int
LfpEquality(const l_fp expected, const l_fp actual) {
if (L_ISEQU(&expected, &actual))
return TRUE;
else
return FALSE;
}
int IsEqual(const l_fp expected, const l_fp actual) {
if (L_ISEQU(&expected, &actual)) {
return TRUE;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
int
LfpEquality(
const l_fp expected,
const l_fp actual
)
{
return !!(L_ISEQU(&expected, &actual));
}
::testing::AssertionResult LfpEquality(const l_fp &expected, const l_fp &actual) {
if (L_ISEQU(&expected, &actual)) {
return ::testing::AssertionSuccess();
} else {
return ::testing::AssertionFailure()
<< " expected: " << lfptoa(&expected, FRACTION_PREC)
<< " (" << expected.l_ui << "." << expected.l_uf << ")"
<< " but was: " << lfptoa(&actual, FRACTION_PREC)
<< " (" << actual.l_ui << "." << actual.l_uf << ")";
}
}
int
process_pkt (
struct pkt *rpkt,
sockaddr_u *sas,
int pkt_len,
int mode,
struct pkt *spkt,
const char * func_name
)
{
unsigned int key_id = 0;
struct key *pkt_key = NULL;
int is_authentic = 0;
unsigned int exten_words, exten_words_used = 0;
int mac_size;
/*
* Parse the extension field if present. We figure out whether
* an extension field is present by measuring the MAC size. If
* the number of words following the packet header is 0, no MAC
* is present and the packet is not authenticated. If 1, the
* packet is a crypto-NAK; if 3, the packet is authenticated
* with DES; if 5, the packet is authenticated with MD5; if 6,
* the packet is authenticated with SHA. If 2 or 4, the packet
* is a runt and discarded forthwith. If greater than 6, an
* extension field is present, so we subtract the length of the
* field and go around again.
*/
if (pkt_len < (int)LEN_PKT_NOMAC || (pkt_len & 3) != 0) {
unusable:
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: Funny packet length: %i. Discarding package.\n", func_name, pkt_len);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* skip past the extensions, if any */
exten_words = ((unsigned)pkt_len - LEN_PKT_NOMAC) >> 2;
while (exten_words > 6) {
unsigned int exten_len;
exten_len = ntohl(rpkt->exten[exten_words_used]) & 0xffff;
exten_len = (exten_len + 7) >> 2; /* convert to words, add 1 */
if (exten_len > exten_words || exten_len < 5)
goto unusable;
exten_words -= exten_len;
exten_words_used += exten_len;
}
switch (exten_words) {
case 1:
key_id = ntohl(rpkt->exten[exten_words_used]);
printf("Crypto NAK = 0x%08x\n", key_id);
break;
case 5:
case 6:
/* Look for the key used by the server in the specified keyfile
* and if existent, fetch it or else leave the pointer untouched */
key_id = ntohl(rpkt->exten[exten_words_used]);
get_key(key_id, &pkt_key);
if (!pkt_key) {
printf("unrecognized key ID = 0x%08x\n", key_id);
break;
}
/* Seems like we've got a key with matching keyid */
/* Generate a md5sum of the packet with the key from our keyfile
* and compare those md5sums */
mac_size = exten_words << 2;
if (!auth_md5((char *)rpkt, pkt_len - mac_size, mac_size - 4, pkt_key)) {
break;
}
/* Yay! Things worked out! */
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(sas);
printf("sntp %s: packet received from %s successfully authenticated using key id %i.\n",
func_name, hostname, key_id);
free(hostname);
}
is_authentic = 1;
break;
case 0:
break;
default:
goto unusable;
break;
}
if (!is_authentic) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(AUTHENTICATION)) {
/* We want a authenticated packet */
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(sas);
printf("sntp %s: packet received from %s is not authentic. Will discard it.\n",
func_name, hostname);
free(hostname);
}
return SERVER_AUTH_FAIL;
}
/* We don't know if the user wanted authentication so let's
* use it anyways */
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(sas);
printf("sntp %s: packet received from %s is not authentic. Authentication not enforced.\n",
func_name, hostname);
free(hostname);
}
}
/* Check for server's ntp version */
if (PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) < NTP_OLDVERSION ||
PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) > NTP_VERSION) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: Packet shows wrong version (%i)\n",
func_name, PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode));
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* We want a server to sync with */
if (PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != mode &&
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_PASSIVE) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: mode %d stratum %i\n", func_name,
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode), rpkt->stratum);
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* Stratum is unspecified (0) check what's going on */
if (STRATUM_PKT_UNSPEC == rpkt->stratum) {
char *ref_char;
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: Stratum unspecified, going to check for KOD (stratum: %i)\n",
func_name, rpkt->stratum);
ref_char = (char *) &rpkt->refid;
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: Packet refid: %c%c%c%c\n", func_name,
ref_char[0], ref_char[1], ref_char[2], ref_char[3]);
/* If it's a KOD packet we'll just use the KOD information */
if (ref_char[0] != 'X') {
if (strncmp(ref_char, "DENY", 4) == 0)
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (strncmp(ref_char, "RSTR", 4) == 0)
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (strncmp(ref_char, "RATE", 4) == 0)
return KOD_RATE;
/* There are other interesting kiss codes which might be interesting for authentication */
}
}
/* If the server is not synced it's not really useable for us */
if (LEAP_NOTINSYNC == PKT_LEAP(rpkt->li_vn_mode)) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp %s: Server not in sync, skipping this server\n", func_name);
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/*
* Decode the org timestamp and make sure we're getting a response
* to our last request, but only if we're not in broadcast mode.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("rpkt->org:\n");
l_fp_output(&rpkt->org, stdout);
printf("spkt->xmt:\n");
l_fp_output(&spkt->xmt, stdout);
#endif
if (mode != MODE_BROADCAST && !L_ISEQU(&rpkt->org, &spkt->xmt)) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp process_pkt: pkt.org and peer.xmt differ\n");
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
return pkt_len;
}
/*
** Check if it's data for us and whether it's useable or not.
**
** If not, return a failure code so we can delete this server from our list
** and continue with another one.
*/
int
process_pkt (
struct pkt *rpkt,
sockaddr_u *sender,
int pkt_len,
int mode,
struct pkt *spkt,
const char * func_name
)
{
u_int key_id;
struct key * pkt_key;
int is_authentic;
int mac_size;
u_int exten_len;
u_int32 * exten_end;
u_int32 * packet_end;
l_fp sent_xmt;
l_fp resp_org;
// key_id = 0;
pkt_key = NULL;
is_authentic = (HAVE_OPT(AUTHENTICATION)) ? 0 : -1;
/*
* Parse the extension field if present. We figure out whether
* an extension field is present by measuring the MAC size. If
* the number of words following the packet header is 0, no MAC
* is present and the packet is not authenticated. If 1, the
* packet is a crypto-NAK; if 3, the packet is authenticated
* with DES; if 5, the packet is authenticated with MD5; if 6,
* the packet is authenticated with SHA. If 2 or 4, the packet
* is a runt and discarded forthwith. If greater than 6, an
* extension field is present, so we subtract the length of the
* field and go around again.
*/
if (pkt_len < (int)LEN_PKT_NOMAC || (pkt_len & 3) != 0) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: Incredible packet length: %d. Discarding.",
func_name, pkt_len);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* HMS: the following needs a bit of work */
/* Note: pkt_len must be a multiple of 4 at this point! */
packet_end = (void*)((char*)rpkt + pkt_len);
exten_end = skip_efields(rpkt->exten, packet_end);
if (NULL == exten_end) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: Missing extension field. Discarding.",
func_name);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* get size of MAC in cells; can be zero */
exten_len = (u_int)(packet_end - exten_end);
/* deduce action required from remaining length */
switch (exten_len) {
case 0: /* no Legacy MAC */
break;
case 1: /* crypto NAK */
/* Only if the keyID is 0 and there were no EFs */
key_id = ntohl(*exten_end);
printf("Crypto NAK = 0x%08x from %s\n", key_id, stoa(sender));
break;
case 3: /* key ID + 3DES MAC -- unsupported! */
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: Key ID + 3DES MAC is unsupported. Discarding.",
func_name);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
case 5: /* key ID + MD5 MAC */
case 6: /* key ID + SHA MAC */
/*
** Look for the key used by the server in the specified
** keyfile and if existent, fetch it or else leave the
** pointer untouched
*/
key_id = ntohl(*exten_end);
get_key(key_id, &pkt_key);
if (!pkt_key) {
printf("unrecognized key ID = 0x%08x\n", key_id);
break;
}
/*
** Seems like we've got a key with matching keyid.
**
** Generate a md5sum of the packet with the key from our
** keyfile and compare those md5sums.
*/
mac_size = exten_len << 2;
if (!auth_md5(rpkt, pkt_len - mac_size,
mac_size - 4, pkt_key)) {
is_authentic = FALSE;
break;
}
/* Yay! Things worked out! */
is_authentic = TRUE;
TRACE(1, ("sntp %s: packet from %s authenticated using key id %d.\n",
func_name, stoa(sender), key_id));
break;
default:
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: Unexpected extension length: %d. Discarding.",
func_name, exten_len);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
switch (is_authentic) {
case -1: /* unknown */
break;
case 0: /* not authentic */
return SERVER_AUTH_FAIL;
break;
case 1: /* authentic */
break;
default: /* error */
break;
}
/* Check for server's ntp version */
if (PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) < NTP_OLDVERSION ||
PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) > NTP_VERSION) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: Packet shows wrong version (%d)",
func_name, PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode));
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* We want a server to sync with */
if (PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != mode &&
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_PASSIVE) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: mode %d stratum %d", func_name,
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode), rpkt->stratum);
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* Stratum is unspecified (0) check what's going on */
if (STRATUM_PKT_UNSPEC == rpkt->stratum) {
char *ref_char;
TRACE(1, ("%s: Stratum unspecified, going to check for KOD (stratum: %d)\n",
func_name, rpkt->stratum));
ref_char = (char *) &rpkt->refid;
TRACE(1, ("%s: Packet refid: %c%c%c%c\n", func_name,
ref_char[0], ref_char[1], ref_char[2], ref_char[3]));
/* If it's a KOD packet we'll just use the KOD information */
if (ref_char[0] != 'X') {
if (strncmp(ref_char, "DENY", 4) == 0)
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (strncmp(ref_char, "RSTR", 4) == 0)
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (strncmp(ref_char, "RATE", 4) == 0)
return KOD_RATE;
/*
** There are other interesting kiss codes which
** might be interesting for authentication.
*/
}
}
/* If the server is not synced it's not really useable for us */
if (LEAP_NOTINSYNC == PKT_LEAP(rpkt->li_vn_mode)) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: %s not in sync, skipping this server",
func_name, stoa(sender));
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/*
* Decode the org timestamp and make sure we're getting a response
* to our last request, but only if we're not in broadcast mode.
*/
if (MODE_BROADCAST == mode)
return pkt_len;
if (!L_ISEQU(&rpkt->org, &spkt->xmt)) {
NTOHL_FP(&rpkt->org, &resp_org);
NTOHL_FP(&spkt->xmt, &sent_xmt);
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s response org expected to match sent xmt",
stoa(sender));
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "resp org: %s", prettydate(&resp_org));
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "sent xmt: %s", prettydate(&sent_xmt));
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
return pkt_len;
}
/* Fetch data, check if it's data for us and whether it's useable or not. If not, return
* a failure code so we can delete this server from our list and continue with another one.
*/
int
recvpkt (
SOCKET rsock,
struct pkt *rpkt,
struct pkt *spkt
)
{
sockaddr_u sender;
char *rdata /* , done */;
register int a;
int has_mac, is_authentic, pkt_len, orig_pkt_len;
/* Much space, just to be sure */
rdata = emalloc(sizeof(char) * 256);
pkt_len = recvdata(rsock, &sender, rdata, 256);
#if 0 /* done uninitialized */
if (!done) {
/* Do something about it, first check for a maximum length of ntp packets,
* probably that's something we can avoid
*/
}
#endif
if (pkt_len < 0) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
printf("sntp recvpkt failed: %d.\n", pkt_len);
}
free(rdata);
return pkt_len;
}
/* Some checks to see if that packet is intended for us */
/* No MAC, no authentication */
if (LEN_PKT_NOMAC == pkt_len)
has_mac = 0;
/* If there's more than just the NTP packet it should be a MAC */
else if (pkt_len > LEN_PKT_NOMAC)
has_mac = pkt_len - LEN_PKT_NOMAC;
else {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Funny packet length: %i. Discarding package.\n", pkt_len);
free(rdata);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* Packet too big */
if (pkt_len > LEN_PKT_MAC) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Received packet is too big (%i bytes), trying again to get a useable packet\n",
pkt_len);
free(rdata);
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
orig_pkt_len = pkt_len;
pkt_len = min(pkt_len, sizeof(struct pkt));
for (a = 0; a < pkt_len; a++)
/* FIXME! */
if (a < orig_pkt_len)
((char *) rpkt)[a] = rdata[a];
else
((char *) rpkt)[a] = 0;
free(rdata);
rdata = NULL;
/* MAC could be useable for us */
if (has_mac) {
/* Two more things that the MAC must conform to */
if(has_mac > MAX_MAC_LEN || has_mac % 4 != 0) {
is_authentic = 0; /* Or should we discard this packet? */
}
else {
if (MAX_MAC_LEN == has_mac) {
struct key *pkt_key = NULL;
/*
* Look for the key used by the server in the specified keyfile
* and if existent, fetch it or else leave the pointer untouched
*/
get_key(rpkt->mac[0], &pkt_key);
/* Seems like we've got a key with matching keyid */
if (pkt_key != NULL) {
/*
* Generate a md5sum of the packet with the key from our keyfile
* and compare those md5sums
*/
if (!auth_md5((char *) rpkt, has_mac, pkt_key)) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(AUTHENTICATION)) {
/* We want a authenticated packet */
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(&sender);
printf("sntp recvpkt: Broadcast packet received from %s is not authentic. Will discard this packet.\n",
hostname);
free(hostname);
}
return SERVER_AUTH_FAIL;
}
else {
/*
* We don't know if the user wanted authentication so let's
* use it anyways
*/
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(&sender);
printf("sntp recvpkt: Broadcast packet received from %s is not authentic. Authentication not enforced.\n",
hostname);
free(hostname);
}
is_authentic = 0;
}
}
else {
/* Yay! Things worked out! */
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE)) {
char *hostname = ss_to_str(&sender);
printf("sntp recvpkt: Broadcast packet received from %s successfully authenticated using key id %i.\n",
hostname, rpkt->mac[0]);
free(hostname);
}
is_authentic = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
/* Check for server's ntp version */
if (PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) < NTP_OLDVERSION ||
PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode) > NTP_VERSION) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Packet got wrong version (%i)\n", PKT_VERSION(rpkt->li_vn_mode));
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* We want a server to sync with */
if (PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_SERVER &&
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode) != MODE_PASSIVE) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: mode %d stratum %i\n",
PKT_MODE(rpkt->li_vn_mode), rpkt->stratum);
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/* Stratum is unspecified (0) check what's going on */
if (STRATUM_PKT_UNSPEC == rpkt->stratum) {
char *ref_char;
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Stratum unspecified, going to check for KOD (stratum: %i)\n", rpkt->stratum);
ref_char = (char *) &rpkt->refid;
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Packet refid: %c%c%c%c\n", ref_char[0], ref_char[1], ref_char[2], ref_char[3]);
/* If it's a KOD packet we'll just use the KOD information */
if (ref_char[0] != 'X') {
if (!strncmp(ref_char, "DENY", 4))
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (!strncmp(ref_char, "RSTR", 4))
return KOD_DEMOBILIZE;
if (!strncmp(ref_char, "RATE", 4))
return KOD_RATE;
/* There are other interesting kiss codes which might be interesting for authentication */
}
}
/* If the server is not synced it's not really useable for us */
if (LEAP_NOTINSYNC == PKT_LEAP(rpkt->li_vn_mode)) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: Server not in sync, skipping this server\n");
return SERVER_UNUSEABLE;
}
/*
* Decode the org timestamp and make sure we're getting a response
* to our last request.
*/
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("rpkt->org:\n");
l_fp_output(&rpkt->org, stdout);
printf("spkt->xmt:\n");
l_fp_output(&spkt->xmt, stdout);
#endif
if (!L_ISEQU(&rpkt->org, &spkt->xmt)) {
if (ENABLED_OPT(NORMALVERBOSE))
printf("sntp recvpkt: pkt.org and peer.xmt differ\n");
return PACKET_UNUSEABLE;
}
return pkt_len;
}
/*
* findpeer - find and return a peer match for a received datagram in
* the peer_hash table.
*/
struct peer *
findpeer(
struct recvbuf *rbufp,
int pkt_mode,
int * action
)
{
struct peer * p;
sockaddr_u * srcadr;
u_int hash;
struct pkt * pkt;
l_fp pkt_org;
findpeer_calls++;
srcadr = &rbufp->recv_srcadr;
hash = NTP_HASH_ADDR(srcadr);
for (p = peer_hash[hash]; p != NULL; p = p->adr_link) {
if (ADDR_PORT_EQ(srcadr, &p->srcadr)) {
/*
* if the association matching rules determine
* that this is not a valid combination, then
* look for the next valid peer association.
*/
*action = MATCH_ASSOC(p->hmode, pkt_mode);
/*
* A response to our manycastclient solicitation
* might be misassociated with an ephemeral peer
* already spun for the server. If the packet's
* org timestamp doesn't match the peer's, check
* if it matches the ACST prototype peer's. If
* so it is a redundant solicitation response,
* return AM_ERR to discard it. [Bug 1762]
*/
if (MODE_SERVER == pkt_mode &&
AM_PROCPKT == *action) {
pkt = &rbufp->recv_pkt;
NTOHL_FP(&pkt->org, &pkt_org);
if (!L_ISEQU(&p->aorg, &pkt_org) &&
findmanycastpeer(rbufp))
*action = AM_ERR;
}
/*
* if an error was returned, exit back right
* here.
*/
if (*action == AM_ERR)
return NULL;
/*
* if a match is found, we stop our search.
*/
if (*action != AM_NOMATCH)
break;
}
}
/*
* If no matching association is found
*/
if (NULL == p) {
*action = MATCH_ASSOC(NO_PEER, pkt_mode);
} else if (p->dstadr != rbufp->dstadr) {
set_peerdstadr(p, rbufp->dstadr);
if (p->dstadr == rbufp->dstadr) {
DPRINTF(1, ("Changed %s local address to match response\n",
stoa(&p->srcadr)));
return findpeer(rbufp, pkt_mode, action);
}
}
return p;
}
bool l_isequ(const LFP &rhs) const
{ return L_ISEQU(&_v, &rhs._v); }
bool LFP::operator==(const LFP &rhs) const
{
return L_ISEQU(&_v, &rhs._v);
}
bool
l_isequ(const l_fp first, const l_fp second)
{
return L_ISEQU(&first, &second);
}
