int main() { krb5_context context; krb5_authdata **results; krb5_authdata *container[2]; krb5_authdata **container_out; assert(krb5_init_context(&context) == 0); assert(krb5_merge_authdata(context, adseq1, adseq2, &results) == 0); compare_authdata(results[0], &ad1); compare_authdata( results[1], &ad2); compare_authdata(results[2], &ad4); compare_authdata( results[3], &ad3); assert(results[4] == NULL); krb5_free_authdata(context, results); container[0] = &ad3; container[1] = NULL; assert(krb5_encode_authdata_container( context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, container, &container_out) == 0); assert(krb5int_find_authdata(context, adseq1, container_out, 22, &results) == 0); compare_authdata(&ad1, results[0]); compare_authdata( results[1], &ad4); compare_authdata( results[2], &ad3); assert( results[3] == NULL); krb5_free_authdata(context, results); krb5_free_authdata(context, container_out); return 0; }
static krb5_error_code generate_authenticator(krb5_context context, krb5_authenticator *authent, krb5_principal client, krb5_checksum *cksum, krb5_key key, krb5_ui_4 seq_number, krb5_authdata **authorization, krb5_authdata_context ad_context, krb5_enctype *desired_etypes, krb5_enctype tkt_enctype) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_authdata **ext_authdata = NULL; authent->client = client; authent->checksum = cksum; if (key) { retval = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, key, &authent->subkey); if (retval) return retval; } else authent->subkey = 0; authent->seq_number = seq_number; authent->authorization_data = NULL; if (ad_context != NULL) { retval = krb5_authdata_export_authdata(context, ad_context, AD_USAGE_AP_REQ, &ext_authdata); if (retval) return retval; } if (authorization != NULL || ext_authdata != NULL) { retval = krb5_merge_authdata(context, authorization, ext_authdata, &authent->authorization_data); if (retval) { krb5_free_authdata(context, ext_authdata); return retval; } krb5_free_authdata(context, ext_authdata); } /* Only send EtypeList if we prefer another enctype to tkt_enctype */ if (desired_etypes != NULL && desired_etypes[0] != tkt_enctype) { TRACE_MK_REQ_ETYPES(context, desired_etypes); retval = make_etype_list(context, desired_etypes, tkt_enctype, &authent->authorization_data); if (retval) return retval; } return(krb5_us_timeofday(context, &authent->ctime, &authent->cusec)); }
/* * Copy an authdata array, with fresh allocation. */ krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_merge_authdata(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata *const *inauthdat1, krb5_authdata * const *inauthdat2, krb5_authdata ***outauthdat) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_authdata ** tempauthdat; register unsigned int nelems = 0, nelems2 = 0; *outauthdat = NULL; if (!inauthdat1 && !inauthdat2) { *outauthdat = 0; return 0; } if (inauthdat1) while (inauthdat1[nelems]) nelems++; if (inauthdat2) while (inauthdat2[nelems2]) nelems2++; /* one more for a null terminated list */ if (!(tempauthdat = (krb5_authdata **) calloc(nelems+nelems2+1, sizeof(*tempauthdat)))) return ENOMEM; if (inauthdat1) { for (nelems = 0; inauthdat1[nelems]; nelems++) { retval = krb5int_copy_authdatum(context, inauthdat1[nelems], &tempauthdat[nelems]); if (retval) { krb5_free_authdata(context, tempauthdat); return retval; } } } if (inauthdat2) { for (nelems2 = 0; inauthdat2[nelems2]; nelems2++) { retval = krb5int_copy_authdatum(context, inauthdat2[nelems2], &tempauthdat[nelems++]); if (retval) { krb5_free_authdata(context, tempauthdat); return retval; } } } *outauthdat = tempauthdat; return 0; }
static krb5_error_code greet_kdc_sign(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_const_principal tgs, krb5_data *greeting) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata ad_datum, *ad_data[2], **kdc_issued = NULL; krb5_authdata **if_relevant = NULL; krb5_authdata **tkt_authdata; ad_datum.ad_type = -42; ad_datum.contents = (krb5_octet *)greeting->data; ad_datum.length = greeting->length; ad_data[0] = &ad_datum; ad_data[1] = NULL; code = krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(context, enc_tkt_reply->session, tgs, ad_data, &kdc_issued); if (code != 0) return code; code = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, kdc_issued, &if_relevant); if (code != 0) { krb5_free_authdata(context, kdc_issued); return code; } code = krb5_merge_authdata(context, if_relevant, enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, &tkt_authdata); if (code == 0) { krb5_free_authdata(context, enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data); enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data = tkt_authdata; } krb5_free_authdata(context, if_relevant); krb5_free_authdata(context, kdc_issued); return code; }
/* Convert a JSON value to a null-terminated authdata list or to NULL. */ static int json_to_authdata(krb5_context context, k5_json_value v, krb5_authdata ***authdata_out) { k5_json_array array; krb5_authdata **authdata = NULL; size_t len, i; *authdata_out = NULL; if (k5_json_get_tid(v) == K5_JSON_TID_NULL) return 0; if (k5_json_get_tid(v) != K5_JSON_TID_ARRAY) return -1; array = v; len = k5_json_array_length(array); authdata = calloc(len + 1, sizeof(*authdata)); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (json_to_authdata_element(k5_json_array_get(array, i), &authdata[i])) goto invalid; } authdata[i] = NULL; *authdata_out = authdata; return 0; invalid: krb5_free_authdata(context, authdata); return -1; }
static krb5_error_code verify_ad_signedpath(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_part, krb5_principal **pdelegated, krb5_boolean *path_is_signed) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_ad_signedpath *sp = NULL; krb5_authdata **sp_authdata = NULL; krb5_data enc_sp; *pdelegated = NULL; *path_is_signed = FALSE; code = krb5_find_authdata(context, enc_tkt_part->authorization_data, NULL, KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET, &sp_authdata); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if (sp_authdata == NULL || sp_authdata[0]->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET || sp_authdata[1] != NULL) goto cleanup; enc_sp.data = (char *)sp_authdata[0]->contents; enc_sp.length = sp_authdata[0]->length; code = decode_krb5_ad_signedpath(&enc_sp, &sp); if (code != 0) { /* Treat an invalid signedpath authdata element as a missing one, since * we believe MS is using the same number for something else. */ code = 0; goto cleanup; } code = verify_ad_signedpath_checksum(context, krbtgt, krbtgt_key, enc_tkt_part, sp->delegated, sp->method_data, &sp->checksum, path_is_signed); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if (*path_is_signed) { *pdelegated = sp->delegated; sp->delegated = NULL; } cleanup: krb5_free_ad_signedpath(context, sp); krb5_free_authdata(context, sp_authdata); return code; }
/* * Merge authdata. * * If copy is FALSE, in_authdata is invalid on successful return. * If ignore_kdc_issued is TRUE, KDC-issued authdata is not copied. */ static krb5_error_code merge_authdata (krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **in_authdata, krb5_authdata ***out_authdata, krb5_boolean copy, krb5_boolean ignore_kdc_issued) { size_t i, j, nadata = 0; krb5_authdata **in_copy = NULL, **authdata = *out_authdata; krb5_error_code code; if (in_authdata == NULL || in_authdata[0] == NULL) return 0; if (authdata != NULL) { for (nadata = 0; authdata[nadata] != NULL; nadata++) ; } for (i = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++) ; if (copy) { code = krb5_copy_authdata(context, in_authdata, &in_copy); if (code != 0) return code; in_authdata = in_copy; } authdata = realloc(authdata, (nadata + i + 1) * sizeof(krb5_authdata *)); if (authdata == NULL) { krb5_free_authdata(context, in_copy); return ENOMEM; } for (i = 0, j = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++) { if (ignore_kdc_issued && is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, in_authdata[i], 0)) { free(in_authdata[i]->contents); free(in_authdata[i]); } else authdata[nadata + j++] = in_authdata[i]; } authdata[nadata + j] = NULL; free(in_authdata); if (authdata[0] == NULL) { free(authdata); authdata = NULL; } *out_authdata = authdata; return 0; }
/* * Determine the starting IAKERB state for a context. If we already * have a ticket, we may not need to do IAKERB at all. */ static krb5_error_code iakerb_get_initial_state(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_gss_cred_id_t cred, krb5_gss_name_t target, OM_uint32 time_req, enum iakerb_state *state) { krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds = NULL; krb5_error_code code; memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); in_creds.client = cred->name->princ; in_creds.server = target->princ; if (cred->name->ad_context != NULL) { code = krb5_authdata_export_authdata(ctx->k5c, cred->name->ad_context, AD_USAGE_TGS_REQ, &in_creds.authdata); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; } if (time_req != 0 && time_req != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) { krb5_timestamp now; code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5c, &now); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; in_creds.times.endtime = now + time_req; } /* Make an AS request if we have no creds or it's time to refresh them. */ if (cred->expire == 0 || kg_cred_time_to_refresh(ctx->k5c, cred)) { *state = IAKERB_AS_REQ; code = 0; goto cleanup; } code = krb5_get_credentials(ctx->k5c, KRB5_GC_CACHED, cred->ccache, &in_creds, &out_creds); if (code == KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND || code == KRB5_CC_NOT_KTYPE) { *state = cred->have_tgt ? IAKERB_TGS_REQ : IAKERB_AS_REQ; code = 0; } else if (code == 0) { *state = IAKERB_AP_REQ; krb5_free_creds(ctx->k5c, out_creds); } cleanup: krb5_free_authdata(ctx->k5c, in_creds.authdata); return code; }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_free_ad_kdcissued(krb5_context context, krb5_ad_kdcissued *val) { if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &val->ad_checksum); krb5_free_principal(context, val->i_principal); krb5_free_authdata(context, val->elements); free(val); }
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_copy_authenticator(krb5_context context, const krb5_authenticator *authfrom, krb5_authenticator **authto) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_authenticator *tempto; if (!(tempto = (krb5_authenticator *)MALLOC(sizeof(*tempto)))) return ENOMEM; #ifdef HAVE_C_STRUCTURE_ASSIGNMENT *tempto = *authfrom; #else (void) memcpy(tempto, authfrom, sizeof(krb5_authenticator)); #endif retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, authfrom->client, &tempto->client); if (retval) { krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto, sizeof(*tempto)); return retval; } if (authfrom->checksum && (retval = krb5_copy_checksum(context, authfrom->checksum, &tempto->checksum))) { krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto, sizeof(*tempto)); return retval; } if (authfrom->subkey) { retval = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, authfrom->subkey, &tempto->subkey); if (retval) { krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto->subkey, sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); krb5_free_checksum(context, tempto->checksum); krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto, sizeof(*tempto)); return retval; } } if (authfrom->authorization_data) { retval = krb5_copy_authdata(context, authfrom->authorization_data, &tempto->authorization_data); if (retval) { krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto->subkey, sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); krb5_free_checksum(context, tempto->checksum); krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); krb5_free_authdata(context, tempto->authorization_data); krb5_xfree_wrap(tempto, sizeof(*tempto)); return retval; } } *authto = tempto; return 0; }
static void free_test_cred(krb5_context context) { krb5_free_principal(context, test_creds.client); krb5_free_principal(context, test_creds.server); if(test_creds.authdata) { krb5_free_authdata(context, test_creds.authdata); test_creds.authdata = 0; } }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(krb5_context context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *val) { if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_keyblock(context, val->session); krb5_free_principal(context, val->client); free(val->transited.tr_contents.data); krb5_free_addresses(context, val->caddrs); krb5_free_authdata(context, val->authorization_data); free(val); }
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_copy_authenticator(krb5_context context, const krb5_authenticator *authfrom, krb5_authenticator **authto) { krb5_error_code retval; krb5_authenticator *tempto; if (!(tempto = (krb5_authenticator *)malloc(sizeof(*tempto)))) return ENOMEM; *tempto = *authfrom; retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, authfrom->client, &tempto->client); if (retval) { free(tempto); return retval; } if (authfrom->checksum && (retval = krb5_copy_checksum(context, authfrom->checksum, &tempto->checksum))) { krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); free(tempto); return retval; } if (authfrom->subkey) { retval = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, authfrom->subkey, &tempto->subkey); if (retval) { free(tempto->subkey); krb5_free_checksum(context, tempto->checksum); krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); free(tempto); return retval; } } if (authfrom->authorization_data) { retval = krb5_copy_authdata(context, authfrom->authorization_data, &tempto->authorization_data); if (retval) { free(tempto->subkey); krb5_free_checksum(context, tempto->checksum); krb5_free_principal(context, tempto->client); krb5_free_authdata(context, tempto->authorization_data); free(tempto); return retval; } } *authto = tempto; return 0; }
int main() { krb5_context context; krb5_authdata **results; krb5_authdata *container[2]; krb5_authdata **container_out; krb5_authdata **kdci; assert(krb5_init_context(&context) == 0); assert(krb5_merge_authdata(context, adseq1, adseq2, &results) == 0); compare_authdata(results[0], &ad1); compare_authdata( results[1], &ad2); compare_authdata(results[2], &ad4); compare_authdata( results[3], &ad3); assert(results[4] == NULL); krb5_free_authdata(context, results); container[0] = &ad3; container[1] = NULL; assert(krb5_encode_authdata_container( context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, container, &container_out) == 0); assert(krb5_find_authdata(context, adseq1, container_out, 22, &results) == 0); compare_authdata(&ad1, results[0]); compare_authdata( results[1], &ad4); compare_authdata( results[2], &ad3); assert( results[3] == NULL); krb5_free_authdata(context, container_out); assert(krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(context, &key, NULL, results, &kdci) == 0); assert(krb5_verify_authdata_kdc_issued(context, &key, kdci[0], NULL, &container_out) == 0); compare_authdata(container_out[0], results[0]); compare_authdata(container_out[1], results[1]); compare_authdata(container_out[2], results[2]); krb5_free_authdata(context, kdci); krb5_free_authdata(context, results); krb5_free_authdata(context, container_out); krb5_free_context(context); return 0; }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_free_authenticator_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_authenticator *val) { if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_checksum(context, val->checksum); val->checksum = 0; krb5_free_principal(context, val->client); val->client = 0; krb5_free_keyblock(context, val->subkey); val->subkey = 0; krb5_free_authdata(context, val->authorization_data); val->authorization_data = 0; }
static krb5_error_code copy_cc_array_to_authdata (krb5_context in_context, cc_data **in_cc_array, krb5_authdata ***out_authdata) { krb5_error_code err = 0; if (in_cc_array == NULL) { *out_authdata = NULL; } else { unsigned int count, i; krb5_authdata **authdata = NULL; /* get length of array */ for (count = 0; in_cc_array[count]; count++); authdata = (krb5_authdata **) malloc (sizeof (*authdata) * (count + 1)); if (!authdata) { err = KRB5_CC_NOMEM; } for (i = 0; !err && i < count; i++) { authdata[i] = (krb5_authdata *) malloc (sizeof (krb5_authdata)); if (!authdata[i]) { err = KRB5_CC_NOMEM; } if (!err) { authdata[i]->contents = (krb5_octet *) malloc (sizeof (krb5_octet) * in_cc_array[i]->length); if (!authdata[i]->contents) { err = KRB5_CC_NOMEM; } } if (!err) { authdata[i]->magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA; authdata[i]->ad_type = in_cc_array[i]->type; authdata[i]->length = in_cc_array[i]->length; memcpy (authdata[i]->contents, in_cc_array[i]->data, in_cc_array[i]->length); } } if (!err) { authdata[i] = NULL; /* terminator */ *out_authdata = authdata; authdata = NULL; } if (authdata) { krb5_free_authdata (in_context, authdata); } } return err; }
void k5_free_cammac(krb5_context context, krb5_cammac *val) { krb5_verifier_mac **vp; if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_authdata(context, val->elements); free_vmac(context, val->kdc_verifier); free_vmac(context, val->svc_verifier); for (vp = val->other_verifiers; vp != NULL && *vp != NULL; vp++) free_vmac(context, *vp); free(val->other_verifiers); free(val); }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_free_kdc_req(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_req *val) { if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_pa_data(context, val->padata); krb5_free_principal(context, val->client); krb5_free_principal(context, val->server); free(val->ktype); krb5_free_addresses(context, val->addresses); free(val->authorization_data.ciphertext.data); krb5_free_authdata(context, val->unenc_authdata); krb5_free_tickets(context, val->second_ticket); free(val); }
static krb5_error_code s4u2proxy_export_authdata(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_authdata_context context, void *plugin_context, void *request_context, krb5_flags usage, krb5_authdata ***out_authdata) { struct s4u2proxy_context *s4uctx = (struct s4u2proxy_context *)request_context; krb5_error_code code; krb5_ad_signedpath sp; krb5_authdata **authdata; krb5_data *data; if (s4uctx->count == 0) return 0; memset(&sp, 0, sizeof(sp)); sp.delegated = s4uctx->delegated; authdata = k5calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_authdata *), &code); if (authdata == NULL) return code; authdata[0] = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_authdata), &code); if (authdata[0] == NULL) return code; code = encode_krb5_ad_signedpath(&sp, &data); if (code != 0) { krb5_free_authdata(kcontext, authdata); return code; } authdata[0]->magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA; authdata[0]->ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET; authdata[0]->length = data->length; authdata[0]->contents = (krb5_octet *)data->data; authdata[1] = NULL; free(data); *out_authdata = authdata; return 0; }
/* * Initialise the krb5_tkt_creds context for the IAKERB context */ static krb5_error_code iakerb_tkt_creds_ctx(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx, krb5_gss_cred_id_t cred, krb5_gss_name_t name, OM_uint32 time_req) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_creds creds; krb5_timestamp now; assert(cred->name != NULL); assert(cred->name->princ != NULL); memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); creds.client = cred->name->princ; creds.server = name->princ; if (time_req != 0 && time_req != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) { code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5c, &now); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; creds.times.endtime = now + time_req; } if (cred->name->ad_context != NULL) { code = krb5_authdata_export_authdata(ctx->k5c, cred->name->ad_context, AD_USAGE_TGS_REQ, &creds.authdata); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; } code = krb5_tkt_creds_init(ctx->k5c, cred->ccache, &creds, 0, &ctx->tcc); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; cleanup: krb5_free_authdata(ctx->k5c, creds.authdata); return code; }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_tkt_creds_free(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->in_creds); krb5_cc_close(context, ctx->ccache); krb5_free_principal(context, ctx->req_server); krb5_free_authdata(context, ctx->authdata); krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->cur_tgt); krb5int_free_data_list(context, ctx->realms_seen); krb5_free_principal(context, ctx->tgt_princ); krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->subkey); krb5_free_data_contents(context, &ctx->previous_request); krb5int_free_data_list(context, ctx->realm_path); krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->reply_creds); free(ctx); }
static krb5_error_code mspac_export_authdata(krb5_context kcontext, krb5_authdata_context context, void *plugin_context, void *request_context, krb5_flags usage, krb5_authdata ***out_authdata) { struct mspac_context *pacctx = (struct mspac_context *)request_context; krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata **authdata; krb5_data data; if (pacctx->pac == NULL) return 0; authdata = calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_authdata *)); if (authdata == NULL) return ENOMEM; authdata[0] = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_authdata)); if (authdata[0] == NULL) { free(authdata); return ENOMEM; } authdata[1] = NULL; code = krb5int_copy_data_contents(kcontext, &pacctx->pac->data, &data); if (code != 0) { krb5_free_authdata(kcontext, authdata); return code; } authdata[0]->magic = KV5M_AUTHDATA; authdata[0]->ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC; authdata[0]->length = data.length; authdata[0]->contents = (krb5_octet *)data.data; authdata[1] = NULL; *out_authdata = authdata; return 0; }
void KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_free_cred_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *val) { if (val == NULL) return; krb5_free_principal(context, val->client); val->client = 0; krb5_free_principal(context, val->server); val->server = 0; krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &val->keyblock); free(val->ticket.data); val->ticket.data = 0; free(val->second_ticket.data); val->second_ticket.data = 0; krb5_free_addresses(context, val->addresses); val->addresses = 0; krb5_free_authdata(context, val->authdata); val->authdata = 0; }
static krb5_error_code k5_get_kdc_issued_authdata(krb5_context kcontext, const krb5_ap_req *ap_req, krb5_principal *kdc_issuer, krb5_authdata ***kdc_issued_authdata) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata **authdata; krb5_authdata **ticket_authdata; *kdc_issuer = NULL; *kdc_issued_authdata = NULL; ticket_authdata = ap_req->ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data; code = krb5int_find_authdata(kcontext, ticket_authdata, NULL, KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED, &authdata); if (code != 0 || authdata == NULL) return code; /* * Note: a module must still implement a verify_authdata * method, even it is a NOOP that simply records the value * of the kdc_issued_flag. */ code = krb5_verify_authdata_kdc_issued(kcontext, ap_req->ticket->enc_part2->session, authdata[0], kdc_issuer, kdc_issued_authdata); assert(code == 0 || *kdc_issued_authdata == NULL); krb5_free_authdata(kcontext, authdata); return code; }
/*ARGSUSED*/ krb5_error_code process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response) { krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0; krb5_kdc_req *request = 0; krb5_db_entry server; krb5_kdc_rep reply; krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart; krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0; int st_idx = 0; krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply; krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited; int newtransited = 0; krb5_error_code retval = 0; krb5_keyblock encrypting_key; int nprincs = 0; krb5_boolean more; krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0; krb5_keyblock session_key; krb5_timestamp until, rtime; krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL; krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr; krb5_key_data *server_key; char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0; krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry; krb5_enctype useenctype; int errcode, errcode2; register int i; int firstpass = 1; const char *status = 0; krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */ krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt; int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0; krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */ krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */ unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */ char *s4u_name = NULL; krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE; const char *emsg = NULL; krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL; krb5_principal krbtgt_princ; krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0; struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL; krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/ krb5_data scratch; session_key.contents = NULL; retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request); if (retval) return retval; /* * setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer. */ if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) { krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request); return retval; } errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req); if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 && (errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client, &cname))) { status = "UNPARSING CLIENT"; errcode = errcode2; goto cleanup; } limit_string(cname); if (errcode) { status = "PROCESS_TGS"; goto cleanup; } if (!header_ticket) { errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */ status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket"; goto cleanup; } errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state); if (errcode !=0) { status = "making state"; goto cleanup; } scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length; scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents; errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state); if (errcode !=0) { status = "kdc_find_fast"; goto cleanup; } /* * Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be * replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket * if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of * special cases for constrained delegation. */ header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2; /* * We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can * use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been * decrypted with the session key. */ /* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ header? */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) { setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE); setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE); } db_ref_done = FALSE; ref_tgt_again: nprincs = 1; if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) { status = "UNPARSING SERVER"; goto cleanup; } limit_string(sname); errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context, request->server, s_flags, &server, &nprincs, &more); if (errcode) { status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER"; nprincs = 0; goto cleanup; } tgt_again: if (more) { status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE; goto cleanup; } else if (nprincs != 1) { /* * might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we * should do our best to find such a TGS in this db */ if (firstpass ) { if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */ if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) { server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1); tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1); if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) { krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs); find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs); firstpass = 0; goto tgt_again; } } krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs); status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto cleanup; } else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) { retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ); if (!retval) { krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server); retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ, &(request->server)); if (!retval) { db_ref_done = TRUE; if (sname != NULL) free(sname); goto ref_tgt_again; } } } } krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs); status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto cleanup; } if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) { status = "TIME_OF_DAY"; goto cleanup; } if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket, kdc_time, &status))) { if (!status) status = "UNKNOWN_REASON"; errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; goto cleanup; } if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client)) setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM); is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) && !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ); /* Check for protocol transition */ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context, request, header_enc_tkt->client, &server, subkey, header_enc_tkt->session, kdc_time, &s4u_x509_user, &client, &c_nprincs, &status); if (errcode) goto cleanup; if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION); /* * We pick the session keytype here.... * * Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user * case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server * which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We * know that it at least must be able to support the encryption * type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be * able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference * to anything else. */ useenctype = 0; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) { krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key; krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno; krb5_enctype etype; krb5_db_entry st_client; int st_nprincs = 0; /* * Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it. */ if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx], c_flags, TRUE, /* match_enctype */ &st_client, &st_nprincs, &st_sealing_key, &st_srv_kvno))) { status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER"; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key, request->second_ticket[st_idx]); krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key); if (errcode) { status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT"; krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs); goto cleanup; } etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype; if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) { status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs); goto cleanup; } for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) { if (request->ktype[i] == etype) { useenctype = etype; break; } } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) { /* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context, request, request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2, &st_client, header_ticket->enc_part2->client, request->server, &status); if (errcode) goto cleanup; setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION); assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server)); /* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */ header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */ client = st_client; c_nprincs = st_nprincs; } else { /* "client" is not used for user2user */ krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs); } } /* * Select the keytype for the ticket session key. */ if ((useenctype == 0) && (useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server, request->nktypes, request->ktype)) == 0) { /* unsupported ktype */ status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key); if (errcode) { /* random key failed */ status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED"; goto cleanup; } authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime; if (is_referral) ticket_reply.server = server.princ; else ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */ enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0; enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE); /* * Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the * authtime's value. */ if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime)) header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime; /* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs; /* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */ reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */ reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL; /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) { /* * If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as * unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is * different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error * (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued. * * Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to * validate_forwardable(). */ if (c_nprincs && isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); /* * OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting * S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned. */ else if (!is_referral && !isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); } } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED); /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses; reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses; } if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY); /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses; reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses; } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED); setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from; } else enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) { assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0); /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) { krb5_deltat old_life; assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0); /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime; enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime = min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till, kdc_time + old_life); } else { /* not a renew request */ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till; enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime = min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm, header_enc_tkt->times.endtime))); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) && (enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) && isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) { setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE); request->rtime = min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till); } } rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) { /* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE); enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = min(rtime, min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + min(server.max_renewable_life, max_renewable_life_for_realm))); } else { enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0; } /* * Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's */ enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime; /* * Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket. */ if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH); if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH); /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present. so we can nuke it if it matches */ if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime) enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) { errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user, &s4u_name); } else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) { errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name); } else { errcode = 0; } if (errcode) { status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT"; goto cleanup; } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session); } else { /* * Find the server key */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server, -1, /* ignore keytype */ -1, /* Ignore salttype */ 0,/* Get highest kvno */ &server_key))) { status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server, &mkey_ptr))) { krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list; /* try refreshing master key list */ /* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */ if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ, &master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) { krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist); master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list; if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server, &mkey_ptr))) { status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } } else { status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } } /* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted * in the database) */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, mkey_ptr, server_key, &encrypting_key, NULL))) { status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } } if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) { /* * Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained * delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server * the ability to validate that delegation was used. */ clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED); } if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) { /* * If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation * and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup * the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account. * * Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation * because we must validate the KDC signatures. */ if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) && header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) { /* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC); /* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS); assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */ c_nprincs = 1; errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, c_flags, &client, &c_nprincs, &more); /* * We can ignore errors because the principal may be a * valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local * mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry * was returned. */ if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) { errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE; goto cleanup; } else if (errcode) { c_nprincs = 0; } } } enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL; if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) && !isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user; else enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client; enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */ errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, (c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL, &server, (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL, subkey != NULL ? subkey : header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */ pkt, request, s4u_x509_user ? s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL, header_enc_tkt, &enc_tkt_reply); if (errcode) { krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode); status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA"; goto cleanup; } if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) { errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context, &server, &reply_encpart); if (errcode) { status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA"; goto cleanup; } } /* * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if * it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different * than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already * implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly * listed). */ /* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */ if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) || realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) { /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */ enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited; } else { /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */ /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */ if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type != KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) { status = "BAD_TRTYPE"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0; enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited; if ((errcode = add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client, request->server))) { status = "ADD_TR_FAIL"; goto cleanup; } newtransited = 1; } if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) { errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &server, (k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL); if (errcode) { status = "NON_TRANSITIVE"; goto cleanup; } } if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) { unsigned int tlen; char *tdots; errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client), krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server)); tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length; tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : ""; tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen; if (errcode == 0) { setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED); } else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT) krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' " "via '%.*s%s'", cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen, enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots); else { emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode); krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR, "unexpected error checking transit from " "'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s", cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen, enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots, emsg); krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg); emsg = NULL; } } else krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path"); if (reject_bad_transit && !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) { errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; status = "BAD_TRANSIT"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply; /* * If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure * that the client for the second ticket matches the request * server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of * the second ticket. */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { /* * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches * requested server. */ krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client; if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) { if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname))) altcname = 0; if (altcname != NULL) limit_string(altcname); errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH; status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH"; goto cleanup; } ticket_kvno = 0; ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype; st_idx++; } else { ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno; } errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key, &ticket_reply); if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key); if (errcode) { status = "TKT_ENCRYPT"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno; /* Start assembling the response */ reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP; reply.padata = 0;/* always */ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) && find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) { errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, s4u_x509_user, &reply, &reply_encpart); if (errcode) { status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA"; goto cleanup; } } reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client; reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */ reply.ticket = &ticket_reply; reply_encpart.session = &session_key; reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce; /* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location is used for ktime */ reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times; reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime; /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present. so we can nuke it if it matches */ if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime) enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE; nolrentry.value = 0; nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry; nolrarray[1] = 0; reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */ reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */ reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags; reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server; /* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key in the AP_REQ */ reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype; errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply, subkey?subkey->enctype:header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype); if (errcode !=0 ) { status = "Preparing FAST padata"; goto cleanup; } errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key); if (errcode) { status = "generating reply key"; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart, subkey ? 1 : 0, reply_key, &reply, response); if (errcode) { status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP"; } else { status = "ISSUE"; } memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); /* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */ memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); cleanup: assert(status != NULL); if (reply_key) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key); if (errcode) emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime, c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg); if (errcode) { krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg); emsg = NULL; } if (errcode) { int got_err = 0; if (status == 0) { status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); got_err = 1; } errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128) errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode, nprincs ? server.princ : NULL, response, status); if (got_err) { krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status); status = 0; } } if (header_ticket != NULL) krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket); if (request != NULL) krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request); if (state) kdc_free_rstate(state); if (cname != NULL) free(cname); if (sname != NULL) free(sname); if (nprincs != 0) krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1); if (session_key.contents != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key); if (newtransited) free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data); if (k_nprincs) krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs); if (c_nprincs) krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs); if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user); if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL) krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data); if (s4u_name != NULL) free(s4u_name); if (subkey != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey); if (reply.padata) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata); if (reply_encpart.enc_padata) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata); return retval; }
static OM_uint32 kg_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status, const krb5_gss_cred_id_t impersonator_cred, const krb5_gss_name_t user, OM_uint32 time_req, krb5_gss_cred_id_t *output_cred, OM_uint32 *time_rec, krb5_context context) { OM_uint32 major_status; krb5_error_code code; krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds = NULL; *output_cred = NULL; memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); in_creds.client = user->princ; in_creds.server = impersonator_cred->name->princ; if (impersonator_cred->req_enctypes != NULL) in_creds.keyblock.enctype = impersonator_cred->req_enctypes[0]; code = k5_mutex_lock(&user->lock); if (code != 0) { *minor_status = code; return GSS_S_FAILURE; } if (user->ad_context != NULL) { code = krb5_authdata_export_authdata(context, user->ad_context, AD_USAGE_TGS_REQ, &in_creds.authdata); if (code != 0) { k5_mutex_unlock(&user->lock); *minor_status = code; return GSS_S_FAILURE; } } k5_mutex_unlock(&user->lock); code = krb5_get_credentials_for_user(context, KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE | KRB5_GC_NO_STORE, impersonator_cred->ccache, &in_creds, NULL, &out_creds); if (code != 0) { krb5_free_authdata(context, in_creds.authdata); *minor_status = code; return GSS_S_FAILURE; } major_status = kg_compose_deleg_cred(minor_status, impersonator_cred, out_creds, time_req, output_cred, time_rec, context); krb5_free_authdata(context, in_creds.authdata); krb5_free_creds(context, out_creds); return major_status; }
static krb5_error_code decode_etype_list(krb5_context context, const krb5_authenticator *authp, krb5_enctype **desired_etypes, int *desired_etypes_len) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata **ad_if_relevant = NULL; krb5_authdata *etype_adata = NULL; krb5_etype_list *etype_list = NULL; int i, j; krb5_data data; *desired_etypes = NULL; if (authp->authorization_data == NULL) return 0; /* * RFC 4537 says that ETYPE_NEGOTIATION auth data should be wrapped * in AD_IF_RELEVANT, but we handle the case where it is mandatory. */ for (i = 0; authp->authorization_data[i] != NULL; i++) { switch (authp->authorization_data[i]->ad_type) { case KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT: code = krb5_decode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, authp->authorization_data[i], &ad_if_relevant); if (code != 0) continue; for (j = 0; ad_if_relevant[j] != NULL; j++) { if (ad_if_relevant[j]->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION) { etype_adata = ad_if_relevant[j]; break; } } if (etype_adata == NULL) { krb5_free_authdata(context, ad_if_relevant); ad_if_relevant = NULL; } break; case KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION: etype_adata = authp->authorization_data[i]; break; default: break; } if (etype_adata != NULL) break; } if (etype_adata == NULL) return 0; data.data = (char *)etype_adata->contents; data.length = etype_adata->length; code = decode_krb5_etype_list(&data, &etype_list); if (code == 0) { *desired_etypes = etype_list->etypes; *desired_etypes_len = etype_list->length; free(etype_list); } if (ad_if_relevant != NULL) krb5_free_authdata(context, ad_if_relevant); return code; }
/*ARGSUSED*/ krb5_error_code process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response) { krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0; krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL; krb5_kdc_req *request = 0; krb5_db_entry *server = NULL; krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL; krb5_kdc_rep reply; krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart; krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0; int st_idx = 0; krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply; int newtransited = 0; krb5_error_code retval = 0; krb5_keyblock encrypting_key; krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0; krb5_keyblock session_key; krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL; krb5_key_data *server_key; krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL; krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry; int errcode; const char *status = 0; krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */ krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */ krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL; krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL; krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */ krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */ unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */ krb5_boolean is_referral; const char *emsg = NULL; krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0; struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL; krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/ krb5_data scratch; krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL; kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL; krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL; krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL; memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply)); memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart)); memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply)); memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply)); session_key.contents = NULL; retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request); if (retval) return retval; /* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of * errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */ sprinc = request->server; if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) { krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request); return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE; } /* * setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer. */ kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server); if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) { krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request); return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM; } errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state); if (errcode !=0) { krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request); return errcode; } /* Initialize audit state. */ errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state); if (errcode) { krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request); return errcode; } /* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */ kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state); errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm, request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &header_server, &header_key, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req); if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2) cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client; if (errcode) { status = "PROCESS_TGS"; goto cleanup; } if (!header_ticket) { errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */ status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket"; goto cleanup; } errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket, &au_state->tkt_in_id); if (errcode) { status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID"; goto cleanup; } scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length; scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents; errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL); /* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */ sprinc = request->server; if (errcode !=0) { status = "FIND_FAST"; goto cleanup; } errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server, &local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage); if (errcode) { status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT"; goto cleanup; } /* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */ au_state->request = request; /* * Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be * replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket * if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of * special cases for constrained delegation. */ header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2; /* * We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can * use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been * decrypted with the session key. */ au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC; /* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ header? */ setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) { setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE); setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE); } errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server, &status); if (errcode != 0) goto cleanup; sprinc = server->princ; /* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are * issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */ is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) && !krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ); au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL; if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) { status = "TIME_OF_DAY"; goto cleanup; } if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm, request, *server, header_ticket, kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) { if (!status) status = "UNKNOWN_REASON"; if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION) au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT; errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; goto cleanup; } if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client)) setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM); /* Check for protocol transition */ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt->client, server, subkey, header_enc_tkt->session, kdc_time, &s4u_x509_user, &client, &status); if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) { if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user; if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION) au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT; au_state->status = status; kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state); au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL; } if (errcode) goto cleanup; if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) { setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION); if (is_referral) { /* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found * a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */ errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER"; goto cleanup; } } /* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */ errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags, &stkt_server, &status); if (errcode) goto cleanup; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) { /* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */ errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm, request, request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2, stkt_server, header_ticket->enc_part2->client, request->server, &status); if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION) au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT; else if (errcode) au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY; au_state->status = status; retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx], &au_state->evid_tkt_id); if (retval) { status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID"; errcode = retval; goto cleanup; } kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state); if (errcode) goto cleanup; setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION); assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server)); assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */ client = stkt_server; stkt_server = NULL; } else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) { krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server); stkt_server = NULL; } else assert(stkt_server == NULL); au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT; errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key, &status); if (errcode) goto cleanup; /* * subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained * delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is * necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields: * the others could be forged by a malicious server. */ if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; else subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt; authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime; /* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy * requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */ if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) { errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt, &auth_indicators); if (errcode) { status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS"; goto cleanup; } } errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators); if (errcode) { status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED"; goto cleanup; } if (is_referral) ticket_reply.server = server->princ; else ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */ enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options); enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags); enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE); /* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP); /* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs; /* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */ reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */ reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL; /* * It should be noted that local policy may affect the * processing of any of these flags. For example, some * realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) { if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) { /* * If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as * unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is * different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error * (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued. * * Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to * validate_forwardable(). */ if (client != NULL && isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); /* * Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path. */ else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); /* * OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting * S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned. */ else if (!is_referral && !isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); } } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) || isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) { /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses; reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses; } /* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on * non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) && !isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS)) clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from; } else enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) { assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0); /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL; clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) { krb5_timestamp old_starttime; krb5_deltat old_life; assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0); /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL; old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ? enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime; old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - old_starttime; enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime = min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till, kdc_time + old_life); } else { /* not a renew request */ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime, header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till, client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime); } kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client, server, &enc_tkt_reply); /* * Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's */ enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime; /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present. so we can nuke it if it matches */ if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime) enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) { altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user; } else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) { altcprinc = subject_tkt->client; } else { altcprinc = NULL; } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session); } else { /* * Find the server key */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server, -1, /* ignore keytype */ -1, /* Ignore salttype */ 0, /* Get highest kvno */ &server_key))) { status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } /* * Convert server.key into a real key * (it may be encrypted in the database) */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL, server_key, &encrypting_key, NULL))) { status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } } if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) { /* * Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained * delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server * the ability to validate that delegation was used. */ clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED); } if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) { /* * If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation * try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional * authorization information. * * Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation * because we must validate the KDC signatures. */ if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) { /* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC); /* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */ setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS); assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */ errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client, c_flags, &client); } } if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) && !isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user; else enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client; enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */ /* * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if * it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different * than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already * implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly * listed). */ /* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */ if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) || krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) { /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */ enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited; } else { /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */ /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */ if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type != KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) { status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited)); enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; if ((errcode = add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client, request->server))) { status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST"; goto cleanup; } newtransited = 1; } if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) { errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, server, header_server); if (errcode) { status = "NON_TRANSITIVE"; goto cleanup; } } if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) { errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client), krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server)); if (errcode == 0) { setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED); } else { log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode); } } else krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path")); if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit && !isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) { errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; status = "BAD_TRANSIT"; au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY; goto cleanup; } errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server, header_server, local_tgt, subkey != NULL ? subkey : header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */ header_key, pkt, request, s4u_x509_user ? s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL, subject_tkt, auth_indicators, &enc_tkt_reply); if (errcode) { krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"), errcode); status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply; /* * If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure * that the client for the second ticket matches the request * server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of * the second ticket. */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { /* * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches * requested server. */ krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client; if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) { altcprinc = client2; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH; status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH"; au_state->status = status; kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state); goto cleanup; } ticket_kvno = 0; ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype; kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state); st_idx++; } else { ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno; } errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key, &ticket_reply); if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key); if (errcode) { status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno; /* Start assembling the response */ au_state->stage = ENCR_REP; reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP; if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) && krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) { errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, s4u_x509_user, &reply, &reply_encpart); if (errcode) { status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA"; au_state->status = status; } kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state); if (errcode) goto cleanup; } reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client; reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */ reply.ticket = &ticket_reply; reply_encpart.session = &session_key; reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce; /* copy the time fields */ reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times; nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE; nolrentry.value = 0; nolrentry.magic = 0; nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry; nolrarray[1] = 0; reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */ reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */ reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags; reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server; /* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key in the AP_REQ */ reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype; errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply, subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype); if (errcode !=0 ) { status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE"; goto cleanup; } errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key); if (errcode) { status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY"; goto cleanup; } errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request, reply_key, server, &reply_encpart, is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)); if (errcode) { status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA"; goto cleanup; } errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id); if (errcode) { status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID"; goto cleanup; } if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state)) reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal(); errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart, subkey ? 1 : 0, reply_key, &reply, response); if (errcode) { status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP"; } else { status = "ISSUE"; } memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); /* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */ memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); cleanup: assert(status != NULL); if (reply_key) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key); if (errcode) emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); au_state->status = status; if (!errcode) au_state->reply = &reply; kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state); kau_free_kdc_req(au_state); log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc, sprinc, altcprinc, authtime, c_flags, status, errcode, emsg); if (errcode) { krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg); emsg = NULL; } if (errcode) { int got_err = 0; if (status == 0) { status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); got_err = 1; } errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX) errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode, (server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL, response, status, e_data); if (got_err) { krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status); status = 0; } } if (header_ticket != NULL) krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket); if (request != NULL) krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request); if (state) kdc_free_rstate(state); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage); if (session_key.contents != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key); if (newtransited) free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data); if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user); if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL) krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data); if (subkey != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey); if (header_key != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key); if (reply.padata) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata); if (reply_encpart.enc_padata) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata); if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL) krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data); krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data); k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators); return retval; }
static void finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode) { krb5_key_data *server_key; krb5_key_data *client_key; krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL; krb5_data *response = NULL; const char *emsg = 0; int did_log = 0; register int i; krb5_enctype useenctype; loop_respond_fn oldrespond; void *oldarg; kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm; assert(state); oldrespond = state->respond; oldarg = state->arg; if (errcode) goto egress; if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client, *state->server, state->kdc_time, &state->status))) { errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; goto egress; } state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply; /* * Find the server key */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server, -1, /* ignore keytype */ -1, /* Ignore salttype */ 0, /* Get highest kvno */ &server_key))) { state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY"; goto egress; } /* * Convert server->key into a real key * (it may be encrypted in the database) * * server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL, server_key, &state->server_keyblock, NULL))) { state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY"; goto egress; } /* * Find the appropriate client key. We search in the order specified * by request keytype list. */ client_key = NULL; useenctype = 0; for (i = 0; i < state->request->nktypes; i++) { useenctype = state->request->ktype[i]; if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(useenctype)) continue; if (!krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->client, useenctype, -1, 0, &client_key)) break; } if (!(client_key)) { /* Cannot find an appropriate key */ state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; goto egress; } state->rock.client_key = client_key; /* convert client.key_data into a real key */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL, client_key, &state->client_keyblock, NULL))) { state->status = "DECRYPT_CLIENT_KEY"; goto egress; } state->client_keyblock.enctype = useenctype; /* Start assembling the response */ state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP; state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */ state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply; state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key; if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client, &state->reply_encpart.last_req))) { state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ"; goto egress; } state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce; state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client); state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags; state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server; /* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location * is used for ktime */ state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times; state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time; state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs; state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL; /* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before * authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key */ errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt, state->request, &state->reply, &state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context); if (errcode) { state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA"; goto egress; } errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, state->c_flags, state->client, state->server, state->server, &state->client_keyblock, &state->server_keyblock, &state->server_keyblock, state->req_pkt, state->request, NULL, /* for_user_princ */ NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */ &state->enc_tkt_reply); if (errcode) { krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"), errcode); state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA"; goto egress; } errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock, &state->ticket_reply); if (errcode) { state->status = "ENCRYPTING_TICKET"; goto egress; } state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno; errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate, state->request, &state->reply, state->client_keyblock.enctype); if (errcode) { state->status = "fast response handling"; goto egress; } /* now encode/encrypt the response */ state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype; errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock, &as_encrypting_key); if (errcode) { state->status = "generating reply key"; goto egress; } errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request, as_encrypting_key, state->server, &state->reply_encpart, FALSE); if (errcode) { state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA"; goto egress; } errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP, &state->reply_encpart, 0, as_encrypting_key, &state->reply, &response); state->reply.enc_part.kvno = client_key->key_data_kvno; if (errcode) { state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP"; goto egress; } /* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */ memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0); did_log = 1; egress: if (errcode != 0) assert (state->status != 0); free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context); if (as_encrypting_key) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key); if (errcode) emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode); if (state->status) { log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client, state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime, state->status, errcode, emsg); did_log = 1; } if (errcode) { if (state->status == 0) { state->status = emsg; } if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) { errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128) errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request, errcode, state->e_data, state->typed_e_data, ((state->client != NULL) ? state->client->princ : NULL), &response, state->status); state->status = 0; } } if (emsg) krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg); if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL) krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data); if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock); if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock); if (state->reply.padata != NULL) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata); if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata) krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata); if (state->cname != NULL) free(state->cname); if (state->sname != NULL) free(state->sname); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client); krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server); if (state->session_key.contents != NULL) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key); if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) { memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0, state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); } krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data); krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body); kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate); krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request); assert(did_log != 0); free(state); (*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response); }
/* Advance the referral request loop. */ static krb5_error_code step_referrals(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx) { krb5_error_code code; const krb5_data *referral_realm; /* Possibly retry with the fallback realm on error. */ if (ctx->reply_code != 0) return try_fallback_realm(context, ctx); if (krb5_principal_compare(context, ctx->reply_creds->server, ctx->server)) { /* We got the ticket we asked for... but we didn't necessarily ask for * it with the right enctypes. Try a non-referral request if so. */ if (wrong_enctype(context, ctx->reply_creds->keyblock.enctype)) { TRACE_TKT_CREDS_WRONG_ENCTYPE(context); return begin_non_referral(context, ctx); } return complete(context, ctx); } /* Old versions of Active Directory can rewrite the server name instead of * returning a referral. Try a non-referral query if we see this. */ if (!IS_TGS_PRINC(context, ctx->reply_creds->server)) { TRACE_TKT_CREDS_NON_TGT(context, ctx->reply_creds->server); return begin_non_referral(context, ctx); } if (ctx->referral_count == 1) { /* Cache the referral TGT only if it's from the local realm. * Make sure to note the associated authdata, if any. */ code = krb5_copy_authdata(context, ctx->authdata, &ctx->reply_creds->authdata); if (code != 0) return code; (void) krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ctx->ccache, ctx->reply_creds); /* The authdata in this TGT will be copied into subsequent TGTs or the * final credentials, so we don't need to request it again. */ krb5_free_authdata(context, ctx->in_creds->authdata); ctx->in_creds->authdata = NULL; } /* Give up if we've gotten too many referral TGTs. */ if (ctx->referral_count++ >= KRB5_REFERRAL_MAXHOPS) return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; /* Check for referral loops. */ referral_realm = &ctx->reply_creds->server->data[1]; if (seen_realm_before(context, ctx, referral_realm)) return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; code = remember_realm(context, ctx, referral_realm); if (code != 0) return code; /* Use the referral TGT for the next request. */ krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->cur_tgt); ctx->cur_tgt = ctx->reply_creds; ctx->reply_creds = NULL; TRACE_TKT_CREDS_REFERRAL(context, ctx->cur_tgt->server); /* Rewrite the server realm to be the referral realm. */ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &ctx->server->realm); code = krb5int_copy_data_contents(context, referral_realm, &ctx->server->realm); if (code != 0) return code; /* Generate the next referral request. */ return make_request_for_service(context, ctx, TRUE); }