
"client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
client_time,
(unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
context->max_skew,
client_name);
#if 0
/* This code is from samba, needs testing */
/*
* the following is needed to make windows clients
* to retry using the timestamp in the error message
*
* this is maybe a bug in windows to not trying when e_text
* is present...
*/
e_text = NULL;
#else
e_text = "Too large time skew";
#endif
goto out;
}
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
if (ret)
str = NULL;
kdc_log(context, config, 2,
"ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
free(str);
break;
}
#ifdef PKINIT
preauth_done:
#endif
if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
goto use_pa;
/* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
e_text = NULL;
goto out;
}
}else if (config->require_preauth
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
METHOD_DATA method_data;
PA_DATA *pa;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t len;
use_pa:
method_data.len = 0;
method_data.val = NULL;
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
#ifdef PKINIT
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
#endif
/*
* RFC4120 requires:
* - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
*/
/* XXX check ret */
if (only_older_enctype_p(req))
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
&method_data, &client->entry,
b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
/* XXX check ret */
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config, &method_data,
&client->entry, b->etype.val, b->etype.len);
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
e_data.data = buf;
e_data.length = len;
e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
/*
* Find the client key (for preauth ENC-TS verification and reply
* encryption). Then the best encryption type for the KDC and
* last the best session key that shared between the client and
* KDC runtime enctypes.
*/
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len,
&ckey, &cetype);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) has no support for etypes", client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
server, server_name,
&setype, &skey);
if(ret)
goto out;
/*
* Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto systems
* supported enctype, is supported by the client and is one of the
* enctype of the enctype of the krbtgt.
*
* The later is used as a hint what enctype all KDC are supporting
* to make sure a newer version of KDC wont generate a session
* enctype that and older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
* decrypt.
*
* But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "no
* the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
* the client list and hope that that will work for any other
* KDCs.
*/
{
const krb5_enctype *p;
krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
int i, j;
p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
sessionetype = ETYPE_NULL;
for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
continue;
for (j = 0; j < b->etype.len && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
Key *dummy;
/* check with client */
if (p[i] != b->etype.val[j])
continue;
/* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
clientbest = p[i];
/* check with krbtgt */
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &server->entry, p[i], &dummy);
if (ret)
continue;
sessionetype = p[i];
}
}
/* if krbtgt had no shared keys with client, pick clients best */
if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
sessionetype = clientbest;
} else if (sessionetype == ETYPE_NULL) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC"
"to use for the session key",
client_name, from);
goto out;
}
}
log_as_req(context, config, cetype, setype, b);
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
|| (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
rep.pvno = 5;
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
if (f.request_anonymous)
_kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
else
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname,
client->entry.principal);
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
server->entry.principal);
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
* uncomplicated name-types. */
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
#undef CNT
et.flags.initial = 1;
if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
else if (f.forwardable) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
else if (f.proxiable) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
else if (f.allow_postdate){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
/* check for valid set of addresses */
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
if (ret)
goto out;
copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
{
time_t start;
time_t t;
start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
ALLOC(et.starttime);
start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
et.flags.invalid = 1;
et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
}
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
t = *b->till;
/* be careful not overflowing */
if(client->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
if(server->entry.max_life)
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
#endif
et.endtime = t;
if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
f.renewable = 1;
if(b->rtime == NULL){
ALLOC(b->rtime);
*b->rtime = 0;
}
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
*b->rtime = *b->till;
}
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
t = *b->rtime;
if(t == 0)
t = MAX_TIME;
if(client->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
if(server->entry.max_renew)
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
#if 0
t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
#endif
ALLOC(et.renew_till);
*et.renew_till = t;
et.flags.renewable = 1;
}
}
if (f.request_anonymous)
et.flags.anonymous = 1;
if(b->addresses){
ALLOC(et.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
}
et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
*
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
*
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
*/
ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ek.last_req.len = 0;
if (client->entry.pw_end
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
++ek.last_req.len;
}
ek.nonce = b->nonce;
if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
if (client->entry.pw_end)
*ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
*client->entry.pw_end);
else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
} else
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
} else
ek.key_expiration = NULL;
ek.flags = et.flags;
ek.authtime = et.authtime;
if (et.starttime) {
ALLOC(ek.starttime);
*ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
}
ek.endtime = et.endtime;
if (et.renew_till) {
ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
*ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
}
copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
if(et.caddr){
ALLOC(ek.caddr);
copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
}
ALLOC(rep.padata);
rep.padata->len = 0;
rep.padata->val = NULL;
reply_key = &ckey->key;
#if PKINIT
if (pkp) {
ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
req, req_buffer,
&reply_key, rep.padata);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
config,
pkp,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
#endif
set_salt_padata (rep.padata, ckey->salt);
/* Add signing of alias referral */
if (f.canonicalize) {
PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
krb5_data data;
PA_DATA pa;
krb5_crypto crypto;
size_t len;
memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
canon.names.real_name = client->entry.principal->name;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
&canon.names, &len, ret);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (data.length != len)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
/* sign using "returned session key" */
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &crypto);
if (ret) {
free(data.data);
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto,
KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
data.data, data.length,
&canon.canon_checksum);
free(data.data);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
&canon, &len, ret);
free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (data.length != len)
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
pa.padata_value = data;
ret = add_METHOD_DATA(rep.padata, &pa);
free(data.data);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
free(rep.padata);
rep.padata = NULL;
}
/* Add the PAC */
if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
krb5_pac p = NULL;
krb5_data data;
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
if (p != NULL) {
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
client->entry.principal,
&skey->key, /* Server key */
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
&data);
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
client_name);
goto out;
}
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
&data);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
config,
server,
setype,
NULL,
NULL,
&et);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
&skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
reply_key, &e_text, reply);
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* */
if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(reply);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
e_text = "Reply packet too large";
}
out:
free_AS_REP(&rep);
if(ret){
krb5_mk_error(context,
ret,
e_text,
(e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
client_princ,
server_princ,
NULL,
NULL,
reply);
ret = 0;
}
#ifdef PKINIT
if (pkp)
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
#endif
if (e_data.data)
free(e_data.data);
if (client_princ)
krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
free(client_name);
if (server_princ)
krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
free(server_name);
if(client)
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
if(server)
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
return ret;
}