krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_cc_store_cred (krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
krb5_creds *creds)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *tkt;
krb5_principal s1, s2;
/* remove any dups */
krb5_cc_remove_cred(context, cache, 0, creds);
ret = cache->ops->store(context, cache, creds);
if (ret) return ret;
/*
* If creds->server and the server in the decoded ticket differ,
* store both principals.
*/
s1 = creds->server;
ret = decode_krb5_ticket(&creds->ticket, &tkt);
/* Bail out on errors in case someone is storing a non-ticket. */
if (ret) return 0;
s2 = tkt->server;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, s1, s2)) {
creds->server = s2;
/* remove any dups */
krb5_cc_remove_cred(context, cache, 0, creds);
ret = cache->ops->store(context, cache, creds);
creds->server = s1;
}
krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
return ret;
}
/* Taken from accept_sec_context.c,v 1.65 */
krb5_error_code smb_rd_req_return_stuff(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
const krb5_data *inbuf,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_principal acceptor_principal,
krb5_data *outbuf,
krb5_ticket **ticket,
krb5_keyblock **keyblock)
{
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx in = NULL;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx out = NULL;
krb5_error_code kret;
*keyblock = NULL;
*ticket = NULL;
outbuf->length = 0;
outbuf->data = NULL;
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_alloc(context, &in);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_set_keytab(context, in, keytab);
if (kret) {
if (in)
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
return kret;
}
kret = krb5_rd_req_ctx(context,
auth_context,
inbuf,
acceptor_principal,
in, &out);
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
if (kret) {
return kret;
}
/*
* We need to remember some data on the context_handle.
*/
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ticket(context, out,
ticket);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_keyblock(context, out,
keyblock);
}
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(context, out);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, outbuf);
}
if (kret) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, *ticket);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, *keyblock);
krb5_data_free(outbuf);
}
return kret;
}
static int gensec_krb5_destroy(struct gensec_krb5_state *gensec_krb5_state)
{
if (!gensec_krb5_state->smb_krb5_context) {
/* We can't clean anything else up unless we started up this far */
return 0;
}
if (gensec_krb5_state->enc_ticket.length) {
kerberos_free_data_contents(gensec_krb5_state->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
&gensec_krb5_state->enc_ticket);
}
if (gensec_krb5_state->ticket) {
krb5_free_ticket(gensec_krb5_state->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
gensec_krb5_state->ticket);
}
/* ccache freed in a child destructor */
krb5_free_keyblock(gensec_krb5_state->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
gensec_krb5_state->keyblock);
if (gensec_krb5_state->auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(gensec_krb5_state->smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
gensec_krb5_state->auth_context);
}
return 0;
}
static int
kvno5(krb5_context ctx, const char *host, int socktype, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_principal sprinc, krb5_ccache ccache)
{
krb5_error_code kerr = 0;
krb5_creds increds;
krb5_creds *outcreds = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
VERBOSE(1, (stderr, "initiating kvno5/%s ping to %s\n",
socktype == SOCK_DGRAM ? "udp" : "tcp", host));
memset(&increds, 0x0, sizeof(increds));
increds.client = princ;
increds.server = sprinc;
kerr = krb5_get_credentials(ctx, 0, ccache, &increds, &outcreds);
if (kerr)
goto bail;
kerr = krb5_decode_ticket(&outcreds->ticket, &ticket);
if (kerr)
goto bail;
VERBOSE(2, (stderr, "kvno5 says kvno = %d\n", ticket->enc_part.kvno));
bail:
if (kerr)
fail_msg("kvno5", socktype, host, error_message(kerr));
if (ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(ctx, ticket);
if (outcreds)
krb5_free_creds(ctx, outcreds);
return kerr;
}
static void
handle_v5(krb5_context contextp,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_socket_t fd)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_ticket *ticket;
char *server_name;
char *client;
void *kadm_handlep;
krb5_boolean initial;
krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
unsigned kadm_version;
kadm5_config_params realm_params;
ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(contextp, &ac, &fd,
match_appl_version, &kadm_version,
NULL, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION,
keytab, &ticket);
if (ret)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth");
ret = krb5_unparse_name (contextp, ticket->server, &server_name);
if (ret)
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
if (strncmp (server_name, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
strlen(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE)) != 0)
krb5_errx (contextp, 1, "ticket for strange principal (%s)",
server_name);
free (server_name);
memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params));
if(kadm_version == 1) {
krb5_data params;
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, ¶ms);
if(ret)
krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
_kadm5_unmarshal_params(contextp, ¶ms, &realm_params);
}
initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->client, &client);
if (ret)
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
krb5_free_ticket (contextp, ticket);
ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(contextp,
client,
NULL,
KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE,
&realm_params,
0, 0,
&kadm_handlep);
if(ret)
krb5_err (contextp, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx");
v5_loop (contextp, ac, initial, kadm_handlep, fd);
}
void KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_free_ap_req(krb5_context context, register krb5_ap_req *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
krb5_free_ticket(context, val->ticket);
free(val->authenticator.ciphertext.data);
free(val);
}
void KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_free_tkt_authent(krb5_context context, krb5_tkt_authent *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
krb5_free_ticket(context, val->ticket);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, val->authenticator);
free(val);
}
static krb5_error_code armor_ap_request
(struct kdc_request_state *state, krb5_fast_armor *armor)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_auth_context authcontext = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->realm_data;
assert(armor->armor_type == KRB5_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST);
krb5_clear_error_message(kdc_context);
retval = krb5_auth_con_init(kdc_context, &authcontext);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_auth_con_setflags(kdc_context,
authcontext, 0); /*disable replay cache*/
retval = krb5_rd_req(kdc_context, &authcontext,
&armor->armor_value, NULL /*server*/,
kdc_active_realm->realm_keytab, NULL, &ticket);
if (retval != 0) {
const char * errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, retval);
krb5_set_error_message(kdc_context, retval,
_("%s while handling ap-request armor"),
errmsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, errmsg);
}
if (retval == 0) {
if (!krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(kdc_context,
tgs_server,
ticket->server)) {
krb5_set_error_message(kdc_context, KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH,
_("ap-request armor for something other "
"than the local TGS"));
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
}
if (retval == 0) {
retval = krb5_auth_con_getrecvsubkey(kdc_context, authcontext, &subkey);
if (retval != 0 || subkey == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(kdc_context, KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY,
_("ap-request armor without subkey"));
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
}
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(kdc_context,
subkey, "subkeyarmor",
ticket->enc_part2->session, "ticketarmor",
&state->armor_key);
if (ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, ticket);
if (subkey)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (authcontext)
krb5_auth_con_free(kdc_context, authcontext);
return retval;
}
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION void KRB5_LIB_CALL
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(krb5_context context, krb5_rd_req_out_ctx ctx)
{
if (ctx->ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(context, ctx->ticket);
if (ctx->keyblock)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->keyblock);
if (ctx->server)
krb5_free_principal(context, ctx->server);
free(ctx);
}
void KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_free_tickets(krb5_context context, krb5_ticket **val)
{
register krb5_ticket **temp;
if (val == NULL)
return;
for (temp = val; *temp; temp++)
krb5_free_ticket(context, *temp);
free(val);
}
void KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_free_kdc_rep(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_rep *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
krb5_free_pa_data(context, val->padata);
krb5_free_principal(context, val->client);
krb5_free_ticket(context, val->ticket);
free(val->enc_part.ciphertext.data);
krb5_free_enc_kdc_rep_part(context, val->enc_part2);
free(val);
}
OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
_gsskrb5_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
krb5_context context;
gsskrb5_ctx ctx;
GSSAPI_KRB5_INIT (&context);
*minor_status = 0;
if (output_token) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
ctx = (gsskrb5_ctx) *context_handle;
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ctx->auth_context);
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ctx->deleg_auth_context);
if (ctx->kcred)
krb5_free_creds(context, ctx->kcred);
if(ctx->source)
krb5_free_principal (context, ctx->source);
if(ctx->target)
krb5_free_principal (context, ctx->target);
if (ctx->ticket)
krb5_free_ticket (context, ctx->ticket);
if(ctx->order)
_gssapi_msg_order_destroy(&ctx->order);
if (ctx->service_keyblock)
krb5_free_keyblock (context, ctx->service_keyblock);
krb5_data_free(&ctx->fwd_data);
if (ctx->crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, ctx->crypto);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_destroy(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
free (ctx);
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static void
copy_realm_of_ticket(krb5_context context, char * dest, size_t destlen, krb5_creds *v5cred) {
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_ticket *ticket;
size_t len;
code = krb5_decode_ticket(&v5cred->ticket, &ticket);
if (code == 0) {
len = krb5_princ_realm(context, ticket->server)->length;
if (len > destlen - 1)
len = destlen - 1;
strncpy(dest, krb5_princ_realm(context, ticket->server)->data, len);
dest[len] = '\0';
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
}
}
/*
* call-seq:
* list_cache([cache_name]) -> array
*
* Call krb5_cc_next_cred to fetch credentials from a cachefile. With no parameters, it fetches the credentials in the default cachefile. With one parameter, it fetches the credentials in the named cachefile. Returns a list of Krb5Auth::Krb5::Cred objects on success, raises Krb5Auth::Krb5::Exception on failure.
*/
static VALUE Krb5_list_cache_creds(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self)
{
VALUE cache_val;
struct ruby_krb5 *kerb;
krb5_error_code krbret;
char *cache_name;
krb5_ccache cc;
krb5_cc_cursor cur;
krb5_creds creds;
char *name;
char *sname;
krb5_ticket *tkt;
VALUE result;
VALUE line;
rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "01", &cache_val);
cache_name = get_string_or_nil(cache_val);
Data_Get_Struct(self, struct ruby_krb5, kerb);
if (!kerb) {
NOSTRUCT_EXCEPT();
return Qfalse;
}
if (cache_name == NULL) {
krbret = krb5_cc_default(kerb->ctx, &cc);
}
else {
krbret = krb5_cc_resolve(kerb->ctx, cache_name, &cc);
}
if (krbret) {
goto cache_fail_raise;
}
krbret = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(kerb->ctx, cc, &cur);
if (krbret) {
goto cache_fail_close;
}
result = rb_ary_new();
while (!(krbret = krb5_cc_next_cred(kerb->ctx, cc, &cur, &creds))) {
krbret = krb5_unparse_name(kerb->ctx, creds.client, &name);
if (krbret) {
krb5_free_cred_contents(kerb->ctx, &creds);
break;
}
krbret = krb5_unparse_name(kerb->ctx, creds.server, &sname);
if (krbret) {
free(name);
krb5_free_cred_contents(kerb->ctx, &creds);
break;
}
krbret = krb5_decode_ticket(&creds.ticket, &tkt);
if (krbret) {
free(sname);
free(name);
krb5_free_cred_contents(kerb->ctx, &creds);
break;
}
line = rb_class_new_instance(0, NULL, cCred);
rb_iv_set(line, "@client", rb_str_new2(name));
rb_iv_set(line, "@server", rb_str_new2(sname));
rb_iv_set(line, "@starttime", INT2NUM(creds.times.starttime));
rb_iv_set(line, "@authtime", INT2NUM(creds.times.authtime));
rb_iv_set(line, "@endtime", INT2NUM(creds.times.endtime));
rb_iv_set(line, "@ticket_flags", INT2NUM(creds.ticket_flags));
rb_iv_set(line, "@cred_enctype", INT2NUM(creds.keyblock.enctype));
rb_iv_set(line, "@ticket_enctype", INT2NUM(tkt->enc_part.enctype));
rb_ary_push(result, line);
krb5_free_ticket(kerb->ctx, tkt);
free(sname);
free(name);
krb5_free_cred_contents(kerb->ctx, &creds);
}
if (krbret != KRB5_CC_END) {
// FIXME: do we need to free up "result" here? There will be no
// references to it, so I think the garbage collector will pick it up,
// but I'm not sure.
goto cache_fail_close;
}
krbret = krb5_cc_end_seq_get(kerb->ctx, cc, &cur);
krb5_cc_close(kerb->ctx, cc);
return result;
cache_fail_close:
krb5_cc_close(kerb->ctx, cc);
cache_fail_raise:
Krb5_register_error(krbret);
return Qfalse;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0;
const char *fromstring = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
/* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
char ktypestr[128];
char rep_etypestr[128];
char fromstringbuf[70];
session_key.contents = 0;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ)
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr),
request->nktypes, request->ktype);
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype),
from->address->contents,
fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
if (!fromstring)
fromstring = "<unknown>";
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
/* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server,
&nprincs, &more))) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
krb5_data *server_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
krb5_data *tgs_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime))
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime =
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags,
TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/* assemble any authorization data */
if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) {
krb5_data scratch;
scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length;
if (!(scratch.data =
malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) {
status = "AUTH_NOMEM";
errcode = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY,
0, &request->authorization_data,
&scratch))) {
status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL";
free(scratch.data);
goto cleanup;
}
/* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */
errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata));
free(scratch.data);
if (errcode) {
status = "AUTH_DECODE";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode =
concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata,
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
&enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) {
status = "CONCAT_AUTH";
goto cleanup;
}
} else
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data =
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = krb5_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &tmp)))
tmp = 0;
if (tmp != NULL)
limit_string(tmp);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ %s: 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: "
"authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s",
fromstring, authtime,
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>");
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, t2enc->session,
&ticket_reply))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
st_idx++;
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
&master_keyblock,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0; /* always */
reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
subkey ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
if (status) {
const char * emsg = NULL;
if (!errcode)
rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), &reply);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, "
"%s%s %s for %s%s%s",
ktypestr,
fromstring, status, authtime,
!errcode ? rep_etypestr : "",
!errcode ? "," : "",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
errcode ? ", " : "",
errcode ? emsg : "");
if (errcode)
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
fromstring, response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (cname)
free(cname);
if (sname)
free(sname);
if (nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (subkey)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
return retval;
}
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
krb5_verify_ap_req2(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
krb5_ap_req *ap_req,
krb5_const_principal server,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
krb5_flags flags,
krb5_flags *ap_req_options,
krb5_ticket **ticket,
krb5_key_usage usage)
{
krb5_ticket *t;
krb5_auth_context ac;
krb5_error_code ret;
EtypeList etypes;
memset(&etypes, 0, sizeof(etypes));
if(ticket)
*ticket = NULL;
if (auth_context && *auth_context) {
ac = *auth_context;
} else {
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
t = calloc(1, sizeof(*t));
if (t == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key && ac->keyblock){
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket,
ac->keyblock,
&t->ticket,
flags);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock);
ac->keyblock = NULL;
}else
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket,
keyblock,
&t->ticket,
flags);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&t->server,
ap_req->ticket.sname,
ap_req->ticket.realm);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&t->client,
t->ticket.cname,
t->ticket.crealm);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = decrypt_authenticator(context,
&t->ticket.key,
&ap_req->authenticator,
ac->authenticator,
usage);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
krb5_principal p1, p2;
krb5_boolean res;
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&p1,
ac->authenticator->cname,
ac->authenticator->crealm);
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&p2,
t->ticket.cname,
t->ticket.crealm);
res = krb5_principal_compare(context, p1, p2);
krb5_free_principal(context, p1);
krb5_free_principal(context, p2);
if (!res) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
}
/* check addresses */
if (t->ticket.caddr
&& ac->remote_address
&& !krb5_address_search(context,
ac->remote_address,
t->ticket.caddr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
/* check timestamp in authenticator */
{
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (krb5_time_abs(ac->authenticator->ctime, now) > context->max_skew) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
goto out;
}
}
if (ac->authenticator->seq_number)
krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, ac,
*ac->authenticator->seq_number);
/* XXX - Xor sequence numbers */
if (ac->authenticator->subkey) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, ac,
ac->authenticator->subkey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = find_etypelist(context, ac, &etypes);
if (ret)
goto out;
ac->keytype = (krb5_keytype)ETYPE_NULL;
if (etypes.val) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < etypes.len; i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes.val[i]) == 0) {
ac->keytype = etypes.val[i];
break;
}
}
}
/* save key */
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &t->ticket.key, &ac->keyblock);
if (ret) goto out;
if (ap_req_options) {
*ap_req_options = 0;
if (ac->keytype != ETYPE_NULL)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY;
if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY;
if (ap_req->ap_options.mutual_required)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED;
}
if(ticket)
*ticket = t;
else
krb5_free_ticket(context, t);
if (auth_context) {
if (*auth_context == NULL)
*auth_context = ac;
} else
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
free_EtypeList(&etypes);
return 0;
out:
free_EtypeList(&etypes);
if (t)
krb5_free_ticket(context, t);
if (auth_context == NULL || *auth_context == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
return ret;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - old_starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
krb5_principal c1, c2;
krb5_authenticator authent;
krb5_keytab keytab;
krb5_socket_t sock = rk_INVALID_SOCKET;
HDB *db = NULL;
int optidx = 0;
char *tmp_db;
krb5_log_facility *fac;
int nprincs;
setprogname(argv[0]);
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if(ret)
exit(1);
ret = krb5_openlog(context, "hpropd", &fac);
if(ret)
errx(1, "krb5_openlog");
krb5_set_warn_dest(context, fac);
if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optidx))
usage(1);
if(local_realm != NULL)
krb5_set_default_realm(context, local_realm);
if(help_flag)
usage(0);
if(version_flag) {
print_version(NULL);
exit(0);
}
argc -= optidx;
argv += optidx;
if (argc != 0)
usage(1);
if (database == NULL)
database = hdb_default_db(context);
if(from_stdin) {
sock = STDIN_FILENO;
} else {
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
socklen_t sin_len = sizeof(ss);
char addr_name[256];
krb5_ticket *ticket;
char *server;
sock = STDIN_FILENO;
#ifdef SUPPORT_INETD
if (inetd_flag == -1) {
if (getpeername (sock, sa, &sin_len) < 0) {
inetd_flag = 0;
} else {
inetd_flag = 1;
}
}
#else
inetd_flag = 0;
#endif
if (!inetd_flag) {
mini_inetd (krb5_getportbyname (context, "hprop", "tcp",
HPROP_PORT), &sock);
}
sin_len = sizeof(ss);
if(getpeername(sock, sa, &sin_len) < 0)
krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "getpeername");
if (inet_ntop(sa->sa_family,
socket_get_address (sa),
addr_name,
sizeof(addr_name)) == NULL)
strlcpy (addr_name, "unknown address",
sizeof(addr_name));
krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Connection from %s", addr_name);
ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register");
if (ktname != NULL) {
ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, ktname, &keytab);
if (ret)
krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve %s", ktname);
} else {
ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab);
if (ret)
krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default");
}
ret = krb5_recvauth(context, &ac, &sock, HPROP_VERSION, NULL,
0, keytab, &ticket);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth");
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->server, &server);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
if (strncmp(server, "hprop/", 5) != 0)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "ticket not for hprop (%s)", server);
free(server);
krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket);
ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &authent);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator");
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &c1, NULL, "kadmin", "hprop", NULL);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal");
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &c2,
authent->cname, authent->crealm);
if(!krb5_principal_compare(context, c1, c2)) {
char *s;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, c2, &s);
if (ret)
s = unparseable_name;
krb5_errx(context, 1, "Unauthorized connection from %s", s);
}
krb5_free_principal(context, c1);
krb5_free_principal(context, c2);
ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close");
}
if(!print_dump) {
asprintf(&tmp_db, "%s~", database);
ret = hdb_create(context, &db, tmp_db);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create(%s)", tmp_db);
ret = db->hdb_open(context, db, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_open(%s)", tmp_db);
}
nprincs = 0;
while(1){
krb5_data data;
hdb_entry_ex entry;
if(from_stdin) {
ret = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &data);
if(ret != 0 && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_message");
} else {
ret = krb5_read_priv_message(context, ac, &sock, &data);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message");
}
if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF || data.length == 0) {
if(!from_stdin) {
data.data = NULL;
data.length = 0;
krb5_write_priv_message(context, ac, &sock, &data);
}
if(!print_dump) {
ret = db->hdb_close(context, db);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_close");
ret = db->hdb_rename(context, db, database);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_rename");
}
break;
}
memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &entry.entry);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_value2entry");
if(print_dump)
hdb_print_entry(context, db, &entry, stdout);
else {
ret = db->hdb_store(context, db, 0, &entry);
if(ret == HDB_ERR_EXISTS) {
char *s;
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.entry.principal, &s);
if (ret)
s = strdup(unparseable_name);
krb5_warnx(context, "Entry exists: %s", s);
free(s);
} else if(ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_store");
else
nprincs++;
}
hdb_free_entry(context, &entry);
}
if (!print_dump)
krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Received %d principals", nprincs);
if (inetd_flag == 0)
rk_closesocket(sock);
exit(0);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
request->server,
s_flags,
&server,
&nprincs,
&more);
if (errcode) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ, &(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry st_client;
int st_nprincs = 0;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_nprincs,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
&st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
/* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */
header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (c_nprincs &&
isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user, &s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0,/* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server,
&mkey_ptr))) {
krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list;
/* try refreshing master key list */
/* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */
if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ,
&master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) {
krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist);
master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list;
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist,
&server, &mkey_ptr))) {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
mkey_ptr,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup
* the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) &&
header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
c_nprincs = 1;
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
header_enc_tkt->client,
c_flags,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&more);
/*
* We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
* valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
* mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
* was returned.
*/
if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (errcode) {
c_nprincs = 0;
}
}
}
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
c_flags,
(c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
header_enc_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context,
&server, &reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0;/* always */
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey?subkey->enctype:header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
if (nprincs != 0)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (k_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
if (c_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
return retval;
}
static void
add_slave (krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab, slave **root, int fd)
{
krb5_principal server;
krb5_error_code ret;
slave *s;
socklen_t addr_len;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
char hostname[128];
s = malloc(sizeof(*s));
if (s == NULL) {
krb5_warnx (context, "add_slave: no memory");
return;
}
s->name = NULL;
s->ac = NULL;
addr_len = sizeof(s->addr);
s->fd = accept (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s->addr, &addr_len);
if (s->fd < 0) {
krb5_warn (context, errno, "accept");
goto error;
}
gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname));
ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, hostname, IPROP_NAME,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (ret) {
krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal");
goto error;
}
ret = krb5_recvauth (context, &s->ac, &s->fd,
IPROP_VERSION, server, 0, keytab, &ticket);
krb5_free_principal (context, server);
if (ret) {
krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_recvauth");
goto error;
}
ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->client, &s->name);
if (ret) {
krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name");
goto error;
}
if (check_acl (context, s->name)) {
krb5_warnx (context, "%s not in acl", s->name);
goto error;
}
krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket);
ticket = NULL;
{
slave *l = *root;
while (l) {
if (strcmp(l->name, s->name) == 0)
break;
l = l->next;
}
if (l) {
if (l->flags & SLAVE_F_DEAD) {
remove_slave(context, l, root);
} else {
krb5_warnx (context, "second connection from %s", s->name);
goto error;
}
}
}
krb5_warnx (context, "connection from %s", s->name);
s->version = 0;
s->flags = 0;
slave_seen(s);
s->next = *root;
*root = s;
return;
error:
remove_slave(context, s, root);
}
NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
time_t time_offset,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
char **principal,
struct PAC_DATA **pac_data,
DATA_BLOB *ap_rep,
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
bool use_replay_cache)
{
NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
NTSTATUS pac_ret;
DATA_BLOB auth_data;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_data packet;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL;
time_t authtime;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
int flags = 0;
krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
krb5_const_principal client_principal = NULL;
char *host_princ_s = NULL;
bool auth_ok = False;
bool got_auth_data = False;
struct named_mutex *mutex = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
*principal = NULL;
*pac_data = NULL;
*ap_rep = data_blob_null;
*session_key = data_blob_null;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_init_context failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
if (time_offset != 0) {
krb5_set_real_time(context, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
}
ret = krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
/* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
krb5_auth_con_getflags( context, auth_context, &flags );
if ( !use_replay_cache ) {
/* Disable default use of a replay cache */
flags &= ~KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME;
krb5_auth_con_setflags( context, auth_context, flags );
}
if (asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$", global_myname()) == -1) {
goto out;
}
strlower_m(host_princ_s);
ret = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n",
host_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ( use_replay_cache ) {
/* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no
locking in the MIT krb5 code surrounding the replay
cache... */
mutex = grab_named_mutex(talloc_tos(), "replay cache mutex",
10);
if (mutex == NULL) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect "
"replay cache with mutex.\n"));
ret = KRB5_CC_IO;
goto out;
}
/* JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent
replay attacks. */
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context,
krb5_princ_component(context, host_princ, 0),
&rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache "
"failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache "
"failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
}
/* Try secrets.tdb first and fallback to the krb5.keytab if
necessary */
auth_ok = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(context, auth_context, host_princ,
ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
if (!auth_ok &&
(ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW)) {
goto auth_failed;
}
if (!auth_ok && lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) {
auth_ok = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(context, auth_context,
ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
}
if ( use_replay_cache ) {
TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
#if 0
/* Heimdal leaks here, if we fix the leak, MIT crashes */
if (rcache) {
krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
}
#endif
}
auth_failed:
if (!auth_ok) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
/* Try map the error return in case it's something like
* a clock skew error.
*/
sret = krb5_to_nt_status(ret);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret) || NT_STATUS_EQUAL(sret,NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)) {
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
DEBUG(10,("ads_verify_ticket: returning error %s\n",
nt_errstr(sret) ));
goto out;
}
authtime = get_authtime_from_tkt(tkt);
client_principal = get_principal_from_tkt(tkt);
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &packet);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
*ap_rep = data_blob(packet.data, packet.length);
if (packet.data) {
kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &packet);
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
}
get_krb5_smb_session_key(context, auth_context, session_key, True);
dump_data_pw("SMB session key (from ticket)\n", session_key->data, session_key->length);
#if 0
file_save("/tmp/ticket.dat", ticket->data, ticket->length);
#endif
/* continue when no PAC is retrieved or we couldn't decode the PAC
(like accounts that have the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED flag set, or
Kerberos tickets encrypted using a DES key) - Guenther */
got_auth_data = get_auth_data_from_tkt(mem_ctx, &auth_data, tkt);
if (!got_auth_data) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: did not retrieve auth data. continuing without PAC\n"));
}
if (got_auth_data) {
pac_ret = decode_pac_data(mem_ctx, &auth_data, context, keyblock, client_principal, authtime, pac_data);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(pac_ret)) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: failed to decode PAC_DATA: %s\n", nt_errstr(pac_ret)));
*pac_data = NULL;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_data);
}
#if 0
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2)
/* MIT */
if (tkt->enc_part2) {
file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents,
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->length);
}
#else
/* Heimdal */
if (tkt->ticket.authorization_data) {
file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.data,
tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.length);
}
#endif
#endif
if ((ret = smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, principal))) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
sret = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(&auth_data);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(ap_rep);
}
if (host_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
}
if (keyblock) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock);
}
if (tkt != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
}
SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return sret;
}
int do_krb5_comm(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab keytab, krb5_principal server, char *cmddir) {
struct sockaddr_in c_saddr, s_saddr;
socklen_t namelen;
int sock = 0;
int len;
char buff[BUFFSIZE];
char *cname = NULL;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data kdata, message;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket;
krb5_address ckaddr, skaddr;
krb5_rcache rcache;
krb5_data rcache_name;
long srand, rrand;
int fd[2];
char rcname_piece[RC_PIECE_MAXLEN];
namelen = sizeof(c_saddr);
if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&c_saddr, &namelen) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername: %m");
return 1;
}
namelen = sizeof(s_saddr);
if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&s_saddr, &namelen) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "getsockname: %m");
return 1;
}
/* INIT MSG = random number */
srand = random();
/* Send it */
if (send(sock, &srand, sizeof(srand), 0) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%m while sending init message");
return 1;
}
if (recv(sock, &rrand, sizeof(rrand), 0) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%m while receiving init reply");
return 1;
}
/* Reply should contain the same message (number) */
if (srand != rrand) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Bad init reply");
return 1;
}
/* Do authentication */
if (retval = krb5_recvauth(context, &auth_context, (krb5_pointer)&sock, AFSADM_VERSION, server, 0, keytab, &ticket)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvauth failed: %s", error_message(retval));
exit(1);
}
/* Get client name */
if (retval = krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->enc_part2->client, &cname)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "unparse failed: %s", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
if (ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
if (debug)
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Principal %s", cname);
/*******************************************************************/
ckaddr.addrtype = ADDRTYPE_IPPORT;
ckaddr.length = sizeof(c_saddr.sin_port);
ckaddr.contents = (krb5_octet *)&c_saddr.sin_port;
skaddr.addrtype = ADDRTYPE_IPPORT;
skaddr.length = sizeof(s_saddr.sin_port);
skaddr.contents = (krb5_octet *)&s_saddr.sin_port;
if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_setports(context, auth_context, &skaddr, &ckaddr))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while setting ports", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
/* Set foreign_addr for rd_priv() */
ckaddr.addrtype = ADDRTYPE_INET;
ckaddr.length = sizeof(c_saddr.sin_addr);
ckaddr.contents = (krb5_octet *)&c_saddr.sin_addr;
/* Set local_addr */
skaddr.addrtype = ADDRTYPE_INET;
skaddr.length = sizeof(s_saddr.sin_addr);
skaddr.contents = (krb5_octet *)&s_saddr.sin_addr;
if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context, &skaddr, &ckaddr))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while setting addrs", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
/* Receive a request */
if ((len = recv(sock, (char *)buff, sizeof(buff), 0)) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%m while receiving datagram");
return 1;
}
kdata.length = len;
kdata.data = buff;
if (debug)
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Received %d bytes", len);
/* Decrypt it */
if ((retval = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &kdata, &message, NULL))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while verifying PRIV message", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
if (message.length > 0) {
#ifdef __osf__
sprintf(rcname_piece, "afsadmd_%d", getpid());
#else
snprintf(rcname_piece, RC_PIECE_MAXLEN, "afsadmd_%d", getpid());
#endif
rcache_name.data = rcname_piece;
rcache_name.length = strlen(rcache_name.data);
if ((retval = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &rcache_name, &rcache))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while getting server rcache", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
/* set auth_context rcache */
if (retval = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while setting rcache", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
/*********************************************************************
* Call the desired command, read stdout/stderr, send it
*********************************************************************/
/* create fork */
if (pipe(fd) == -1)
printf("Failed create fork with pipe().\n");
if (fork() == 0) {
close(fd[0]);
close(1);
close(2);
dup2(fd[1], 1);
dup2(fd[1], 2);
/* Call required command */
do_command(context, keytab, server, cname, message.data, cmddir );
krb5_xfree(message.data);
exit(0);
} else {
/* Read stdout/stderr from pipe, store it to the buffer, encrypt it a send to the client */
krb5_data message, kdata;
char buff[PIPEBUFF];
int n = 0;
int len = 0;
int sent = 0;
int counter = 0;
int end = 0;
short netlen;
time_t starttime, oldtime, newtime;
FILE *pipedes;
close(fd[1]);
pipedes = fdopen(fd[0], "r");
starttime = oldtime = time(NULL);
for (n = 0; end == 0; ) {
/* Read line from pipe */
if (fgets(buff + n, PIPEBUFF - n, pipedes) == NULL)
end++;
else
n = strlen(buff);
/* Get time */
newtime = time(NULL);
/* Send buffer when
* a) buffer is full
* b) buffer contains data and
* 1) end-of-file encountered (end flag)
* 2) buffer sent before 1s
*/
if ((n == PIPEBUFF) || (((newtime > oldtime) || end ) && (n != 0))) {
/* Prepare data for sending */
message.data = buff;
message.length = n;
kdata.data = NULL;
/* Make the encrypted message */
if ((retval = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &message, &kdata, NULL))) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while making KRB_PRIV message", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
/* Convert byte order */
netlen = htons((short)kdata.length);
/* Send len of encrypted data */
if ((len = send(sock, (char *)&netlen, sizeof(netlen), 0)) != sizeof(netlen)) {
krb5_xfree(kdata.data);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%m while sending len of PRIV message");
return 1;
}
/* Send it */
if ((len = send(sock, (char *)kdata.data, kdata.length, 0)) != kdata.length) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%m while sending PRIV message");
krb5_xfree(kdata.data);
return 1;
}
/* Statistics */
sent += len;
counter++;
/* Timestanmp */
oldtime = newtime;
n = 0;
krb5_xfree(kdata.data);
}
}
newtime = time(NULL);
if (debug)
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Sent %d bytes in %ds [%d fragment(s)]", sent, (int)(newtime - starttime), counter);
}
}
//FIXME: There is no way to close or destroy rcache declared in krb5 headers
//krb5_rc_destroy(context, rcache);
/* set auth_context rcache */
if (retval = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s while setting rcache to NULL", error_message(retval));
return 1;
}
free(cname);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
krb5_flags ap_req_options, krb5_data *in_data,
krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_data *outbuf)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_checksum checksum;
krb5_checksum *checksump = 0;
krb5_auth_context new_auth_context;
krb5_enctype *desired_etypes = NULL;
krb5_ap_req request;
krb5_data *scratch = 0;
krb5_data *toutbuf;
request.ap_options = ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_WIRE_MASK;
request.authenticator.ciphertext.data = NULL;
request.ticket = 0;
if (!in_creds->ticket.length)
return(KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED);
if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION) &&
!(ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED))
return(EINVAL);
/* we need a native ticket */
if ((retval = decode_krb5_ticket(&(in_creds)->ticket, &request.ticket)))
return(retval);
/* verify that the ticket is not expired */
if ((retval = krb5int_validate_times(context, &in_creds->times)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* generate auth_context if needed */
if (*auth_context == NULL) {
if ((retval = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &new_auth_context)))
goto cleanup;
*auth_context = new_auth_context;
}
if ((*auth_context)->key != NULL) {
krb5_k_free_key(context, (*auth_context)->key);
(*auth_context)->key = NULL;
}
/* set auth context keyblock */
if ((retval = krb5_k_create_key(context, &in_creds->keyblock,
&((*auth_context)->key))))
goto cleanup;
/* generate seq number if needed */
if ((((*auth_context)->auth_context_flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE)
|| ((*auth_context)->auth_context_flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE))
&& ((*auth_context)->local_seq_number == 0)) {
if ((retval = krb5_generate_seq_number(context, &in_creds->keyblock,
&(*auth_context)->local_seq_number)))
goto cleanup;
}
/* generate subkey if needed */
if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)&&(!(*auth_context)->send_subkey)) {
retval = k5_generate_and_save_subkey(context, *auth_context,
&in_creds->keyblock,
in_creds->keyblock.enctype);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
if (!in_data && (*auth_context)->checksum_func) {
retval = (*auth_context)->checksum_func( context,
*auth_context,
(*auth_context)->checksum_func_data,
&in_data);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
}
if (in_data) {
if ((*auth_context)->req_cksumtype == 0x8003) {
/* XXX Special hack for GSSAPI */
checksum.checksum_type = 0x8003;
checksum.length = in_data->length;
checksum.contents = (krb5_octet *) in_data->data;
} else {
krb5_enctype enctype = krb5_k_key_enctype(context,
(*auth_context)->key);
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype = ap_req_cksum(context, *auth_context,
enctype);
if ((retval = krb5_k_make_checksum(context,
cksumtype,
(*auth_context)->key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
in_data, &checksum)))
goto cleanup_cksum;
}
checksump = &checksum;
}
/* Generate authenticator */
if (((*auth_context)->authentp = (krb5_authenticator *)malloc(sizeof(
krb5_authenticator))) == NULL) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup_cksum;
}
if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION) {
if ((*auth_context)->permitted_etypes == NULL) {
retval = krb5_get_tgs_ktypes(context, in_creds->server, &desired_etypes);
if (retval)
goto cleanup_cksum;
} else
desired_etypes = (*auth_context)->permitted_etypes;
}
TRACE_MK_REQ(context, in_creds, (*auth_context)->local_seq_number,
(*auth_context)->send_subkey, &in_creds->keyblock);
if ((retval = generate_authenticator(context,
(*auth_context)->authentp,
in_creds->client, checksump,
(*auth_context)->send_subkey,
(*auth_context)->local_seq_number,
in_creds->authdata,
(*auth_context)->ad_context,
desired_etypes,
in_creds->keyblock.enctype)))
goto cleanup_cksum;
/* encode the authenticator */
if ((retval = encode_krb5_authenticator((*auth_context)->authentp,
&scratch)))
goto cleanup_cksum;
/* call the encryption routine */
if ((retval = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, &in_creds->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH,
scratch, &request.authenticator)))
goto cleanup_cksum;
if ((retval = encode_krb5_ap_req(&request, &toutbuf)))
goto cleanup_cksum;
*outbuf = *toutbuf;
free(toutbuf);
cleanup_cksum:
/* Null out these fields, to prevent pointer sharing problems;
* they were supplied by the caller
*/
if ((*auth_context)->authentp != NULL) {
(*auth_context)->authentp->client = NULL;
(*auth_context)->authentp->checksum = NULL;
}
if (checksump && checksump->checksum_type != 0x8003)
free(checksump->contents);
cleanup:
if (desired_etypes &&
desired_etypes != (*auth_context)->permitted_etypes)
free(desired_etypes);
if (request.ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(context, request.ticket);
if (request.authenticator.ciphertext.data) {
(void) memset(request.authenticator.ciphertext.data, 0,
request.authenticator.ciphertext.length);
free(request.authenticator.ciphertext.data);
}
if (scratch) {
memset(scratch->data, 0, scratch->length);
free(scratch->data);
free(scratch);
}
return retval;
}
/*
* pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
* from the client
*
* We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
* packet to the authenticated name, as described in pg_krb4_recvauth. This
* is a bit more problematic in v5, as described above in pg_an_to_ln.
*
* We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
* and so cannot read the default keytab.
*/
static int
pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int ret;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket;
char *kusername;
ret = pg_krb5_init();
if (ret != STATUS_OK)
return ret;
retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
(krb5_pointer) & port->sock, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
if (retval)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
retval)));
com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*
* The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
* authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
* postmaster startup packet.
*
* I have no idea why this is considered necessary.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
ticket->client, &kusername);
#else
#error "bogus configuration"
#endif
if (retval)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
retval)));
com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
kusername = pg_an_to_ln(kusername);
if (strncmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER))
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
port->user_name, kusername)));
ret = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
ret = STATUS_OK;
krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
free(kusername);
return ret;
}
static void
test_ap(krb5_context context,
krb5_principal target,
krb5_principal server,
krb5_keytab keytab,
krb5_ccache ccache,
const krb5_flags client_flags)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_auth_context client_ac = NULL, server_ac = NULL;
krb5_data data;
krb5_flags server_flags;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
int32_t server_seq, client_seq;
ret = krb5_mk_req_exact(context,
&client_ac,
client_flags,
target,
NULL,
ccache,
&data);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_mk_req_exact");
ret = krb5_rd_req(context,
&server_ac,
&data,
server,
keytab,
&server_flags,
&ticket);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_rd_req");
if (server_flags & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) {
krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl;
krb5_data_free(&data);
if ((client_flags & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) == 0)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "client flag missing mutual req");
ret = krb5_mk_rep (context, server_ac, &data);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_mk_rep");
ret = krb5_rd_rep (context,
client_ac,
&data,
&repl);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_rd_rep");
krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (context, repl);
} else {
if (client_flags & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "server flag missing mutual req");
}
krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber(context, server_ac, &server_seq);
krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber(context, client_ac, &client_seq);
if (server_seq != client_seq)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "seq num differ");
krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(context, server_ac, &server_seq);
krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber(context, client_ac, &client_seq);
if (server_seq != client_seq)
krb5_errx(context, 1, "seq num differ");
krb5_data_free(&data);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, client_ac);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, server_ac);
if (verify_pac) {
krb5_pac pac;
ret = krb5_ticket_get_authorization_data_type(context,
ticket,
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
&data);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "get pac");
ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, data.data, data.length, &pac);
if (ret)
krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "pac parse");
krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
}
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int log_level = 0;
char *ap_req_str = NULL;
/* krb5 */
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_context context;
krb5_auth_context auth_context;
char *princ_str_tn = "kink/tn.example.com";
krb5_principal princ_tn;
char *princ_str_nut = "kink/nut.example.com";
krb5_principal princ_nut;
char *princ_str_krbtgt = "krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM";
krb5_principal princ_krbtgt;
krb5_ccache ccache;
krb5_keytab keytab;
krb5_creds creds_tgt;
krb5_data ap_req;
prog = (const char *) basename(argv[0]);
if (prog == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr,
"basename: %s -- %s\n", strerror(errno), argv[0]);
return(0);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
{
int ch = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dq:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'd':
log_level++;
break;
case 'q':
ap_req_str = optarg;
break;
default:
usage();
/* NOTREACHED */
break;
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
}
if (argc) {
usage();
/* NOTREACHED */
}
{
printf("dbg: %s starts\n", prog);
}
if (ap_req_str != NULL) {
hex2krb5data(ap_req_str, &ap_req);
if (log_level) {
dump_krb5_data(&ap_req);
}
{ /* stdout */
int i = 0;
unsigned char *p;
p = (unsigned char *)ap_req.data;
printf("std:ap_req:");
for (i = 0; i < ap_req.length; i++) {
printf("%02x", *p++);
}
printf("\n");
}
}
/* prepare krb5 context */
{
/** init context */
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_init_context:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
/** setup principals */
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princ_str_tn, &princ_tn);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_parse_name:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princ_str_nut, &princ_nut);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_parse_name:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princ_str_krbtgt, &princ_krbtgt);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_parse_name:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
/** prepare credential cache */
ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_cc_default:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
/** prepare keytab */
/*ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, "/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadm5.keytab", &keytab);*/
ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab);
if (ret != 0) {
/* printf("ERR:krb5_kt_default:%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); */
printf("ERR:krb5_kt_resolve:%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
}
/* get TGT */
{
krb5_creds mcreds;
memset(&mcreds, 0, sizeof(mcreds));
mcreds.client = princ_tn;
mcreds.server = princ_krbtgt;
ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, 0, &mcreds, &creds_tgt);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_cc_retrieve_cred:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
}
/* prepare authentiation context */
{
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_auth_con_init:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_auth_con_setflags:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
/* if USE_SKEY */
/*
ret = krb5_auth_con_setuserkey(context, auth_context, &creds_tgt.session);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
*/
}
/* set keyblock in auth_context */
{
krb5_ticket *ticket;
krb5_flags ap_req_options;
ap_req_options = AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED;
ticket = NULL;
ret = krb5_rd_req(context,
&auth_context,
&ap_req,
NULL,
keytab,
&ap_req_options,
&ticket);
if (log_level) {
printf("info: ticket.ticket.key is SKEYID_d\n");
/*dump_krb5_ticket(context, *ticket);*/
}
if (log_level) {
printf("ap_req_opt (%d)\n", ap_req_options);
}
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_rd_req:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
if (log_level) {
dump_krb5_keyblock(auth_context->keyblock);
}
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
}
/* make AP_REP */
{
krb5_data ap_rep;
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_mk_rep:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
{ /* stdout */
int i = 0;
unsigned char *p;
p = (unsigned char *)ap_rep.data;
printf("std:ap_rep:");
for (i = 0; i < ap_rep.length; i++) {
printf("%02x", *p++);
}
printf("\n");
}
}
/* clenaup */
{
/*free(data);*/
/*krb5_data_free(&ap_req);*/
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds_tgt);
ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_kt_close:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
ret = krb5_cc_close(context, ccache);
if (ret != 0) {
printf("ERR:krb5_cc_close:%s\n", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret));
return(ret);
}
krb5_free_principal(context, princ_krbtgt);
krb5_free_principal(context, princ_nut);
krb5_free_principal(context, princ_tn);
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return(0);
}
krb5_error_code
_kdc_tgs_rep(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
KDC_REQ *req,
krb5_data *data,
const char *from,
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
int datagram_reply)
{
AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
int i = 0;
const PA_DATA *tgs_req;
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
const char *e_text = NULL;
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype = ETYPE_NULL;
time_t *csec = NULL;
int *cusec = NULL;
if(req->padata == NULL){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from);
goto out;
}
tgs_req = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ);
if(tgs_req == NULL){
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from);
goto out;
}
ret = tgs_parse_request(context, config,
&req->req_body, tgs_req,
&krbtgt,
&krbtgt_etype,
&ticket,
&e_text,
from, from_addr,
&csec, &cusec,
&auth_data);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed parsing TGS-REQ from %s", from);
goto out;
}
ret = tgs_build_reply(context,
config,
req,
&req->req_body,
krbtgt,
krbtgt_etype,
ticket,
data,
from,
&e_text,
auth_data,
from_addr,
datagram_reply);
if (ret) {
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Failed building TGS-REP to %s", from);
goto out;
}
/* */
if (datagram_reply && data->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
krb5_data_free(data);
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
e_text = "Reply packet too large";
}
out:
if(ret && data->data == NULL){
krb5_mk_error(context,
ret,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
csec,
cusec,
data);
}
free(csec);
free(cusec);
if (ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
if(krbtgt)
_kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt);
if (auth_data) {
free_AuthorizationData(auth_data);
free(auth_data);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Construct a TGS request and return its ASN.1 encoding as well as the
* timestamp, nonce, and subkey used. The pacb_fn callback allows the caller
* to amend the request padata after the nonce and subkey are determined.
*/
krb5_error_code
k5_make_tgs_req(krb5_context context,
struct krb5int_fast_request_state *fast_state,
krb5_creds *tgt, krb5_flags kdcoptions,
krb5_address *const *addrs, krb5_pa_data **in_padata,
krb5_creds *desired, k5_pacb_fn pacb_fn, void *pacb_data,
krb5_data *req_asn1_out, krb5_timestamp *timestamp_out,
krb5_int32 *nonce_out, krb5_keyblock **subkey_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_kdc_req req;
krb5_data *authdata_asn1 = NULL, *req_body_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_data *ap_req_asn1 = NULL, *tgs_req_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_ticket *sec_ticket = NULL;
krb5_ticket *sec_ticket_arr[2];
krb5_timestamp time_now;
krb5_pa_data **padata = NULL, *pa;
krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
krb5_enc_data authdata_enc;
krb5_enctype enctypes[2], *defenctypes = NULL;
size_t count, i;
*req_asn1_out = empty_data();
*timestamp_out = 0;
*nonce_out = 0;
*subkey_out = NULL;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
memset(&authdata_enc, 0, sizeof(authdata_enc));
/* tgt's client principal must match the desired client principal. */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, tgt->client, desired->client))
return KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
/* tgt must be an actual credential, not a template. */
if (!tgt->ticket.length)
return KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
req.kdc_options = kdcoptions;
req.server = desired->server;
req.from = desired->times.starttime;
req.till = desired->times.endtime ? desired->times.endtime :
tgt->times.endtime;
req.rtime = desired->times.renew_till;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &time_now);
if (ret)
return ret;
*nonce_out = req.nonce = (krb5_int32)time_now;
*timestamp_out = time_now;
req.addresses = (krb5_address **)addrs;
/* Generate subkey. */
ret = krb5_generate_subkey(context, &tgt->keyblock, &subkey);
if (ret)
return ret;
TRACE_SEND_TGS_SUBKEY(context, subkey);
ret = krb5int_fast_tgs_armor(context, fast_state, subkey, &tgt->keyblock,
NULL, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (desired->authdata != NULL) {
ret = encode_krb5_authdata(desired->authdata, &authdata_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, subkey,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SUBKEY,
authdata_asn1, &authdata_enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
req.authorization_data = authdata_enc;
}
if (desired->keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_NULL) {
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(desired->keyblock.enctype)) {
ret = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enctypes[0] = desired->keyblock.enctype;
enctypes[1] = ENCTYPE_NULL;
req.ktype = enctypes;
req.nktypes = 1;
} else {
/* Get the default TGS enctypes. */
ret = krb5_get_tgs_ktypes(context, desired->server, &defenctypes);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
for (count = 0; defenctypes[count]; count++);
req.ktype = defenctypes;
req.nktypes = count;
}
TRACE_SEND_TGS_ETYPES(context, req.ktype);
if (kdcoptions & (KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
if (desired->second_ticket.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5_NO_2ND_TKT;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = decode_krb5_ticket(&desired->second_ticket, &sec_ticket);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
sec_ticket_arr[0] = sec_ticket;
sec_ticket_arr[1] = NULL;
req.second_ticket = sec_ticket_arr;
}
/* Encode the request body. */
ret = krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(context, fast_state, &req,
&req_body_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = tgs_construct_ap_req(context, req_body_asn1, tgt, subkey,
&ap_req_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
for (count = 0; in_padata != NULL && in_padata[count] != NULL; count++);
/* Construct a padata array for the request, beginning with the ap-req. */
padata = k5calloc(count + 2, sizeof(krb5_pa_data *), &ret);
if (padata == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0] = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data), &ret);
if (padata[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0]->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ;
padata[0]->contents = k5memdup(ap_req_asn1->data, ap_req_asn1->length,
&ret);
if (padata[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0]->length = ap_req_asn1->length;
/* Append copies of any other supplied padata. */
for (i = 0; in_padata != NULL && in_padata[i] != NULL; i++) {
pa = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data), &ret);
if (pa == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pa->pa_type = in_padata[i]->pa_type;
pa->length = in_padata[i]->length;
pa->contents = k5memdup(in_padata[i]->contents, in_padata[i]->length,
&ret);
if (pa->contents == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[i + 1] = pa;
}
req.padata = padata;
if (pacb_fn != NULL) {
ret = (*pacb_fn)(context, subkey, &req, pacb_data);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the TGS-REQ. Discard the krb5_data container. */
ret = krb5int_fast_prep_req(context, fast_state, &req, ap_req_asn1,
encode_krb5_tgs_req, &tgs_req_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*req_asn1_out = *tgs_req_asn1;
free(tgs_req_asn1);
tgs_req_asn1 = NULL;
*subkey_out = subkey;
subkey = NULL;
cleanup:
krb5_free_data(context, authdata_asn1);
krb5_free_data(context, req_body_asn1);
krb5_free_data(context, ap_req_asn1);
krb5_free_pa_data(context, req.padata);
krb5_free_ticket(context, sec_ticket);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &authdata_enc.ciphertext);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, subkey);
free(defenctypes);
return ret;
}
int print_ccache (kim_ccache in_ccache, int *out_found_valid_tgt)
{
kim_error err = 0;
kim_credential_iterator iterator = NULL;
kim_identity ccache_identity = NULL;
kim_string type = NULL;
kim_string name = NULL;
kim_string ccache_identity_string = NULL;
int found_tickets = 0;
*out_found_valid_tgt = 0;
if (!err) {
err = kim_ccache_get_type (in_ccache, &type);
printiferr (err, "while getting the ccache type");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_ccache_get_name (in_ccache, &name);
printiferr (err, "while getting the ccache name");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_ccache_get_client_identity (in_ccache, &ccache_identity);
printiferr (err, "while getting the ccache principal");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_identity_get_display_string (ccache_identity,
&ccache_identity_string);
printiferr (err, "while unparsing the ccache principal name");
}
if (!err) {
printmsg ("Kerberos 5 ticket cache: '%s:%s'\nDefault principal: %s\n\n",
type, name, ccache_identity_string);
printmsg ("Valid Starting");
printfiller (' ', get_timestamp_width () - sizeof ("Valid Starting") + 3);
printmsg ("Expires");
printfiller (' ', get_timestamp_width () - sizeof ("Expires") + 3);
printmsg ("Service Principal\n");
err = kim_credential_iterator_create (&iterator, in_ccache);
}
while (!err) {
kim_credential credential = NULL;
kim_identity client = NULL;
kim_identity service = NULL;
kim_string client_string = NULL;
kim_string service_string = NULL;
krb5_creds *creds = NULL;
int extra_field = 0;
err = kim_credential_iterator_next (iterator, &credential);
if (!err && !credential) { break; }
if (!err) {
err = kim_credential_get_client_identity (credential, &client);
printiferr (err, "while getting the client principal");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_identity_get_display_string (client, &client_string);
printiferr (err, "while unparsing the client principal name");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_credential_get_service_identity (credential, &service);
printiferr (err, "while getting the service principal");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_identity_get_display_string (service, &service_string);
printiferr (err, "while unparsing the service principal name");
}
if (!err) {
err = kim_credential_get_krb5_creds (credential, kcontext, &creds);
printiferr (err, "while getting krb5 creds");
}
if (!err && krb5_is_config_principal(kcontext, creds->server))
goto next;
if (!err) {
found_tickets = 1;
printtime (creds->times.starttime ? creds->times.starttime : creds->times.authtime);
printmsg (" ");
printtime (creds->times.endtime);
printmsg (" ");
printmsg ("%s\n", service_string);
if (strcmp (ccache_identity_string, client_string)) {
if (!extra_field) {
printmsg ("\t");
}
printmsg ("for client %s", client_string);
extra_field++;
}
if (creds->ticket_flags & TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE) {
printmsg (extra_field ? ", " : "\t");
printmsg ("renew until ");
printtime (creds->times.renew_till);
extra_field += 2;
}
if (extra_field > 2) {
printmsg ("\n");
extra_field = 0;
}
if (show_flags) {
printmsg (extra_field ? ", " : "\t");
printflags (creds->ticket_flags);
extra_field++;
}
if (extra_field > 2) {
printmsg ("\n");
extra_field = 0;
}
if (show_enctypes) {
krb5_ticket *ticket_rep;
if (krb5_decode_ticket (&creds->ticket, &ticket_rep) == 0) {
if (!extra_field) {
printmsg ("\t");
} else {
printmsg (", ");
}
printmsg ("Etype (skey, tkt): %s, ",
enctype_to_string (creds->keyblock.enctype));
printmsg ("%s ",
enctype_to_string (ticket_rep->enc_part.enctype));
extra_field++;
krb5_free_ticket (kcontext, ticket_rep);
}
}
if (extra_field) {
printmsg ("\n");
}
if (show_address_list) {
printmsg ("\tAddresses: ");
if (!creds->addresses || !creds->addresses[0]) {
printmsg ("(none)\n");
} else {
int i;
for (i = 0; creds->addresses[i]; i++) {
if (i > 0) {
printmsg (", ");
}
printaddress (*creds->addresses[i]);
}
printmsg ("\n");
}
}
if (extra_field) {
printmsg ("\n");
}
}
if (!err) {
kim_boolean is_tgt = 0;
kim_credential_state state;
err = kim_credential_is_tgt (credential, &is_tgt);
printiferr (err, "while checking if creds are valid");
if (!err) {
err = kim_credential_get_state (credential, &state);
}
if (!err && is_tgt && state == kim_credentials_state_valid) {
*out_found_valid_tgt = 1;
}
}
next:
if (creds) { krb5_free_creds (kcontext, creds); }
kim_string_free (&client_string);
kim_string_free (&service_string);
kim_identity_free (&client);
kim_identity_free (&service);
kim_credential_free (&credential);
}
kim_string_free (&type);
kim_string_free (&name);
kim_string_free (&ccache_identity_string);
kim_identity_free (&ccache_identity);
kim_credential_iterator_free (&iterator);
if (!err) {
if (!found_tickets) {
printerr ("No Kerberos 5 tickets in credentials cache\n");
} else {
printmsg ("\n");
}
}
return err;
}
/* Construct an AP-REQ message for a TGS request. */
static krb5_error_code
tgs_construct_ap_req(krb5_context context, krb5_data *checksum_data,
krb5_creds *tgt, krb5_keyblock *subkey,
krb5_data **ap_req_asn1_out)
{
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_checksum checksum;
krb5_authenticator authent;
krb5_ap_req ap_req;
krb5_data *authent_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
krb5_enc_data authent_enc;
*ap_req_asn1_out = NULL;
memset(&checksum, 0, sizeof(checksum));
memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req));
memset(&authent_enc, 0, sizeof(authent_enc));
/* Determine the authenticator checksum type. */
switch (tgt->keyblock.enctype) {
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP:
cksumtype = context->kdc_req_sumtype;
break;
default:
ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, tgt->keyblock.enctype,
&cksumtype);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/* Generate checksum. */
ret = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, &tgt->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, checksum_data,
&checksum);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Construct, encode, and encrypt an authenticator. */
authent.subkey = subkey;
authent.seq_number = 0;
authent.checksum = &checksum;
authent.client = tgt->client;
authent.authorization_data = tgt->authdata;
ret = krb5_us_timeofday(context, &authent.ctime, &authent.cusec);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = encode_krb5_authenticator(&authent, &authent_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, &tgt->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH, authent_asn1,
&authent_enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = decode_krb5_ticket(&tgt->ticket, &ticket);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encode the AP-REQ. */
ap_req.authenticator = authent_enc;
ap_req.ticket = ticket;
ret = encode_krb5_ap_req(&ap_req, ap_req_asn1_out);
cleanup:
free(checksum.contents);
krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &authent_enc.ciphertext);
if (authent_asn1 != NULL)
zapfree(authent_asn1->data, authent_asn1->length);
free(authent_asn1);
return ret;
}
