示例#1
0
/*
 * Privilege system call entry point
 */
int
privsys(int code, priv_op_t op, priv_ptype_t type, void *buf, size_t bufsize,
    int itype)
{
	int retv;
	extern int issetugid(void);

	switch (code) {
	case PRIVSYS_SETPPRIV:
		if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t))
			return (set_errno(ENOMEM));
		return (setppriv(op, type, buf));
	case PRIVSYS_GETPPRIV:
		if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t))
			return (set_errno(ENOMEM));
		return (getppriv(type, buf));
	case PRIVSYS_GETIMPLINFO:
		return (getprivimplinfo(buf, bufsize));
	case PRIVSYS_SETPFLAGS:
		retv = setpflags((uint_t)op, (uint_t)type, NULL);
		return (retv != 0 ? set_errno(retv) : 0);
	case PRIVSYS_GETPFLAGS:
		retv = (int)getpflags((uint_t)op, CRED());
		return (retv == -1 ? set_errno(EINVAL) : retv);
	case PRIVSYS_ISSETUGID:
		return (issetugid());
	case PRIVSYS_KLPD_REG:
		if (bufsize < sizeof (priv_set_t))
			return (set_errno(ENOMEM));
		return ((int)klpd_reg((int)op, (idtype_t)itype, (id_t)type,
		    buf));
	case PRIVSYS_KLPD_UNREG:
		return ((int)klpd_unreg((int)op, (idtype_t)itype, (id_t)type));
	case PRIVSYS_PFEXEC_REG:
		return ((int)pfexec_reg((int)op));
	case PRIVSYS_PFEXEC_UNREG:
		return ((int)pfexec_unreg((int)op));
	}
	return (set_errno(EINVAL));
}
示例#2
0
/*ARGSUSED*/
static int
lo_mount(struct vfs *vfsp,
         struct vnode *vp,
         struct mounta *uap,
         struct cred *cr)
{
    int error;
    struct vnode *srootvp = NULL;	/* the server's root */
    struct vnode *realrootvp;
    struct loinfo *li;
    int nodev;

    nodev = vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NODEVICES, NULL);

    if ((error = secpolicy_fs_mount(cr, vp, vfsp)) != 0)
        return (EPERM);

    /*
     * Loopback devices which get "nodevices" added can be done without
     * "nodevices" set because we cannot import devices into a zone
     * with loopback.  Note that we have all zone privileges when
     * this happens; if not, we'd have gotten "nosuid".
     */
    if (!nodev && vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NODEVICES, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_DEVICES, NULL, VFS_NODISPLAY);

    mutex_enter(&vp->v_lock);
    if (!(uap->flags & MS_OVERLAY) &&
            (vp->v_count != 1 || (vp->v_flag & VROOT))) {
        mutex_exit(&vp->v_lock);
        return (EBUSY);
    }
    mutex_exit(&vp->v_lock);

    /*
     * Find real root, and make vfs point to real vfs
     */

    if (error = lookupname(uap->spec, (uap->flags & MS_SYSSPACE) ?
                           UIO_SYSSPACE : UIO_USERSPACE, FOLLOW, NULLVPP, &realrootvp))
        return (error);

    /*
     * Enforce MAC policy if needed.
     *
     * Loopback mounts must not allow writing up. The dominance test
     * is intended to prevent a global zone caller from accidentally
     * creating write-up conditions between two labeled zones.
     * Local zones can't violate MAC on their own without help from
     * the global zone because they can't name a pathname that
     * they don't already have.
     *
     * The special case check for the NET_MAC_AWARE process flag is
     * to support the case of the automounter in the global zone. We
     * permit automounting of local zone directories such as home
     * directories, into the global zone as required by setlabel,
     * zonecopy, and saving of desktop sessions. Such mounts are
     * trusted not to expose the contents of one zone's directories
     * to another by leaking them through the global zone.
     */
    if (is_system_labeled() && crgetzoneid(cr) == GLOBAL_ZONEID) {
        char	specname[MAXPATHLEN];
        zone_t	*from_zptr;
        zone_t	*to_zptr;

        if (vnodetopath(NULL, realrootvp, specname,
                        sizeof (specname), CRED()) != 0) {
            VN_RELE(realrootvp);
            return (EACCES);
        }

        from_zptr = zone_find_by_path(specname);
        to_zptr = zone_find_by_path(refstr_value(vfsp->vfs_mntpt));

        /*
         * Special case for zone devfs: the zone for /dev will
         * incorrectly appear as the global zone since it's not
         * under the zone rootpath.  So for zone devfs check allow
         * read-write mounts.
         *
         * Second special case for scratch zones used for Live Upgrade:
         * this is used to mount the zone's root from /root to /a in
         * the scratch zone.  As with the other special case, this
         * appears to be outside of the zone because it's not under
         * the zone rootpath, which is $ZONEPATH/lu in the scratch
         * zone case.
         */

        if (from_zptr != to_zptr &&
                !(to_zptr->zone_flags & ZF_IS_SCRATCH)) {
            /*
             * We know at this point that the labels aren't equal
             * because the zone pointers aren't equal, and zones
             * can't share a label.
             *
             * If the source is the global zone then making
             * it available to a local zone must be done in
             * read-only mode as the label will become admin_low.
             *
             * If it is a mount between local zones then if
             * the current process is in the global zone and has
             * the NET_MAC_AWARE flag, then regular read-write
             * access is allowed.  If it's in some other zone, but
             * the label on the mount point dominates the original
             * source, then allow the mount as read-only
             * ("read-down").
             */
            if (from_zptr->zone_id == GLOBAL_ZONEID) {
                /* make the mount read-only */
                vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_RO, NULL, 0);
            } else { /* cross-zone mount */
                if (to_zptr->zone_id == GLOBAL_ZONEID &&
                        /* LINTED: no consequent */
                        getpflags(NET_MAC_AWARE, cr) != 0) {
                    /* Allow the mount as read-write */
                } else if (bldominates(
                               label2bslabel(to_zptr->zone_slabel),
                               label2bslabel(from_zptr->zone_slabel))) {
                    /* make the mount read-only */
                    vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_RO, NULL, 0);
                } else {
                    VN_RELE(realrootvp);
                    zone_rele(to_zptr);
                    zone_rele(from_zptr);
                    return (EACCES);
                }
            }
        }
        zone_rele(to_zptr);
        zone_rele(from_zptr);
    }

    /*
     * realrootvp may be an AUTOFS node, in which case we
     * perform a VOP_ACCESS() to trigger the mount of the
     * intended filesystem, so we loopback mount the intended
     * filesystem instead of the AUTOFS filesystem.
     */
    (void) VOP_ACCESS(realrootvp, 0, 0, cr, NULL);

    /*
     * We're interested in the top most filesystem.
     * This is specially important when uap->spec is a trigger
     * AUTOFS node, since we're really interested in mounting the
     * filesystem AUTOFS mounted as result of the VOP_ACCESS()
     * call not the AUTOFS node itself.
     */
    if (vn_mountedvfs(realrootvp) != NULL) {
        if (error = traverse(&realrootvp)) {
            VN_RELE(realrootvp);
            return (error);
        }
    }

    /*
     * Allocate a vfs info struct and attach it
     */
    li = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (struct loinfo), KM_SLEEP);
    li->li_realvfs = realrootvp->v_vfsp;
    li->li_mountvfs = vfsp;

    /*
     * Set mount flags to be inherited by loopback vfs's
     */
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_RO, NULL)) {
        li->li_mflag |= VFS_RDONLY;
    }
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOSUID, NULL)) {
        li->li_mflag |= (VFS_NOSETUID|VFS_NODEVICES);
    }
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NODEVICES, NULL)) {
        li->li_mflag |= VFS_NODEVICES;
    }
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOSETUID, NULL)) {
        li->li_mflag |= VFS_NOSETUID;
    }
    /*
     * Permissive flags are added to the "deny" bitmap.
     */
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOXATTR, NULL)) {
        li->li_dflag |= VFS_XATTR;
    }
    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NONBMAND, NULL)) {
        li->li_dflag |= VFS_NBMAND;
    }

    /*
     * Propagate inheritable mount flags from the real vfs.
     */
    if ((li->li_realvfs->vfs_flag & VFS_RDONLY) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_RO, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_RO, NULL,
                      VFS_NODISPLAY);
    if ((li->li_realvfs->vfs_flag & VFS_NOSETUID) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOSETUID, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOSETUID, NULL,
                      VFS_NODISPLAY);
    if ((li->li_realvfs->vfs_flag & VFS_NODEVICES) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NODEVICES, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_NODEVICES, NULL,
                      VFS_NODISPLAY);
    /*
     * Permissive flags such as VFS_XATTR, as opposed to restrictive flags
     * such as VFS_RDONLY, are handled differently.  An explicit
     * MNTOPT_NOXATTR should override the underlying filesystem's VFS_XATTR.
     */
    if ((li->li_realvfs->vfs_flag & VFS_XATTR) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOXATTR, NULL) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_XATTR, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_XATTR, NULL,
                      VFS_NODISPLAY);
    if ((li->li_realvfs->vfs_flag & VFS_NBMAND) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NBMAND, NULL) &&
            !vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_NONBMAND, NULL))
        vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_NBMAND, NULL,
                      VFS_NODISPLAY);

    li->li_refct = 0;
    vfsp->vfs_data = (caddr_t)li;
    vfsp->vfs_bcount = 0;
    vfsp->vfs_fstype = lofsfstype;
    vfsp->vfs_bsize = li->li_realvfs->vfs_bsize;

    vfsp->vfs_dev = li->li_realvfs->vfs_dev;
    vfsp->vfs_fsid.val[0] = li->li_realvfs->vfs_fsid.val[0];
    vfsp->vfs_fsid.val[1] = li->li_realvfs->vfs_fsid.val[1];

    if (vfs_optionisset(vfsp, MNTOPT_LOFS_NOSUB, NULL)) {
        li->li_flag |= LO_NOSUB;
    }

    /*
     * Propagate any VFS features
     */

    vfs_propagate_features(li->li_realvfs, vfsp);

    /*
     * Setup the hashtable. If the root of this mount isn't a directory,
     * there's no point in allocating a large hashtable. A table with one
     * bucket is sufficient.
     */
    if (realrootvp->v_type != VDIR)
        lsetup(li, 1);
    else
        lsetup(li, 0);

    /*
     * Make the root vnode
     */
    srootvp = makelonode(realrootvp, li, 0);
    srootvp->v_flag |= VROOT;
    li->li_rootvp = srootvp;

#ifdef LODEBUG
    lo_dprint(4, "lo_mount: vfs %p realvfs %p root %p realroot %p li %p\n",
              vfsp, li->li_realvfs, srootvp, realrootvp, li);
#endif
    return (0);
}
示例#3
0
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	char *cmd;
	char *pset = NULL;
	char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
	int c;
	priv_set_t *wanted;
	int oflag;

	oflag = getpflags(PRIV_PFEXEC);
	if (setpflags(PRIV_PFEXEC, 1) != 0) {
		perror("setpflags(PRIV_PFEXEC)");
		exit(1);
	}

	if (*argv[0] == '-')
		cmd = argv[0] + 1;
	else
		cmd = argv[0];

	/* Strip "pf" from argv[0], it confuses some shells. */
	if (strncmp(cmd, "pf", 2) == 0) {
		argv[0] += 2;
		/* argv[0] will need to start with '-' again. */
		if (argv[0][-2] == '-')
			*argv[0] = '-';
	}

	/* If this fails, we just continue with plan B */
	if (shellname(getexecname(), pathbuf) == RES_OK)
		(void) execv(pathbuf, argv);

	switch (shellname(cmd, pathbuf)) {
	case RES_OK:
		(void) execv(pathbuf, argv);
		perror(pathbuf);
		return (1);
	case RES_PFEXEC:
	case RES_FAILURE:
		while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "P:")) != EOF) {
			switch (c) {
			case 'P':
				if (pset == NULL) {
					pset = optarg;
					break;
				}
				/* FALLTHROUGH */
			default:
				usage();
			}
		}
		argc -= optind;
		argv += optind;
		if (argc < 1)
			usage();

		if (pset != NULL) {
			wanted = priv_str_to_set(pset, ",", NULL);
			if (setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_INHERITABLE, wanted) != 0) {
				(void) fprintf(stderr,
				    gettext("setppriv(): %s\n"),
				    strerror(errno));
				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
			}
			(void) setpflags(PRIV_PFEXEC, oflag);
		}

		(void) execvp(argv[0], argv);
		perror(argv[0]);
		return (1);
	}
	return (1);
}
示例#4
0
int
mtev_security_usergroup(const char *user, const char *group, mtev_boolean effective) {
  static long pwnam_buflen = 0;
  static long grnam_buflen = 0;
  uid_t uid = 0;
  gid_t gid = 0;

  if(pwnam_buflen == 0)
#ifdef _SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX
    pwnam_buflen = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
#else
    pwnam_buflen = 100; /* This shouldn't be used, so size is not important. */
#endif
  if(grnam_buflen == 0)
#ifdef _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX
    grnam_buflen = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
#else
    grnam_buflen = 100;
#endif

  if(user) {
    if(isuinteger(user)) uid = atoi(user);
    else {
      struct passwd *pw, _pw;
      char *buf;
      if(NULL == (buf = alloca(pwnam_buflen))) BAIL("alloca failed\n");
      if(NULL == (pw = __getpwnam_r(user, &_pw, buf, pwnam_buflen)))
        BAIL("Cannot find user '%s'\n", user);
      uid = pw->pw_uid;
    }
  }

  if(group) {
    if(isuinteger(group)) gid = atoi(group);
    else {
      struct group *gr, _gr;
      char *buf;
      if(NULL == (buf = alloca(grnam_buflen))) BAIL("alloca failed\n");
      if(NULL == (gr = __getgrnam_r(group, &_gr, buf, grnam_buflen)))
        BAIL("Cannot find group '%s'\n", group);
      gid = gr->gr_gid;
    }
  }

  if(!user && !group) return 0;

#if defined(CAP_SUPPORTED) && defined(HAVE_SETPPRIV)
  if(!effective && getpflags(PRIV_AWARE)) {
    int rv;
    priv_set_t *set;
    set = priv_allocset();
    priv_addset(set, "proc_setid");
    rv = setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, set);
    priv_freeset(set);
    if(rv) BAIL("setppriv(proc_setid) failed");
  }
#endif

  if(group) {
    if(!effective && gid == 0) BAIL("Cannot use this function to setgid(0)\n");
    if((effective ? setegid(gid) : setgid(gid)) != 0)
      BAIL("setgid(%d) failed: %s\n", (int)gid, strerror(errno));
  }
  if(user) {
    if(!effective && uid == 0) BAIL("Cannot use this function to setuid(0)\n");
    if((effective ? seteuid(uid) : setuid(uid)) != 0) 
      BAIL("setgid(%d) failed: %s\n", (int)gid, strerror(errno));

    if(!effective) {
#if defined(CAP_SUPPORTED) && defined(HAVE_SETPPRIV)
      if(getpflags(PRIV_AWARE)) {
        int rv;
        priv_set_t *set;
        set = priv_allocset();
        priv_addset(set, "proc_setid");
        rv = setppriv(PRIV_OFF, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, set);
        if(rv) BAIL("setppriv(off, effective, proc_setid) failed");
        getppriv(PRIV_EFFECTIVE, set);
        rv = setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, set);
        if(rv) BAIL("setppriv(effective -> permitted) failed");
        priv_freeset(set);
      }
#endif

      if(setuid(0) == 0) BAIL("setuid(0) worked, and it shouldn't have.\n");
      if(setgid(0) == 0) BAIL("setgid(0) worked, and it shouldn't have.\n");
    }
  }

  return 0;
}
示例#5
0
/*
 * smbfs_mount_label_policy:
 *	Determine whether the mount is allowed according to MAC check,
 *	by comparing (where appropriate) label of the remote server
 *	against the label of the zone being mounted into.
 *
 *	Returns:
 *		 0 :	access allowed
 *		-1 :	read-only access allowed (i.e., read-down)
 *		>0 :	error code, such as EACCES
 *
 * NB:
 * NFS supports Cipso labels by parsing the vfs_resource
 * to see what the Solaris server global zone has shared.
 * We can't support that for CIFS since resource names
 * contain share names, not paths.
 */
static int
smbfs_mount_label_policy(vfs_t *vfsp, void *ipaddr, int addr_type, cred_t *cr)
{
	bslabel_t	*server_sl, *mntlabel;
	zone_t		*mntzone = NULL;
	ts_label_t	*zlabel;
	tsol_tpc_t	*tp;
	ts_label_t	*tsl = NULL;
	int		retv;

	/*
	 * Get the zone's label.  Each zone on a labeled system has a label.
	 */
	mntzone = zone_find_by_any_path(refstr_value(vfsp->vfs_mntpt), B_FALSE);
	zlabel = mntzone->zone_slabel;
	ASSERT(zlabel != NULL);
	label_hold(zlabel);

	retv = EACCES;				/* assume the worst */

	/*
	 * Next, get the assigned label of the remote server.
	 */
	tp = find_tpc(ipaddr, addr_type, B_FALSE);
	if (tp == NULL)
		goto out;			/* error getting host entry */

	if (tp->tpc_tp.tp_doi != zlabel->tsl_doi)
		goto rel_tpc;			/* invalid domain */
	if ((tp->tpc_tp.host_type != UNLABELED))
		goto rel_tpc;			/* invalid hosttype */

	server_sl = &tp->tpc_tp.tp_def_label;
	mntlabel = label2bslabel(zlabel);

	/*
	 * Now compare labels to complete the MAC check.  If the labels
	 * are equal or if the requestor is in the global zone and has
	 * NET_MAC_AWARE, then allow read-write access.   (Except for
	 * mounts into the global zone itself; restrict these to
	 * read-only.)
	 *
	 * If the requestor is in some other zone, but his label
	 * dominates the server, then allow read-down.
	 *
	 * Otherwise, access is denied.
	 */
	if (blequal(mntlabel, server_sl) ||
	    (crgetzoneid(cr) == GLOBAL_ZONEID &&
	    getpflags(NET_MAC_AWARE, cr) != 0)) {
		if ((mntzone == global_zone) ||
		    !blequal(mntlabel, server_sl))
			retv = -1;		/* read-only */
		else
			retv = 0;		/* access OK */
	} else if (bldominates(mntlabel, server_sl)) {
		retv = -1;			/* read-only */
	} else {
		retv = EACCES;
	}

	if (tsl != NULL)
		label_rele(tsl);

rel_tpc:
	/*LINTED*/
	TPC_RELE(tp);
out:
	if (mntzone)
		zone_rele(mntzone);
	label_rele(zlabel);
	return (retv);
}