SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
Time time, void* pinArg, const char* hostname,
const Flags flags,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponseSECItem,
/*optional out*/ ScopedCERTCertList* builtChain,
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus)
{
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
PR_ASSERT(cert);
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !keySizeStatus);
if (builtChain) {
*builtChain = nullptr;
}
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
*ocspStaplingStatus = OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
}
if (keySizeStatus) {
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
}
if (!cert ||
(usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
Result rv;
Input certDER;
rv = certDER.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
return SECFailure;
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching
= !mOCSPDownloadEnabled ||
(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
: !mOCSPStrict ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig = mOCSPGETEnabled ? ocspGetEnabled
: ocspGetDisabled;
Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
const Input* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
if (stapledOCSPResponseSECItem) {
rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->data,
stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->len);
if (rv != Success) {
// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
}
switch (usage) {
case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
// XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
// just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
// TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
// restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
// chosen by the server.
#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
// Try to validate for EV first.
CertPolicyId evPolicy;
SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
SECStatus srv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
if (srv == SECSuccess) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain
trustDomain(trustSSL,
ocspFetching == NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mPinningMode,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS, hostname, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
if (rv == Success) {
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
rv = Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
break;
}
// Now try non-EV.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mPinningMode,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS, hostname,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, // (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
if (rv == Success) {
if (keySizeStatus) {
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::LargeMinimumSucceeded;
}
break;
}
// If that failed, try again with a smaller minimum key size.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomainWeak(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mPinningMode,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, hostname,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomainWeak, certDER, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, // (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
if (keySizeStatus) {
if (rv == Success) {
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::CompatibilityRisk;
} else {
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
}
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::nonRepudiation,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
// TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
// usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
// based on the result of the verification(s).
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageObjectSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustObjectSigning, ocspFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
case certificateUsageStatusResponder: {
// XXX This is a pretty useless way to verify a certificate. It is used
// by the certificate viewer UI. Because we don't know what trust bit is
// interesting, we just try them all.
mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA;
mozilla::pkix::KeyUsage keyUsage;
KeyPurposeId eku;
if (usage == certificateUsageVerifyCA) {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::keyCertSign;
eku = KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage;
} else {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::digitalSignature;
eku = KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning;
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain sslTrust(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg,
ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain emailTrust(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain objectSigningTrust(trustObjectSigning,
ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
pinningDisabled,
MINIMUM_NON_ECC_BITS_WEAK,
nullptr, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, certDER, time,
endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
}
break;
}
default:
rv = Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
if (rv != Success) {
if (rv != Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE &&
usage == certificateUsageSSLServer) {
ScopedCERTCertificate certCopy(CERT_DupCertificate(cert));
if (!certCopy) {
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedCERTCertList certList(CERT_NewCertList());
if (!certList) {
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus srv = CERT_AddCertToListTail(certList.get(), certCopy.get());
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
certCopy.forget(); // now owned by certList
Result pinningResult = CertListContainsExpectedKeys(certList, hostname,
time, mPinningMode);
if (pinningResult != Success) {
rv = pinningResult;
}
}
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
Time time, void* pinArg, const char* hostname,
/*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain,
/*optional*/ const Flags flags,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponseSECItem,
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
/*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
/*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo)
{
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
PR_ASSERT(cert);
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !keySizeStatus);
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !sha1ModeResult);
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
*ocspStaplingStatus = OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
}
if (keySizeStatus) {
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
}
if (sha1ModeResult) {
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
}
if (!cert ||
(usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
Result rv;
Input certDER;
rv = certDER.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// We configure the OCSP fetching modes separately for EV and non-EV
// verifications.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching defaultOCSPFetching
= (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
(mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspEVOnly) ||
(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
: !mOCSPStrict ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig = mOCSPGETEnabled ? ocspGetEnabled
: ocspGetDisabled;
Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
const Input* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
if (stapledOCSPResponseSECItem) {
rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->data,
stapledOCSPResponseSECItem->len);
if (rv != Success) {
// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
}
switch (usage) {
case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
// XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
// just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
// TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
// restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
// chosen by the server.
// These configurations are in order of most restrictive to least
// restrictive. This enables us to gather telemetry on the expected
// results of setting the default policy to a particular configuration.
SHA1Mode sha1ModeConfigurations[] = {
SHA1Mode::Forbidden,
SHA1Mode::Before2016,
SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot,
SHA1Mode::Allowed,
};
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResults[] = {
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithoutSHA1,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1Before2016,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRoot,
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1,
};
size_t sha1ModeConfigurationsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations);
static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations) ==
MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeResults),
"digestAlgorithm array lengths differ");
rv = Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
// Try to validate for EV first.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching evOCSPFetching
= (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) ||
(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV;
CertPolicyId evPolicy;
SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
SECStatus srv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
for (size_t i = 0;
i < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success && srv == SECSuccess;
i++) {
// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[i])) {
continue;
}
// Because of the try-strict and fallback approach, we have to clear any
// previously noted telemetry information
if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain
trustDomain(trustSSL, evOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays, mPinningMode, MIN_RSA_BITS,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV,
sha1ModeConfigurations[i], builtChain,
pinningTelemetryInfo, hostname);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots to
// issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built doesn't
// terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This only works
// because we try SHA1 configurations in order of decreasing
// strictness.)
// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have already
// been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued after
// 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
if (rv == Success &&
sha1ModeConfigurations[i] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
if (rv != Success) {
break;
}
if (isBuiltInRoot) {
rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
}
}
if (rv == Success) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("cert is EV with status %i\n", sha1ModeResults[i]));
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
}
if (sha1ModeResult) {
*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[i];
}
}
}
if (rv == Success) {
break;
}
#endif
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
rv = Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
break;
}
// Now try non-EV.
unsigned int keySizeOptions[] = {
MIN_RSA_BITS,
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK
};
KeySizeStatus keySizeStatuses[] = {
KeySizeStatus::LargeMinimumSucceeded,
KeySizeStatus::CompatibilityRisk
};
static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeOptions) ==
MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses),
"keySize array lengths differ");
size_t keySizeOptionsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses);
for (size_t i = 0; i < keySizeOptionsCount && rv != Success; i++) {
for (size_t j = 0; j < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success;
j++) {
// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[j])) {
continue;
}
// invalidate any telemetry info relating to failed chains
if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
mPinningMode, keySizeOptions[i],
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
sha1ModeConfigurations[j],
builtChain, pinningTelemetryInfo,
hostname);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, certDER, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,//(EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment,//RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement,//(EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse,
ocspStaplingStatus);
// If we succeeded with the SHA1Mode of only allowing imported roots
// to issue SHA1 certificates after 2015, if the chain we built
// doesn't terminate with an imported root, we must reject it. (This
// only works because we try SHA1 configurations in order of
// decreasing strictness.)
// Note that if there existed a certificate chain with a built-in root
// that had SHA1 certificates issued before 2016, it would have
// already been accepted. If such a chain had SHA1 certificates issued
// after 2015, it will only be accepted in the SHA1Mode::Allowed case.
if (rv == Success &&
sha1ModeConfigurations[j] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
if (rv != Success) {
break;
}
if (isBuiltInRoot) {
rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
}
}
if (rv == Success) {
if (keySizeStatus) {
*keySizeStatus = keySizeStatuses[i];
}
if (sha1ModeResult) {
*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[j];
}
}
}
}
if (rv == Success) {
break;
}
if (keySizeStatus) {
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
}
// Only collect CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS telemetry indicating a
// failure when mSHA1Mode is the default.
// NB: When we change the default, we have to change this.
if (sha1ModeResult && mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::Failed;
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
mSHA1Mode, builtChain, nullptr, nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::nonRepudiation,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
// TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
// usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
// based on the result of the verification(s).
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageObjectSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustObjectSigning, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
case certificateUsageStatusResponder: {
// XXX This is a pretty useless way to verify a certificate. It is used
// by the certificate viewer UI. Because we don't know what trust bit is
// interesting, we just try them all.
mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA;
mozilla::pkix::KeyUsage keyUsage;
KeyPurposeId eku;
if (usage == certificateUsageVerifyCA) {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::keyCertSign;
eku = KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage;
} else {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::digitalSignature;
eku = KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning;
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain sslTrust(trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain emailTrust(trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain, nullptr,
nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, certDER, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain objectSigningTrust(trustObjectSigning,
defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
pinningDisabled,
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK,
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
SHA1Mode::Allowed, builtChain,
nullptr, nullptr);
rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, certDER, time,
endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
}
break;
}
default:
rv = Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
}
if (rv != Success) {
PR_SetError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv), 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
CertVerifier::VerifyCert(CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage,
PRTime time, void* pinArg, const char* hostname,
const Flags flags,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse,
/*optional out*/ ScopedCERTCertList* builtChain,
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy)
{
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
PR_ASSERT(cert);
PR_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
if (builtChain) {
*builtChain = nullptr;
}
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!cert ||
(usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
ChainValidationCallbackState callbackState = {
hostname, mPinningEnforcementLevel, usage, time
};
CERTChainVerifyCallback callbackContainer;
callbackContainer.isChainValid = chainValidationCallback;
callbackContainer.isChainValidArg = &callbackState;
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching
= !mOCSPDownloadEnabled ||
(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY) ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
: !mOCSPStrict ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
ocsp_get_config ocspGETConfig = mOCSPGETEnabled ? ocsp_get_enabled
: ocsp_get_disabled;
SECStatus rv;
switch (usage) {
case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
// XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
// just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
// TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
// restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
// chosen by the server.
#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
// Try to validate for EV first.
CertPolicyId evPolicy;
SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
rv = GetFirstEVPolicy(cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain
trustDomain(trustSSL,
ocspFetching == NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
&callbackContainer, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, cert, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,// (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (evOidPolicy) {
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED, 0);
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
// Now try non-EV.
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, &callbackContainer,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(trustDomain, cert, time,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, // (EC)DHE
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA, KeyUsage::keyCertSign,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
// TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
// usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
// based on the result of the verification(s).
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PR_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
break;
}
case certificateUsageObjectSigner: {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(trustObjectSigning, ocspFetching,
mOCSPCache, pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
nullptr, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, cert->derCert, time,
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
KeyUsage::digitalSignature,
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
break;
}
case certificateUsageVerifyCA:
case certificateUsageStatusResponder: {
// XXX This is a pretty useless way to verify a certificate. It is used
// by the implementation of window.crypto.importCertificates and in the
// certificate viewer UI. Because we don't know what trust bit is
// interesting, we just try them all.
mozilla::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA;
mozilla::pkix::KeyUsage keyUsage;
KeyPurposeId eku;
if (usage == certificateUsageVerifyCA) {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::keyCertSign;
eku = KeyPurposeId::anyExtendedKeyUsage;
} else {
endEntityOrCA = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
keyUsage = KeyUsage::digitalSignature;
eku = KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning;
}
NSSCertDBTrustDomain sslTrust(trustSSL, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg,
ocspGETConfig, nullptr, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(sslTrust, cert->derCert, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == SECFailure && PR_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain emailTrust(trustEmail, ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig, nullptr,
builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(emailTrust, cert->derCert, time, endEntityOrCA,
keyUsage, eku, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == SECFailure && PR_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
NSSCertDBTrustDomain objectSigningTrust(trustObjectSigning,
ocspFetching, mOCSPCache,
pinArg, ocspGETConfig,
nullptr, builtChain);
rv = BuildCertChain(objectSigningTrust, cert->derCert, time,
endEntityOrCA, keyUsage, eku,
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
}
}
break;
}
default:
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return rv;
}
