static int sms4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
if(!enc) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE) enc = 1;
else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE) enc = 1; //encrypt key == decrypt key
}
if (enc)
sms4_set_encrypt_key(ctx->cipher_data, key);
else //ecb, cbc
sms4_set_decrypt_key(ctx->cipher_data, key);
return 1;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int ret;
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap)
ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
ret = 1;
break;
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
}
/* The subkey for Camellia is generated. */
static int camellia_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_CAMELLIA_KEY,ctx);
ret = Camellia_set_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &dat->ks);
if (ret < 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_CAMELLIA_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_CAMELLIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
return 0;
}
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc) {
dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else {
dat->block = (block128_f) Camellia_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) Camellia_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
}
return 1;
}
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
/* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
if (kekcipher) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
* DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
*/
if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
else if (keylen <= 16)
kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
else if (keylen <= 24)
kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
else
kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
int aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
int block;
int i, j;
unsigned int mode, key_len;
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) - 1;
key_len = (ctx->key_len)/8 - 2;
block = len / 16;
for (i = 0; i < block; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
REG_TEXT(j) = GETU32(in + i*16 + j*4);
}
REG_AES = ED(0, key_len, ctx->encrypt, mode, 0, 0);
int a[5];
a[4] = REG_RESULT(0);
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
a[j] = REG_RESULT(j);
}
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
PUTU32(a[j], out + i*16 + j*4);
}
}
return 1;
}
int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int i;
unsigned int key_len, mode;
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) - 1;
key_len = (ctx->key_len)/8 - 2;
REG_MODE = 0x20;
REG_AES = BC_INI(0, key_len, enc, mode, 0);
for (i = 0; i < (4 + key_len * 2); i++)
REG_KEY(i) = GETU32(key + i * 4);
if (!mode) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
REG_IV(i) = GETU32(iv + i * 4);
}
// Key expension
REG_AES = KEXP(0, key_len, enc, mode, 0);
return 1;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int ret;
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
ret = 1;
break;
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
break;
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
}
STDMETHODIMP CBCipher::get_CipherMode(short *pVal)
{
if(!m_ctx.cipher)return SetErrorInfo(s_strAlgoError);
*pVal = (short)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&m_ctx);
return S_OK;
}
STDMETHODIMP CBCipher::get_IVSize(short *pVal)
{
if(!m_ctx.cipher)return SetErrorInfo(s_strAlgoError);
if(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&m_ctx) < 2)
*pVal = 0;
else *pVal = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx);
return S_OK;
}
static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
if(!enc) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE) enc = 1;
else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE) enc = 1;
}
if (enc) idea_set_encrypt_key(key,&(ctx->c.idea_ks));
else
{
IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE tmp;
idea_set_encrypt_key(key,&tmp);
idea_set_decrypt_key(&tmp,&(ctx->c.idea_ks));
memset((unsigned char *)&tmp,0,
sizeof(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE));
}
return 1;
}
static int idea_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
if(!enc) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE) enc = 1;
else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE) enc = 1;
}
if (enc) idea_set_encrypt_key(key,ctx->cipher_data);
else
{
IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE tmp;
idea_set_encrypt_key(key,&tmp);
idea_set_decrypt_key(&tmp,ctx->cipher_data);
OPENSSL_cleanse((unsigned char *)&tmp,
sizeof(IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE));
}
return 1;
}
STDMETHODIMP CBCipher::GenerateIV()
{
if(!m_ctx.cipher)return SetErrorInfo(s_strAlgoError);
if(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx) == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&m_ctx) < 2)
return E_NOTIMPL;
m_pIV.Allocate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
RAND_bytes(m_pIV, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
return S_OK;
}
static int
aes_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char * key,
const unsigned char * iv,
int encp)
{
AES_KEY *k = ctx->cipher_data;
if (ctx->encrypt || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB8_MODE)
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->cipher->key_len * 8, k);
else
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->cipher->key_len * 8, k);
return 1;
}
static int
aes_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int size)
{
AES_KEY *k = ctx->cipher_data;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB8_MODE)
AES_cfb8_encrypt(in, out, size, k, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
else
AES_cbc_encrypt(in, out, size, k, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt);
return 1;
}
static LUA_FUNCTION(openssl_cipher_ctx_info)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = CHECK_OBJECT(1, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, "openssl.evp_cipher_ctx");
lua_newtable(L);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "block_size", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "key_length", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "iv_length", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "flags", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "nid", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "type", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SET(L, -1, "mode", EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx), integer);
AUXILIAR_SETOBJECT(L, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), "openssl.evp_cipher", -1, "cipher");
return 1;
}
int CBCMAC_Init(CBCMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *eng)
{
int i, block_size;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, key, NULL, eng)) {
return 0;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE) {
return 0;
}
ctx->worklen = 0;
block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
bzero(ctx->cbcstate, block_size);
return 0;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int ret;
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret=c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c,type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
{
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
return 1;
ret=EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
}
else
ret=-1;
return(ret);
}
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
#endif
/* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
if (kekcipher) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
* DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
*/
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)
/* EVP_des_ede3_wrap() depends on EVP_sha1() */
if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SMS4
if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_sms4_cbc
|| EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_sm1_cbc
|| EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_ssf33_cbc)
kekcipher = EVP_sms4_wrap();
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
if (keylen <= 16)
kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
else if (keylen <= 24)
kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
else
kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
#endif
if (kekcipher == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int sms4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int mode;
EVP_SMS4_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_KEY, ctx);
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) {
sms4_set_decrypt_key(&dat->ks, key);
} else {
sms4_set_encrypt_key(&dat->ks, key);
}
dat->block = (block128_f)sms4_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ? (cbc128_f) sms4_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
return 1;
}
/* The subkey for ARIA is generated. */
static int aria_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret;
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if (enc || (mode != EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE && mode != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
ret = aria_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx));
else
ret = aria_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx));
if (ret < 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_ARIA_INIT_KEY,EVP_R_ARIA_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static size_t aead_tls_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const size_t in_len,
const size_t extra_in_len) {
assert(extra_in_len == 0);
AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
const size_t hmac_len = HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
// The NULL cipher.
return hmac_len;
}
const size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
// An overflow of |in_len + hmac_len| doesn't affect the result mod
// |block_size|, provided that |block_size| is a smaller power of two.
assert(block_size != 0 && (block_size & (block_size - 1)) == 0);
const size_t pad_len = block_size - (in_len + hmac_len) % block_size;
return hmac_len + pad_len;
}
int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
{
int ret;
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret=c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c,type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
{
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
{
ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
ret = 1;
}
else
ret=EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
}
else
ret=-1;
return(ret);
}
STDMETHODIMP CBCipher::put_IV(VARIANT Val)
{
if(!m_ctx.cipher)return SetErrorInfo(s_strAlgoError);
if(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx) == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&m_ctx) < 2)
return E_NOTIMPL;
HRESULT hr;
CBVarPtr varPtr;
hr = varPtr.Attach(Val);
if(FAILED(hr))return hr;
if(varPtr.m_nSize != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx))
return E_INVALIDARG;
m_pIV.Allocate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
CopyMemory(m_pIV, varPtr.m_pData, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
return S_OK;
}
STDMETHODIMP CBCipher::get_IV(VARIANT *pVal)
{
if(!m_ctx.cipher)return SetErrorInfo(s_strAlgoError);
if(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx) == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&m_ctx) < 2)
return E_NOTIMPL;
if(m_pIV)
{
CBVarPtr varPtr;
HRESULT hr;
hr = varPtr.Create(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
if(FAILED(hr))return hr;
CopyMemory(varPtr.m_pData, m_pIV, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&m_ctx));
return varPtr.GetVariant(pVal);
}
return S_OK;
}
int
cipher_ctx_mode (const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
{
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode (ctx);
}
int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
unsigned char *p,rec_char;
size_t md_size;
int npad;
int t;
if (send)
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->write_hash;
}
else
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
md_size=t;
npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
if (!send &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
{
/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
* data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
* timing-oracle. */
/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size. */
unsigned char header[75];
unsigned j = 0;
memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
j += md_size;
memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
j += npad;
memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
j += 8;
header[j++] = rec->type;
header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
hash,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
mac_sec, md_size,
1 /* is SSLv3 */);
}
/* Prepare the encryption key for PadLock usage */
static int
padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
int key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
unsigned long mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if (key == NULL)
return 0; /* ERROR */
cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(*cdata));
/* Prepare Control word. */
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0;
else
cdata->cword.b.encdec = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) == 0);
cdata->cword.b.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 128) / 32;
cdata->cword.b.ksize = (key_len - 128) / 64;
switch (key_len) {
case 128:
/*
* PadLock can generate an extended key for AES128 in hardware
*/
memcpy(cdata->ks.rd_key, key, AES_KEY_SIZE_128);
cdata->cword.b.keygen = 0;
break;
case 192:
case 256:
/*
* Generate an extended AES key in software. Needed for AES192/AES256
*/
/*
* Well, the above applies to Stepping 8 CPUs and is listed as
* hardware errata. They most likely will fix it at some point and
* then a check for stepping would be due here.
*/
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc)
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
else
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
# ifndef AES_ASM
/*
* OpenSSL C functions use byte-swapped extended key.
*/
padlock_key_bswap(&cdata->ks);
# endif
cdata->cword.b.keygen = 1;
break;
default:
/* ERROR */
return 0;
}
/*
* This is done to cover for cases when user reuses the
* context for new key. The catch is that if we don't do
* this, padlock_eas_cipher might proceed with old key...
*/
padlock_reload_key();
return 1;
}
static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
return 0;
}
if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_len < in_len) {
/* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
* will always be removed on return. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
/* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
/* Configure the explicit IV. */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
!tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
return 0;
}
/* Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. */
size_t total = 0;
int len;
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
assert(total == in_len);
/* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to
* |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */
int padding_ok;
unsigned data_plus_mac_len, data_len;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
padding_ok = EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(
&data_plus_mac_len, out, total,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx),
(unsigned)HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
/* Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. */
if (padding_ok == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
} else {
padding_ok = 1;
data_plus_mac_len = total;
/* |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has
* already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */
assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
}
data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
/* At this point, |padding_ok| is 1 or -1. If 1, the padding is valid and the
* first |data_plus_mac_size| bytes after |out| are the plaintext and
* MAC. Either way, |data_plus_mac_size| is large enough to extract a MAC. */
/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
* length for legacy ciphers. */
uint8_t ad_fixed[13];
memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11);
ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8);
ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff);
ad_len += 2;
/* Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. */
uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t mac_len;
uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
uint8_t *record_mac;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) {
if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len,
ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total,
tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
record_mac = record_mac_tmp;
EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total);
} else {
/* We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers
* implemented. */
assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
unsigned mac_len_u;
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, out, data_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
return 0;
}
mac_len = mac_len_u;
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
record_mac = &out[data_len];
}
/* Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be
* safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a
* different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See
* EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. */
unsigned good = constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len),
0);
good &= constant_time_eq_int(padding_ok, 1);
if (!good) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_open, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
/* End of timing-sensitive code. */
*out_len = data_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
size_t total = 0;
if (!tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
return 0;
}
if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len ||
in_len > INT_MAX) {
/* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_len < in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, aead_tls_seal, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
* length for legacy ciphers. */
uint8_t ad_extra[2];
ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8);
ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff);
/* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done
* in-place. */
uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned mac_len;
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, in, in_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
/* Configure the explicit IV. */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
!tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
return 0;
}
/* Encrypt the input. */
int len;
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in,
(int)in_len)) {
return 0;
}
total = len;
/* Feed the MAC into the cipher. */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, mac,
(int)mac_len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
if (block_size > 1) {
assert(block_size <= 256);
assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
/* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */
uint8_t padding[256];
unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size);
memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len);
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, padding,
(int)padding_len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
}
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
return 0;
}
total += len;
*out_len = total;
return 1;
}
int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
if (enc == -1)
enc = ctx->encrypt;
else
{
if (enc)
enc = 1;
ctx->encrypt = enc;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_FIPS
if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
{
FIPSerr(FIPS_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
ctx->cipher = &bad_cipher;
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts
* so this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing
* the previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a
* reinitialisation, when it may all be unecessary. */
if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher && (!cipher ||
(cipher && (cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid))))
goto skip_to_init;
#endif
if (cipher)
{
/* Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared
* (the previous check attempted to avoid this if the same
* ENGINE and EVP_CIPHER could be used). */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
/* Restore encrypt field: it is zeroed by cleanup */
ctx->encrypt = enc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (!do_evp_enc_engine(ctx, &cipher, impl))
return 0;
#endif
ctx->cipher=cipher;
if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size)
{
ctx->cipher_data=OPENSSL_malloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
if (!ctx->cipher_data)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
else
{
ctx->cipher_data = NULL;
}
ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len;
ctx->flags = 0;
if(ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
{
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
}
else if(!ctx->cipher)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
skip_to_init:
#endif
/* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1
|| ctx->cipher->block_size == 8
|| ctx->cipher->block_size == 16);
if(!(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(ctx) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) {
switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER:
case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
ctx->num = 0;
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <=
(int)sizeof(ctx->iv));
if(iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
break;
default:
return 0;
break;
}
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* After 'key' is set no further parameters changes are permissible.
* So only check for non FIPS enabling at this point.
*/
if (key && FIPS_mode())
{
if (!(ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS)
& !(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS);
#if 0
ERR_add_error_data(2, "cipher=",
EVP_CIPHER_name(ctx->cipher));
#endif
ctx->cipher = &bad_cipher;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
if(key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) {
if(!ctx->cipher->init(ctx,key,iv,enc)) return 0;
}
ctx->buf_len=0;
ctx->final_used=0;
ctx->block_mask=ctx->cipher->block_size-1;
return 1;
}
