示例#1
0
文件: dh.c 项目: MekliCZ/positron
SECStatus 
DH_NewKey(DHParams *params, DHPrivateKey **privKey)
{
    PLArenaPool *arena;
    DHPrivateKey *key;
    mp_int g, xa, p, Ya;
    mp_err   err = MP_OKAY;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    if (!params || !privKey) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (!arena) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    key = (DHPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(DHPrivateKey));
    if (!key) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    key->arena = arena;
    MP_DIGITS(&g)  = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&xa) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&p)  = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&Ya) = 0;
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&g)  );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&xa) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p)  );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Ya) );
    /* Set private key's p */
    CHECK_SEC_OK( SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->prime, &params->prime) );
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->prime, &p);
    /* Set private key's g */
    CHECK_SEC_OK( SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->base, &params->base) );
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->base, &g);
    /* Generate private key xa */
    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue,
                      dh_GetSecretKeyLen(params->prime.len));
    CHECK_SEC_OK(RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(key->privateValue.data, 
                                  key->privateValue.len));
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT( key->privateValue, &xa );
    /* xa < p */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&xa, &p, &xa) );
    /* Compute public key Ya = g ** xa mod p */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&g, &xa, &p, &Ya) );
    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&Ya, &key->publicValue, key->arena);
    *privKey = key;
cleanup:
    mp_clear(&g);
    mp_clear(&xa);
    mp_clear(&p);
    mp_clear(&Ya);
    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }
    if (rv) {
	*privKey = NULL;
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
    }
    return rv;
}
示例#2
0
文件: dh.c 项目: MekliCZ/positron
SECStatus 
DH_GenParam(int primeLen, DHParams **params)
{
    PLArenaPool *arena;
    DHParams *dhparams;
    unsigned char *pb = NULL;
    unsigned char *ab = NULL;
    unsigned long counter = 0;
    mp_int p, q, a, h, psub1, test;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    if (!params || primeLen < 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
    if (!arena) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    dhparams = (DHParams *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(DHParams));
    if (!dhparams) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
	return SECFailure;
    }
    dhparams->arena = arena;
    MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&a) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&h) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&psub1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&test) = 0;
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&q) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&a) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&h) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&psub1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&test) );
    /* generate prime with MPI, uses Miller-Rabin to generate strong prime. */
    pb = PORT_Alloc(primeLen);
    CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pb, primeLen) );
    pb[0]          |= 0x80; /* set high-order bit */
    pb[primeLen-1] |= 0x01; /* set low-order bit  */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&p, pb, primeLen) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mpp_make_prime(&p, primeLen * 8, PR_TRUE, &counter) );
    /* construct Sophie-Germain prime q = (p-1)/2. */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &psub1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_div_2(&psub1, &q)    );
    /* construct a generator from the prime. */
    ab = PORT_Alloc(primeLen);
    /* generate a candidate number a in p's field */
    CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(ab, primeLen) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&a, ab, primeLen) );
    /* force a < p (note that quot(a/p) <= 1) */
    if ( mp_cmp(&a, &p) > 0 )
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub(&a, &p, &a) );
    do {
	/* check that a is in the range [2..p-1] */
	if ( mp_cmp_d(&a, 2) < 0 || mp_cmp(&a, &psub1) >= 0) {
	    /* a is outside of the allowed range.  Set a=3 and keep going. */
            mp_set(&a, 3);
	}
	/* if a**q mod p != 1 then a is a generator */
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&a, &q, &p, &test) );
	if ( mp_cmp_d(&test, 1) != 0 )
	    break;
	/* increment the candidate and try again. */
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add_d(&a, 1, &a) );
    } while (PR_TRUE);
    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&p, &dhparams->prime, arena);
    MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&a, &dhparams->base, arena);
    *params = dhparams;
cleanup:
    mp_clear(&p);
    mp_clear(&q);
    mp_clear(&a);
    mp_clear(&h);
    mp_clear(&psub1);
    mp_clear(&test);
    if (pb) PORT_ZFree(pb, primeLen);
    if (ab) PORT_ZFree(ab, primeLen);
    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }
    if (rv)
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
    return rv;
}
示例#3
0
/* Computes the ECDSA signature (a concatenation of two values r and s)
 * on the digest using the given key and the random value kb (used in
 * computing s).
 */
SECStatus
ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature,
                         const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *kb, const int kblen)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
    mp_int x1;
    mp_int d, k; /* private key, random integer */
    mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is the signature */
    mp_int t;    /* holding tmp values */
    mp_int n;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
    SECItem kGpoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
    int flen = 0;   /* length in bytes of the field size */
    unsigned olen;  /* length in bytes of the base point order */
    unsigned obits; /* length in bits  of the base point order */
    unsigned char *t2 = NULL;

#if EC_DEBUG
    char mpstr[256];
#endif

    /* Initialize MPI integers. */
    /* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
    MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&t) = 0;

    /* Check args */
    if (!key || !signature || !digest || !kb || (kblen < 0)) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
        goto cleanup;
    }

    ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
    flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
    olen = ecParams->order.len;
    if (signature->data == NULL) {
        /* a call to get the signature length only */
        goto finish;
    }
    if (signature->len < 2 * olen) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
        goto cleanup;
    }

    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x1));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&d));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&n));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));

    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(ecParams->order, &n);
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &d);

    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, kblen));
    /* Make sure k is in the interval [1, n-1] */
    if ((mp_cmp_z(&k) <= 0) || (mp_cmp(&k, &n) >= 0)) {
#if EC_DEBUG
        printf("k is outside [1, n-1]\n");
        mp_tohex(&k, mpstr);
        printf("k : %s \n", mpstr);
        mp_tohex(&n, mpstr);
        printf("n : %s \n", mpstr);
#endif
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
        goto cleanup;
    }

    /*
    ** We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
    ** so we compute k*G using an equivalent scalar of fixed
    ** bit-length.
    ** Fix based on patch for ECDSA timing attack in the paper
    ** by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri at
    **   http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232
    **
    ** How do we convert k to a value of a fixed bit-length?
    ** k starts off as an integer satisfying 0 <= k < n.  Hence,
    ** n <= k+n < 2n, which means k+n has either the same number
    ** of bits as n or one more bit than n.  If k+n has the same
    ** number of bits as n, the second addition ensures that the
    ** final value has exactly one more bit than n.  Thus, we
    ** always end up with a value that exactly one more bit than n.
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &n, &k));
    if (mpl_significant_bits(&k) <= mpl_significant_bits(&n)) {
        CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &n, &k));
    }

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.2, Step 2
    **
    ** Compute kG
    */
    kGpoint.len = ecParams->pointSize;
    kGpoint.data = PORT_Alloc(ecParams->pointSize);
    if ((kGpoint.data == NULL) ||
        (ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &kGpoint) != SECSuccess))
        goto cleanup;

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 1
    **
    ** Extract the x co-ordinate of kG into x1
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, kGpoint.data + 1,
                                         (mp_size)flen));

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 2
    **
    ** r = x1 mod n  NOTE: n is the order of the curve
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&x1, &n, &r));

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 3
    **
    ** verify r != 0
    */
    if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
        goto cleanup;
    }

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 4
    **
    ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + d*r)) mod n
    */
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &s); /* s = HASH(M)     */

    /* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
     * to the length of n in bits.
     * (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
    CHECK_MPI_OK((obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)));
    if (digest->len * 8 > obits) {
        mpl_rsh(&s, &s, digest->len * 8 - obits);
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&n, mpstr);
    printf("n : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&d, mpstr);
    printf("d : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
    printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
    printf("digest: %s (decimal)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&r, mpstr);
    printf("r : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&r, mpstr);
    printf("r : %s\n", mpstr);
#endif

    if ((t2 = PORT_Alloc(2 * ecParams->order.len)) == NULL) {
        rv = SECFailure;
        goto cleanup;
    }
    if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(t2, 2 * ecParams->order.len) != SECSuccess) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
        rv = SECFailure;
        goto cleanup;
    }
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&t, t2, 2 * ecParams->order.len)); /* t <-$ Zn */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &n, &k));                                /* k = k * t mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &n, &k));                                    /* k = k**-1 mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &n, &k));                                /* k = k * t mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&d, &r, &n, &d));                                /* d = d * r mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_addmod(&s, &d, &n, &s));                                /* s = s + d mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &n, &s));                                /* s = s * k mod n */

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
    printf("s : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&s, mpstr);
    printf("s : %s\n", mpstr);
#endif

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 5
    **
    ** verify s != 0
    */
    if (mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
        goto cleanup;
    }

    /*
    **
    ** Signature is tuple (r, s)
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&r, signature->data, olen));
    CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&s, signature->data + olen, olen));
finish:
    signature->len = 2 * olen;

    rv = SECSuccess;
    err = MP_OKAY;
cleanup:
    mp_clear(&x1);
    mp_clear(&d);
    mp_clear(&k);
    mp_clear(&r);
    mp_clear(&s);
    mp_clear(&n);
    mp_clear(&t);

    if (t2) {
        PORT_Free(t2);
    }

    if (kGpoint.data) {
        PORT_ZFree(kGpoint.data, ecParams->pointSize);
    }

    if (err) {
        MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
        rv = SECFailure;
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ECDSA signing with seed %s\n",
           (rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */

    return rv;
}