void jacobian_double(struct jacobian_point *p, const struct domain_params *dp) { if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(p->z, 0)) { if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(p->y, 0)) { gcry_mpi_t t1, t2; t1 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); t2 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, p->x, p->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(t2, t1, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(t2, t2, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, p->z, p->z, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, dp->a, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(t1, t1, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p->z, p->z, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(p->z, p->z, p->z, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p->y, p->y, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(p->y, p->y, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t2, p->x, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(t2, t2, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p->x, t1, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p->x, p->x, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p->x, p->x, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(t2, t2, p->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t2, p->y, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(t2, t2, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p->y, t1, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_release(t1); gcry_mpi_release(t2); } else gcry_mpi_set_ui(p->z, 0); } }
int point_decompress(struct affine_point *p, const gcry_mpi_t x, int yflag, const struct domain_params *dp) { gcry_mpi_t h, y; int res; h = gcry_mpi_snew(0); y = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_mulm(h, x, x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(h, h, dp->a, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(h, h, x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(h, h, dp->b, dp->m); if ((res = mod_root(y, h, dp->m))) if ((res = (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(y, 0) || ! yflag))) { p->x = gcry_mpi_snew(0); p->y = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_set(p->x, x); if (gcry_mpi_test_bit(y, 0) == yflag) gcry_mpi_set(p->y, y); else gcry_mpi_sub(p->y, dp->m, y); assert(point_on_curve(p, dp)); } gcry_mpi_release(h); gcry_mpi_release(y); return res; }
struct affine_point point_new(void) { struct affine_point r; r.x = gcry_mpi_snew(0); r.y = gcry_mpi_snew(0); return r; }
struct jacobian_point jacobian_new(void) { struct jacobian_point r; r.x = gcry_mpi_snew(0); r.y = gcry_mpi_snew(0); r.z = gcry_mpi_snew(0); return r; }
void point_add(struct affine_point *p1, const struct affine_point *p2, const struct domain_params *dp) { if (! point_is_zero(p2)) { if (! point_is_zero(p1)) { if (! gcry_mpi_cmp(p1->x, p2->x)) { if (! gcry_mpi_cmp(p1->y, p2->y)) point_double(p1, dp); else point_load_zero(p1); } else { gcry_mpi_t t; t = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_subm(t, p1->y, p2->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->y, p1->x, p2->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_invm(p1->y, p1->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p1->y, t, p1->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t, p1->y, p1->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(p1->x, p1->x, p2->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->x, t, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(t, p2->x, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p1->y, p1->y, t, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->y, p1->y, p2->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_release(t); } } else point_set(p1, p2); } }
/*output this number*/ void mpiOut2(gcry_mpi_t value) { int i=0; char buffer[1024/8],buffer2[1024/8]; //buffer for the output gcry_randomize (buffer, 1024/8, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); printf("\n random buffer: "); for (i = 0; i<1024/8; i++){ if(i%32==0) printf("\n"); printf("%0u", (unsigned char)buffer[i]); } printf("\n"); gcry_mpi_t test; test=gcry_mpi_snew(1024/8); gcry_mpi_scan(&test,GCRYMPI_FMT_STD,buffer,sizeof(buffer),NULL); gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_STD,buffer2,sizeof(buffer2),NULL,test); //converts the MPI to a writable buffer printf("\n random buffer2:\n"); for (i = 0; i<1024/8; i++){ if(i%32==0) printf("\n"); printf("%0u", (unsigned char)buffer2[i]); } printf("\n test"); }
int deserialize_mpi(gcry_mpi_t *x, enum disp_format df, const char *buf, int inlen) { switch(df) { case DF_BIN: gcry_mpi_scan(x, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, inlen, NULL); gcry_mpi_set_flag(*x, GCRYMPI_FLAG_SECURE); break; case DF_COMPACT: case DF_BASE36: do { const char *digits = get_digits(df); unsigned int digit_count = get_digit_count(df); char *d; int i; *x = gcry_mpi_snew(0); for(i = 0; i < inlen; i++) { if (! (d = memchr(digits, buf[i], digit_count))) { gcry_mpi_release(*x); return 0; } gcry_mpi_mul_ui(*x, *x, digit_count); gcry_mpi_add_ui(*x, *x, d - digits); } } while (0); break; default: assert(0); } return 1; }
/* Choose a random value x and calculate e = g^x mod p. Returns e and if ret_x is not NULL x. */ static gcry_mpi_t calc_dh_secret (gcry_mpi_t gex_g, gcry_mpi_t gex_p, gcry_mpi_t * ret_x) { gcry_mpi_t e, g, x, prime; size_t n = sizeof diffie_hellman_group1_prime; if (gex_p) prime = gcry_mpi_copy (gex_p); else if (gcry_mpi_scan (&prime, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, diffie_hellman_group1_prime, n, NULL)) abort (); /*_gsti_dump_mpi( "prime=", prime );*/ if (gex_g) g = gcry_mpi_copy (gex_g); else g = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 2); /* FIXME: we n bits for the private exponent, where n is 2*derrived_key_material */ x = gcry_mpi_snew (200); gcry_mpi_randomize (x, 200, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); n = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (prime); e = gcry_mpi_new (n+1); gcry_mpi_powm (e, g, x, prime); if (ret_x) *ret_x = x; else gcry_mpi_release (x); gcry_mpi_release (g); gcry_mpi_release (prime); return e; }
int point_on_curve(const struct affine_point *p, const struct domain_params *dp) { int res; if (! (res = point_is_zero(p))) { gcry_mpi_t h1, h2; h1 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); h2 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_mulm(h1, p->x, p->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(h1, h1, dp->a, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(h1, h1, p->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_addm(h1, h1, dp->b, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(h2, p->y, p->y, dp->m); res = ! gcry_mpi_cmp(h1, h2); gcry_mpi_release(h1); gcry_mpi_release(h2); } return res; }
/* Algorithms 4.29 and 4.30 in the "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" */ gcry_mpi_t ECDSA_sign(const char *msg, const gcry_mpi_t d, const struct curve_params *cp) { struct affine_point p1; gcry_mpi_t e, k, r, s; #if ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC struct aes256cprng *cprng; cprng = ecdsa_cprng_init(msg, d, cp); #endif r = gcry_mpi_snew(0); s = gcry_mpi_snew(0); Step1: #if ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC k = ecdsa_cprng_get_exponent(cprng, cp); #else k = get_random_exponent(cp); #endif p1 = pointmul(&cp->dp.base, k, &cp->dp); gcry_mpi_mod(r, p1.x, cp->dp.order); point_release(&p1); if (! gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(r, 0)) { gcry_mpi_release(k); goto Step1; } gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, msg, 64, NULL); gcry_mpi_set_flag(e, GCRYMPI_FLAG_SECURE); gcry_mpi_mod(e, e, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_mulm(s, d, r, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_addm(s, s, e, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_invm(e, k, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_mulm(s, s, e, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_release(e); gcry_mpi_release(k); if (! gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0)) goto Step1; gcry_mpi_mul(s, s, cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_add(s, s, r); gcry_mpi_release(r); #if ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC ecdsa_cprng_done(cprng); #endif return s; }
void jacobian_affine_point_add(struct jacobian_point *p1, const struct affine_point *p2, const struct domain_params *dp) { if (! point_is_zero(p2)) { if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(p1->z, 0)) { gcry_mpi_t t1, t2, t3; t1 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); t2 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, p1->z, p1->z, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t2, t1, p2->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, p1->z, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, p2->y, dp->m); if (! gcry_mpi_cmp(p1->x, t2)) { if (! gcry_mpi_cmp(p1->y, t1)) jacobian_double(p1, dp); else jacobian_load_zero(p1); } else { t3 = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->x, p1->x, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->y, p1->y, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p1->z, p1->z, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t3, p1->x, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t2, t2, t3, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t3, t3, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(t1, t1, t3, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p1->x, p1->y, p1->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->x, p1->x, t3, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->x, p1->x, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->x, p1->x, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(t2, t2, p1->x, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(p1->y, p1->y, t2, dp->m); gcry_mpi_subm(p1->y, p1->y, t1, dp->m); gcry_mpi_release(t3); } gcry_mpi_release(t1); gcry_mpi_release(t2); } else jacobian_load_affine(p1, p2); } }
gcry_mpi_t get_random_exponent(const struct curve_params *cp) { int bits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits(cp->dp.order); gcry_mpi_t a; a = gcry_mpi_snew(0); do { gcry_mpi_randomize(a, bits, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); gcry_mpi_clear_highbit(a, bits); } while (! gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(a, 0) || gcry_mpi_cmp(a, cp->dp.order) >= 0); return a; }
GkmDataResult gkm_data_der_read_private_key_dsa_parts (const guchar *keydata, gsize n_keydata, const guchar *params, gsize n_params, gcry_sexp_t *s_key) { gcry_mpi_t p, q, g, y, x; GkmDataResult ret = GKM_DATA_UNRECOGNIZED; int res; GNode *asn_params = NULL; GNode *asn_key = NULL; p = q = g = y = x = NULL; asn_params = egg_asn1x_create_and_decode (pk_asn1_tab, "DSAParameters", params, n_params); asn_key = egg_asn1x_create_and_decode (pk_asn1_tab, "DSAPrivatePart", keydata, n_keydata); if (!asn_params || !asn_key) goto done; ret = GKM_DATA_FAILURE; if (!gkm_data_asn1_read_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn_params, "p", NULL), &p) || !gkm_data_asn1_read_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn_params, "q", NULL), &q) || !gkm_data_asn1_read_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn_params, "g", NULL), &g)) goto done; if (!gkm_data_asn1_read_mpi (asn_key, &x)) goto done; /* Now we calculate y */ y = gcry_mpi_snew (1024); gcry_mpi_powm (y, g, x, p); res = gcry_sexp_build (s_key, NULL, SEXP_PRIVATE_DSA, p, q, g, y, x); if (res) goto done; g_assert (*s_key); ret = GKM_DATA_SUCCESS; done: egg_asn1x_destroy (asn_key); egg_asn1x_destroy (asn_params); gcry_mpi_release (p); gcry_mpi_release (q); gcry_mpi_release (g); gcry_mpi_release (y); gcry_mpi_release (x); if (ret == GKM_DATA_FAILURE) g_message ("invalid DSA key"); return ret; }
void compress_to_string(char *buf, enum disp_format df, const struct affine_point *P, const struct curve_params *cp) { int outlen = (df == DF_COMPACT) ? cp->pk_len_compact : cp->pk_len_bin; if (point_compress(P)) { gcry_mpi_t x; x = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_add(x, P->x, cp->dp.m); serialize_mpi(buf, outlen, df, x); gcry_mpi_release(x); } else serialize_mpi(buf, outlen, df, P->x); }
struct affine_point jacobian_to_affine(const struct jacobian_point *p, const struct domain_params *dp) { struct affine_point r = point_new(); if (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(p->z, 0)) { gcry_mpi_t h; h = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_invm(h, p->z, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(r.y, h, h, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(r.x, p->x, r.y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(r.y, r.y, h, dp->m); gcry_mpi_mulm(r.y, r.y, p->y, dp->m); gcry_mpi_release(h); } return r; }
int ECIES_decryption(char *key, const struct affine_point *R, const gcry_mpi_t d, const struct curve_params *cp) { struct affine_point Z; gcry_mpi_t e; int res = 0; if (! embedded_key_validation(R, &cp->dp)) return 0; e = gcry_mpi_snew(0); gcry_mpi_mul_ui(e, d, cp->dp.cofactor); Z = pointmul(R, e, &cp->dp); gcry_mpi_release(e); if ((res = ! point_is_zero(&Z))) ECIES_KDF(key, Z.x, R, cp->elem_len_bin); point_release(&Z); return res; }
gpointer egg_dh_gen_secret (gcry_mpi_t peer, gcry_mpi_t priv, gcry_mpi_t prime, gsize *bytes) { gcry_error_t gcry; guchar *value; gsize n_value; gcry_mpi_t k; gint bits; g_return_val_if_fail (peer, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (priv, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (prime, NULL); bits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (prime); g_return_val_if_fail (bits >= 0, NULL); k = gcry_mpi_snew (bits); g_return_val_if_fail (k, NULL); gcry_mpi_powm (k, peer, priv, prime); /* Write out the secret */ gcry = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0, &n_value, k); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, NULL); value = egg_secure_alloc (n_value); gcry = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, value, n_value, &n_value, k); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, NULL); #if DEBUG_DH_SECRET g_printerr ("DH SECRET: "); gcry_mpi_dump (k); gcry_mpi_release (k); #endif *bytes = n_value; #if DEBUG_DH_SECRET gcry_mpi_scan (&k, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, value, bytes, NULL); g_printerr ("RAW SECRET: "); gcry_mpi_dump (k); gcry_mpi_release (k); #endif return value; }
static gcry_mpi_t calc_dh_key (gcry_mpi_t gex_p, gcry_mpi_t f, gcry_mpi_t x) { gcry_mpi_t k, prime; size_t n = sizeof diffie_hellman_group1_prime; if (gex_p) prime = gcry_mpi_copy (gex_p); else if (gcry_mpi_scan (&prime, GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, diffie_hellman_group1_prime, n, NULL)) abort (); n = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (prime); k = gcry_mpi_snew (n+1); gcry_mpi_powm (k, f, x, prime); gcry_mpi_release (prime); return k; }
gboolean egg_dh_gen_pair (gcry_mpi_t prime, gcry_mpi_t base, guint bits, gcry_mpi_t *pub, gcry_mpi_t *priv) { guint pbits; g_return_val_if_fail (prime, FALSE); g_return_val_if_fail (base, FALSE); g_return_val_if_fail (pub, FALSE); g_return_val_if_fail (priv, FALSE); pbits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (prime); g_return_val_if_fail (pbits > 1, FALSE); if (bits == 0) { bits = pbits; } else if (bits > pbits) { g_return_val_if_reached (FALSE); } /* * Generate a strong random number of bits, and not zero. * gcry_mpi_randomize bumps up to the next byte. Since we * need to have a value less than half of prime, we make sure * we bump down. */ *priv = gcry_mpi_snew (bits); g_return_val_if_fail (*priv, FALSE); while (gcry_mpi_cmp_ui (*priv, 0) == 0) gcry_mpi_randomize (*priv, bits, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); /* Secret key value must be less than half of p */ if (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (*priv) > bits) gcry_mpi_clear_highbit (*priv, bits); if (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (*priv) > pbits - 1) gcry_mpi_clear_highbit (*priv, pbits - 1); g_assert (gcry_mpi_cmp (prime, *priv) > 0); *pub = gcry_mpi_new (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (*priv)); g_return_val_if_fail (*pub, FALSE); gcry_mpi_powm (*pub, base, *priv, prime); return TRUE; }
static gboolean dsa_subject_public_key_from_private (GNode *key_asn, const GckAttribute *ap, const GckAttribute *aq, const GckAttribute *ag, const GckAttribute *ax) { gcry_mpi_t mp, mq, mg, mx, my; size_t n_buffer; gcry_error_t gcry; unsigned char *buffer; gcry = gcry_mpi_scan (&mp, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, ap->value, ap->length, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, FALSE); gcry = gcry_mpi_scan (&mq, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, aq->value, aq->length, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, FALSE); gcry = gcry_mpi_scan (&mg, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, ag->value, ag->length, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, FALSE); gcry = gcry_mpi_scan (&mx, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, ax->value, ax->length, NULL); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, FALSE); /* Calculate the public part from the private */ my = gcry_mpi_snew (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (mx)); g_return_val_if_fail (my, FALSE); gcry_mpi_powm (my, mg, mx, mp); gcry = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &buffer, &n_buffer, my); g_return_val_if_fail (gcry == 0, FALSE); egg_asn1x_take_integer_as_raw (key_asn, g_bytes_new_with_free_func (buffer, n_buffer, gcry_free, buffer)); gcry_mpi_release (mp); gcry_mpi_release (mq); gcry_mpi_release (mg); gcry_mpi_release (mx); gcry_mpi_release (my); return TRUE; }
void serialize_mpi(char *outbuf, int outlen, enum disp_format df, const gcry_mpi_t x) { switch(df) { case DF_BIN: do { int len = (gcry_mpi_get_nbits(x) + 7) / 8; assert(len <= outlen); memset(outbuf, 0, outlen - len); gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, (unsigned char*)outbuf + (outlen - len), len, NULL, x); } while (0); break; case DF_COMPACT: case DF_BASE36: do { const char *digits = get_digits(df); unsigned int digit_count = get_digit_count(df); gcry_mpi_t base, Q, R; int i; base = gcry_mpi_set_ui(NULL, digit_count); Q = gcry_mpi_copy(x); R = gcry_mpi_snew(0); for(i = outlen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { unsigned char digit = 0; gcry_mpi_div(Q, R, Q, base, 0); gcry_mpi_print(GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &digit, 1, NULL, R); assert(digit < digit_count); outbuf[i] = digits[digit]; } assert(! gcry_mpi_cmp_ui(Q, 0)); gcry_mpi_release(base); gcry_mpi_release(Q); gcry_mpi_release(R); } while(0); break; default: assert(0); } }
/* Check that the RSA secret key SKEY is valid. Swap parameters to the libgcrypt standard. */ static gpg_error_t rsa_key_check (struct rsa_secret_key_s *skey) { int err = 0; gcry_mpi_t t = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t t1 = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t t2 = gcry_mpi_snew (0); gcry_mpi_t phi = gcry_mpi_snew (0); /* Check that n == p * q. */ gcry_mpi_mul (t, skey->p, skey->q); if (gcry_mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) ) { log_error ("RSA oops: n != p * q\n"); err++; } /* Check that p is less than q. */ if (gcry_mpi_cmp (skey->p, skey->q) > 0) { gcry_mpi_t tmp; log_info ("swapping secret primes\n"); tmp = gcry_mpi_copy (skey->p); gcry_mpi_set (skey->p, skey->q); gcry_mpi_set (skey->q, tmp); gcry_mpi_release (tmp); /* Recompute u. */ gcry_mpi_invm (skey->u, skey->p, skey->q); } /* Check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1. */ gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->p, 1 ); gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0); if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) ) { log_error ("RSA oops: e divides p-1\n"); err++; } gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t, skey->q, 1); gcry_mpi_div (NULL, t, t, skey->e, 0); if (!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0)) { log_info ("RSA oops: e divides q-1\n" ); err++; } /* Check that d is correct. */ gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t1, skey->p, 1); gcry_mpi_sub_ui (t2, skey->q, 1); gcry_mpi_mul (phi, t1, t2); gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, phi); if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d)) { /* No: try universal exponent. */ gcry_mpi_gcd (t, t1, t2); gcry_mpi_div (t, NULL, phi, t, 0); gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->e, t); if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->d)) { log_error ("RSA oops: bad secret exponent\n"); err++; } } /* Check for correctness of u. */ gcry_mpi_invm (t, skey->p, skey->q); if (gcry_mpi_cmp (t, skey->u)) { log_info ("RSA oops: bad u parameter\n"); err++; } if (err) log_info ("RSA secret key check failed\n"); gcry_mpi_release (t); gcry_mpi_release (t1); gcry_mpi_release (t2); gcry_mpi_release (phi); return err? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY):0; }
guchar* gkm_data_der_write_private_key_rsa (gcry_sexp_t s_key, gsize *n_key) { GNode *asn = NULL; gcry_mpi_t n, e, d, p, q, u, e1, e2, tmp; guchar *result = NULL; n = e = d = p = q = u = e1 = e2 = tmp = NULL; asn = egg_asn1x_create (pk_asn1_tab, "RSAPrivateKey"); g_return_val_if_fail (asn, NULL); if (!gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &n, "rsa", "n", NULL) || !gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &e, "rsa", "e", NULL) || !gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &d, "rsa", "d", NULL) || !gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &p, "rsa", "p", NULL) || !gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &q, "rsa", "q", NULL) || !gkm_sexp_extract_mpi (s_key, &u, "rsa", "u", NULL)) goto done; if (!gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "modulus", NULL), n) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "publicExponent", NULL), e) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "privateExponent", NULL), d) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "prime1", NULL), p) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "prime2", NULL), q) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "coefficient", NULL), u)) goto done; /* Calculate e1 and e2 */ tmp = gcry_mpi_snew (1024); gcry_mpi_sub_ui (tmp, p, 1); e1 = gcry_mpi_snew (1024); gcry_mpi_mod (e1, d, tmp); gcry_mpi_sub_ui (tmp, q, 1); e2 = gcry_mpi_snew (1024); gcry_mpi_mod (e2, d, tmp); /* Write out calculated */ if (!gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "exponent1", NULL), e1) || !gkm_data_asn1_write_mpi (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "exponent2", NULL), e2)) goto done; /* Write out the version */ if (!egg_asn1x_set_integer_as_ulong (egg_asn1x_node (asn, "version", NULL), 0)) goto done; result = egg_asn1x_encode (asn, egg_secure_realloc, n_key); if (result == NULL) g_warning ("couldn't encode private rsa key: %s", egg_asn1x_message (asn)); done: egg_asn1x_destroy (asn); gcry_mpi_release (n); gcry_mpi_release (e); gcry_mpi_release (d); gcry_mpi_release (p); gcry_mpi_release (q); gcry_mpi_release (u); gcry_mpi_release (tmp); gcry_mpi_release (e1); gcry_mpi_release (e2); return result; }
static gcry_mpi_t gen_prime (unsigned int nbits, int secret, int randomlevel, int (*extra_check)(void *, gcry_mpi_t), void *extra_check_arg) { gcry_mpi_t prime, ptest, pminus1, val_2, val_3, result; int i; unsigned int x, step; unsigned int count1, count2; int *mods; /* if ( DBG_CIPHER ) */ /* log_debug ("generate a prime of %u bits ", nbits ); */ if (nbits < 16) log_fatal ("can't generate a prime with less than %d bits\n", 16); mods = gcry_xmalloc( no_of_small_prime_numbers * sizeof *mods ); /* Make nbits fit into gcry_mpi_t implementation. */ val_2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 ); val_3 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 3); prime = secret? gcry_mpi_snew ( nbits ): gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); result = mpi_alloc_like( prime ); pminus1= mpi_alloc_like( prime ); ptest = mpi_alloc_like( prime ); count1 = count2 = 0; for (;;) { /* try forvever */ int dotcount=0; /* generate a random number */ gcry_mpi_randomize( prime, nbits, randomlevel ); /* Set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to 1. If we are generating a secret prime we are most probably doing that for RSA, to make sure that the modulus does have the requested key size we set the 2 high order bits. */ mpi_set_highbit (prime, nbits-1); if (secret) mpi_set_bit (prime, nbits-2); mpi_set_bit(prime, 0); /* Calculate all remainders. */ for (i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) mods[i] = mpi_fdiv_r_ui(NULL, prime, x); /* Now try some primes starting with prime. */ for(step=0; step < 20000; step += 2 ) { /* Check against all the small primes we have in mods. */ count1++; for (i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) { while ( mods[i] + step >= x ) mods[i] -= x; if ( !(mods[i] + step) ) break; } if ( x ) continue; /* Found a multiple of an already known prime. */ mpi_add_ui( ptest, prime, step ); /* Do a fast Fermat test now. */ count2++; mpi_sub_ui( pminus1, ptest, 1); gcry_mpi_powm( result, val_2, pminus1, ptest ); if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( result, 1 ) ) { /* Not composite, perform stronger tests */ if (is_prime(ptest, 5, &count2 )) { if (!mpi_test_bit( ptest, nbits-1-secret )) { progress('\n'); log_debug ("overflow in prime generation\n"); break; /* Stop loop, continue with a new prime. */ } if (extra_check && extra_check (extra_check_arg, ptest)) { /* The extra check told us that this prime is not of the caller's taste. */ progress ('/'); } else { /* Got it. */ mpi_free(val_2); mpi_free(val_3); mpi_free(result); mpi_free(pminus1); mpi_free(prime); gcry_free(mods); return ptest; } } } if (++dotcount == 10 ) { progress('.'); dotcount = 0; } } progress(':'); /* restart with a new random value */ } }
static void gen_prime (gcry_mpi_t * ptest, unsigned int nbits, struct GNUNET_HashCode * hc) { /* Note: 2 is not included because it can be tested more easily by * looking at bit 0. The last entry in this list is marked by a zero */ static const uint16_t small_prime_numbers[] = { 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, 1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399, 1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931, 1933, 1949, 1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053, 2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161, 2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297, 2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357, 2371, 2377, 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411, 2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473, 2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551, 2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633, 2647, 2657, 2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729, 2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791, 2797, 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851, 2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917, 2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999, 3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061, 3067, 3079, 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137, 3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209, 3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271, 3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331, 3343, 3347, 3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391, 3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467, 3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533, 3539, 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583, 3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643, 3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709, 3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779, 3793, 3797, 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851, 3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917, 3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989, 4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049, 4051, 4057, 4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111, 4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177, 4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243, 4253, 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297, 4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391, 4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457, 4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519, 4523, 4547, 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597, 4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657, 4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729, 4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799, 4801, 4813, 4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889, 4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951, 4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999, 0 }; #define DIM(v) (sizeof(v)/sizeof((v)[0])) static int no_of_small_prime_numbers = DIM (small_prime_numbers) - 1; gcry_mpi_t prime, pminus1, val_2, val_3, result; unsigned int i; unsigned int step; unsigned int mods[no_of_small_prime_numbers]; gcry_mpi_t tmp; gcry_mpi_t sp; GNUNET_assert (nbits >= 16); /* Make nbits fit into mpz_t implementation. */ val_2 = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 2); val_3 = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 3); prime = gcry_mpi_snew (0); result = gcry_mpi_new (0); pminus1 = gcry_mpi_new (0); *ptest = gcry_mpi_new (0); tmp = gcry_mpi_new (0); sp = gcry_mpi_new (0); while (1) { /* generate a random number */ mpz_randomize (prime, nbits, hc); /* Set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to 1. If we are * generating a secret prime we are most probably doing that * for RSA, to make sure that the modulus does have the * requested key size we set the 2 high order bits. */ gcry_mpi_set_bit (prime, nbits - 1); gcry_mpi_set_bit (prime, nbits - 2); gcry_mpi_set_bit (prime, 0); /* Calculate all remainders. */ for (i = 0; i < no_of_small_prime_numbers; i++) { size_t written; gcry_mpi_set_ui (sp, small_prime_numbers[i]); gcry_mpi_div (NULL, tmp, prime, sp, -1); mods[i] = 0; written = sizeof (unsigned int); GNUNET_assert (0 == gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, (unsigned char *) &mods[i], written, &written, tmp)); adjust ((unsigned char *) &mods[i], written, sizeof (unsigned int)); mods[i] = ntohl (mods[i]); } /* Now try some primes starting with prime. */ for (step = 0; step < 20000; step += 2) { /* Check against all the small primes we have in mods. */ for (i = 0; i < no_of_small_prime_numbers; i++) { uint16_t x = small_prime_numbers[i]; while (mods[i] + step >= x) mods[i] -= x; if (!(mods[i] + step)) break; } if (i < no_of_small_prime_numbers) continue; /* Found a multiple of an already known prime. */ gcry_mpi_add_ui (*ptest, prime, step); if (!gcry_mpi_test_bit (*ptest, nbits - 2)) break; /* Do a fast Fermat test now. */ gcry_mpi_sub_ui (pminus1, *ptest, 1); gcry_mpi_powm (result, val_2, pminus1, *ptest); if ((!gcry_mpi_cmp_ui (result, 1)) && (is_prime (*ptest, 5, hc))) { /* Got it. */ gcry_mpi_release (sp); gcry_mpi_release (tmp); gcry_mpi_release (val_2); gcry_mpi_release (val_3); gcry_mpi_release (result); gcry_mpi_release (pminus1); gcry_mpi_release (prime); return; } } } }
/*create a new MPI number with this many bytes*/ void mpiNew(int bytes,gcry_mpi_t output) { output = gcry_mpi_snew(bytes); }
/**************** * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values * and an array with n-1 factors of (p-1) */ static void generate ( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors ) { gcry_mpi_t p; /* the prime */ gcry_mpi_t p_min1; gcry_mpi_t g; gcry_mpi_t x; /* the secret exponent */ gcry_mpi_t y; unsigned int qbits; unsigned int xbits; byte *rndbuf; p_min1 = gcry_mpi_new ( nbits ); qbits = wiener_map( nbits ); if( qbits & 1 ) /* better have a even one */ qbits++; g = mpi_alloc(1); p = _gcry_generate_elg_prime( 0, nbits, qbits, g, ret_factors ); mpi_sub_ui(p_min1, p, 1); /* Select a random number which has these properties: * 0 < x < p-1 * This must be a very good random number because this is the * secret part. The prime is public and may be shared anyway, * so a random generator level of 1 is used for the prime. * * I don't see a reason to have a x of about the same size * as the p. It should be sufficient to have one about the size * of q or the later used k plus a large safety margin. Decryption * will be much faster with such an x. */ xbits = qbits * 3 / 2; if( xbits >= nbits ) BUG(); x = gcry_mpi_snew ( xbits ); if( DBG_CIPHER ) log_debug("choosing a random x of size %u", xbits ); rndbuf = NULL; do { if( DBG_CIPHER ) progress('.'); if( rndbuf ) { /* Change only some of the higher bits */ if( xbits < 16 ) /* should never happen ... */ { gcry_free(rndbuf); rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( (xbits+7)/8, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM ); } else { char *r = gcry_random_bytes_secure( 2, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM ); memcpy(rndbuf, r, 2 ); gcry_free(r); } } else { rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( (xbits+7)/8, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM ); } _gcry_mpi_set_buffer( x, rndbuf, (xbits+7)/8, 0 ); mpi_clear_highbit( x, xbits+1 ); } while( !( mpi_cmp_ui( x, 0 )>0 && mpi_cmp( x, p_min1 )<0 ) ); gcry_free(rndbuf); y = gcry_mpi_new (nbits); gcry_mpi_powm( y, g, x, p ); if( DBG_CIPHER ) { progress('\n'); log_mpidump("elg p= ", p ); log_mpidump("elg g= ", g ); log_mpidump("elg y= ", y ); log_mpidump("elg x= ", x ); } /* Copy the stuff to the key structures */ sk->p = p; sk->g = g; sk->y = y; sk->x = x; gcry_mpi_release ( p_min1 ); /* Now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */ test_keys ( sk, nbits - 64, 0 ); }
/* Parse a private key S-expression and retutn a malloced array with the RSA paramaters in pkcs#12 order. The caller needs to deep-release this array. */ static gcry_mpi_t * sexp_to_kparms (gcry_sexp_t sexp) { gcry_sexp_t list, l2; const char *name; const char *s; size_t n; int idx; const char *elems; gcry_mpi_t *array; list = gcry_sexp_find_token (sexp, "private-key", 0 ); if(!list) return NULL; l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list); gcry_sexp_release (list); list = l2; name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 0, &n); if(!name || n != 3 || memcmp (name, "rsa", 3)) { gcry_sexp_release (list); return NULL; } /* Parameter names used with RSA in the pkcs#12 order. */ elems = "nedqp--u"; array = xtrycalloc (strlen(elems) + 1, sizeof *array); if (!array) { gcry_sexp_release (list); return NULL; } for (idx=0, s=elems; *s; s++, idx++ ) { if (*s == '-') continue; /* Computed below */ l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, s, 1); if (l2) { array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); gcry_sexp_release (l2); } if (!array[idx]) /* Required parameter not found or invalid. */ { for (idx=0; array[idx]; idx++) gcry_mpi_release (array[idx]); xfree (array); gcry_sexp_release (list); return NULL; } } gcry_sexp_release (list); array[5] = gcry_mpi_snew (0); /* compute d mod (q-1) */ gcry_mpi_sub_ui (array[5], array[3], 1); gcry_mpi_mod (array[5], array[2], array[5]); array[6] = gcry_mpi_snew (0); /* compute d mod (p-1) */ gcry_mpi_sub_ui (array[6], array[4], 1); gcry_mpi_mod (array[6], array[3], array[6]); return array; }