VOID
ODM_delay_us(IN u4Byte us)
{
#if(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & (ODM_AP|ODM_ADSL))
delay_us(us);
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_CE)
rtw_udelay_os(us);
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_MP)
PlatformStallExecution(us);
#endif
}
//
// ODM Timer relative API.
//
VOID
ODM_StallExecution(
IN u4Byte usDelay
)
{
#if(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & (ODM_AP|ODM_ADSL))
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_CE)
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_MP)
PlatformStallExecution(usDelay);
#endif
}
//
// ODM Timer relative API.
//
void
ODM_StallExecution(
u32 usDelay
)
{
#if(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & (ODM_AP|ODM_ADSL))
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_CE)
rtw_udelay_os(usDelay);
#elif(DM_ODM_SUPPORT_TYPE & ODM_MP)
PlatformStallExecution(usDelay);
#endif
}
// Description: According received EAPOL-key, enter the next state.
// Output: void
// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-02
// Discard using condition pKeyMgnt->bPTKInstalled.
// Instead, I add a macro KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey to check the state.
void
Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(
IN PADAPTER Adapter,
IN PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG pKeyMgnt,
IN OCTET_STRING pdu
)
{
PMGNT_INFO pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG pGlInfo = &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo;
PRT_WLAN_STA pEntry = pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA;
pu1Byte pSTA_addr = Frame_pSaddr(pdu);
pu1Byte pAP_addr = Frame_pDaddr(pdu);
PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT eapol_key_recvd;
OCTET_STRING SNonce;
OCTET_STRING RSNIE;
MsgType msg_type = type_unknow;
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd()\n") );
pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_EAPOLKeyRecvd;
FillOctetString(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd, \
pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd.Octet+LIB1X_EAPOL_HDRLEN, \
pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd.Length-LIB1X_EAPOL_HDRLEN ); \
eapol_key_recvd = (PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT)pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Octet;
//PRINT_DATA( ("EapolKeyMsgRecvd: "), pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Octet, pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Length);
RSNIE.Octet = NULL;
RSNIE.Length = 0;
// Get the message number.
if( Message_KeyType(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == type_Pairwise )
{
if( (Message_Error(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == 1) &&
(Message_Request(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == 1))
{
//Enter integrity failure state...
Authenticator_StateINTEGRITYFAILURE(Adapter, pEntry);
}
if( (eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x01 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x09) ||
( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x01 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x0a) ||
( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x0a) ||
( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x09) )
{
if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA)
RSNIE = EAPOLkeyGetRSNIE( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd, EID_Vendor );
else if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA2)
RSNIE = EAPOLkeyGetRSNIE( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd, EID_WPA2 );
if( RSNIE.Length != 0 )
msg_type = type_4way2nd; // with RSNIE: msg 2 (159 or 161)
else
msg_type = type_4way4th; // msg 4 (135)
}
else
{
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("unknow pairwise EAPOL-key: info=0x%X-0x%X\n", eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0], eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]) );
}
}
else
{
// [AnnieNote] Windows zero-config may send 2-way message as 03-01.
//
//if( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x11 ) // if group key index is fixed 1, key information is 03-11.
// msg_type = type_2way2nd; // group key msg2 (155)
//else
// RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("unknow group EAPOL-key: info=0x%X-0x%X\n", eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0], eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]) );
msg_type = type_2way2nd;
}
// Check state.
if( KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey(pKeyMgnt) )
{
if( (pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKSTART && msg_type==type_4way2nd ) ||
( pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_4way2nd ))
{
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 4-way message 2\n"));
pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
// AnnieTODO: if (1)k is pairwise and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING state
// TODO: MIC Verify
SNonce = Message_KeyNonce( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd );
CopyMem( pKeyMgnt->SNonce, SNonce.Octet, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
CalcPTK( pAP_addr, pSTA_addr, pKeyMgnt->ANonce, pKeyMgnt->SNonce,
pGlInfo->PMK, PMK_LEN, pKeyMgnt->PTK_update, PTK_LEN );
if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
{
SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
PlatformStallExecution(100);
RT_TRACE_F(COMP_AP, DBG_TRACE, ("AsocEntry_RemoveStation\n"));
AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
return;
}
Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING(Adapter, pEntry);
}
else if( pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_4way4th )
{
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 4-way message 4\n"));
pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
// if (1)k is pairwise and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMPS_PTKINITDONE state
if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
{
SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
PlatformStallExecution(100);
RT_TRACE_F(COMP_AP, DBG_TRACE, ("AsocEntry_RemoveStation case 2\n"));
AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
return;
}
PlatformMoveMemory(&pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV, &((PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT)eapol_key_recvd)->key_rsc[0], 6);
pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV &= UINT64_C(0x0000ffffffffffff);
//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV = 0x%16"i64fmt"x", pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV));
Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE(Adapter, pEntry);
}
else if( pKeyMgnt->GrState == ASMGS_REKEYNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_2way2nd )
{
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 2-way message 2\n"));
pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
// if (1)k is group and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMGS_REKEYESTABLISHED state
// 2012/01/17 CCW If 4-way check is ok, we need not to check 2-way again.
/*
if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
{
SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
PlatformStallExecution(100);
AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
return;
}
*/
Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED(Adapter, pEntry);
}
else
{
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(): Unexpected case: PrState=%d, GrState=%d, msg_type=%d\n",
pKeyMgnt->PrState, pKeyMgnt->GrState, msg_type ) );
}
}
else
{
RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(): Unexpected State!!\n"));
RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("--- TimeoutCounter:%d, PairwiseKeyState:%d, GroupKeyState:%d ---\n", pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr, pKeyMgnt->PrState, pKeyMgnt->GrState));
}
RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd()\n") );
}
u1Byte //bit0 = 1 => Tx OK, bit1 = 1 => Rx OK
phy_PathA_IQK_8192C(
IN PADAPTER pAdapter,
IN BOOLEAN configPathB
)
{
u4Byte regEAC, regE94, regE9C, regEA4;
u1Byte result = 0x00;
HAL_DATA_TYPE *pHalData = GET_HAL_DATA(pAdapter);
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("Path A IQK!\n"));
//path-A IQK setting
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("Path-A IQK setting!\n"));
if(pAdapter->interfaceIndex == 0)
{
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_IQK_Tone_A, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c1f);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_Tone_A, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c1f);
}
else
{
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_IQK_Tone_A, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c22);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_Tone_A, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c22);
}
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_IQK_PI_A, bMaskDWord, 0x82140102);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_PI_A, bMaskDWord, configPathB ? 0x28160202 :
IS_81xxC_VENDOR_UMC_B_CUT(pHalData->VersionID)?0x28160202:0x28160502);
//path-B IQK setting
if(configPathB)
{
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_IQK_Tone_B, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c22);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_Tone_B, bMaskDWord, 0x10008c22);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_IQK_PI_B, bMaskDWord, 0x82140102);
if(IS_HARDWARE_TYPE_8192D(pAdapter))
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_PI_B, bMaskDWord, 0x28160206);
else
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_IQK_PI_B, bMaskDWord, 0x28160202);
}
//LO calibration setting
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("LO calibration setting!\n"));
if(IS_HARDWARE_TYPE_8192D(pAdapter))
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rIQK_AGC_Rsp, bMaskDWord, 0x00462911);
else
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rIQK_AGC_Rsp, bMaskDWord, 0x001028d1);
//One shot, path A LOK & IQK
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("One shot, path A LOK & IQK!\n"));
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rIQK_AGC_Pts, bMaskDWord, 0xf9000000);
PHY_SetBBReg(pAdapter, rIQK_AGC_Pts, bMaskDWord, 0xf8000000);
// delay x ms
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("Delay %d ms for One shot, path A LOK & IQK.\n", IQK_DELAY_TIME));
PlatformStallExecution(IQK_DELAY_TIME*1000);
// Check failed
regEAC = PHY_QueryBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_Power_After_IQK_A_2, bMaskDWord);
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("0xeac = 0x%x\n", regEAC));
regE94 = PHY_QueryBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_Power_Before_IQK_A, bMaskDWord);
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("0xe94 = 0x%x\n", regE94));
regE9C= PHY_QueryBBReg(pAdapter, rTx_Power_After_IQK_A, bMaskDWord);
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("0xe9c = 0x%x\n", regE9C));
regEA4= PHY_QueryBBReg(pAdapter, rRx_Power_Before_IQK_A_2, bMaskDWord);
RTPRINT(FINIT, INIT_IQK, ("0xea4 = 0x%x\n", regEA4));
if(!(regEAC & BIT28) &&
(((regE94 & 0x03FF0000)>>16) != 0x142) &&
(((regE9C & 0x03FF0000)>>16) != 0x42) )
result |= 0x01;
else //if Tx not OK, ignore Rx
return result;