/*******************************************************************************
* Initialize the TrustZone Controller.
* Early initialization create only one region with full access to secure.
* This setting is used before and during DDR initialization.
******************************************************************************/
static void early_init_tzc400(void)
{
stm32mp_clk_enable(TZC1);
stm32mp_clk_enable(TZC2);
tzc400_init(STM32MP1_TZC_BASE);
tzc400_disable_filters();
/* Region 1 set to cover Non-Secure DRAM at 0xC000_0000 */
tzc400_configure_region(STM32MP1_FILTER_BIT_ALL, 1,
STM32MP_DDR_BASE,
STM32MP_DDR_BASE +
(STM32MP_DDR_MAX_SIZE - 1U),
TZC_REGION_S_NONE,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(STM32MP1_TZC_A7_ID) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(STM32MP1_TZC_SDMMC_ID));
/* Raise an exception if a NS device tries to access secure memory */
tzc400_set_action(TZC_ACTION_ERR);
tzc400_enable_filters();
}
/*
* For the moment we assume that all security programming is done by the
* primary core.
* TODO:
* Might want to enable interrupt on violations when supported?
*/
void plat_security_setup(void)
{
struct tzc_instance controller;
/*
* The Base FVP has a TrustZone address space controller, the Foundation
* FVP does not. Trying to program the device on the foundation FVP will
* cause an abort.
*
* If the platform had additional peripheral specific security
* configurations, those would be configured here.
*/
if (!platform_get_cfgvar(CONFIG_HAS_TZC))
return;
/*
* The TrustZone controller controls access to main DRAM. Give
* full NS access for the moment to use with OS.
*/
INFO("Configuring TrustZone Controller\n");
/*
* The driver does some error checking and will assert.
* - Provide base address of device on platform.
* - Provide width of ACE-Lite IDs on platform.
*/
controller.base = TZC400_BASE;
controller.aid_width = FVP_AID_WIDTH;
tzc_init(&controller);
/*
* Currently only filters 0 and 2 are connected on Base FVP.
* Filter 0 : CPU clusters (no access to DRAM by default)
* Filter 1 : not connected
* Filter 2 : LCDs (access to VRAM allowed by default)
* Filter 3 : not connected
* Programming unconnected filters will have no effect at the
* moment. These filter could, however, be connected in future.
* So care should be taken not to configure the unused filters.
*/
/* Disable all filters before programming. */
tzc_disable_filters(&controller);
/*
* Allow full access to all DRAM to supported devices for the
* moment. Give access to the CPUs and Virtio. Some devices
* would normally use the default ID so allow that too. We use
* three different regions to cover the three separate blocks of
* memory in the FVPs. We allow secure access to DRAM to load NS
* software.
* FIXME: In current models Virtio uses a reserved ID. This is
* not correct and will be fixed.
*/
/* Set to cover 2GB block of DRAM */
tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 1,
DRAM_BASE, 0xFFFFFFFF, TZC_REGION_S_RDWR,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_RES5));
/* Set to cover the 30GB block */
tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 2,
0x880000000, 0xFFFFFFFFF, TZC_REGION_S_RDWR,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_RES5));
/* Set to cover 480GB block */
tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 3,
0x8800000000, 0xFFFFFFFFFF, TZC_REGION_S_RDWR,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_RES5));
/*
* TODO: Interrupts are not currently supported. The only
* options we have are for access errors to occur quietly or to
* cause an exception. We choose to cause an exception.
*/
tzc_set_action(&controller, TZC_ACTION_ERR);
/* Enable filters. */
tzc_enable_filters(&controller);
}
static void init_tzc400(void)
{
/* Enable all filter units available */
mmio_write_32(TZC400_BASE + GATE_KEEPER_OFF, 0x0000000f);
/*
* Secure read and write are enabled for region 0, and the background
* region (region 0) is enabled for all four filter units
*/
mmio_write_32(TZC400_BASE + REGION_ATTRIBUTES_OFF, 0xc0000000);
/*
* Enable Non-secure read/write accesses for the Soc Devices from the
* Non-Secure World
*/
mmio_write_32(TZC400_BASE + REGION_ID_ACCESS_OFF,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_CCI400) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_PCIE) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_HDLCD0) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_HDLCD1) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_USB) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_DMA330) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_THINLINKS) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_GPU) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_SCP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(TZC400_NSAID_CORESIGHT)
);
}
/*
* For the moment we assume that all security programming is done by the
* primary core.
* TODO:
* Might want to enable interrupt on violations when supported?
*/
void plat_security_setup(void)
{
tzc_instance_t controller;
/*
* The Base FVP has a TrustZone address space controller, the Foundation
* FVP does not. Trying to program the device on the foundation FVP will
* cause an abort.
*
* If the platform had additional peripheral specific security
* configurations, those would be configured here.
*/
if (!platform_get_cfgvar(CONFIG_HAS_TZC))
return;
/*
* The TrustZone controller controls access to main DRAM. Give
* full NS access for the moment to use with OS.
*/
INFO("Configuring TrustZone Controller\n");
/*
* The driver does some error checking and will assert.
* - Provide base address of device on platform.
* - Provide width of ACE-Lite IDs on platform.
*/
controller.base = TZC400_BASE;
controller.aid_width = FVP_AID_WIDTH;
tzc_init(&controller);
/*
* Currently only filters 0 and 2 are connected on Base FVP.
* Filter 0 : CPU clusters (no access to DRAM by default)
* Filter 1 : not connected
* Filter 2 : LCDs (access to VRAM allowed by default)
* Filter 3 : not connected
* Programming unconnected filters will have no effect at the
* moment. These filter could, however, be connected in future.
* So care should be taken not to configure the unused filters.
*/
/* Disable all filters before programming. */
tzc_disable_filters(&controller);
/*
* Allow only non-secure access to all DRAM to supported devices.
* Give access to the CPUs and Virtio. Some devices
* would normally use the default ID so allow that too. We use
* two regions to cover the blocks of physical memory in the FVPs.
*
* Software executing in the secure state, such as a secure
* boot-loader, can access the DRAM by using the NS attributes in
* the MMU translation tables and descriptors.
*/
/* Set to cover the first block of DRAM */
tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 1,
DRAM_BASE, 0xFFFFFFFF, TZC_REGION_S_NONE,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_PCI) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO_OLD));
/* Set to cover the second block of DRAM */
tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 2,
0x880000000, 0xFFFFFFFFF, TZC_REGION_S_NONE,
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_PCI) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO) |
TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO_OLD));
/*
* TODO: Interrupts are not currently supported. The only
* options we have are for access errors to occur quietly or to
* cause an exception. We choose to cause an exception.
*/
tzc_set_action(&controller, TZC_ACTION_ERR);
/* Enable filters. */
tzc_enable_filters(&controller);
}