static int get_entry(liServer *srv, ocsp_response_cert_entry* entry, gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp, unsigned int ndx) {
int r;
memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry));
r = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(
resp, ndx, &entry->digest, &entry->issuer_name_hash, NULL, &entry->serial,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE == r) return r;
if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS > r) {
ERROR(srv, "Couldn't retrieve OCSP response information for entry %u (%s): %s",
ndx,
gnutls_strerror_name(r), gnutls_strerror(r));
return r;
}
if (0 == entry->serial.size || GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN == entry->digest || entry->issuer_name_hash.size != gnutls_hash_get_len(entry->digest)) {
ERROR(srv, "Invalid OCSP response data in entry %u", ndx);
return GNUTLS_E_OCSP_RESPONSE_ERROR;
}
return GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS;
}
static void
print_resp(gnutls_buffer_st * str, gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp,
gnutls_ocsp_print_formats_t format)
{
int ret;
unsigned indx;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_status(resp);
if (ret < 0) {
addf(str, "error: ocsp_resp_get_status: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
return;
}
adds(str, "\tResponse Status: ");
switch (ret) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_SUCCESSFUL:
adds(str, "Successful\n");
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_MALFORMEDREQUEST:
adds(str, "malformedRequest\n");
return;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_INTERNALERROR:
adds(str, "internalError\n");
return;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_TRYLATER:
adds(str, "tryLater\n");
return;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_SIGREQUIRED:
adds(str, "sigRequired\n");
return;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_UNAUTHORIZED:
adds(str, "unauthorized\n");
return;
default:
adds(str, "unknown\n");
return;
}
{
gnutls_datum_t oid;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_response(resp, &oid, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
addf(str, "error: get_response: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
return;
}
adds(str, "\tResponse Type: ");
#define OCSP_BASIC "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.1"
if (oid.size == sizeof(OCSP_BASIC)
&& memcmp(oid.data, OCSP_BASIC, oid.size) == 0) {
adds(str, "Basic OCSP Response\n");
gnutls_free(oid.data);
} else {
addf(str, "Unknown response type (%.*s)\n",
oid.size, oid.data);
gnutls_free(oid.data);
return;
}
}
/* Version. */
{
int version = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_version(resp);
if (version < 0)
addf(str, "error: get_version: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(version));
else
addf(str, _("\tVersion: %d\n"), version);
}
/* responderID */
{
gnutls_datum_t dn;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_responder(resp, &dn);
if (ret < 0 || dn.data == NULL) {
if (dn.data == 0) {
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_responder_raw_id(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_RESP_ID_KEY, &dn);
if (ret >= 0) {
addf(str, _("\tResponder Key ID: "));
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, dn.data, dn.size);
adds(str, "\n");
}
gnutls_free(dn.data);
} else {
addf(str, "error: get_dn: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
}
} else {
if (dn.data != NULL) {
addf(str, _("\tResponder ID: %.*s\n"), dn.size,
dn.data);
gnutls_free(dn.data);
}
}
}
{
char s[42];
size_t max = sizeof(s);
struct tm t;
time_t tim = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_produced(resp);
if (tim == (time_t) - 1)
addf(str, "error: ocsp_resp_get_produced\n");
else if (gmtime_r(&tim, &t) == NULL)
addf(str, "error: gmtime_r (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) tim);
else if (strftime(s, max, "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S UTC %Y", &t)
== 0)
addf(str, "error: strftime (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) tim);
else
addf(str, _("\tProduced At: %s\n"), s);
}
addf(str, "\tResponses:\n");
for (indx = 0;; indx++) {
gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest;
gnutls_datum_t in, ik, sn;
unsigned int cert_status;
time_t this_update;
time_t next_update;
time_t revocation_time;
unsigned int revocation_reason;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(resp,
indx,
&digest, &in, &ik, &sn,
&cert_status,
&this_update,
&next_update,
&revocation_time,
&revocation_reason);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE)
break;
addf(str, "\t\tCertificate ID:\n");
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
addf(str, "error: get_singleresponse: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
addf(str, "\t\t\tHash Algorithm: %s\n",
_gnutls_digest_get_name(hash_to_entry(digest)));
adds(str, "\t\t\tIssuer Name Hash: ");
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, in.data, in.size);
adds(str, "\n");
adds(str, "\t\t\tIssuer Key Hash: ");
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, ik.data, ik.size);
adds(str, "\n");
adds(str, "\t\t\tSerial Number: ");
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, sn.data, sn.size);
adds(str, "\n");
gnutls_free(in.data);
gnutls_free(ik.data);
gnutls_free(sn.data);
{
const char *p = NULL;
switch (cert_status) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD:
p = "good";
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED:
p = "revoked";
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
p = "unknown";
break;
default:
addf(str,
"\t\tCertificate Status: unexpected value %d\n",
cert_status);
break;
}
if (p)
addf(str, "\t\tCertificate Status: %s\n",
p);
}
/* XXX revocation reason */
if (cert_status == GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED) {
char s[42];
size_t max = sizeof(s);
struct tm t;
if (revocation_time == (time_t) - 1)
addf(str, "error: revocation_time\n");
else if (gmtime_r(&revocation_time, &t) == NULL)
addf(str, "error: gmtime_r (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) revocation_time);
else if (strftime
(s, max, "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S UTC %Y",
&t) == 0)
addf(str, "error: strftime (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) revocation_time);
else
addf(str, _("\t\tRevocation time: %s\n"),
s);
}
{
char s[42];
size_t max = sizeof(s);
struct tm t;
if (this_update == (time_t) - 1)
addf(str, "error: this_update\n");
else if (gmtime_r(&this_update, &t) == NULL)
addf(str, "error: gmtime_r (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) this_update);
else if (strftime
(s, max, "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S UTC %Y",
&t) == 0)
addf(str, "error: strftime (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) this_update);
else
addf(str, _("\t\tThis Update: %s\n"), s);
}
{
char s[42];
size_t max = sizeof(s);
struct tm t;
if (next_update != (time_t) - 1) {
if (gmtime_r(&next_update, &t) == NULL)
addf(str, "error: gmtime_r (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) next_update);
else if (strftime
(s, max, "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S UTC %Y",
&t) == 0)
addf(str, "error: strftime (%ld)\n",
(unsigned long) next_update);
else
addf(str, _("\t\tNext Update: %s\n"), s);
}
}
/* XXX singleRequestExtensions */
}
adds(str, "\tExtensions:\n");
for (indx = 0;; indx++) {
gnutls_datum_t oid;
unsigned int critical;
gnutls_datum_t data;
ret =
gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_extension(resp, indx, &oid,
&critical, &data);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE)
break;
else if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
addf(str, "error: get_extension: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
if (oid.size == sizeof(GNUTLS_OCSP_NONCE) &&
memcmp(oid.data, GNUTLS_OCSP_NONCE, oid.size) == 0) {
gnutls_datum_t nonce;
unsigned int ncrit;
ret =
gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_nonce(resp, &ncrit,
&nonce);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
addf(str, "error: get_nonce: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
} else {
addf(str, "\t\tNonce%s: ",
ncrit ? " (critical)" : "");
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, nonce.data,
nonce.size);
adds(str, "\n");
gnutls_free(nonce.data);
}
} else {
addf(str, "\t\tUnknown extension %s (%s):\n",
oid.data,
critical ? "critical" : "not critical");
adds(str, _("\t\t\tASCII: "));
_gnutls_buffer_asciiprint(str, (char *) data.data,
data.size);
addf(str, "\n");
adds(str, _("\t\t\tHexdump: "));
_gnutls_buffer_hexprint(str, (char *) data.data,
data.size);
adds(str, "\n");
}
gnutls_free(oid.data);
gnutls_free(data.data);
}
/* Signature. */
if (format == GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL) {
gnutls_datum_t sig;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_signature_algorithm(resp);
if (ret < 0)
addf(str, "error: get_signature_algorithm: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
else {
const char *name =
gnutls_sign_algorithm_get_name(ret);
if (name == NULL)
name = _("unknown");
addf(str, _("\tSignature Algorithm: %s\n"), name);
}
if (ret != GNUTLS_SIGN_UNKNOWN && gnutls_sign_is_secure(ret) == 0) {
adds(str,
_("warning: signed using a broken signature "
"algorithm that can be forged.\n"));
}
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_signature(resp, &sig);
if (ret < 0)
addf(str, "error: get_signature: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
else {
adds(str, _("\tSignature:\n"));
_gnutls_buffer_hexdump(str, sig.data, sig.size,
"\t\t");
gnutls_free(sig.data);
}
}
/* certs */
if (format == GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL) {
gnutls_x509_crt_t *certs;
size_t ncerts, i;
gnutls_datum_t out;
ret = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_certs(resp, &certs, &ncerts);
if (ret < 0)
addf(str, "error: get_certs: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
else {
if (ncerts > 0)
addf(str, "\tAdditional certificates:\n");
for (i = 0; i < ncerts; i++) {
size_t s = 0;
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_print(certs[i],
GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_FULL,
&out);
if (ret < 0)
addf(str, "error: crt_print: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
else {
addf(str, "%.*s", out.size,
out.data);
gnutls_free(out.data);
}
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_export(certs[i],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
NULL, &s);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
addf(str,
"error: crt_export: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
else {
out.data = gnutls_malloc(s);
if (out.data == NULL)
addf(str,
"error: malloc: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror
(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR));
else {
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_export
(certs[i],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
out.data, &s);
if (ret < 0)
addf(str,
"error: crt_export: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror
(ret));
else {
out.size = s;
addf(str, "%.*s",
out.size,
out.data);
}
gnutls_free(out.data);
}
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(certs[i]);
}
gnutls_free(certs);
}
}
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum_t *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509_cert, x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum_t issuerp;
char certbuf[256] = ""; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session_t session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
bool incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
gnutls_datum_t proto;
#endif
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
gnutls_protocol_t version = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session);
/* the name of the cipher suite used, e.g. ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(gnutls_kx_get(session),
gnutls_cipher_get(session),
gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr);
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo && chainp) {
unsigned int i;
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, cert_list_size);
if(result)
return result;
for(i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++) {
const char *beg = (const char *) chainp[i].data;
const char *end = beg + chainp[i].size;
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i, beg, end);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
#ifdef HAS_OCSP
if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
if(gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(session, 0) == 0) {
gnutls_datum_t status_request;
gnutls_ocsp_resp_t ocsp_resp;
gnutls_ocsp_cert_status_t status;
gnutls_x509_crl_reason_t reason;
rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(session, &status_request);
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification FAILED\n");
if(rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&ocsp_resp);
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(ocsp_resp, &status_request);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(ocsp_resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&status, NULL, NULL, NULL, &reason);
switch(status) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD:
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED: {
const char *crl_reason;
switch(reason) {
default:
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED:
crl_reason = "unspecified reason";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_KEYCOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "private key compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "CA compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AFFILIATIONCHANGED:
crl_reason = "affiliation has changed";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED:
crl_reason = "certificate superseded";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CESSATIONOFOPERATION:
crl_reason = "operation has ceased";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATEHOLD:
crl_reason = "certificate is on hold";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_REMOVEFROMCRL:
crl_reason = "will be removed from delta CRL";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGEWITHDRAWN:
crl_reason = "privilege withdrawn";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "AA compromised";
break;
}
failf(data, "Server certificate was revoked: %s", crl_reason);
break;
}
default:
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
failf(data, "Server certificate status is unknown");
break;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(ocsp_resp);
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification SKIPPED\n");
#endif
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
if(chainp)
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030306
/* Before 3.3.6, gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() didn't check IP
addresses. */
if(!rc) {
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
#define use_addr in6_addr
#else
#define use_addr in_addr
#endif
unsigned char addrbuf[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
unsigned char certaddr[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
size_t addrlen = 0, certaddrlen;
int i;
int ret = 0;
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 4;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 16;
#endif
if(addrlen) {
for(i=0; ; i++) {
certaddrlen = sizeof(certaddr);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(x509_cert, i, certaddr,
&certaddrlen, NULL);
/* If this happens, it wasn't an IP address. */
if(ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
continue;
if(ret < 0)
break;
if(ret != GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS)
continue;
if(certaddrlen == addrlen && !memcmp(addrbuf, certaddr, addrlen)) {
rc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
}
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
}
ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
if(ptr) {
result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, x509_cert, ptr);
if(result != CURLE_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return result;
}
}
/* Show:
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
rc = gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(session, &proto);
if(rc == 0) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", proto.size,
proto.data);
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(proto.size == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, proto.data,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(proto.size == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, proto.data, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
else
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
}
#endif
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize = 0;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
static int check_ocsp(struct tls_connection *conn, gnutls_session_t session,
gnutls_alert_description_t *err)
{
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030103
gnutls_datum_t response, buf;
gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp;
unsigned int cert_status;
int res;
if (!(conn->flags & (TLS_CONN_REQUEST_OCSP | TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP)))
return 0;
if (!gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(session, 0)) {
if (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"GnuTLS: No valid OCSP response received");
goto ocsp_error;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"GnuTLS: Valid OCSP response was not received - continue since OCSP was not required");
return 0;
}
/*
* GnuTLS has already verified the OCSP response in
* check_ocsp_response() and rejected handshake if the certificate was
* found to be revoked. However, if the response indicates that the
* status is unknown, handshake continues and reaches here. We need to
* re-import the OCSP response to check for unknown certificate status,
* but we do not need to repeat gnutls_ocsp_resp_check_crt() and
* gnutls_ocsp_resp_verify_direct() calls.
*/
res = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(session, &response);
if (res != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"GnuTLS: OCSP response was received, but it was not valid");
goto ocsp_error;
}
if (gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
goto ocsp_error;
res = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &response);
if (res != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"GnuTLS: Could not parse received OCSP response: %s",
gnutls_strerror(res));
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(resp);
goto ocsp_error;
}
res = gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL, &buf);
if (res == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "GnuTLS: %s", buf.data);
gnutls_free(buf.data);
}
res = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, &cert_status, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(resp);
if (res != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"GnuTLS: Failed to extract OCSP information: %s",
gnutls_strerror(res));
goto ocsp_error;
}
if (cert_status == GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "GnuTLS: OCSP cert status: good");
} else if (cert_status == GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"GnuTLS: OCSP cert status: revoked");
goto ocsp_error;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"GnuTLS: OCSP cert status: unknown");
if (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP)
goto ocsp_error;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"GnuTLS: OCSP was not required, so allow connection to continue");
}
return 0;
ocsp_error:
gnutls_tls_fail_event(conn, NULL, 0, NULL,
"bad certificate status response",
TLS_FAIL_REVOKED);
*err = GNUTLS_A_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
return -1;
#else /* GnuTLS 3.1.3 or newer */
return 0;
#endif /* GnuTLS 3.1.3 or newer */
}
