NTSTATUS rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user2(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *username,
const char *newpassword,
const char *oldpassword)
{
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
struct samr_CryptPassword new_nt_password;
struct samr_CryptPassword new_lm_password;
struct samr_Password old_nt_hash_enc;
struct samr_Password old_lanman_hash_enc;
uchar old_nt_hash[16];
uchar old_lanman_hash[16];
uchar new_nt_hash[16];
uchar new_lanman_hash[16];
struct lsa_String server, account;
DEBUG(10,("rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user2\n"));
init_lsa_String(&server, cli->srv_name_slash);
init_lsa_String(&account, username);
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
E_md4hash(oldpassword, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpassword, new_nt_hash);
if (lp_client_lanman_auth() &&
E_deshash(newpassword, new_lanman_hash) &&
E_deshash(oldpassword, old_lanman_hash)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14) */
encode_pw_buffer(new_lm_password.data, newpassword, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_lm_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_lanman_hash, old_lanman_hash_enc.hash);
} else {
ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_password);
ZERO_STRUCT(old_lanman_hash_enc);
}
encode_pw_buffer(new_nt_password.data, newpassword, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_nt_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash, old_nt_hash_enc.hash);
result = rpccli_samr_ChangePasswordUser2(cli, mem_ctx,
&server,
&account,
&new_nt_password,
&old_nt_hash_enc,
true,
&new_lm_password,
&old_lanman_hash_enc);
return result;
}
NTSTATUS dcerpc_samr_chgpasswd_user(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *h,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct policy_handle *user_handle,
const char *newpassword,
const char *oldpassword,
NTSTATUS *presult)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samr_Password hash1, hash2, hash3, hash4, hash5, hash6;
uchar old_nt_hash[16];
uchar old_lm_hash[16];
uchar new_nt_hash[16];
uchar new_lm_hash[16];
ZERO_STRUCT(old_nt_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(new_nt_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash);
DEBUG(10,("rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user\n"));
E_md4hash(oldpassword, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpassword, new_nt_hash);
E_deshash(oldpassword, old_lm_hash);
E_deshash(newpassword, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, old_lm_hash, hash1.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_lm_hash, new_lm_hash, hash2.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash, hash3.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_nt_hash, new_nt_hash, hash4.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_lm_hash, new_nt_hash, hash5.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_nt_hash, new_lm_hash, hash6.hash);
status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser(h,
mem_ctx,
user_handle,
true,
&hash1,
&hash2,
true,
&hash3,
&hash4,
true,
&hash5,
true,
&hash6,
presult);
return status;
}
NTSTATUS rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user(struct rpc_pipe_client *cli,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct policy_handle *user_handle,
const char *newpassword,
const char *oldpassword)
{
NTSTATUS result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
struct samr_Password hash1, hash2, hash3, hash4, hash5, hash6;
uchar old_nt_hash[16];
uchar old_lm_hash[16];
uchar new_nt_hash[16];
uchar new_lm_hash[16];
ZERO_STRUCT(old_nt_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(new_nt_hash);
ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash);
DEBUG(10,("rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user\n"));
E_md4hash(oldpassword, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpassword, new_nt_hash);
E_deshash(oldpassword, old_lm_hash);
E_deshash(newpassword, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, old_lm_hash, hash1.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_lm_hash, new_lm_hash, hash2.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash, hash3.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_nt_hash, new_nt_hash, hash4.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_lm_hash, new_nt_hash, hash5.hash);
E_old_pw_hash(old_nt_hash, new_lm_hash, hash6.hash);
result = rpccli_samr_ChangePasswordUser(cli, mem_ctx,
user_handle,
true,
&hash1,
&hash2,
true,
&hash3,
&hash4,
true,
&hash5,
true,
&hash6);
return result;
}
/**
* Converts a password to the hashes on an NTLMSSP context.
*
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_password(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, const char *password)
{
uint8_t lm_hash[16];
uint8_t nt_hash[16];
TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state->lm_hash);
TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state->nt_hash);
if (password == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (E_deshash(password, lm_hash)) {
ntlmssp_state->lm_hash = (uint8_t *)
talloc_memdup(ntlmssp_state, lm_hash, 16);
if (!ntlmssp_state->lm_hash) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
ntlmssp_state->nt_hash = (uint8_t *)
talloc_memdup(ntlmssp_state, nt_hash, 16);
if (!ntlmssp_state->nt_hash) {
TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state->lm_hash);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS store_memory_creds(struct WINBINDD_MEMORY_CREDS *memcredp,
const char *pass)
{
#if !defined(HAVE_MLOCK)
return NT_STATUS_OK;
#else
/* new_entry->nt_hash is the base pointer for the block
of memory pointed into by new_entry->lm_hash and
new_entry->pass (if we're storing plaintext). */
memcredp->len = NT_HASH_LEN + LM_HASH_LEN;
if (pass) {
memcredp->len += strlen(pass)+1;
}
#if defined(LINUX)
/* aligning the memory on on x86_64 and compiling
with gcc 4.1 using -O2 causes a segv in the
next memset() --jerry */
memcredp->nt_hash = SMB_MALLOC_ARRAY(unsigned char, memcredp->len);
#else
/* On non-linux platforms, mlock()'d memory must be aligned */
memcredp->nt_hash = SMB_MEMALIGN_ARRAY(unsigned char,
getpagesize(), memcredp->len);
#endif
if (!memcredp->nt_hash) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(memcredp->nt_hash, 0x0, memcredp->len);
memcredp->lm_hash = memcredp->nt_hash + NT_HASH_LEN;
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(10,("mlocking memory: %p\n", memcredp->nt_hash));
#endif
if ((mlock(memcredp->nt_hash, memcredp->len)) == -1) {
DEBUG(0,("failed to mlock memory: %s (%d)\n",
strerror(errno), errno));
SAFE_FREE(memcredp->nt_hash);
return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(10,("mlocked memory: %p\n", memcredp->nt_hash));
#endif
if (pass) {
/* Create and store the password hashes. */
E_md4hash(pass, memcredp->nt_hash);
E_deshash(pass, memcredp->lm_hash);
memcredp->pass = (char *)memcredp->lm_hash + LM_HASH_LEN;
memcpy(memcredp->pass, pass,
memcredp->len - NT_HASH_LEN - LM_HASH_LEN);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
#endif
}
BOOL SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uchar *c8, uchar p24[24])
{
BOOL ret;
uchar lm_hash[16];
ret = E_deshash(passwd, lm_hash);
SMBencrypt_hash(lm_hash, c8, p24);
return ret;
}
bool SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
{
bool ret;
uint8_t lm_hash[16];
ret = E_deshash(passwd, lm_hash);
SMBencrypt_hash(lm_hash, c8, p24);
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned uid;
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
uchar new_lanman_p16[LM_HASH_LEN];
int g;
int smbpasswd_present;
char smbpasswd_line[256];
char *s;
if(argc != 3)
{
printf("usage for openwrt_smbpasswd - \n\t%s USERNAME PASSWD\n\t%s -del USERNAME\n", argv[0], argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if(strcmp(argv[1], "-del") == 0)
{
printf("deleting user %s\n", argv[2]);
delete_user_from_smbpasswd(argv[2]);
return 0;
}
uid = find_uid_for_user(argv[1]);
if(uid == -1)
exit(2);
E_md4hash(argv[2], new_nt_p16);
if (!E_deshash(argv[2], new_lanman_p16)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14 */
memset(new_lanman_p16, 0, LM_HASH_LEN);
}
s = smbpasswd_line;
s += snprintf(s, 256 - (s - smbpasswd_line), "%s:%u:", argv[1], uid);
for(g = 0; g < 16; g++)
s += snprintf(s, 256 - (s - smbpasswd_line), "%02X", new_lanman_p16[g]);
s += snprintf(s, 256 - (s - smbpasswd_line), ":");
for(g = 0; g < 16; g++)
s += snprintf(s, 256 - (s - smbpasswd_line), "%02X", new_nt_p16[g]);
snprintf(s, 256 - (s - smbpasswd_line), ":[UX ]:LCT-00000001:\n");
insert_user_in_smbpasswd(argv[1], smbpasswd_line);
return 0;
}
/**
* Converts a password to the hashes on an NTLMSSP context.
*
*/
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_password(NTLMSSP_STATE *ntlmssp_state, const char *password)
{
if (!password) {
ntlmssp_state->lm_hash = NULL;
ntlmssp_state->nt_hash = NULL;
} else {
unsigned char lm_hash[16];
unsigned char nt_hash[16];
E_deshash(password, lm_hash);
E_md4hash(password, nt_hash);
return ntlmssp_set_hashes(ntlmssp_state, lm_hash, nt_hash);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static bool torture_deshash(struct torture_context *tctx)
{
struct {
const char *input;
uint8_t output[16];
bool should_pass;
} testcases[] = {
{ "",
{ 0xAA, 0xD3, 0xB4, 0x35, 0xB5, 0x14, 0x04, 0xEE,
0xAA, 0xD3, 0xB4, 0x35, 0xB5, 0x14, 0x04, 0xEE
}, true
},
{ "abcdefgh",
{ 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0xC6, 0x6A, 0xBD,
0x5A, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0x7C, 0x24, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x3A
}, true
},
{ "0123456789abc",
{ 0x56, 0x45, 0xF1, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x08, 0x82, 0xB2,
0x50, 0x79, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0x33, 0x38, 0xAF, 0xE9
}, true
},
{ "0123456789abcd",
{ 0x56, 0x45, 0xF1, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x08, 0x82, 0xB2,
0x1A, 0xC3, 0x88, 0x4B, 0x83, 0x32, 0x45, 0x40
}, true
},
{ "0123456789abcde",
{ 0x56, 0x45, 0xF1, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x08, 0x82, 0xB2,
0x1A, 0xC3, 0x88, 0x4B, 0x83, 0x32, 0x45, 0x40
}, false
},
};
int i;
for (i=0; i<ARRAY_SIZE(testcases); i++) {
uint8_t res[16];
bool ret;
ret = E_deshash(testcases[i].input, res);
torture_assert(tctx, ret == testcases[i].should_pass,
"E_deshash bad result");
torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx, res, testcases[i].output, 16, "E_deshash bad return data");
}
return true;
}
/*
This implements the X/Open SMB password encryption
It takes a password ('unix' string), a 8 byte "crypt key"
and puts 24 bytes of encrypted password into p24
Returns False if password must have been truncated to create LM hash
*/
BOOL SMBencrypt(const char *passwd, const uchar *c8, uchar p24[24])
{
BOOL ret;
uchar p21[21];
memset(p21,'\0',21);
ret = E_deshash(passwd, p21);
SMBOWFencrypt(p21, c8, p24);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("SMBencrypt: lm#, challenge, response\n"));
dump_data(100, (char *)p21, 16);
dump_data(100, (const char *)c8, 8);
dump_data(100, (char *)p24, 24);
#endif
return ret;
}
/* Does both the NT and LM owfs of a user's password */
void nt_lm_owf_gen(const char *pwd, uint8_t nt_p16[16], uint8_t p16[16])
{
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
memset(nt_p16, '\0', 16);
E_md4hash(pwd, nt_p16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, nt#\n"));
dump_data(120, (const uint8_t *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
dump_data(100, nt_p16, 16);
#endif
E_deshash(pwd, (uint8_t *)p16);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("nt_lm_owf_gen: pwd, lm#\n"));
dump_data(120, (const uint8_t *)pwd, strlen(pwd));
dump_data(100, p16, 16);
#endif
}
_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
int *flags,
DATA_BLOB challenge,
const NTTIME *server_timestamp,
DATA_BLOB target_info,
DATA_BLOB *_lm_response, DATA_BLOB *_nt_response,
DATA_BLOB *_lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *_session_key)
{
const char *user, *domain;
DATA_BLOB lm_response, nt_response;
DATA_BLOB lm_session_key, session_key;
const struct samr_Password *nt_hash;
lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
/* We may already have an NTLM response we prepared earlier.
* This is used for NTLM pass-though authentication */
if (cred->nt_response.data || cred->lm_response.data) {
*_nt_response = cred->nt_response;
*_lm_response = cred->lm_response;
if (!cred->lm_response.data) {
*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
}
*_lm_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
*_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
nt_hash = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(cred, mem_ctx);
cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(cred, mem_ctx, &user, &domain);
/* If we are sending a username@realm login (see function
* above), then we will not send LM, it will not be
* accepted */
if (cred->principal_obtained > cred->username_obtained) {
*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
}
/* Likewise if we are a machine account (avoid protocol downgrade attacks) */
if (cred->machine_account) {
*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
}
if (cred->use_kerberos == CRED_MUST_USE_KERBEROS) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
if (!nt_hash) {
static const uint8_t zeros[16];
/* do nothing - blobs are zero length */
/* session key is all zeros */
session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, zeros, 16);
lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, zeros, 16);
lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
/* not doing NTLM2 without a password */
*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_NTLM2;
} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH) {
if (!target_info.length) {
/* be lazy, match win2k - we can't do NTLMv2 without it */
DEBUG(1, ("Server did not provide 'target information', required for NTLMv2\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* TODO: if the remote server is standalone, then we should replace 'domain'
with the server name as supplied above */
if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(mem_ctx,
user,
domain,
nt_hash->hash, &challenge,
server_timestamp, &target_info,
&lm_response, &nt_response,
NULL, &session_key)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* LM Key is incompatible... */
*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
if (lm_response.length != 0) {
/*
* We should not expose the lm key.
*/
memset(lm_response.data, 0, lm_response.length);
}
} else if (*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM2) {
MD5_CTX md5_session_nonce_ctx;
uint8_t session_nonce[16];
uint8_t session_nonce_hash[16];
uint8_t user_session_key[16];
lm_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
generate_random_buffer(lm_response.data, 8);
memset(lm_response.data+8, 0, 16);
memcpy(session_nonce, challenge.data, 8);
memcpy(&session_nonce[8], lm_response.data, 8);
MD5Init(&md5_session_nonce_ctx);
MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, challenge.data, 8);
MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, lm_response.data, 8);
MD5Final(session_nonce_hash, &md5_session_nonce_ctx);
DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP challenge set by NTLM2\n"));
DEBUG(5, ("challenge is: \n"));
dump_data(5, session_nonce_hash, 8);
nt_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash,
session_nonce_hash,
nt_response.data);
session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, user_session_key);
hmac_md5(user_session_key, session_nonce, sizeof(session_nonce), session_key.data);
dump_data_pw("NTLM2 session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
/* LM Key is incompatible... */
*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
} else {
uint8_t lm_hash[16];
nt_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBOWFencrypt(nt_hash->hash, challenge.data,
nt_response.data);
session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash->hash, session_key.data);
dump_data_pw("NT session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
/* lanman auth is insecure, it may be disabled.
We may also not have a password */
if (*flags & CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH) {
const char *password;
password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
if (!password) {
lm_response = nt_response;
} else {
lm_response = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
if (!SMBencrypt(password,challenge.data,
lm_response.data)) {
/* If the LM password was too long (and therefore the LM hash being
of the first 14 chars only), don't send it.
We don't have any better options but to send the NT response
*/
data_blob_free(&lm_response);
lm_response = nt_response;
/* LM Key is incompatible with 'long' passwords */
*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
} else if (E_deshash(password, lm_hash)) {
lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
memcpy(lm_session_key.data, lm_hash, 8);
memset(&lm_session_key.data[8], '\0', 8);
if (!(*flags & CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH)) {
session_key = lm_session_key;
}
}
}
} else {
const char *password;
/* LM Key is incompatible... */
lm_response = nt_response;
*flags &= ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
password = cli_credentials_get_password(cred);
if (password && E_deshash(password, lm_hash)) {
lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
memcpy(lm_session_key.data, lm_hash, 8);
memset(&lm_session_key.data[8], '\0', 8);
}
}
}
if (_lm_response) {
*_lm_response = lm_response;
}
if (_nt_response) {
*_nt_response = nt_response;
}
if (_lm_session_key) {
*_lm_session_key = lm_session_key;
}
if (_session_key) {
*_session_key = session_key;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static bool test_lm_ntlm_broken(enum ntlm_break break_which)
{
bool pass = True;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
uint32 flags = 0;
DATA_BLOB lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
uchar lm_key[8];
uchar user_session_key[16];
uchar lm_hash[16];
uchar nt_hash[16];
DATA_BLOB chall = get_challenge();
char *error_string;
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_key);
ZERO_STRUCT(user_session_key);
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY;
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY;
SMBencrypt(opt_password,chall.data,lm_response.data);
E_deshash(opt_password, lm_hash);
SMBNTencrypt(opt_password,chall.data,nt_response.data);
E_md4hash(opt_password, nt_hash);
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, session_key.data);
switch (break_which) {
case BREAK_NONE:
break;
case BREAK_LM:
lm_response.data[0]++;
break;
case BREAK_NT:
nt_response.data[0]++;
break;
case NO_LM:
data_blob_free(&lm_response);
break;
case NO_NT:
data_blob_free(&nt_response);
break;
}
nt_status = contact_winbind_auth_crap(opt_username, opt_domain,
opt_workstation,
&chall,
&lm_response,
&nt_response,
flags,
lm_key,
user_session_key,
&error_string, NULL);
data_blob_free(&lm_response);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
d_printf("%s (0x%x)\n",
error_string,
NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
return break_which == BREAK_NT;
}
if (memcmp(lm_hash, lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("LM Key does not match expectations!\n"));
DEBUG(1, ("lm_key:\n"));
dump_data(1, lm_key, 8);
DEBUG(1, ("expected:\n"));
dump_data(1, lm_hash, 8);
pass = False;
}
if (break_which == NO_NT) {
if (memcmp(lm_hash, user_session_key,
8) != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("NT Session Key does not match expectations (should be LM hash)!\n"));
DEBUG(1, ("user_session_key:\n"));
dump_data(1, user_session_key, sizeof(user_session_key));
DEBUG(1, ("expected:\n"));
dump_data(1, lm_hash, sizeof(lm_hash));
pass = False;
}
} else {
if (memcmp(session_key.data, user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("NT Session Key does not match expectations!\n"));
DEBUG(1, ("user_session_key:\n"));
dump_data(1, user_session_key, 16);
DEBUG(1, ("expected:\n"));
dump_data(1, session_key.data, session_key.length);
pass = False;
}
}
return pass;
}
static bool test_ntlm_in_both(void)
{
bool pass = True;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
uint32 flags = 0;
DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 24);
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16);
uint8 lm_key[8];
uint8 lm_hash[16];
uint8 user_session_key[16];
uint8 nt_hash[16];
DATA_BLOB chall = get_challenge();
char *error_string;
ZERO_STRUCT(lm_key);
ZERO_STRUCT(user_session_key);
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_LMKEY;
flags |= WBFLAG_PAM_USER_SESSION_KEY;
SMBNTencrypt(opt_password,chall.data,nt_response.data);
E_md4hash(opt_password, nt_hash);
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, session_key.data);
E_deshash(opt_password, lm_hash);
nt_status = contact_winbind_auth_crap(opt_username, opt_domain,
opt_workstation,
&chall,
&nt_response,
&nt_response,
flags,
lm_key,
user_session_key,
&error_string, NULL);
data_blob_free(&nt_response);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
d_printf("%s (0x%x)\n",
error_string,
NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
SAFE_FREE(error_string);
return False;
}
if (memcmp(lm_hash, lm_key,
sizeof(lm_key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("LM Key does not match expectations!\n"));
DEBUG(1, ("lm_key:\n"));
dump_data(1, lm_key, 8);
DEBUG(1, ("expected:\n"));
dump_data(1, lm_hash, 8);
pass = False;
}
if (memcmp(session_key.data, user_session_key,
sizeof(user_session_key)) != 0) {
DEBUG(1, ("NT Session Key does not match expectations!\n"));
DEBUG(1, ("user_session_key:\n"));
dump_data(1, user_session_key, 16);
DEBUG(1, ("expected:\n"));
dump_data(1, session_key.data, session_key.length);
pass = False;
}
return pass;
}
bool cli_oem_change_password(struct cli_state *cli, const char *user, const char *new_password,
const char *old_password)
{
char param[1024];
unsigned char data[532];
char *p = param;
unsigned char old_pw_hash[16];
unsigned char new_pw_hash[16];
unsigned int data_len;
unsigned int param_len = 0;
char *rparam = NULL;
char *rdata = NULL;
unsigned int rprcnt, rdrcnt;
if (strlen(user) >= sizeof(fstring)-1) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_oem_change_password: user name %s is too long.\n", user));
return False;
}
SSVAL(p,0,214); /* SamOEMChangePassword command. */
p += 2;
strlcpy(p, "zsT", sizeof(param)-PTR_DIFF(p,param));
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
strlcpy(p, "B516B16", sizeof(param)-PTR_DIFF(p,param));
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
strlcpy(p,user, sizeof(param)-PTR_DIFF(p,param));
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
SSVAL(p,0,532);
p += 2;
param_len = PTR_DIFF(p,param);
/*
* Get the Lanman hash of the old password, we
* use this as the key to make_oem_passwd_hash().
*/
E_deshash(old_password, old_pw_hash);
encode_pw_buffer(data, new_password, STR_ASCII);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("make_oem_passwd_hash\n"));
dump_data(100, data, 516);
#endif
arcfour_crypt( (unsigned char *)data, (unsigned char *)old_pw_hash, 516);
/*
* Now place the old password hash in the data.
*/
E_deshash(new_password, new_pw_hash);
E_old_pw_hash( new_pw_hash, old_pw_hash, (uchar *)&data[516]);
data_len = 532;
if (!cli_api(cli,
param, param_len, 4, /* param, length, max */
(char *)data, data_len, 0, /* data, length, max */
&rparam, &rprcnt,
&rdata, &rdrcnt)) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_oem_change_password: Failed to send password change for user %s\n",
user ));
return False;
}
if (rparam) {
cli->rap_error = SVAL(rparam,0);
}
SAFE_FREE(rparam);
SAFE_FREE(rdata);
return (cli->rap_error == 0);
}
/*
samr_ChangePasswordUser3
*/
NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct samr_ChangePasswordUser3 *r)
{
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB new_password;
struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
int ret;
struct ldb_message **res, *mod;
const char * const attrs[] = { "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL };
struct samr_Password *nt_pwd, *lm_pwd;
DATA_BLOB nt_pwd_blob;
struct samr_DomInfo1 *dominfo = NULL;
struct samr_ChangeReject *reject = NULL;
enum samr_RejectReason reason = SAMR_REJECT_OTHER;
uint8_t new_nt_hash[16], new_lm_hash[16];
struct samr_Password nt_verifier, lm_verifier;
*r->out.dominfo = NULL;
*r->out.reject = NULL;
if (r->in.nt_password == NULL ||
r->in.nt_verifier == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* To change a password we need to open as system */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, system_session(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx));
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(sam_ctx);
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
/* we need the users dn and the domain dn (derived from the
user SID). We also need the current lm and nt password hashes
in order to decrypt the incoming passwords */
ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx,
mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs,
"(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
r->in.account->string);
if (ret != 1) {
/* Don't give the game away: (don't allow anonymous users to prove the existance of usernames) */
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
user_dn = res[0]->dn;
status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) {
goto failed;
}
if (!nt_pwd) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* decrypt the password we have been given */
nt_pwd_blob = data_blob(nt_pwd->hash, sizeof(nt_pwd->hash));
arcfour_crypt_blob(r->in.nt_password->data, 516, &nt_pwd_blob);
data_blob_free(&nt_pwd_blob);
if (!extract_pw_from_buffer(mem_ctx, r->in.nt_password->data, &new_password)) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to decode password buffer\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (r->in.nt_verifier == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* check NT verifier */
mdfour(new_nt_hash, new_password.data, new_password.length);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, nt_pwd->hash, nt_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(nt_verifier.hash, r->in.nt_verifier->hash, 16) != 0) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* check LM verifier (really not needed as we just checked the
* much stronger NT hash, but the RPC-SAMR test checks for
* this) */
if (lm_pwd && r->in.lm_verifier != NULL) {
char *new_pass;
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lp_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_UTF16, CH_UNIX,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_pass, NULL, false)) {
E_deshash(new_pass, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, lm_pwd->hash, lm_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(lm_verifier.hash, r->in.lm_verifier->hash, 16) != 0) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
}
}
mod = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx);
if (mod == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto failed;
}
mod->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mod, user_dn);
if (!mod->dn) {
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
goto failed;
}
/* set the password on the user DN specified. This may fail
* due to password policies */
status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
user_dn, NULL,
mod, &new_password,
NULL, NULL,
true, /* this is a user password change */
&reason,
&dominfo);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
goto failed;
}
/* The above call only setup the modifications, this actually
* makes the write to the database. */
ret = samdb_replace(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, mod);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(2,("samdb_replace failed to change password for %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
goto failed;
}
/* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
status = NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
goto failed;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
failed:
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
talloc_free(sam_ctx);
reject = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samr_ChangeReject);
*r->out.dominfo = dominfo;
*r->out.reject = reject;
if (reject == NULL) {
return status;
}
ZERO_STRUCTP(reject);
reject->reason = reason;
return status;
}
NTSTATUS dcerpc_samr_chgpasswd_user3(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *h,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *srv_name_slash,
const char *username,
const char *newpassword,
const char *oldpassword,
struct samr_DomInfo1 **dominfo1,
struct userPwdChangeFailureInformation **reject,
NTSTATUS *presult)
{
NTSTATUS status;
struct samr_CryptPassword new_nt_password;
struct samr_CryptPassword new_lm_password;
struct samr_Password old_nt_hash_enc;
struct samr_Password old_lanman_hash_enc;
uint8_t old_nt_hash[16];
uint8_t old_lanman_hash[16];
uint8_t new_nt_hash[16];
uint8_t new_lanman_hash[16];
struct lsa_String server, account;
DEBUG(10,("rpccli_samr_chgpasswd_user3\n"));
init_lsa_String(&server, srv_name_slash);
init_lsa_String(&account, username);
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
E_md4hash(oldpassword, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpassword, new_nt_hash);
if (lp_client_lanman_auth() &&
E_deshash(newpassword, new_lanman_hash) &&
E_deshash(oldpassword, old_lanman_hash)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14) */
encode_pw_buffer(new_lm_password.data, newpassword, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_lm_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_lanman_hash, old_lanman_hash_enc.hash);
} else {
ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_password);
ZERO_STRUCT(old_lanman_hash_enc);
}
encode_pw_buffer(new_nt_password.data, newpassword, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_nt_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash, old_nt_hash_enc.hash);
status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(h,
mem_ctx,
&server,
&account,
&new_nt_password,
&old_nt_hash_enc,
true,
&new_lm_password,
&old_lanman_hash_enc,
NULL,
dominfo1,
reject,
presult);
return status;
}
NTSTATUS ntlm_password_check(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool lanman_auth,
bool ntlm_auth,
uint32_t logon_parameters,
const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
const char *username,
const char *client_username,
const char *client_domain,
const struct samr_Password *stored_lanman,
const struct samr_Password *stored_nt,
DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
{
const static uint8_t zeros[8];
DATA_BLOB tmp_sess_key;
const char *upper_client_domain = NULL;
if (client_domain != NULL) {
upper_client_domain = talloc_strdup_upper(mem_ctx, client_domain);
if (upper_client_domain == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
if (stored_nt == NULL) {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO NT password stored for user %s.\n",
username));
}
*lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
*user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
/* Check for cleartext netlogon. Used by Exchange 5.5. */
if ((logon_parameters & MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED)
&& challenge->length == sizeof(zeros)
&& (memcmp(challenge->data, zeros, challenge->length) == 0 )) {
struct samr_Password client_nt;
struct samr_Password client_lm;
char *unix_pw = NULL;
bool lm_ok;
size_t converted_size = 0;
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: checking plaintext passwords for user %s\n",
username));
mdfour(client_nt.hash, nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
if (lm_response->length &&
(convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx, CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
lm_response->data, lm_response->length,
(void *)&unix_pw, &converted_size))) {
if (E_deshash(unix_pw, client_lm.hash)) {
lm_ok = true;
} else {
lm_ok = false;
}
} else {
lm_ok = false;
}
return hash_password_check(mem_ctx,
lanman_auth,
lm_ok ? &client_lm : NULL,
nt_response->length ? &client_nt : NULL,
username,
stored_lanman, stored_nt);
}
if (nt_response->length != 0 && nt_response->length < 24) {
DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid NT password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
(unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
}
if (nt_response->length > 24 && stored_nt) {
/* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
use it
*/
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with domain [%s]\n",
client_domain ? client_domain : "<NULL>"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
client_domain,
user_sess_key)) {
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password with uppercased version of domain [%s]\n",
upper_client_domain ? upper_client_domain : "<NULL>"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
upper_client_domain,
user_sess_key)) {
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NTLMv2 password without a domain\n"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
"",
user_sess_key)) {
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv2 password check failed\n"));
}
} else if (nt_response->length == 24 && stored_nt) {
if (ntlm_auth) {
/* We have the NT MD4 hash challenge available - see if we can
use it (ie. does it exist in the smbpasswd file).
*/
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password\n"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
user_sess_key)) {
/* The LM session key for this response is not very secure,
so use it only if we otherwise allow LM authentication */
if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} else {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NT MD4 password check failed for user %s\n",
username));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
} else {
DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: NTLMv1 passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
username));
/* no return, because we might pick up LMv2 in the LM field */
}
}
if (lm_response->length == 0) {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NEITHER LanMan nor NT password supplied for user %s\n",
username));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (lm_response->length < 24) {
DEBUG(2,("ntlm_password_check: invalid LanMan password length (%lu) for user %s\n",
(unsigned long)nt_response->length, username));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (!lanman_auth) {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: Lanman passwords NOT PERMITTED for user %s\n",
username));
} else if (!stored_lanman) {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password set for user %s (and no NT password supplied)\n",
username));
} else if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: NO LanMan password allowed for username@realm logins (user: %s)\n",
username));
} else {
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LM password\n"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
lm_response,
stored_lanman->hash, challenge,
NULL)) {
/* The session key for this response is still very odd.
It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
allow LM authentication */
if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
}
if (!stored_nt) {
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: LM password check failed for user, no NT password %s\n",username));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* This is for 'LMv2' authentication. almost NTLMv2 but limited to 24 bytes.
- related to Win9X, legacy NAS pass-though authentication
*/
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with domain %s\n",
client_domain ? client_domain : "<NULL>"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
lm_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
client_domain,
&tmp_sess_key)) {
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
* (even if it failed), then use the session
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
* torture test */
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
client_domain,
user_sess_key);
} else {
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
}
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password with upper-cased version of domain %s\n",
upper_client_domain ? upper_client_domain : "<NULL>"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
lm_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
upper_client_domain,
&tmp_sess_key)) {
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
* (even if it failed), then use the session
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
* torture test */
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
upper_client_domain,
user_sess_key);
} else {
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
}
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking LMv2 password without a domain\n"));
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
lm_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
"",
&tmp_sess_key)) {
if (nt_response->length > 24) {
/* If NTLMv2 authentication has preceded us
* (even if it failed), then use the session
* key from that. See the RPC-SAMLOGON
* torture test */
smb_sess_key_ntlmv2(mem_ctx,
nt_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
client_username,
"",
user_sess_key);
} else {
/* Otherwise, use the LMv2 session key */
*user_sess_key = tmp_sess_key;
}
if (user_sess_key->length) {
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data, MIN(8, user_sess_key->length));
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Apparently NT accepts NT responses in the LM field
- I think this is related to Win9X pass-though authentication
*/
DEBUG(4,("ntlm_password_check: Checking NT MD4 password in LM field\n"));
if (ntlm_auth) {
if (smb_pwd_check_ntlmv1(mem_ctx,
lm_response,
stored_nt->hash, challenge,
NULL)) {
/* The session key for this response is still very odd.
It not very secure, so use it only if we otherwise
allow LM authentication */
if (lanman_auth && stored_lanman) {
uint8_t first_8_lm_hash[16];
memcpy(first_8_lm_hash, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
memset(first_8_lm_hash + 8, '\0', 8);
*user_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, first_8_lm_hash, 16);
*lm_sess_key = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, stored_lanman->hash, 8);
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password, NT MD4 password in LM field and LMv2 failed for user %s\n",username));
} else {
DEBUG(3,("ntlm_password_check: LM password and LMv2 failed for user %s, and NT MD4 password in LM field not permitted\n",username));
}
/* Try and match error codes */
if (strchr_m(username, '@')) {
return NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
bool pdb_set_plaintext_passwd(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
{
uchar new_lanman_p16[LM_HASH_LEN];
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
if (!plaintext)
return False;
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
E_md4hash(plaintext, new_nt_p16);
if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd (sampass, new_nt_p16, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
if (!E_deshash(plaintext, new_lanman_p16)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14 */
if (!pdb_set_lanman_passwd (sampass, NULL, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
} else {
if (!pdb_set_lanman_passwd (sampass, new_lanman_p16, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
}
if (!pdb_set_plaintext_pw_only (sampass, plaintext, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
if (!pdb_set_pass_last_set_time (sampass, time(NULL), PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
/* Store the password history. */
if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) {
uchar *pwhistory;
uint32 pwHistLen;
pdb_get_account_policy(AP_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHistLen);
if (pwHistLen != 0){
uint32 current_history_len;
/* We need to make sure we don't have a race condition here - the
account policy history length can change between when the pw_history
was first loaded into the struct samu struct and now.... JRA. */
pwhistory = (uchar *)pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, ¤t_history_len);
if (current_history_len != pwHistLen) {
/* After closing and reopening struct samu the history
values will sync up. We can't do this here. */
/* current_history_len > pwHistLen is not a problem - we
have more history than we need. */
if (current_history_len < pwHistLen) {
/* Ensure we have space for the needed history. */
uchar *new_history = (uchar *)TALLOC(sampass,
pwHistLen*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
if (!new_history) {
return False;
}
/* And copy it into the new buffer. */
if (current_history_len) {
memcpy(new_history, pwhistory,
current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
}
/* Clearing out any extra space. */
memset(&new_history[current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN],
'\0', (pwHistLen-current_history_len)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
/* Finally replace it. */
pwhistory = new_history;
}
}
if (pwhistory && pwHistLen){
/* Make room for the new password in the history list. */
if (pwHistLen > 1) {
memmove(&pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN],
pwhistory, (pwHistLen -1)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN );
}
/* Create the new salt as the first part of the history entry. */
generate_random_buffer(pwhistory, PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN);
/* Generate the md5 hash of the salt+new password as the second
part of the history entry. */
E_md5hash(pwhistory, new_nt_p16, &pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN]);
pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, pwhistory, pwHistLen, PDB_CHANGED);
} else {
DEBUG (10,("pdb_get_set.c: pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory was NULL!\n"));
}
} else {
/* Set the history length to zero. */
pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, NULL, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
}
}
return True;
}
bool pdb_set_plaintext_passwd(struct samu *sampass, const char *plaintext)
{
uchar new_lanman_p16[LM_HASH_LEN];
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
uchar *pwhistory;
uint32 pwHistLen;
uint32 current_history_len;
if (!plaintext)
return False;
/* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */
E_md4hash(plaintext, new_nt_p16);
if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd (sampass, new_nt_p16, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
if (!E_deshash(plaintext, new_lanman_p16)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14 */
if (!pdb_set_lanman_passwd (sampass, NULL, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
} else {
if (!pdb_set_lanman_passwd (sampass, new_lanman_p16, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
}
if (!pdb_set_plaintext_pw_only (sampass, plaintext, PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
if (!pdb_set_pass_last_set_time (sampass, time(NULL), PDB_CHANGED))
return False;
if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) == 0) {
/*
* No password history for non-user accounts
*/
return true;
}
pdb_get_account_policy(PDB_POLICY_PASSWORD_HISTORY, &pwHistLen);
if (pwHistLen == 0) {
/* Set the history length to zero. */
pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, NULL, 0, PDB_CHANGED);
return true;
}
/*
* We need to make sure we don't have a race condition here -
* the account policy history length can change between when
* the pw_history was first loaded into the struct samu struct
* and now.... JRA.
*/
pwhistory = (uchar *)pdb_get_pw_history(sampass, ¤t_history_len);
if ((current_history_len != 0) && (pwhistory == NULL)) {
DEBUG(1, ("pdb_set_plaintext_passwd: pwhistory == NULL!\n"));
return false;
}
if (current_history_len < pwHistLen) {
/*
* Ensure we have space for the needed history. This
* also takes care of an account which did not have
* any history at all so far, i.e. pwhistory==NULL
*/
uchar *new_history = talloc_zero_array(
sampass, uchar,
pwHistLen*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
if (!new_history) {
return False;
}
memcpy(new_history, pwhistory,
current_history_len*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN);
pwhistory = new_history;
}
/*
* Make room for the new password in the history list.
*/
if (pwHistLen > 1) {
memmove(&pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN], pwhistory,
(pwHistLen-1)*PW_HISTORY_ENTRY_LEN );
}
/*
* Fill the salt area with 0-s: this indicates that
* a plain nt hash is stored in the has area.
* The old format was to store a 16 byte salt and
* then an md5hash of the nt_hash concatenated with
* the salt.
*/
memset(pwhistory, 0, PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN);
/*
* Store the plain nt hash in the second 16 bytes.
* The old format was to store the md5 hash of
* the salt+newpw.
*/
memcpy(&pwhistory[PW_HISTORY_SALT_LEN], new_nt_p16, SALTED_MD5_HASH_LEN);
pdb_set_pw_history(sampass, pwhistory, pwHistLen, PDB_CHANGED);
return True;
}
static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
const DATA_BLOB reply, DATA_BLOB *next_request)
{
uint32 chal_flags, ntlmssp_command, unkn1, unkn2;
DATA_BLOB server_domain_blob;
DATA_BLOB challenge_blob;
DATA_BLOB struct_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0);
char *server_domain;
const char *chal_parse_string;
const char *auth_gen_string;
DATA_BLOB lm_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB nt_response = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
DATA_BLOB encrypted_session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
NTSTATUS nt_status;
if (!msrpc_parse(&reply, "CdBd",
"NTLMSSP",
&ntlmssp_command,
&server_domain_blob,
&chal_flags)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
dump_data(2, (const char *)reply.data, reply.length);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, chal_flags, lp_client_lanman_auth());
if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_CHAL_TARGET_INFO) {
chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
} else {
chal_parse_string = "CdUdbdd";
}
auth_gen_string = "CdBBUUUBd";
} else {
if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_CHAL_TARGET_INFO) {
chal_parse_string = "CdAdbddB";
} else {
chal_parse_string = "CdAdbdd";
}
auth_gen_string = "CdBBAAABd";
}
DEBUG(3, ("NTLMSSP: Set final flags:\n"));
debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
if (!msrpc_parse(&reply, chal_parse_string,
"NTLMSSP",
&ntlmssp_command,
&server_domain,
&chal_flags,
&challenge_blob, 8,
&unkn1, &unkn2,
&struct_blob)) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#2)\n"));
dump_data(2, (const char *)reply.data, reply.length);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
ntlmssp_state->server_domain = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx,
server_domain);
SAFE_FREE(server_domain);
if (challenge_blob.length != 8) {
data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (!ntlmssp_state->password) {
static const uchar zeros[16];
/* do nothing - blobs are zero length */
/* session key is all zeros */
session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, zeros, 16);
/* not doing NLTM2 without a password */
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
} else if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
if (!struct_blob.length) {
/* be lazy, match win2k - we can't do NTLMv2 without it */
DEBUG(1, ("Server did not provide 'target information', required for NTLMv2\n"));
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* TODO: if the remote server is standalone, then we should replace 'domain'
with the server name as supplied above */
if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt(ntlmssp_state->user,
ntlmssp_state->domain,
ntlmssp_state->password, &challenge_blob,
&struct_blob,
&lm_response, &nt_response, &session_key)) {
data_blob_free(&challenge_blob);
data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
} else if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
struct MD5Context md5_session_nonce_ctx;
uchar nt_hash[16];
uchar session_nonce[16];
uchar session_nonce_hash[16];
uchar user_session_key[16];
E_md4hash(ntlmssp_state->password, nt_hash);
lm_response = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
generate_random_buffer(lm_response.data, 8);
memset(lm_response.data+8, 0, 16);
memcpy(session_nonce, challenge_blob.data, 8);
memcpy(&session_nonce[8], lm_response.data, 8);
MD5Init(&md5_session_nonce_ctx);
MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, challenge_blob.data, 8);
MD5Update(&md5_session_nonce_ctx, lm_response.data, 8);
MD5Final(session_nonce_hash, &md5_session_nonce_ctx);
DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP challenge set by NTLM2\n"));
DEBUG(5, ("challenge is: \n"));
dump_data(5, (const char *)session_nonce_hash, 8);
nt_response = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBNTencrypt(ntlmssp_state->password,
session_nonce_hash,
nt_response.data);
session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, NULL, user_session_key);
hmac_md5(user_session_key, session_nonce, sizeof(session_nonce), session_key.data);
dump_data_pw("NTLM2 session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
} else {
uchar lm_hash[16];
uchar nt_hash[16];
E_deshash(ntlmssp_state->password, lm_hash);
E_md4hash(ntlmssp_state->password, nt_hash);
/* lanman auth is insecure, it may be disabled */
if (lp_client_lanman_auth()) {
lm_response = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBencrypt(ntlmssp_state->password,challenge_blob.data,
lm_response.data);
}
nt_response = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBNTencrypt(ntlmssp_state->password,challenge_blob.data,
nt_response.data);
session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, NULL, 16);
if ((ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)
&& lp_client_lanman_auth()) {
SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(lm_hash, lm_response.data,
session_key.data);
dump_data_pw("LM session key\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
} else {
SMBsesskeygen_ntv1(nt_hash, NULL, session_key.data);
dump_data_pw("NT session key:\n", session_key.data, session_key.length);
}
}
data_blob_free(&struct_blob);
/* Key exchange encryptes a new client-generated session key with
the password-derived key */
if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH) {
/* Make up a new session key */
uint8 client_session_key[16];
generate_random_buffer(client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
/* Encrypt the new session key with the old one */
encrypted_session_key = data_blob(client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key:\n", encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length);
SamOEMhash(encrypted_session_key.data, session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length);
dump_data_pw("KEY_EXCH session key (enc):\n", encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length);
/* Mark the new session key as the 'real' session key */
data_blob_free(&session_key);
session_key = data_blob_talloc(ntlmssp_state->mem_ctx, client_session_key, sizeof(client_session_key));
}
/* this generates the actual auth packet */
if (!msrpc_gen(next_request, auth_gen_string,
"NTLMSSP",
NTLMSSP_AUTH,
lm_response.data, lm_response.length,
nt_response.data, nt_response.length,
ntlmssp_state->domain,
ntlmssp_state->user,
ntlmssp_state->get_global_myname(),
encrypted_session_key.data, encrypted_session_key.length,
ntlmssp_state->neg_flags)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
data_blob_free(&encrypted_session_key);
data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_state->chal);
ntlmssp_state->chal = challenge_blob;
ntlmssp_state->lm_resp = lm_response;
ntlmssp_state->nt_resp = nt_response;
ntlmssp_state->session_key = session_key;
ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_UNKNOWN;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_init(ntlmssp_state))) {
DEBUG(1, ("Could not setup NTLMSSP signing/sealing system (error was: %s)\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
return nt_status;
}
return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
}
/*
samr_OemChangePasswordUser2
*/
NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_OemChangePasswordUser2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct samr_OemChangePasswordUser2 *r)
{
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB new_password, new_unicode_password;
char *new_pass;
struct samr_CryptPassword *pwbuf = r->in.password;
struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
int ret;
struct ldb_message **res;
const char * const attrs[] = { "objectSid", "dBCSPwd", NULL };
struct samr_Password *lm_pwd;
DATA_BLOB lm_pwd_blob;
uint8_t new_lm_hash[16];
struct samr_Password lm_verifier;
size_t unicode_pw_len;
if (pwbuf == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (r->in.hash == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* this call can only work with lanman auth */
if (!lpcfg_lanman_auth(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx)) {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw
* hashes. */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
/* we need the users dn and the domain dn (derived from the
user SID). We also need the current lm password hash in
order to decrypt the incoming password */
ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx,
mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs,
"(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
r->in.account->string);
if (ret != 1) {
/* Don't give the game away: (don't allow anonymous users to prove the existance of usernames) */
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
user_dn = res[0]->dn;
status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
res[0], &lm_pwd, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !lm_pwd) {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* decrypt the password we have been given */
lm_pwd_blob = data_blob(lm_pwd->hash, sizeof(lm_pwd->hash));
arcfour_crypt_blob(pwbuf->data, 516, &lm_pwd_blob);
data_blob_free(&lm_pwd_blob);
if (!extract_pw_from_buffer(mem_ctx, pwbuf->data, &new_password)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to decode password buffer\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lpcfg_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_pass, NULL, false)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to convert incoming password buffer to unix charset\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lpcfg_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_DOS, CH_UTF16,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_unicode_password.data, &unicode_pw_len, false)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to convert incoming password buffer to UTF16 charset\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
new_unicode_password.length = unicode_pw_len;
E_deshash(new_pass, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, lm_pwd->hash, lm_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(lm_verifier.hash, r->in.hash->hash, 16) != 0) {
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* Connect to a SAMDB with user privileges for the password change */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0);
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
/* Start transaction */
ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
/* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out
* from the database since they were already checked against the user-
* provided ones. */
status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
user_dn, NULL,
&new_unicode_password,
NULL, NULL,
lm_pwd, NULL, /* this is a user password change */
NULL,
NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return status;
}
/* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static NTSTATUS local_pw_check_specified(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
const char *username,
const char *domain,
const char *workstation,
const DATA_BLOB *challenge,
const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
uint32_t flags,
DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key,
DATA_BLOB *user_session_key,
char **error_string,
char **unix_name)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct samr_Password lm_pw, nt_pw;
struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd;
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_init("local_pw_check_specified");
if (!mem_ctx) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
} else {
E_md4hash(opt_password, nt_pw.hash);
if (E_deshash(opt_password, lm_pw.hash)) {
lm_pwd = &lm_pw;
} else {
lm_pwd = NULL;
}
nt_pwd = &nt_pw;
nt_status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx,
lpcfg_lanman_auth(lp_ctx),
lpcfg_ntlm_auth(lp_ctx),
MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT |
MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT,
challenge,
lm_response,
nt_response,
username,
username,
domain,
lm_pwd, nt_pwd, user_session_key, lm_session_key);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
if (unix_name) {
if (asprintf(unix_name, "%s%c%s", domain,
*lpcfg_winbind_separator(lp_ctx),
username) < 0) {
nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
} else {
DEBUG(3, ("Login for user [%s]\\[%s]@[%s] failed due to [%s]\n",
domain, username, workstation,
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
}
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
}
if (error_string) {
*error_string = strdup(nt_errstr(nt_status));
}
return nt_status;
}
/*
samr_OemChangePasswordUser2
*/
NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_OemChangePasswordUser2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct samr_OemChangePasswordUser2 *r)
{
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB new_password, new_unicode_password;
char *new_pass;
struct samr_CryptPassword *pwbuf = r->in.password;
struct ldb_context *sam_ctx;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
int ret;
struct ldb_message **res, *mod;
const char * const attrs[] = { "objectSid", "dBCSPwd", NULL };
struct samr_Password *lm_pwd;
DATA_BLOB lm_pwd_blob;
uint8_t new_lm_hash[16];
struct samr_Password lm_verifier;
size_t unicode_pw_len;
if (pwbuf == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (r->in.hash == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* To change a password we need to open as system */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, system_session(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx));
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
/* we need the users dn and the domain dn (derived from the
user SID). We also need the current lm password hash in
order to decrypt the incoming password */
ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx,
mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs,
"(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
r->in.account->string);
if (ret != 1) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
/* Don't give the game away: (don't allow anonymous users to prove the existance of usernames) */
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
user_dn = res[0]->dn;
status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
res[0], &lm_pwd, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !lm_pwd) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
/* decrypt the password we have been given */
lm_pwd_blob = data_blob(lm_pwd->hash, sizeof(lm_pwd->hash));
arcfour_crypt_blob(pwbuf->data, 516, &lm_pwd_blob);
data_blob_free(&lm_pwd_blob);
if (!extract_pw_from_buffer(mem_ctx, pwbuf->data, &new_password)) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to decode password buffer\n"));
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lp_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_DOS, CH_UNIX,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_pass, NULL, false)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to convert incoming password buffer to unix charset\n"));
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lp_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_DOS, CH_UTF16,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_unicode_password.data, &unicode_pw_len, false)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to convert incoming password buffer to UTF16 charset\n"));
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
new_unicode_password.length = unicode_pw_len;
E_deshash(new_pass, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_lm_hash, lm_pwd->hash, lm_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(lm_verifier.hash, r->in.hash->hash, 16) != 0) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
}
mod = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx);
if (mod == NULL) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
mod->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mod, user_dn);
if (!mod->dn) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
/* set the password on the user DN specified. This may fail
* due to password policies */
status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
user_dn, NULL,
mod, &new_unicode_password,
NULL, NULL,
true, /* this is a user password change */
NULL,
NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return status;
}
/* The above call only setup the modifications, this actually
* makes the write to the database. */
ret = samdb_replace(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, mod);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(2,("Failed to modify record to change password on %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
}
/* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
static bool test_wbc_change_password(struct torture_context *tctx)
{
wbcErr ret;
const char *oldpass = getenv("PASSWORD");
const char *newpass = "******";
struct samr_CryptPassword new_nt_password;
struct samr_CryptPassword new_lm_password;
struct samr_Password old_nt_hash_enc;
struct samr_Password old_lanman_hash_enc;
uint8_t old_nt_hash[16];
uint8_t old_lanman_hash[16];
uint8_t new_nt_hash[16];
uint8_t new_lanman_hash[16];
struct wbcChangePasswordParams params;
if (oldpass == NULL) {
torture_skip(tctx,
"skipping wbcChangeUserPassword test as old password cannot be retrieved\n");
}
ZERO_STRUCT(params);
E_md4hash(oldpass, old_nt_hash);
E_md4hash(newpass, new_nt_hash);
if (lpcfg_client_lanman_auth(tctx->lp_ctx) &&
E_deshash(newpass, new_lanman_hash) &&
E_deshash(oldpass, old_lanman_hash)) {
/* E_deshash returns false for 'long' passwords (> 14
DOS chars). This allows us to match Win2k, which
does not store a LM hash for these passwords (which
would reduce the effective password length to 14) */
encode_pw_buffer(new_lm_password.data, newpass, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_lm_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_lanman_hash,
old_lanman_hash_enc.hash);
params.old_password.response.old_lm_hash_enc_length =
sizeof(old_lanman_hash_enc.hash);
params.old_password.response.old_lm_hash_enc_data =
old_lanman_hash_enc.hash;
params.new_password.response.lm_length =
sizeof(new_lm_password.data);
params.new_password.response.lm_data =
new_lm_password.data;
} else {
ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_password);
ZERO_STRUCT(old_lanman_hash_enc);
}
encode_pw_buffer(new_nt_password.data, newpass, STR_UNICODE);
arcfour_crypt(new_nt_password.data, old_nt_hash, 516);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash, old_nt_hash_enc.hash);
params.old_password.response.old_nt_hash_enc_length =
sizeof(old_nt_hash_enc.hash);
params.old_password.response.old_nt_hash_enc_data =
old_nt_hash_enc.hash;
params.new_password.response.nt_length = sizeof(new_nt_password.data);
params.new_password.response.nt_data = new_nt_password.data;
params.level = WBC_CHANGE_PASSWORD_LEVEL_RESPONSE;
params.account_name = getenv("USERNAME");
params.domain_name = "SAMBA-TEST";
ret = wbcChangeUserPasswordEx(¶ms, NULL, NULL, NULL);
torture_assert_wbc_equal(tctx, ret, WBC_ERR_SUCCESS,
"wbcChangeUserPassword failed");
if (!test_wbc_authenticate_user_int(tctx, "Koo8irei")) {
return false;
}
ret = wbcChangeUserPassword(getenv("USERNAME"), "Koo8irei",
getenv("PASSWORD"));
torture_assert_wbc_equal(tctx, ret, WBC_ERR_SUCCESS,
"wbcChangeUserPassword failed");
return test_wbc_authenticate_user_int(tctx, getenv("PASSWORD"));
}
NTSTATUS encrypt_user_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct auth_context *auth_context,
enum auth_password_state to_state,
const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_in,
const struct auth_usersupplied_info **user_info_encrypted)
{
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp;
switch (to_state) {
case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE:
switch (user_info_in->password_state) {
case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN:
{
const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp2;
nt_status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context,
AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH,
user_info_in, &user_info_temp2);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
user_info_in = user_info_temp2;
/* fall through */
}
case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH:
{
const uint8_t *challenge;
DATA_BLOB chall_blob;
user_info_temp = talloc(mem_ctx, struct auth_usersupplied_info);
if (!user_info_temp) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!talloc_reference(user_info_temp, user_info_in)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*user_info_temp = *user_info_in;
user_info_temp->mapped_state = to_state;
nt_status = auth_get_challenge(auth_context, &challenge);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
chall_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, challenge, 8);
if (lp_client_ntlmv2_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx)) {
DATA_BLOB names_blob = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(mem_ctx, lp_netbios_name(auth_context->lp_ctx), lp_workgroup(auth_context->lp_ctx));
DATA_BLOB lmv2_response, ntlmv2_response, lmv2_session_key, ntlmv2_session_key;
if (!SMBNTLMv2encrypt_hash(user_info_temp,
user_info_in->client.account_name,
user_info_in->client.domain_name,
user_info_in->password.hash.nt->hash, &chall_blob,
&names_blob,
&lmv2_response, &ntlmv2_response,
&lmv2_session_key, &ntlmv2_session_key)) {
data_blob_free(&names_blob);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
data_blob_free(&names_blob);
user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = lmv2_response;
user_info_temp->password.response.nt = ntlmv2_response;
data_blob_free(&lmv2_session_key);
data_blob_free(&ntlmv2_session_key);
} else {
DATA_BLOB blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBOWFencrypt(user_info_in->password.hash.nt->hash, challenge, blob.data);
user_info_temp->password.response.nt = blob;
if (lp_client_lanman_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx) && user_info_in->password.hash.lanman) {
DATA_BLOB lm_blob = data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx, NULL, 24);
SMBOWFencrypt(user_info_in->password.hash.lanman->hash, challenge, blob.data);
user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = lm_blob;
} else {
/* if not sending the LM password, send the NT password twice */
user_info_temp->password.response.lanman = user_info_temp->password.response.nt;
}
}
user_info_in = user_info_temp;
/* fall through */
}
case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE:
*user_info_encrypted = user_info_in;
}
break;
case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH:
{
switch (user_info_in->password_state) {
case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN:
{
struct samr_Password lanman;
struct samr_Password nt;
user_info_temp = talloc(mem_ctx, struct auth_usersupplied_info);
if (!user_info_temp) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!talloc_reference(user_info_temp, user_info_in)) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
*user_info_temp = *user_info_in;
user_info_temp->mapped_state = to_state;
if (E_deshash(user_info_in->password.plaintext, lanman.hash)) {
user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = talloc(user_info_temp,
struct samr_Password);
*user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = lanman;
} else {
user_info_temp->password.hash.lanman = NULL;
}
E_md4hash(user_info_in->password.plaintext, nt.hash);
user_info_temp->password.hash.nt = talloc(user_info_temp,
struct samr_Password);
*user_info_temp->password.hash.nt = nt;
user_info_in = user_info_temp;
/* fall through */
}
case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH:
*user_info_encrypted = user_info_in;
break;
default:
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
break;
}
break;
}
/*
samr_ChangePasswordUser3
*/
NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct samr_ChangePasswordUser3 *r)
{
NTSTATUS status;
DATA_BLOB new_password;
struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = NULL;
struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
int ret;
struct ldb_message **res;
const char * const attrs[] = { "unicodePwd", "dBCSPwd", NULL };
struct samr_Password *nt_pwd, *lm_pwd;
DATA_BLOB nt_pwd_blob;
struct samr_DomInfo1 *dominfo = NULL;
struct userPwdChangeFailureInformation *reject = NULL;
enum samPwdChangeReason reason = SAM_PWD_CHANGE_NO_ERROR;
uint8_t new_nt_hash[16], new_lm_hash[16];
struct samr_Password nt_verifier, lm_verifier;
*r->out.dominfo = NULL;
*r->out.reject = NULL;
if (r->in.nt_password == NULL ||
r->in.nt_verifier == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
/* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw
* hashes. */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0);
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
/* we need the users dn and the domain dn (derived from the
user SID). We also need the current lm and nt password hashes
in order to decrypt the incoming passwords */
ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx,
mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs,
"(&(sAMAccountName=%s)(objectclass=user))",
r->in.account->string);
if (ret != 1) {
/* Don't give the game away: (don't allow anonymous users to prove the existance of usernames) */
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
user_dn = res[0]->dn;
status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ) {
goto failed;
}
if (!nt_pwd) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* decrypt the password we have been given */
nt_pwd_blob = data_blob(nt_pwd->hash, sizeof(nt_pwd->hash));
arcfour_crypt_blob(r->in.nt_password->data, 516, &nt_pwd_blob);
data_blob_free(&nt_pwd_blob);
if (!extract_pw_from_buffer(mem_ctx, r->in.nt_password->data, &new_password)) {
DEBUG(3,("samr: failed to decode password buffer\n"));
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
if (r->in.nt_verifier == NULL) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* check NT verifier */
mdfour(new_nt_hash, new_password.data, new_password.length);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, nt_pwd->hash, nt_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(nt_verifier.hash, r->in.nt_verifier->hash, 16) != 0) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
/* check LM verifier (really not needed as we just checked the
* much stronger NT hash, but the RPC-SAMR test checks for
* this) */
if (lm_pwd && r->in.lm_verifier != NULL) {
char *new_pass;
if (!convert_string_talloc_convenience(mem_ctx, lpcfg_iconv_convenience(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx),
CH_UTF16, CH_UNIX,
(const char *)new_password.data,
new_password.length,
(void **)&new_pass, NULL, false)) {
E_deshash(new_pass, new_lm_hash);
E_old_pw_hash(new_nt_hash, lm_pwd->hash, lm_verifier.hash);
if (memcmp(lm_verifier.hash, r->in.lm_verifier->hash, 16) != 0) {
status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
goto failed;
}
}
}
/* Connect to a SAMDB with user privileges for the password change */
sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx,
dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0);
if (sam_ctx == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
}
ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
}
/* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out
* from the database since they were already checked against the user-
* provided ones. */
status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx,
user_dn, NULL,
&new_password,
NULL, NULL,
lm_pwd, nt_pwd, /* this is a user password change */
&reason,
&dominfo);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx);
goto failed;
}
/* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */
ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n",
ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn),
ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
status = NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED;
goto failed;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
failed:
reject = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct userPwdChangeFailureInformation);
if (reject != NULL) {
reject->extendedFailureReason = reason;
*r->out.reject = reject;
}
*r->out.dominfo = dominfo;
return status;
}
/*********************************************************
Start here.
**********************************************************/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i;
uchar new_lanman_p16[LM_HASH_LEN];
uchar new_nt_p16[NT_HASH_LEN];
char lanPW[LM_HASH_LEN * 2 + 1];
char ntPW[NT_HASH_LEN * 2 + 1];
char *tmp;
FILE *fp;
if (argc == 2 || argc == 3 )
{
fp = fopen("/usr/local/samba/private/smbpasswd", "a");
if (argc == 3)
{
//==================
//create hashs
//==================
memset(lanPW, 0, LM_HASH_LEN * 2 + 1);
memset(ntPW, 0, NT_HASH_LEN * 2 + 1);
E_md4hash(argv[2], new_nt_p16);
for(i=0; i<NT_HASH_LEN; i++)
{
asprintf(&tmp, "%.2X", new_nt_p16[i]);
ntPW[i*2] = tmp[0];
ntPW[i*2 + 1] = tmp[1];
free(tmp);
}
if (!E_deshash(argv[2], new_lanman_p16)) {
fprintf(stderr, "E_deshash failed\n");
return -1;
}
for(i=0; i<LM_HASH_LEN; i++)
{
asprintf(&tmp, "%.2X", new_lanman_p16[i]);
lanPW[i*2] = tmp[0];
lanPW[i*2 + 1] = tmp[1];
free(tmp);
}
//==================
//save to smbpasswd
//==================
P1MSG("save \"%s:0:%s:%s:%s:LCT-3E12A0AC:\"\n", argv[1], lanPW, ntPW, SAMBA_CTL_NORMAL);
if (fp)
{
fprintf(fp, "%s:0:%s:%s:%s:LCT-3E12A0AC:\n", argv[1], lanPW, ntPW, SAMBA_CTL_NORMAL);
}
else
{
perror("open smb file faild: ");
}
} //if (argc == 3)
else
{
//======================
//arg == 2, no password
//======================
P1MSG("save \"%s:0:%s:%s:%s:LCT-3E12A0AC:\"\n", argv[1], SAMBA_NO_PASSWD, SAMBA_NO_PASSWD, SAMBA_CTL_PWNOTREQ);
if (fp)
{
fprintf(fp, "%s:0:%s:%s:%s:LCT-3E12A0AC:\n", argv[1], SAMBA_NO_PASSWD, SAMBA_NO_PASSWD, SAMBA_CTL_PWNOTREQ);
}
else
{
perror("open smb file faild: ");
}
} // agc == 2.
if (fp)
{
fclose(fp);
}
}
else
{
printf("usage smb_pass user passwd\n");
}
return 0;
}
BOOL cli_oem_change_password(struct cli_state *cli, const char *user, const char *new_password,
const char *old_password)
{
pstring param;
unsigned char data[532];
char *p = param;
unsigned char old_pw_hash[16];
unsigned char new_pw_hash[16];
unsigned int data_len;
unsigned int param_len = 0;
char *rparam = NULL;
char *rdata = NULL;
unsigned int rprcnt, rdrcnt;
if (strlen(user) >= sizeof(fstring)-1) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_oem_change_password: user name %s is too long.\n", user));
return False;
}
SSVAL(p,0,214); /* SamOEMChangePassword command. */
p += 2;
pstrcpy_base(p, "zsT", param);
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
pstrcpy_base(p, "B516B16", param);
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
pstrcpy_base(p,user, param);
p = skip_string(param,sizeof(param),p);
SSVAL(p,0,532);
p += 2;
param_len = PTR_DIFF(p,param);
/*
* Get the Lanman hash of the old password, we
* use this as the key to make_oem_passwd_hash().
*/
E_deshash(old_password, old_pw_hash);
encode_pw_buffer(data, new_password, STR_ASCII);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
DEBUG(100,("make_oem_passwd_hash\n"));
dump_data(100, (char *)data, 516);
#endif
SamOEMhash( (unsigned char *)data, (unsigned char *)old_pw_hash, 516);
/*
* Now place the old password hash in the data.
*/
E_deshash(new_password, new_pw_hash);
E_old_pw_hash( new_pw_hash, old_pw_hash, (uchar *)&data[516]);
data_len = 532;
if (cli_send_trans(cli,SMBtrans,
PIPE_LANMAN, /* name */
0,0, /* fid, flags */
NULL,0,0, /* setup, length, max */
param,param_len,2, /* param, length, max */
(char *)data,data_len,0 /* data, length, max */
) == False) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_oem_change_password: Failed to send password change for user %s\n",
user ));
return False;
}
if (!cli_receive_trans(cli,SMBtrans,
&rparam, &rprcnt,
&rdata, &rdrcnt)) {
DEBUG(0,("cli_oem_change_password: Failed to recieve reply to password change for user %s\n",
user ));
return False;
}
if (rparam) {
cli->rap_error = SVAL(rparam,0);
}
SAFE_FREE(rparam);
SAFE_FREE(rdata);
return (cli->rap_error == 0);
}