int sl_fcall_mngr_clone(struct sl_fcall_mngr* mngr, struct sl_fcall_mngr* untrusted)
{
PANIC_ON(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(untrusted, sizeof(*untrusted)));
sgx_lfence();
BUG_ON(mngr == NULL);
BUG_ON(untrusted == NULL);
sl_fcall_type_t type_u = untrusted->fmn_type;
PANIC_ON((type_u != SL_FCALL_TYPE_ECALL) && (type_u != SL_FCALL_TYPE_OCALL));
mngr->fmn_type = type_u;
int ret = sl_siglines_clone(&mngr->fmn_siglns,
&untrusted->fmn_siglns,
can_type_process(type_u) ? process_fcall : NULL);
if (ret) return ret;
//check that we have right call managers.
//i.e ecall manager on untrusted or ocall manager on trusted side
PANIC_ON(fcall_type2direction(type_u) != sl_siglines_get_direction(&mngr->fmn_siglns));
uint32_t num_lines = sl_siglines_size(&mngr->fmn_siglns);
BUG_ON(untrusted->fmn_bufs == NULL);
struct sl_fcall_buf** bufs_u = untrusted->fmn_bufs;
PANIC_ON(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(bufs_u, sizeof(bufs_u[0]) * num_lines));
sgx_lfence();
mngr->fmn_bufs = bufs_u;
mngr->fmn_call_table = NULL;
return 0;
}
/*
* External function used to verify EPID Blob and check whether QE has
* been updated.
*
* @param p_blob[in, out] Pointer to EPID Blob.
* @param blob_size[in] The size of EPID Blob, in bytes.
* @param p_is_resealed[out] Whether the EPID Blob is resealed within this function call.
* @param p_cpusvn[out] Return the raw CPUSVN.
* @return uint32_t AE_SUCCESS or other error cases.
*/
uint32_t verify_blob(
uint8_t *p_blob,
uint32_t blob_size,
uint8_t *p_is_resealed,
sgx_cpu_svn_t *p_cpusvn)
{
se_plaintext_epid_data_sdk_t plain_text;
/* Actually, some cases here will be checked with code generated by
edger8r. Here we just want to defend in depth. */
if(NULL == p_blob || NULL == p_is_resealed || NULL == p_cpusvn)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(SGX_TRUSTED_EPID_BLOB_SIZE_SDK != blob_size)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
//
// if we mispredict here and blob_size is too
// small, we might overflow
//
sgx_lfence();
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_blob, blob_size))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
return random_stack_advance(verify_blob_internal, p_blob, blob_size,
p_is_resealed, FALSE, plain_text, (MemberCtx**) NULL, p_cpusvn);
}
int sl_siglines_clone(struct sl_siglines* sglns,
struct sl_siglines* untrusted,
sl_sighandler_t handler)
{
PANIC_ON(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(untrusted, sizeof(*untrusted)));
sgx_lfence();
sl_siglines_dir_t dir = untrusted->dir;
PANIC_ON((dir != SL_SIGLINES_DIR_T2U) && (dir != SL_SIGLINES_DIR_U2T));
BUG_ON(sglns == NULL);
sglns->dir = dir;
BUG_ON(is_direction_sender(dir) && (handler != NULL));
uint32_t num_lines = untrusted->num_lines;
if ((num_lines <= 0) || ((num_lines % NBITS_PER_UINT64) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
sglns->num_lines = num_lines;
uint32_t nlong = num_lines / NBITS_PER_UINT64;
BUG_ON(untrusted->event_lines == NULL);
uint64_t* event_lines_u = untrusted->event_lines;
PANIC_ON(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(event_lines_u, sizeof(uint64_t) * nlong));
sgx_lfence();
sglns->event_lines = event_lines_u;
uint64_t* free_lines = NULL;
if (is_direction_sender(dir))
{
free_lines = malloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * nlong);
if (free_lines == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nlong; i++)
free_lines[i] = (uint64_t)(-1);// 1's -> free
}
sglns->free_lines = free_lines;
sglns->handler = handler;
return 0;
}
/* Override the weak symbol defined in tRTS */
sgx_status_t do_init_switchless(struct sl_uswitchless* handle)
{
PANIC_ON(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(handle, sizeof(*handle)));
sgx_lfence();
if (lock_cmpxchg64((uint64_t*)&sl_uswitchless_handle, (uint64_t)NULL, (uint64_t)handle) != (uint64_t)NULL)
{
return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
return SGX_SUCCESS;
}
//get the item pointer in the vector
//return 0 if success, return 1 if index is out of range or data pointer is invalid.
errno_t vector_get(const simple_vector* v, uint32_t index, void** data)
{
if (!v || index >= v->size || !data)
return 1;
//fence after boundary check
sgx_lfence();
*data = v->data[index];
return 0;
}
static sgx_status_t make_target_info(
const PS& ps, const sgx_report_t& rpt, sgx_target_info_t& ti)
{
if (!ps.is_valid())
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
memset_s(&ti, sizeof(ti), 0, sizeof(sgx_target_info_t));
auto *d = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&ti);
// Spectre
sgx_lfence();
for (int i = 1, to = 0; i <= ps.ts_count(); ++i)
{
int size = 1 << (ps.target_spec[i] & 0xf);
to += size - 1;
to &= -size;
if (to + size > int(sizeof(ti)))
return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
int from = int16_t(ps.target_spec[i]) >> 4;
if (from >= 0)
{
if (from + size > int(sizeof(rpt)))
return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
memcpy(d + to, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&rpt) + from, size);
} else switch (from)
{
case -1:
break;
default:
return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
to += size;
}
return SGX_SUCCESS;
}
/* the caller is supposed to fill the quote field in emp_msg3 before calling
* this function.*/
extern "C" sgx_status_t sgx_ra_get_msg3_trusted(
sgx_ra_context_t context,
uint32_t quote_size,
sgx_report_t* qe_report,
sgx_ra_msg3_t *emp_msg3, //(mac||g_a||ps_sec_prop||quote)
uint32_t msg3_size)
{
if(vector_size(&g_ra_db) <= context ||!quote_size || !qe_report || !emp_msg3)
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
ra_db_item_t* item = NULL;
if(0 != vector_get(&g_ra_db, context, reinterpret_cast<void**>(&item)) || item == NULL )
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
//check integer overflow of msg3_size and quote_size
if (UINTPTR_MAX - reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(emp_msg3) < msg3_size ||
UINT32_MAX - quote_size < sizeof(sgx_ra_msg3_t) ||
sizeof(sgx_ra_msg3_t) + quote_size != msg3_size)
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
if (!sgx_is_outside_enclave(emp_msg3, msg3_size))
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
//
// fence after boundary check
// this also stops speculation in case of
// branch associated
// with sizeof(sgx_ra_msg3_t) + quote_size != msg3_size
// mispredicting
//
sgx_lfence();
sgx_status_t se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
//verify qe report
se_ret = sgx_verify_report(qe_report);
if(se_ret != SGX_SUCCESS)
{
if (SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH != se_ret &&
SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
return se_ret;
}
sgx_spin_lock(&item->item_lock);
//sgx_ra_proc_msg2_trusted must have been called
if (item->state != ra_proc_msg2ed)
{
sgx_spin_unlock(&item->item_lock);
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
//verify qe_report attributes and mr_enclave same as quoting enclave
if( memcmp( &qe_report->body.attributes, &item->qe_target.attributes, sizeof(sgx_attributes_t)) ||
memcmp( &qe_report->body.mr_enclave, &item->qe_target.mr_enclave, sizeof(sgx_measurement_t)) )
{
sgx_spin_unlock(&item->item_lock);
return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
sgx_ra_msg3_t msg3_except_quote_in;
sgx_cmac_128bit_key_t smk_key;
memcpy(&msg3_except_quote_in.g_a, &item->g_a, sizeof(msg3_except_quote_in.g_a));
memcpy(&msg3_except_quote_in.ps_sec_prop, &item->ps_sec_prop,
sizeof(msg3_except_quote_in.ps_sec_prop));
memcpy(&smk_key, &item->smk_key, sizeof(smk_key));
sgx_spin_unlock(&item->item_lock);
sgx_sha_state_handle_t sha_handle = NULL;
sgx_cmac_state_handle_t cmac_handle = NULL;
//SHA256(NONCE || emp_quote)
sgx_sha256_hash_t hash = {0};
se_ret = sgx_sha256_init(&sha_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
return se_ret;
}
if (NULL == sha_handle)
{
return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
do
{
se_ret = sgx_sha256_update((uint8_t *)&item->quote_nonce,
sizeof(item->quote_nonce),
sha_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
//cmac M := ga || PS_SEC_PROP_DESC(all zero if unused) ||emp_quote
sgx_cmac_128bit_tag_t mac;
se_ret = sgx_cmac128_init(&smk_key, &cmac_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
if (NULL == cmac_handle)
{
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
se_ret = sgx_cmac128_update((uint8_t*)&msg3_except_quote_in.g_a,
sizeof(msg3_except_quote_in.g_a), cmac_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
se_ret = sgx_cmac128_update((uint8_t*)&msg3_except_quote_in.ps_sec_prop,
sizeof(msg3_except_quote_in.ps_sec_prop), cmac_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
// sha256 and cmac quote
uint8_t quote_piece[32];
const uint8_t* emp_quote_piecemeal = emp_msg3->quote;
uint32_t quote_piece_size = static_cast<uint32_t>(sizeof(quote_piece));
while (emp_quote_piecemeal < emp_msg3->quote + quote_size)
{
//calculate size of one piece, the size of them are sizeof(quote_piece) except for the last one.
if (static_cast<uint32_t>(emp_msg3->quote + quote_size - emp_quote_piecemeal) < quote_piece_size)
quote_piece_size = static_cast<uint32_t>(emp_msg3->quote - emp_quote_piecemeal) + quote_size ;
memcpy(quote_piece, emp_quote_piecemeal, quote_piece_size);
se_ret = sgx_sha256_update(quote_piece,
quote_piece_size,
sha_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
se_ret = sgx_cmac128_update(quote_piece,
quote_piece_size,
cmac_handle);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
emp_quote_piecemeal += sizeof(quote_piece);
}
ERROR_BREAK(se_ret);
//get sha256 hash value
se_ret = sgx_sha256_get_hash(sha_handle, &hash);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
//get cmac value
se_ret = sgx_cmac128_final(cmac_handle, &mac);
if (SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
if(SGX_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY != se_ret)
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
break;
}
//verify qe_report->body.report_data == SHA256(NONCE || emp_quote)
if(0 != memcmp(&qe_report->body.report_data, &hash, sizeof(hash)))
{
se_ret = SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH;
break;
}
memcpy(&msg3_except_quote_in.mac, mac, sizeof(mac));
memcpy(emp_msg3, &msg3_except_quote_in, offsetof(sgx_ra_msg3_t, quote));
se_ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
}while(0);
memset_s(&smk_key, sizeof(smk_key), 0, sizeof(smk_key));
(void)sgx_sha256_close(sha_handle);
if(cmac_handle != NULL)
sgx_cmac128_close(cmac_handle);
return se_ret;
}
/*
* External function used to get quote. Prefix "emp_" means it is a pointer
* points memory outside enclave.
*
* @param p_blob[in, out] Pointer to the EPID Blob.
* @param blob_size[in] The size of EPID Blob, in bytes.
* @param p_enclave_report[in] The application enclave's report.
* @param quote_type[in] The type of quote, random based or name based.
* @param p_spid[in] Pointer to SPID.
* @param p_nonce[in] Pointer to nonce.
* @param emp_sig_rl[in] Pointer to SIG-RL.
* @param sig_rl_size[in] The size of SIG-RL, in bytes.
* @param p_qe_report[out] Pointer to QE report, which reportdata is
* sha256(nonce || quote)
* @param emp_quote[out] Pointer to the output buffer for quote.
* @param quote_size[in] The size of emp_quote, in bytes.
* @param pce_isvsvn[in] The ISVSVN of PCE.
* @return ae_error_t AE_SUCCESS for success, otherwise for errors.
*/
uint32_t get_quote(
uint8_t *p_blob,
uint32_t blob_size,
const sgx_report_t *p_enclave_report,
sgx_quote_sign_type_t quote_type,
const sgx_spid_t *p_spid,
const sgx_quote_nonce_t *p_nonce,
const uint8_t *emp_sig_rl,
uint32_t sig_rl_size,
sgx_report_t *p_qe_report,
uint8_t *emp_quote,
uint32_t quote_size,
sgx_isv_svn_t pce_isvsvn)
{
ae_error_t ret = AE_SUCCESS;
EpidStatus epid_ret = kEpidNoErr;
MemberCtx *p_epid_context = NULL;
sgx_quote_t quote_body;
uint8_t is_resealed = 0;
sgx_basename_t basename = {{0}};
uint64_t sign_size = 0;
sgx_status_t se_ret = SGX_SUCCESS;
sgx_report_t qe_report;
uint64_t required_buffer_size = 0;
se_sig_rl_t sig_rl_header;
se_plaintext_epid_data_sdk_t plaintext;
sgx_ec256_signature_t ec_signature;
sgx_cpu_svn_t cpusvn;
memset("e_body, 0, sizeof(quote_body));
memset(&sig_rl_header, 0, sizeof(sig_rl_header));
memset(&plaintext, 0, sizeof(plaintext));
memset(&ec_signature, 0, sizeof(ec_signature));
memset(&cpusvn, 0, sizeof(cpusvn));
/* Actually, some cases here will be checked with code generated by
edger8r. Here we just want to defend in depth. */
if((NULL == p_blob)
|| (NULL == p_enclave_report)
|| (NULL == p_spid)
|| (NULL == emp_quote)
|| (!quote_size)
|| ((NULL != emp_sig_rl) && (sig_rl_size < sizeof(se_sig_rl_t)
+ 2 * SE_ECDSA_SIGN_SIZE))
//
// this size check could mispredict and cause us to
// overflow, but we have an lfence below
// that's safe to use for this case
//
|| ((NULL == emp_sig_rl) && (sig_rl_size != 0)))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(SGX_TRUSTED_EPID_BLOB_SIZE_SDK != blob_size)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
//
// this could mispredict and cause us to
// overflow, but we have an lfence below
// that's safe to use for this case
//
if(SGX_LINKABLE_SIGNATURE != quote_type
&& SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE != quote_type)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(!p_nonce && p_qe_report)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(p_nonce && !p_qe_report)
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
/* To reduce the memory footprint of QE, we should leave sig_rl and
quote buffer outside enclave. */
if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(emp_sig_rl, sig_rl_size))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
//
// for user_check SigRL input
// based on quote_size input parameter
//
sgx_lfence();
if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(emp_quote, quote_size))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
/* Check whether p_blob is copied into EPC. If we want to reduce the
memory usage, maybe we can leave the p_blob outside EPC. */
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_blob, blob_size))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_enclave_report, sizeof(*p_enclave_report)))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_spid, sizeof(*p_spid)))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
/* If the code reach here, if p_nonce is NULL, then p_qe_report will be
NULL also. So we only check p_nonce here.*/
if(p_nonce)
{
/* Actually Edger8r will alloc the buffer within EPC, this is just kind
of defense in depth. */
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_nonce, sizeof(*p_nonce)))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(p_qe_report, sizeof(*p_qe_report)))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
}
/* Verify the input report. */
if(SGX_SUCCESS != sgx_verify_report(p_enclave_report))
return QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
/* Verify EPID p_blob and create the context */
ret = random_stack_advance(verify_blob_internal, p_blob,
blob_size,
&is_resealed,
TRUE,
plaintext,
&p_epid_context,
&cpusvn);
if(AE_SUCCESS != ret)
goto CLEANUP;
/* If SIG-RL is provided, we should check its size. */
if(emp_sig_rl)
{
uint64_t temp_size = 0;
uint64_t n2 = 0;
memcpy(&sig_rl_header, emp_sig_rl, sizeof(sig_rl_header));
if(sig_rl_header.protocol_version != SE_EPID_SIG_RL_VERSION)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
if(sig_rl_header.epid_identifier != SE_EPID_SIG_RL_ID)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
if(memcmp(&sig_rl_header.sig_rl.gid, &plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid,
sizeof(sig_rl_header.sig_rl.gid)))
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
temp_size = se_get_sig_rl_size(&sig_rl_header);
if(temp_size != sig_rl_size)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
se_static_assert(sizeof(ec_signature.x) == SE_ECDSA_SIGN_SIZE);
se_static_assert(sizeof(ec_signature.y) == SE_ECDSA_SIGN_SIZE);
memcpy(ec_signature.x,
emp_sig_rl + sig_rl_size - (SE_ECDSA_SIGN_SIZE * 2),
sizeof(ec_signature.x));
SWAP_ENDIAN_32B(ec_signature.x);
memcpy(ec_signature.y,
emp_sig_rl + sig_rl_size - (SE_ECDSA_SIGN_SIZE * 1),
sizeof(ec_signature.y));
SWAP_ENDIAN_32B(ec_signature.y);
n2 = SWAP_4BYTES(sig_rl_header.sig_rl.n2);
temp_size = sizeof(EpidSignature) - sizeof(NrProof)
+ n2 * sizeof(NrProof);
if(temp_size > UINT32_MAX)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
sign_size = temp_size;
}
else
{
sign_size = sizeof(BasicSignature)
+ sizeof(uint32_t) // rl_ver
+ sizeof(uint32_t); // rl_num
}
/* Verify sizeof basename is large enough and it should always be true*/
se_static_assert(sizeof(basename) > sizeof(*p_spid));
/* Because basename has already been zeroed,
so we don't need to concatenating with 0s.*/
memcpy(&basename, p_spid, sizeof(*p_spid));
if(SGX_UNLINKABLE_SIGNATURE == quote_type)
{
uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)&basename + sizeof(*p_spid);
se_ret = sgx_read_rand(p, sizeof(basename) - sizeof(*p_spid));
if(SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
ret = QE_UNEXPECTED_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
}
epid_ret = EpidRegisterBasename(p_epid_context, (uint8_t *)&basename,
sizeof(basename));
if(kEpidNoErr != epid_ret)
{
ret = QE_UNEXPECTED_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
required_buffer_size = SE_QUOTE_LENGTH_WITHOUT_SIG + sign_size;
/* We should make sure the buffer size is big enough. */
if(quote_size < required_buffer_size)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
//
// for user_check SigRL input
// based on n2 field in SigRL
//
sgx_lfence();
/* Copy the data in the report into quote body. */
memset(emp_quote, 0, quote_size);
quote_body.version = QE_QUOTE_VERSION;
quote_body.sign_type = (uint16_t)quote_type;
quote_body.pce_svn = pce_isvsvn; // Both are little endian
quote_body.xeid = plaintext.xeid; // Both are little endian
se_static_assert(sizeof(plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid) == sizeof(OctStr32));
se_static_assert(sizeof(quote_body.epid_group_id) == sizeof(uint32_t));
((uint8_t *)("e_body.epid_group_id))[0] = plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid.data[3];
((uint8_t *)("e_body.epid_group_id))[1] = plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid.data[2];
((uint8_t *)("e_body.epid_group_id))[2] = plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid.data[1];
((uint8_t *)("e_body.epid_group_id))[3] = plaintext.epid_group_cert.gid.data[0];
memcpy("e_body.basename, &basename, sizeof(quote_body.basename));
// Get the QE's report.
se_ret = sgx_create_report(NULL, NULL, &qe_report);
if(SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
{
ret = QE_PARAMETER_ERROR;
goto CLEANUP;
}
// Copy QE's security version in to Quote body.
quote_body.qe_svn = qe_report.body.isv_svn;
// Copy the incoming report into Quote body.
memcpy("e_body.report_body, &(p_enclave_report->body),
sizeof(quote_body.report_body));
/* Because required_buffer_size is larger than signature_len, so if we
get here, then no integer overflow will ocur. */
quote_body.signature_len = (uint32_t)(sizeof(se_wrap_key_t)
+ QUOTE_IV_SIZE
+ sizeof(uint32_t)
+ sign_size
+ sizeof(sgx_mac_t));
/* Make the signature. */
ret = qe_epid_sign(p_epid_context,
plaintext,
&basename,
emp_sig_rl ? ((const se_sig_rl_t *)emp_sig_rl)->sig_rl.bk
: NULL,
&sig_rl_header,
&ec_signature,
p_enclave_report,
p_nonce,
p_qe_report,
emp_quote,
"e_body,
(uint32_t)sign_size);
if(AE_SUCCESS != ret)
{
// Only need to clean the buffer after the fixed length part.
memset_s(emp_quote + sizeof(sgx_quote_t), quote_size - sizeof(sgx_quote_t),
0, quote_size - sizeof(sgx_quote_t));
goto CLEANUP;
}
memcpy(emp_quote, "e_body, sizeof(sgx_quote_t));
CLEANUP:
if(p_epid_context)
epid_member_delete(&p_epid_context);
return ret;
}
/*******************************************************************
** Function name: invoke_service_wrapper
** Descrption:
** This function is used to invoke a service call
** Parameters:
** tick - the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since the system was started,
** used to detect which session is idle for the longest time.
** req_msg - service request message
** req_msg_size - size of request message
** resp_msg - service response message
** resp_msg_size - size of response message
** Returns: ae_error_t
*******************************************************************/
ae_error_t invoke_service_wrapper (
/* IN */ uint64_t tick,
/* IN */ uint8_t* req_msg,
/* IN */ uint32_t req_msg_size,
/* OUT */ uint8_t* resp_msg,
/* IN */ uint32_t resp_msg_size)
{
// check parameter
ae_error_t ae_ret = AE_SUCCESS;
pse_message_t* pse_req_msg = (pse_message_t*)req_msg;
pse_message_t* pse_resp_msg = (pse_message_t*)resp_msg;
pse_op_error_t op_ret;
if (!req_msg || !resp_msg)
{
return PSE_OP_PARAMETER_ERROR;
}
//
// make sure the header is inside enclave
//
if (req_msg_size < sizeof(pse_message_t))
{
return PSE_OP_PARAMETER_ERROR;
}
//
// if this mispredicts, we might overflow below
//
sgx_lfence();
if (pse_req_msg->payload_size > UINT32_MAX - sizeof(pse_message_t) // check potential overflow
|| req_msg_size != sizeof(pse_message_t) + pse_req_msg->payload_size)
{
return PSE_OP_PARAMETER_ERROR;
}
if (resp_msg_size < sizeof(pse_message_t) // make sure the header is inside enclave
|| pse_req_msg->exp_resp_size > UINT32_MAX - sizeof(pse_message_t) // check potential overflow
|| resp_msg_size < sizeof(pse_message_t) + pse_req_msg->exp_resp_size)
{
return PSE_OP_PARAMETER_ERROR;
}
//
// put LFENCE here mostly for pse_req_msg->payload_size
// check above. I don't think we use
// pse_req_msg->exp_resp_size to calculate
// any pointers.
//
sgx_lfence();
pse_session_t* session = sid2session(pse_req_msg->session_id);
// ephemeral session must have been established
if(!is_eph_session_active())
{
// the ephemeral session is not active
return PSE_OP_EPHEMERAL_SESSION_INVALID;
}
//if session is invalid (session not exists or established, or sequence num overflow)
if (!is_isv_session_valid(session))
{
return PSE_OP_SESSION_INVALID;
}
// update session tick
update_session_tick_count(session, tick);
//clear response message
memset(resp_msg, 0, resp_msg_size);
uint8_t* req = (uint8_t*)malloc(pse_req_msg->payload_size);
uint8_t* resp= NULL;
uint32_t session_seq_num = get_session_seq_num(session);
do
{
BREAK_ON_MALLOC_FAIL(req, ae_ret)
// decrypt service request message using session key
if(false == decrypt_msg(pse_req_msg, req, (sgx_key_128bit_t*)session->active.AEK))
{
ae_ret = PSE_OP_SERVICE_MSG_ERROR;
break;
}
pse_req_hdr_t* req_hdr = (pse_req_hdr_t*)req;
// check session sequence number
if(req_hdr->seq_num != session_seq_num)
{
ae_ret = PSE_OP_SESSION_INVALID;
//close session
free_session(session);
break;
}
// Dispatch the service request to the proper handler
int i;
int service_count = static_cast<int>(sizeof(service_handler) / sizeof(service_handler_t));
for (i = 0; i < service_count; i++)
{
//
// might mispredict the end of the loop
//
sgx_lfence();
if (req_hdr->service_id == service_handler[i].service_id &&
req_hdr->service_cmd == service_handler[i].service_cmd)
{
if (pse_req_msg->payload_size != service_handler[i].req_size ||
pse_req_msg->exp_resp_size < service_handler[i].resp_size) // response message buffer must be large enough to hold response data
{
ae_ret = PSE_OP_SERVICE_MSG_ERROR;
goto clean_up;
}
resp = (uint8_t*)malloc(service_handler[i].resp_size);
if (resp == NULL)
{
ae_ret = PSE_OP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto clean_up;
}
//
// in case payload_size, req_size comparisons
// mispredict
//
sgx_lfence();
// serve the request
op_ret = service_handler[i].srv_pfn(session->isv_attributes, req, resp);
if(op_ret != OP_SUCCESS)
{
ae_ret = error_reinterpret(op_ret);
goto clean_up;
}
// set payload size for valid requests
pse_resp_msg->payload_size = service_handler[i].resp_size;
break;
}
}
if (i == service_count)
{
// service_id or service_cmd mismatch
resp = (uint8_t*)malloc(sizeof(pse_resp_hdr_t));
BREAK_ON_MALLOC_FAIL(resp, ae_ret)
// for unknown requests, payload data only includes response header
pse_resp_msg->payload_size = sizeof(pse_resp_hdr_t);
// set error status
((pse_resp_hdr_t*)resp)->status = PSE_ERROR_UNKNOWN_REQ;
}
// prepare the response message
pse_resp_hdr_t* resp_hdr = (pse_resp_hdr_t*)resp;
pse_resp_msg->exp_resp_size = 0;
pse_resp_msg->session_id = pse_req_msg->session_id;
//set response header, status code is already set in service functions
resp_hdr->seq_num = session_seq_num + 1; // addition overflow already checked in is_isv_session_valid()
resp_hdr->service_id = req_hdr->service_id;
resp_hdr->service_cmd = req_hdr->service_cmd;
// update sequence number for current session
set_session_seq_num(session, resp_hdr->seq_num + 1);
// encrypt the response message
if(false == encrypt_msg((pse_message_t*)pse_resp_msg,
(uint8_t*)resp,
(sgx_key_128bit_t*)session->active.AEK))
{
ae_ret = PSE_OP_INTERNAL_ERROR;
break;
}
} while (0);
clean_up:
SAFE_FREE(req);
SAFE_FREE(resp);
return ae_ret;
}
