static ECDSA_SIG *pkcs11_ecdsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *rp,
EC_KEY *ecdsa) {
struct pkcs11_key_data *pkd = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM mech = {
CKM_ECDSA, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
CK_RV rv;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pkd = ECDSA_get_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_ecdsa_key_idx);
#else
pkd = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, pkcs11_ecdsa_key_idx);
#endif
if((pkd != NULL) &&
((rv = pkd->funcs->C_SignInit(pkd->session, &mech, pkd->key)) == CKR_OK)) {
CK_BYTE_PTR buf = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *rval;
BIGNUM *r, *s;
int nlen;
/* Make a call to C_Sign to find out the size of the signature */
rv = pkd->funcs->C_Sign(pkd->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, NULL, &tlen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
return NULL;
}
if ((buf = malloc(tlen)) == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
rv = pkd->funcs->C_Sign(pkd->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, buf, &tlen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
if ((rval = ECDSA_SIG_new()) != NULL) {
/*
* ECDSA signature is 2 large integers of same size returned
* concatenated by PKCS#11, we separate them to create an
* ECDSA_SIG for OpenSSL.
*/
nlen = tlen / 2;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
ECDSA_SIG_get0(&r, &s, rval);
#else
r = rval->r;
s = rval->s;
#endif
BN_bin2bn(&buf[0], nlen, r);
BN_bin2bn(&buf[nlen], nlen, s);
}
free(buf);
return rval;
} else {
return NULL;
}
}
int
_libssh2_ecdsa_sign(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, libssh2_ecdsa_ctx * ec_ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hash_len,
unsigned char **signature, size_t *signature_len)
{
int r_len, s_len;
int rc = 0;
size_t out_buffer_len = 0;
unsigned char *sp;
const BIGNUM *pr = NULL, *ps = NULL;
unsigned char *temp_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char *out_buffer = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign(hash, hash_len, ec_ctx);
if(sig == NULL)
return -1;
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_STRUCTS
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &pr, &ps);
#else
pr = sig->r;
ps = sig->s;
#endif
r_len = BN_num_bytes(pr) + 1;
s_len = BN_num_bytes(ps) + 1;
temp_buffer = malloc(r_len + s_len + 8);
if(temp_buffer == NULL) {
rc = -1;
goto clean_exit;
}
sp = temp_buffer;
sp = write_bn(sp, pr, r_len);
sp = write_bn(sp, ps, s_len);
out_buffer_len = (size_t)(sp - temp_buffer);
out_buffer = LIBSSH2_CALLOC(session, out_buffer_len);
if(out_buffer == NULL) {
rc = -1;
goto clean_exit;
}
memcpy(out_buffer, temp_buffer, out_buffer_len);
*signature = out_buffer;
*signature_len = out_buffer_len;
clean_exit:
if(temp_buffer != NULL)
free(temp_buffer);
if(sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return rc;
}
static ECDSA_SIG * pkcs11_ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
const BIGNUM *inv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY * ec)
{
unsigned char sigret[512]; /* HACK for now */
ECDSA_SIG * sig = NULL;
PKCS11_KEY * key = NULL;
unsigned int siglen;
int nLen = 48; /* HACK */
int rv;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
key = (PKCS11_KEY *) EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_ex_index);
#else
key = (PKCS11_KEY *) ECDSA_get_ex_data(ec, ecdsa_ex_index);
#endif
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;
siglen = sizeof(sigret);
rv = PKCS11_ecdsa_sign(dgst, dlen, sigret, &siglen, key);
nLen = siglen / 2;
if (rv > 0) {
sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (sig) {
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
/*
* OpenSSL 1.1 does not have a way to allocate r and s
* in ECDSA_SIG as it is now hidden.
* Will us dummy ASN1 so r and s are allocated then
* use ECDSA_SIG_get0 to get access to r and s
* can then update r annd s
*/
const unsigned char *a;
unsigned char dasn1[8] =
{0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00};
BIGNUM *r;
BIGNUM *s;
a = dasn1;
d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&sig, &a, 8);
ECDSA_SIG_get0(&r, &s, sig);
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[0], nLen, r);
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[nLen], nLen, s);
#else
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[0], nLen, sig->r);
BN_bin2bn(&sigret[nLen], nLen, sig->s);
#endif
}
}
return sig;
}
/**
* ECDSA signing method (replaces ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig)
*
* @param dgst hash value to sign
* @param dlen length of the hash value
* @param kinv precomputed inverse k (from the sign_setup method)
* @param rp precomputed rp (from the sign_setup method)
* @param ec private EC signing key
* @return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred
*/
static ECDSA_SIG *pkcs11_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
{
unsigned char sigret[512]; /* HACK for now */
ECDSA_SIG *sig;
PKCS11_KEY *key;
unsigned int siglen;
BIGNUM *r, *s, *order;
(void)kinv; /* Precomputed values are not used for PKCS#11 */
(void)rp; /* Precomputed values are not used for PKCS#11 */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
key = (PKCS11_KEY *)EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_ex_index);
#else
key = (PKCS11_KEY *)ECDSA_get_ex_data(ec, ec_ex_index);
#endif
if (key == NULL) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_SIGN, PKCS11_ALIEN_KEY);
return NULL;
}
/* TODO: Add an atfork check */
/* Truncate digest if its byte size is longer than needed */
order = BN_new();
if (order) {
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (group && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL)) {
int klen = BN_num_bits(order);
if (klen < 8*dlen)
dlen = (klen+7)/8;
}
BN_free(order);
}
siglen = sizeof sigret;
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_sign(dgst, dlen, sigret, &siglen, key) <= 0)
return NULL;
sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (sig == NULL)
return NULL;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
ECDSA_SIG_get0(&r, &s, sig);
#else
r = sig->r;
s = sig->s;
#endif
BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen/2, r);
BN_bin2bn(sigret + siglen/2, siglen/2, s);
return sig;
}
// create a compact signature (65 bytes), which allows reconstructing the used public key
// The format is one header byte, followed by two times 32 bytes for the serialized r and s values.
// The header byte: 0x1B = first key with even y, 0x1C = first key with odd y,
// 0x1D = second key with even y, 0x1E = second key with odd y
bool CKey::SignCompact(uint256 hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)
{
bool fOk = false;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = ECDSA_do_sign((unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), pkey);
if (sig==NULL)
return false;
vchSig.clear();
vchSig.resize(65,0);
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x1000ffffL
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
#else
sig_r = sig->r;
sig_s = sig->s;
#endif
int nBitsR = BN_num_bits(sig_r);
int nBitsS = BN_num_bits(sig_s);
if (nBitsR <= 256 && nBitsS <= 256)
{
int nRecId = -1;
for (int i=0; i<4; i++)
{
CKey keyRec;
keyRec.fSet = true;
if (fCompressedPubKey)
keyRec.SetCompressedPubKey();
if (ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(keyRec.pkey, sig, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), i, 1) == 1)
if (keyRec.GetPubKey() == this->GetPubKey())
{
nRecId = i;
break;
}
}
if (nRecId == -1)
{
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
throw key_error("CKey::SignCompact() : unable to construct recoverable key");
}
vchSig[0] = nRecId+27+(fCompressedPubKey ? 4 : 0);
BN_bn2bin(sig_r,&vchSig[33-(nBitsR+7)/8]);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s,&vchSig[65-(nBitsS+7)/8]);
fOk = true;
}
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return fOk;
}
void getSigRaw(ecc_signature_t *sigraw, char *inFile)
{
ECDSA_SIG* signature;
int fdin;
struct stat s;
void *infile;
unsigned char outbuf[2*EC_COORDBYTES];
int r, rlen, roff, slen, soff;
const BIGNUM *sr, *ss;
fdin = open(inFile, O_RDONLY);
assert(fdin > 0);
r = fstat(fdin, &s);
assert(r==0);
infile = mmap(NULL, s.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fdin, 0);
assert(infile);
signature = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char **) &infile, 7 + 2*EC_COORDBYTES);
memset(&outbuf, 0, sizeof(outbuf));
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sr, &ss);
#else
sr = signature->r;
ss = signature->s;
#endif
rlen = BN_num_bytes(sr);
roff = 66 - rlen;
BN_bn2bin(sr, &outbuf[roff]);
slen = BN_num_bytes(ss);
soff = 66 + (66 - slen);
BN_bn2bin(sr, &outbuf[soff]);
if (debug)
printBytes((char *)"sig (RAW) = ", outbuf, sizeof(outbuf), 32);
memcpy(*sigraw, outbuf, 2*EC_COORDBYTES);
ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
close(fdin);
return;
}
EcdsaSignature BackendOpenSsl::sign_data(const ecdsa256::PrivateKey& key, const ByteBuffer& data)
{
auto priv_key = internal_private_key(key);
auto digest = calculate_digest(data);
// sign message data represented by the digest
openssl::Signature signature { ECDSA_do_sign(digest.data(), digest.size(), priv_key) };
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
const BIGNUM* sig_r = signature->r;
const BIGNUM* sig_s = signature->s;
#else
const BIGNUM* sig_r = nullptr;
const BIGNUM* sig_s = nullptr;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
#endif
EcdsaSignature ecdsa_signature;
X_Coordinate_Only coordinate;
if (sig_r && sig_s) {
const size_t len = field_size(PublicKeyAlgorithm::ECDSA_NISTP256_With_SHA256);
const auto num_bytes_s = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
assert(len >= static_cast<size_t>(num_bytes_s));
ecdsa_signature.s.resize(len, 0x00);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, ecdsa_signature.s.data() + len - num_bytes_s);
const auto num_bytes_r = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
assert(len >= static_cast<size_t>(num_bytes_r));
coordinate.x.resize(len, 0x00);
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, coordinate.x.data() + len - num_bytes_r);
} else {
throw openssl::Exception();
}
ecdsa_signature.R = std::move(coordinate);
return ecdsa_signature;
}
BUF_MEM *
convert_to_plain_sig(const BUF_MEM *x962_sig)
{
size_t r_len, s_len, rs_max;
BUF_MEM *plain_sig_buf = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *tmp_sig = NULL;
const unsigned char *tmp;
unsigned char *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
const BIGNUM *bn_r, *bn_s;
check_return(x962_sig, "Invalid arguments");
/* Convert the ASN.1 data to a C structure*/
tmp = (unsigned char*) x962_sig->data;
tmp_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (!tmp_sig)
goto err;
if (!d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&tmp_sig, &tmp, x962_sig->length))
goto err;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(tmp_sig, &bn_r, &bn_s);
/* Extract the parameters r and s*/
r_len = BN_num_bytes(bn_r);
s_len = BN_num_bytes(bn_s);
rs_max = r_len > s_len ? r_len : s_len;
r = OPENSSL_malloc(rs_max);
s = OPENSSL_malloc(rs_max);
if (!r || !s)
goto err;
/* Convert r and s to a binary representation */
if (!BN_bn2bin(bn_r, r + rs_max - r_len))
goto err;
if (!BN_bn2bin(bn_s, s + rs_max - s_len))
goto err;
/* r and s must be padded with leading zero bytes to ensure they have the
* same length */
memset(r, 0, rs_max - r_len);
memset(s, 0, rs_max - s_len);
/* concatenate r and s to get the plain signature format */
plain_sig_buf = BUF_MEM_create(rs_max + rs_max);
if (!plain_sig_buf)
goto err;
memcpy(plain_sig_buf->data, r, rs_max);
memcpy(plain_sig_buf->data + rs_max, s, rs_max);
OPENSSL_free(r);
OPENSSL_free(s);
ECDSA_SIG_free(tmp_sig);
return plain_sig_buf;
err:
if (r)
OPENSSL_free(r);
if (s)
OPENSSL_free(s);
if (tmp_sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(tmp_sig);
return NULL;
}
// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields
// recid selects which key is recovered
// if check is non-zero, additional checks are performed
int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check)
{
if (!eckey) return 0;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x1000ffffL
ECDSA_SIG_get0(ecsig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
#else
sig_r = ecsig->r;
sig_s = ecsig->s;
#endif
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
BIGNUM *e = NULL;
BIGNUM *order = NULL;
BIGNUM *sor = NULL;
BIGNUM *eor = NULL;
BIGNUM *field = NULL;
EC_POINT *R = NULL;
EC_POINT *O = NULL;
EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
BIGNUM *rr = NULL;
BIGNUM *zero = NULL;
int n = 0;
int i = recid / 2;
const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; }
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; }
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_add(x, x, sig_r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
field = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; }
if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; }
if (check)
{
if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; }
}
if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; }
n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7));
zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, sig_r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, sig_s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; }
ret = 1;
err:
if (ctx) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R);
if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O);
if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q);
return ret;
}
static bool _cjose_jws_build_sig_ec(cjose_jws_t *jws, const cjose_jwk_t *jwk, cjose_err *err)
{
bool retval = false;
// ensure jwk is EC
if (jwk->kty != CJOSE_JWK_KTY_EC)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
return false;
}
ec_keydata *keydata = (ec_keydata *)jwk->keydata;
EC_KEY *ec = keydata->key;
ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = ECDSA_do_sign(jws->dig, jws->dig_len, ec);
if (NULL == ecdsa_sig)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_sig_ec_cleanup;
}
// allocate buffer for signature
switch (keydata->crv)
{
case CJOSE_JWK_EC_P_256:
jws->sig_len = 32 * 2;
break;
case CJOSE_JWK_EC_P_384:
jws->sig_len = 48 * 2;
break;
case CJOSE_JWK_EC_P_521:
jws->sig_len = 66 * 2;
break;
case CJOSE_JWK_EC_INVALID:
jws->sig_len = 0;
break;
}
jws->sig = (uint8_t *)cjose_get_alloc()(jws->sig_len);
if (NULL == jws->sig)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_NO_MEMORY);
goto _cjose_jws_build_sig_ec_cleanup;
}
memset(jws->sig, 0, jws->sig_len);
const BIGNUM *pr, *ps;
#if defined(CJOSE_OPENSSL_11X)
ECDSA_SIG_get0(ecdsa_sig, &pr, &ps);
#else
pr = ecdsa_sig->r;
ps = ecdsa_sig->s;
#endif
int rlen = BN_num_bytes(pr);
int slen = BN_num_bytes(ps);
BN_bn2bin(pr, jws->sig + jws->sig_len / 2 - rlen);
BN_bn2bin(ps, jws->sig + jws->sig_len - slen);
// base64url encode signed digest
if (!cjose_base64url_encode((const uint8_t *)jws->sig, jws->sig_len, &jws->sig_b64u, &jws->sig_b64u_len, err))
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_sig_ec_cleanup;
}
retval = true;
_cjose_jws_build_sig_ec_cleanup:
if (ecdsa_sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
return retval;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
int hash_alg;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t len, dlen;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
(dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
goto out;
if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
{
const BIGNUM *r, *s;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, r)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, s)) != 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (sigp != NULL) {
if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(bb);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
/* some tests from the X9.62 draft */
int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
{
int ret = 0;
const char message[] = "abc";
unsigned char digest[20];
unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
if (md_ctx == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
/* get the message digest */
if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1())
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len))
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, "testing %s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
/* create the key */
if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
use_fake = 1;
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* create the signature */
use_fake = 1;
/* Use ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
if (!ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
goto x962_int_err;
signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, 20, kinv, rp, key);
if (signature == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL || (s = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
if (!BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in) || !BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in))
goto x962_int_err;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(&sig_r, &sig_s, signature);
if (BN_cmp(sig_r, r) || BN_cmp(sig_s, s))
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* verify the signature */
if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key) != 1)
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
ret = 1;
x962_int_err:
if (!ret)
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
EC_KEY_free(key);
ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
BN_clear_free(rp);
return ret;
}
/*-
* This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce.
* The ECDSA KATs are from:
* - the X9.62 draft (4)
* - NIST CAVP (720)
*
* It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG.
* NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing.
*
* Tests the library can successfully:
* - generate public keys that matches those KATs
* - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs
* - accept those signatures as valid
*/
static int x9_62_tests(int n)
{
int nid, md_nid, ret = 0;
const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL;
unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
long q_len, msg_len = 0;
size_t p_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid;
md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid;
r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r;
s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s;
tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg;
numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d;
numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k;
TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
/* get the message digest */
|| !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len))
/* create the key */
|| !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
/* load KAT variables */
|| !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new())
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in))
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in))
/* swap the RNG source */
|| !TEST_true(change_rand()))
goto err;
/* public key must match KAT */
use_fake = 1;
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
|| !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
&pbuf, NULL))
|| !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len))
|| !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len)
|| !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len))
goto err;
/* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
use_fake = 1;
if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
|| !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len,
kinv, rp, key))
/* verify the signature */
|| !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1))
goto err;
/* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r)
|| !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
/* restore the RNG source */
if (!TEST_true(restore_rand()))
ret = 0;
OPENSSL_free(message);
OPENSSL_free(pbuf);
OPENSSL_free(qbuf);
EC_KEY_free(key);
ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
BN_clear_free(rp);
return ret;
}
/* some tests from the X9.62 draft */
static int x9_62_test_internal(int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
{
int ret = 0;
const char message[] = "abc";
unsigned char digest[20];
unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
if (!TEST_ptr(md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()))
goto x962_int_err;
/* get the message digest */
if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1()))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, (const void *)message, 3))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, digest, &dgst_len)))
goto x962_int_err;
TEST_info("testing %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
/* create the key */
if (!TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)))
goto x962_int_err;
use_fake = 1;
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key)))
goto x962_int_err;
/* create the signature */
use_fake = 1;
/* Use ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp)))
goto x962_int_err;
if (!TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, 20, kinv, rp, key)))
goto x962_int_err;
/* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
if (!TEST_ptr(r = BN_new()) || !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new()))
goto x962_int_err;
if (!TEST_true(BN_dec2bn(&r, r_in)) || !TEST_true(BN_dec2bn(&s, s_in)))
goto x962_int_err;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r)
|| !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s))
goto x962_int_err;
/* verify the signature */
if (!TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, signature, key), 1))
goto x962_int_err;
ret = 1;
x962_int_err:
EC_KEY_free(key);
ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
BN_clear_free(rp);
return ret;
}
int test_builtin(BIO *out)
{
EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group;
ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL;
unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
const unsigned char *sig_ptr;
unsigned char *sig_ptr2;
unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
int nid, ret = 0;
/* fill digest values with some random data */
if (RAND_bytes(digest, 20) <= 0 || RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
/*
* create and verify a ecdsa signature with every availble curve (with )
*/
BIO_printf(out, "\ntesting ECDSA_sign() and ECDSA_verify() "
"with some internal curves:\n");
/* get a list of all internal curves */
crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len);
if (curves == NULL) {
BIO_printf(out, "malloc error\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
if (!EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)) {
BIO_printf(out, "unable to get internal curves\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
/* now create and verify a signature for every curve */
for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
unsigned char dirt, offset;
nid = curves[n].nid;
if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_X25519)
continue;
/* create new ecdsa key (== EC_KEY) */
if ((eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (group == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
goto builtin_err;
EC_GROUP_free(group);
degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
if (degree < 160) {
/* drop the curve */
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
eckey = NULL;
continue;
}
BIO_printf(out, "%s: ", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
/* create key */
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
/* create second key */
if ((wrong_eckey = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (group == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
if (EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey, group) == 0)
goto builtin_err;
EC_GROUP_free(group);
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey)) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* check key */
if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey)) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* create signature */
sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
if ((signature = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature, &sig_len, eckey)) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* verify signature */
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* verify signature with the wrong key */
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, wrong_eckey) == 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* wrong digest */
if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* wrong length */
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1, eckey) == 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/*
* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't garble
* the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and modify a byte in
* one of the bignums directly.
*/
sig_ptr = signature;
if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
ECDSA_SIG_get0(&sig_r, &sig_s, ecdsa_sig);
/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len)) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
goto builtin_err;
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, sig_r) == NULL) ||
(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, sig_s) == NULL))
goto builtin_err;
sig_ptr2 = signature;
sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
/*
* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature.
*/
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, sig_r) == NULL) ||
(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, sig_s) == NULL))
goto builtin_err;
sig_ptr2 = signature;
sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1) {
BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
goto builtin_err;
}
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
/* cleanup */
/* clean bogus errors */
ERR_clear_error();
OPENSSL_free(signature);
signature = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
eckey = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
wrong_eckey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
ecdsa_sig = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
raw_buf = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
builtin_err:
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
OPENSSL_free(signature);
OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
OPENSSL_free(curves);
return ret;
}
static int test_builtin(void)
{
EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
size_t crv_len = 0, n = 0;
EC_KEY *eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group;
ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig = NULL, *modified_sig = NULL;
unsigned char digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
const unsigned char *sig_ptr;
unsigned char *sig_ptr2;
unsigned char *raw_buf = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
BIGNUM *modified_r = NULL, *modified_s = NULL;
BIGNUM *unmodified_r = NULL, *unmodified_s = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
int nid, ret = 0;
/* fill digest values with some random data */
if (!TEST_true(RAND_bytes(digest, 20))
|| !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20)))
goto builtin_err;
/* create and verify a ecdsa signature with every available curve */
/* get a list of all internal curves */
crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len))
|| !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)))
goto builtin_err;
/* now create and verify a signature for every curve */
for (n = 0; n < crv_len; n++) {
unsigned char dirt, offset;
nid = curves[n].nid;
if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_X25519)
continue;
/* create new ecdsa key (== EC_KEY) */
if (!TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid))
|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group)))
goto builtin_err;
EC_GROUP_free(group);
degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
if (degree < 160) {
/* drop the curve */
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
eckey = NULL;
continue;
}
TEST_info("testing %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
/* create key */
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* create second key */
if (!TEST_ptr(wrong_eckey = EC_KEY_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid))
|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey, group)))
goto builtin_err;
EC_GROUP_free(group);
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* check key */
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_check_key(eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* create signature */
sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
if (!TEST_ptr(signature = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len))
|| !TEST_true(ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature, &sig_len,
eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* verify signature */
if (!TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len,
eckey), 1))
goto builtin_err;
/* verify signature with the wrong key */
if (!TEST_int_ne(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len,
wrong_eckey), 1))
goto builtin_err;
/* wrong digest */
if (!TEST_int_ne(ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature,
sig_len, eckey), 1))
goto builtin_err;
/* wrong length */
if (!TEST_int_ne(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature,
sig_len - 1, eckey), 1))
goto builtin_err;
/*
* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't garble
* the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and modify a byte in
* one of the bignums directly.
*/
sig_ptr = signature;
if (!TEST_ptr(ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)))
goto builtin_err;
ECDSA_SIG_get0(ecdsa_sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
if (!TEST_false(r_len > bn_len)
|| !TEST_false(s_len > bn_len))
goto builtin_err;
buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
if (!TEST_ptr(raw_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(buf_len)))
goto builtin_err;
BN_bn2bin(sig_r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
BN_bn2bin(sig_s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
if (!TEST_ptr(modified_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()))
goto builtin_err;
if (!TEST_ptr(modified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL))
|| !TEST_ptr(modified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len,
bn_len, NULL))
|| !TEST_true(ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig,
modified_r, modified_s))) {
BN_free(modified_r);
BN_free(modified_s);
goto builtin_err;
}
sig_ptr2 = signature;
sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2);
if (!TEST_false(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
if (!TEST_ptr(unmodified_r = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, NULL))
|| !TEST_ptr(unmodified_s = BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len,
bn_len, NULL))
|| !TEST_true(ECDSA_SIG_set0(modified_sig, unmodified_r,
unmodified_s))) {
BN_free(unmodified_r);
BN_free(unmodified_s);
goto builtin_err;
}
sig_ptr2 = signature;
sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(modified_sig, &sig_ptr2);
if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey)))
goto builtin_err;
/* cleanup */
ERR_clear_error();
OPENSSL_free(signature);
signature = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
eckey = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
wrong_eckey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
ecdsa_sig = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig);
modified_sig = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
raw_buf = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
builtin_err:
EC_KEY_free(eckey);
EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
ECDSA_SIG_free(modified_sig);
OPENSSL_free(signature);
OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
OPENSSL_free(curves);
return ret;
}
int jwt_sign_sha_pem(jwt_t *jwt, char **out, unsigned int *len,
const char *str)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *ec_sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ec_sig_r = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ec_sig_s = NULL;
BIO *bufkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *alg;
int type;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int pkey_type;
unsigned char *sig;
int ret = 0;
size_t slen;
switch (jwt->alg) {
/* RSA */
case JWT_ALG_RS256:
alg = EVP_sha256();
type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
break;
case JWT_ALG_RS384:
alg = EVP_sha384();
type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
break;
case JWT_ALG_RS512:
alg = EVP_sha512();
type = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
break;
/* ECC */
case JWT_ALG_ES256:
alg = EVP_sha256();
type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
break;
case JWT_ALG_ES384:
alg = EVP_sha384();
type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
break;
case JWT_ALG_ES512:
alg = EVP_sha512();
type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
break;
default:
return EINVAL;
}
bufkey = BIO_new_mem_buf(jwt->key, jwt->key_len);
if (bufkey == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
/* This uses OpenSSL's default passphrase callback if needed. The
* library caller can override this in many ways, all of which are
* outside of the scope of LibJWT and this is documented in jwt.h. */
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bufkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (pkey == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pkey_type != type)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (mdctx == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
/* Initialize the DigestSign operation using alg */
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, alg, NULL, pkey) != 1)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
/* Call update with the message */
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, str, strlen(str)) != 1)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
/* First, call EVP_DigestSignFinal with a NULL sig parameter to get length
* of sig. Length is returned in slen */
if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, NULL, &slen) != 1)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
/* Allocate memory for signature based on returned size */
sig = alloca(slen);
if (sig == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
/* Get the signature */
if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, sig, &slen) != 1)
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
if (pkey_type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
*out = malloc(slen);
if (*out == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(*out, sig, slen);
*len = slen;
} else {
unsigned int degree, bn_len, r_len, s_len, buf_len;
unsigned char *raw_buf;
EC_KEY *ec_key;
/* For EC we need to convert to a raw format of R/S. */
/* Get the actual ec_key */
ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey);
if (ec_key == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key));
EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
/* Get the sig from the DER encoded version. */
ec_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&sig, slen);
if (ec_sig == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
ECDSA_SIG_get0(ec_sig, &ec_sig_r, &ec_sig_s);
r_len = BN_num_bytes(ec_sig_r);
s_len = BN_num_bytes(ec_sig_s);
bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
SIGN_ERROR(EINVAL);
buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
raw_buf = alloca(buf_len);
if (raw_buf == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
/* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
BN_bn2bin(ec_sig_r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
BN_bn2bin(ec_sig_s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
*out = malloc(buf_len);
if (*out == NULL)
SIGN_ERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(*out, raw_buf, buf_len);
*len = buf_len;
}
jwt_sign_sha_pem_done:
if (bufkey)
BIO_free(bufkey);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (mdctx)
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
if (ec_sig)
ECDSA_SIG_free(ec_sig);
return ret;
}
