int32 matrixMd2Final(hash_state * md, unsigned char *hash)
{
unsigned long i, k;
sslAssert(md != NULL);
sslAssert(hash != NULL);
if (md->md2.curlen >= sizeof(md->md2.buf)) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
}
/* pad the message */
k = 16 - md->md2.curlen;
for (i = md->md2.curlen; i < 16; i++) {
md->md2.buf[i] = (unsigned char)k;
}
/* hash and update */
md2_compress(md);
md2_update_chksum(md);
/* hash checksum */
memcpy(md->md2.buf, md->md2.chksum, 16);
md2_compress(md);
/* output is lower 16 bytes of X */
memcpy(hash, md->md2.X, 16);
#ifdef CLEAN_STACK
psZeromem(md, sizeof(hash_state));
#endif
return CRYPT_OK;
}
void matrixSha1Update(hash_state * md, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long n;
sslAssert(md != NULL);
sslAssert(buf != NULL);
while (len > 0) {
n = MIN(len, (64 - md->sha1.curlen));
memcpy(md->sha1.buf + md->sha1.curlen, buf, (size_t)n);
md->sha1.curlen += n;
buf += n;
len -= n;
/* is 64 bytes full? */
if (md->sha1.curlen == 64) {
sha1_compress(md);
#ifdef USE_INT64
md->sha1.length += 512;
#else
n = (md->sha1.lengthLo + 512) & 0xFFFFFFFFL;
if (n < md->sha1.lengthLo) {
md->sha1.lengthHi++;
}
md->sha1.lengthLo = n;
#endif /* USE_INT64 */
md->sha1.curlen = 0;
}
}
}
/*
Get the BIT STRING key and plug into RSA structure. Not included in
asn1.c because it deals directly with the sslRsaKey_t struct.
*/
int32 getPubKey(psPool_t *pool, unsigned char **pp, int32 len,
sslRsaKey_t *pubKey)
{
unsigned char *p = *pp;
int32 pubKeyLen, ignore_bits, seqLen;
if (len < 1 || (*(p++) != ASN_BIT_STRING) ||
asnParseLength(&p, len - 1, &pubKeyLen) < 0 ||
(len - 1) < pubKeyLen) {
return -1;
}
ignore_bits = *p++;
/*
We assume this is always zero
*/
sslAssert(ignore_bits == 0);
if (getSequence(&p, pubKeyLen, &seqLen) < 0 ||
getBig(pool, &p, seqLen, &pubKey->N) < 0 ||
getBig(pool, &p, seqLen, &pubKey->e) < 0) {
return -1;
}
pubKey->size = mp_unsigned_bin_size(&pubKey->N);
*pp = p;
return 0;
}
/*
Could be optional. If the tag doesn't contain the value from the left
of the IMPLICIT keyword we don't have a match and we don't incr the pointer.
*/
int32 getImplicitBitString(psPool_t *pool, unsigned char **pp, int32 len,
int32 impVal, unsigned char **bitString, int32 *bitLen)
{
unsigned char *p = *pp;
int32 ignore_bits;
if (len < 1) {
return -1;
}
/*
We don't treat this case as an error, because of the optional nature.
*/
if (*p != (ASN_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | ASN_CONSTRUCTED | impVal)) {
return 0;
}
p++;
if (asnParseLength(&p, len, bitLen) < 0) {
return -1;
}
ignore_bits = *p++;
sslAssert(ignore_bits == 0);
*bitString = psMalloc(pool, *bitLen);
if (*bitString == NULL) {
return -8; /* SSL_MEM_ERROR */
}
memcpy(*bitString, p, *bitLen);
*pp = p + *bitLen;
return 0;
}
/*
Currently just returning the raw BIT STRING and size in bytes
*/
int32 getSignature(psPool_t *pool, unsigned char **pp, int32 len,
unsigned char **sig, int32 *sigLen)
{
unsigned char *p = *pp, *end;
int32 ignore_bits, llen;
end = p + len;
if (len < 1 || (*(p++) != ASN_BIT_STRING) ||
asnParseLength(&p, len - 1, &llen) < 0 || (end - p) < llen) {
return -1;
}
ignore_bits = *p++;
/*
We assume this is always 0.
*/
sslAssert(ignore_bits == 0);
/*
Length included the ignore_bits byte
*/
*sigLen = llen - 1;
*sig = psMalloc(pool, *sigLen);
if (*sig == NULL) {
return -8; /* SSL_MEM_ERROR */
}
memcpy(*sig, p, *sigLen);
*pp = p + *sigLen;
return 0;
}
void matrixMd2Init(hash_state *md)
{
sslAssert(md != NULL);
/* MD2 uses a zero'ed state... */
psZeromem(md->md2.X, sizeof(md->md2.X));
psZeromem(md->md2.chksum, sizeof(md->md2.chksum));
psZeromem(md->md2.buf, sizeof(md->md2.buf));
md->md2.curlen = 0;
}
/*
Rehandshake. Free any allocated sec members that will be repopulated
*/
void sslResetContext(ssl_t *ssl)
{
#ifdef USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) {
/*
Clear the inUse flag of the current session so it may be found again
if client attempts to reuse session id
*/
matrixClearSession(ssl, 0);
}
#endif /* USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL */
sslAssert(ssl->hsPool == NULL);
}
int32 matrixMd2Update(hash_state *md, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long n;
sslAssert(md != NULL);
sslAssert(buf != NULL);
if (md-> md2 .curlen > sizeof(md-> md2 .buf)) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
}
while (len > 0) {
n = MIN(len, (16 - md->md2.curlen));
memcpy(md->md2.buf + md->md2.curlen, buf, (size_t)n);
md->md2.curlen += n;
buf += n;
len -= n;
/* is 16 bytes full? */
if (md->md2.curlen == 16) {
md2_compress(md);
md2_update_chksum(md);
md->md2.curlen = 0;
}
}
return CRYPT_OK;
}
void matrixSha1Init(hash_state * md)
{
sslAssert(md != NULL);
md->sha1.state[0] = 0x67452301UL;
md->sha1.state[1] = 0xefcdab89UL;
md->sha1.state[2] = 0x98badcfeUL;
md->sha1.state[3] = 0x10325476UL;
md->sha1.state[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0UL;
md->sha1.curlen = 0;
#ifdef USE_INT64
md->sha1.length = 0;
#else
md->sha1.lengthHi = 0;
md->sha1.lengthLo = 0;
#endif /* USE_INT64 */
}
/*
Allows for semi-colon delimited list of certificates for cert chaining.
Also allows multiple certificiates in a single file.
HOWERVER, in both cases the first in the list must be the identifying
cert of the application. Each subsequent cert is the parent of the previous
*/
int32 readCertChain(psPool_t *pool, const char *certFiles,
sslLocalCert_t *lkeys)
{
sslLocalCert_t *currCert;
unsigned char *certBin, *tmp;
sslChainLen_t chain;
int32 certLen, i;
if (certFiles == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (matrixX509ReadCert(pool, certFiles, &certBin, &certLen, &chain) < 0) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error reading cert file %s\n", (char*)certFiles);
return -1;
}
/*
The first cert is allocated in the keys struct. All others in
linked list are allocated here.
*/
i = 0;
tmp = certBin;
while (chain[i] != 0) {
if (i == 0) {
currCert = lkeys;
} else {
currCert->next = psMalloc(pool, sizeof(sslLocalCert_t));
if (currCert->next == NULL) {
psFree(tmp);
return -8; /* SSL_MEM_ERROR */
}
memset(currCert->next, 0x0, sizeof(sslLocalCert_t));
currCert = currCert->next;
}
currCert->certBin = psMalloc(pool, chain[i]);
memcpy(currCert->certBin, certBin, chain[i]);
currCert->certLen = chain[i];
certBin += chain[i]; certLen -= chain[i];
i++;
}
psFree(tmp);
sslAssert(certLen == 0);
return 0;
}
/*
Preferred version for commercial users who make use of memory pools.
This use of the sslKeys_t param implies this is for use in the MatrixSSL
product (input to matrixSslNewSession). However, we didn't want to
expose this API at the matrixSsl.h level due to the pool parameter. This
is strictly an API that commerical users will have access to
*/
int32 matrixRsaReadKeysEx(psPool_t *pool, sslKeys_t **keys,
const char *certFile, const char *privFile,
const char *privPass, const char *trustedCAFiles)
{
sslKeys_t *lkeys;
unsigned char *privKeyMem;
int32 rc, privKeyMemLen;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
sslRsaCert_t *currCert, *prevCert = NULL;
unsigned char *caCert, *caStream;
sslChainLen_t chain;
int32 caCertLen, first, i;
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
*keys = lkeys = psMalloc(pool, sizeof(sslKeys_t));
if (lkeys == NULL) {
return -8; /* SSL_MEM_ERROR */
}
memset(lkeys, 0x0, sizeof(sslKeys_t));
/*
Load certificate files. Any additional certificate files should chain
to the root CA held on the other side.
*/
rc = readCertChain(pool, certFile, &lkeys->cert);
if (rc < 0 ) {
matrixRsaFreeKeys(lkeys);
return rc;
}
/*
The first cert in certFile must be associated with the provided
private key.
*/
if (privFile) {
rc = matrixRsaReadPrivKey(pool, privFile, privPass, &privKeyMem,
&privKeyMemLen);
if (rc < 0) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error reading private key file: %s\n",
(char*)privFile);
matrixRsaFreeKeys(lkeys);
return rc;
}
rc = matrixRsaParsePrivKey(pool, privKeyMem, privKeyMemLen,
&lkeys->cert.privKey);
if (rc < 0) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error parsing private key file: %s\n",
(char*)privFile);
psFree(privKeyMem);
matrixRsaFreeKeys(lkeys);
return rc;
}
psFree(privKeyMem);
}
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
/*
Now deal with Certificate Authorities
*/
if (trustedCAFiles != NULL) {
if (matrixX509ReadCert(pool, trustedCAFiles, &caCert, &caCertLen,
&chain) < 0 || caCert == NULL) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error reading CA cert files %s\n",
(char*)trustedCAFiles);
matrixRsaFreeKeys(lkeys);
return -1;
}
caStream = caCert;
i = first = 0;
while (chain[i] != 0) {
/*
Don't allow one bad cert to ruin the whole bunch if possible
*/
if (matrixX509ParseCert(pool, caStream, chain[i], &currCert) < 0) {
matrixX509FreeCert(currCert);
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error parsing CA cert %s\n",
(char*)trustedCAFiles);
caStream += chain[i]; caCertLen -= chain[i];
i++;
continue;
}
if (first == 0) {
lkeys->caCerts = currCert;
} else {
prevCert->next = currCert;
}
first++;
prevCert = currCert;
currCert = NULL;
caStream += chain[i]; caCertLen -= chain[i];
i++;
}
sslAssert(caCertLen == 0);
psFree(caCert);
}
/*
Check to see that if a set of CAs were passed in at least
one ended up being valid.
*/
if (trustedCAFiles != NULL && lkeys->caCerts == NULL) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("No valid CA certs in %s\n",
(char*)trustedCAFiles);
matrixRsaFreeKeys(lkeys);
return -1;
}
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
return 0;
}
/*
* Public API to return a binary buffer from a cert. Suitable to send
* over the wire. Caller must free 'out' if this function returns success (0)
* Parse .pem files according to http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1421.html
*/
int32 matrixX509ReadCert(psPool_t *pool, const char *fileName,
unsigned char **out, int32 *outLen, sslChainLen_t *chain)
{
int32 certBufLen, rc, certChainLen, i;
unsigned char *oneCert[MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH];
unsigned char *certPtr, *tmp;
char *certFile, *start, *end, *certBuf;
const char sep[] = ";";
/*
Init chain array and output params
*/
for (i=0; i < MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH; i++) {
oneCert[i] = NULL;
(*chain)[i] = 0;
}
*outLen = certChainLen = i = 0;
rc = -1;
/*
For PKI product purposes, this routine now accepts a chain of certs.
*/
if (fileName != NULL) {
fileName += parseList(pool, fileName, sep, &certFile);
} else {
return 0;
}
while (certFile != NULL) {
if (i == MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH) {
matrixIntDebugMsg("Exceeded maximum cert chain length of %d\n",
MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH);
psFree(certFile);
rc = -1;
goto err;
}
if ((rc = psGetFileBin(pool, certFile, (unsigned char**)&certBuf,
&certBufLen)) < 0) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Couldn't open file %s\n", certFile);
goto err;
}
psFree(certFile);
certPtr = (unsigned char*)certBuf;
start = end = certBuf;
while (certBufLen > 0) {
if (((start = strstr(certBuf, "-----BEGIN")) != NULL) &&
((start = strstr(certBuf, "CERTIFICATE-----")) != NULL) &&
(end = strstr(start, "-----END")) != NULL) {
start += strlen("CERTIFICATE-----");
(*chain)[i] = (int32)(end - start);
end += strlen("-----END CERTIFICATE-----");
while (*end == '\r' || *end == '\n' || *end == '\t' || *end == ' ') {
end++;
}
} else {
psFree(certPtr);
rc = -1;
goto err;
}
oneCert[i] = psMalloc(pool, (*chain)[i]);
certBufLen -= (int32)(end - certBuf);
certBuf = end;
memset(oneCert[i], '\0', (*chain)[i]);
if (ps_base64_decode((unsigned char*)start, (*chain)[i], oneCert[i],
&(*chain)[i]) != 0) {
psFree(certPtr);
matrixStrDebugMsg("Unable to base64 decode certificate\n", NULL);
rc = -1;
goto err;
}
certChainLen += (*chain)[i];
i++;
if (i == MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH) {
matrixIntDebugMsg("Exceeded maximum cert chain length of %d\n",
MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH);
psFree(certPtr);
rc = -1;
goto err;
}
}
psFree(certPtr);
/*
Check for more files
*/
fileName += parseList(pool, fileName, sep, &certFile);
}
*outLen = certChainLen;
/*
Don't bother stringing them together if only one was passed in
*/
if (i == 1) {
sslAssert(certChainLen == (*chain)[0]);
*out = oneCert[0];
return 0;
} else {
*out = tmp = psMalloc(pool, certChainLen);
for (i=0; i < MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH; i++) {
if (oneCert[i]) {
memcpy(tmp, oneCert[i], (*chain)[i]);
tmp += (*chain)[i];
}
}
rc = 0;
}
err:
for (i=0; i < MAX_CHAIN_LENGTH; i++) {
if (oneCert[i]) psFree(oneCert[i]);
}
return rc;
}
static int32 matrixX509ValidateCertInternal(psPool_t *pool, sslRsaCert_t *subjectCert,
sslRsaCert_t *issuerCert, int32 chain)
{
sslRsaCert_t *ic;
unsigned char sigOut[10 + SSL_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 5]; /* See below */
int32 sigLen;
subjectCert->valid = -1;
/*
Supporting a one level chain or a self-signed cert. If the issuer
is NULL, the self-signed test is done.
*/
if (issuerCert == NULL) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Warning: No CA to validate cert with\n", NULL);
matrixStrDebugMsg("\tPerforming self-signed CA test\n", NULL);
ic = subjectCert;
} else {
ic = issuerCert;
}
/*
Path confirmation. If this is a chain verification, do not allow
any holes in the path. Error out if issuer does not have CA permissions
or if hashes do not match anywhere along the way.
*/
while (ic) {
if (subjectCert != ic) {
/*
Certificate authority contraint32 only available in version 3 certs
*/
if ((ic->version > 1) && (ic->extensions.bc.ca <= 0)) {
if (chain) {
return -1;
}
ic = ic->next;
continue;
}
/*
Use sha1 hash of issuer fields computed at parse time to compare
*/
if (memcmp(subjectCert->issuer.hash, ic->subject.hash,
SSL_SHA1_HASH_SIZE) != 0) {
if (chain) {
return -1;
}
ic = ic->next;
continue;
}
}
/*
Signature confirmation
The sigLen is the ASN.1 size in bytes for encoding the hash.
The magic 10 is comprised of the SEQUENCE and ALGORITHM ID overhead.
The magic 8 and 5 are the OID lengths of the corresponding algorithm.
NOTE: if sigLen is modified, above sigOut static size must be changed
*/
if (subjectCert->sigAlgorithm == OID_RSA_MD5 ||
subjectCert->sigAlgorithm == OID_RSA_MD2) {
sigLen = 10 + SSL_MD5_HASH_SIZE + 8; /* See above */
} else if (subjectCert->sigAlgorithm == OID_RSA_SHA1) {
sigLen = 10 + SSL_SHA1_HASH_SIZE + 5; /* See above */
} else {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Unsupported signature algorithm\n", NULL);
return -1;
}
sslAssert(sigLen <= sizeof(sigOut));
matrixRsaDecryptPub(pool, &(ic->publicKey), subjectCert->signature,
subjectCert->signatureLen, sigOut, sigLen);
/*
If this is a chain test, fail on any gaps in the chain
*/
if (psAsnConfirmSignature(subjectCert->sigHash, sigOut, sigLen) < 0) {
if (chain) {
return -1;
}
ic = ic->next;
continue;
}
/*
Fall through to here only if passed signature check.
*/
subjectCert->valid = 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
int32 matrixSha1Final(hash_state * md, unsigned char *hash)
{
int32 i;
#ifndef USE_INT64
unsigned long n;
#endif
sslAssert(md != NULL);
if (md->sha1.curlen >= sizeof(md->sha1.buf) || hash == NULL) {
return -1;
}
/*
increase the length of the message
*/
#ifdef USE_INT64
md->sha1.length += md->sha1.curlen << 3;
#else
n = (md->sha1.lengthLo + (md->sha1.curlen << 3)) & 0xFFFFFFFFL;
if (n < md->sha1.lengthLo) {
md->sha1.lengthHi++;
}
md->sha1.lengthHi += (md->sha1.curlen >> 29);
md->sha1.lengthLo = n;
#endif /* USE_INT64 */
/*
append the '1' bit
*/
md->sha1.buf[md->sha1.curlen++] = (unsigned char)0x80;
/*
if the length is currently above 56 bytes we append zeros then compress.
Then we can fall back to padding zeros and length encoding like normal.
*/
if (md->sha1.curlen > 56) {
while (md->sha1.curlen < 64) {
md->sha1.buf[md->sha1.curlen++] = (unsigned char)0;
}
sha1_compress(md);
md->sha1.curlen = 0;
}
/*
pad upto 56 bytes of zeroes
*/
while (md->sha1.curlen < 56) {
md->sha1.buf[md->sha1.curlen++] = (unsigned char)0;
}
/*
store length
*/
#ifdef USE_INT64
STORE64H(md->sha1.length, md->sha1.buf+56);
#else
STORE32H(md->sha1.lengthHi, md->sha1.buf+56);
STORE32H(md->sha1.lengthLo, md->sha1.buf+60);
#endif /* USE_INT64 */
sha1_compress(md);
/*
copy output
*/
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
STORE32H(md->sha1.state[i], hash+(4*i));
}
#ifdef CLEAN_STACK
psZeromem(md, sizeof(hash_state));
#endif /* CLEAN_STACK */
return 20;
}
static void sha1_compress(hash_state *md)
#endif /* CLEAN STACK */
{
unsigned long a,b,c,d,e,W[80],i;
#ifdef SMALL_CODE
ulong32 t;
#endif
sslAssert(md != NULL);
/*
copy the state into 512-bits into W[0..15]
*/
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
LOAD32H(W[i], md->sha1.buf + (4*i));
}
/*
copy state
*/
a = md->sha1.state[0];
b = md->sha1.state[1];
c = md->sha1.state[2];
d = md->sha1.state[3];
e = md->sha1.state[4];
/*
expand it
*/
for (i = 16; i < 80; i++) {
W[i] = ROL(W[i-3] ^ W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16], 1);
}
/*
compress
*/
/* round one */
#define FF0(a,b,c,d,e,i) e = (ROLc(a, 5) + F0(b,c,d) + e + W[i] + 0x5a827999UL); b = ROLc(b, 30);
#define FF1(a,b,c,d,e,i) e = (ROLc(a, 5) + F1(b,c,d) + e + W[i] + 0x6ed9eba1UL); b = ROLc(b, 30);
#define FF2(a,b,c,d,e,i) e = (ROLc(a, 5) + F2(b,c,d) + e + W[i] + 0x8f1bbcdcUL); b = ROLc(b, 30);
#define FF3(a,b,c,d,e,i) e = (ROLc(a, 5) + F3(b,c,d) + e + W[i] + 0xca62c1d6UL); b = ROLc(b, 30);
#ifdef SMALL_CODE
for (i = 0; i < 20; ) {
FF0(a,b,c,d,e,i++); t = e; e = d; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = t;
}
for (; i < 40; ) {
FF1(a,b,c,d,e,i++); t = e; e = d; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = t;
}
for (; i < 60; ) {
FF2(a,b,c,d,e,i++); t = e; e = d; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = t;
}
for (; i < 80; ) {
FF3(a,b,c,d,e,i++); t = e; e = d; d = c; c = b; b = a; a = t;
}
#else /* SMALL_CODE */
for (i = 0; i < 20; ) {
FF0(a,b,c,d,e,i++);
FF0(e,a,b,c,d,i++);
FF0(d,e,a,b,c,i++);
FF0(c,d,e,a,b,i++);
FF0(b,c,d,e,a,i++);
}
/* round two */
for (; i < 40; ) {
FF1(a,b,c,d,e,i++);
FF1(e,a,b,c,d,i++);
FF1(d,e,a,b,c,i++);
FF1(c,d,e,a,b,i++);
FF1(b,c,d,e,a,i++);
}
/* round three */
for (; i < 60; ) {
FF2(a,b,c,d,e,i++);
FF2(e,a,b,c,d,i++);
FF2(d,e,a,b,c,i++);
FF2(c,d,e,a,b,i++);
FF2(b,c,d,e,a,i++);
}
/* round four */
for (; i < 80; ) {
FF3(a,b,c,d,e,i++);
FF3(e,a,b,c,d,i++);
FF3(d,e,a,b,c,i++);
FF3(c,d,e,a,b,i++);
FF3(b,c,d,e,a,i++);
}
#endif /* SMALL_CODE */
#undef FF0
#undef FF1
#undef FF2
#undef FF3
/*
store
*/
md->sha1.state[0] = md->sha1.state[0] + a;
md->sha1.state[1] = md->sha1.state[1] + b;
md->sha1.state[2] = md->sha1.state[2] + c;
md->sha1.state[3] = md->sha1.state[3] + d;
md->sha1.state[4] = md->sha1.state[4] + e;
}
/*
Parse incoming data per http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3
*/
int32 matrixSslDecode(ssl_t *ssl, sslBuf_t *in, sslBuf_t *out,
unsigned char *error, unsigned char *alertLevel,
unsigned char *alertDescription)
{
unsigned char *c, *p, *end, *pend, *oend;
unsigned char *mac, macError;
int32 rc;
unsigned char padLen;
/*
If we've had a protocol error, don't allow further use of the session
*/
*error = SSL_ALERT_NONE;
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_ERROR || ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_CLOSED) {
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
This flag is set if the previous call to this routine returned an SSL_FULL
error from encodeResponse, indicating that there is data to be encoded,
but the out buffer was not big enough to handle it. If we fall in this
case, the user has increased the out buffer size and is re-calling this
routine
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_NEED_ENCODE) {
ssl->flags &= ~SSL_FLAGS_NEED_ENCODE;
goto encodeResponse;
}
c = in->start;
end = in->end;
oend = out->end;
/*
Processing the SSL Record header:
If the high bit of the first byte is set and this is the first
message we've seen, we parse the request as an SSLv2 request
http://wp.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html
SSLv2 also supports a 3 byte header when padding is used, but this should
not be required for the initial plaintext message, so we don't support it
v3 Header:
1 byte type
1 byte major version
1 byte minor version
2 bytes length
v2 Header
2 bytes length (ignore high bit)
*/
decodeMore:
sslAssert(out->end == oend);
if (end - c == 0) {
/*
This case could happen if change cipher spec was last
message in the buffer
*/
return SSL_SUCCESS;
}
if (end - c < SSL2_HEADER_LEN) {
return SSL_PARTIAL;
}
if (ssl->majVer != 0 || (*c & 0x80) == 0) {
if (end - c < ssl->recordHeadLen) {
return SSL_PARTIAL;
}
ssl->rec.type = *c; c++;
ssl->rec.majVer = *c; c++;
ssl->rec.minVer = *c; c++;
ssl->rec.len = *c << 8; c++;
ssl->rec.len += *c; c++;
} else {
ssl->rec.type = SSL_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->rec.majVer = 2;
ssl->rec.minVer = 0;
ssl->rec.len = (*c & 0x7f) << 8; c++;
ssl->rec.len += *c; c++;
}
/*
Validate the various record headers. The type must be valid,
the major and minor versions must match the negotiated versions (if we're
past ClientHello) and the length must be < 16K and > 0
*/
if (ssl->rec.type != SSL_RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
ssl->rec.type != SSL_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT &&
ssl->rec.type != SSL_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->rec.type != SSL_RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Record header type not valid: %d\n", ssl->rec.type);
goto encodeResponse;
}
/*
Verify the record version numbers unless this is the first record we're
reading.
*/
if (ssl->hsState != SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO &&
ssl->hsState != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
if (ssl->rec.majVer != ssl->majVer || ssl->rec.minVer != ssl->minVer) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Record header version not valid\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
}
/*
Verify max and min record lengths
*/
if (ssl->rec.len > SSL_MAX_RECORD_LEN || ssl->rec.len == 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Record header length not valid: %d\n", ssl->rec.len);
goto encodeResponse;
}
/*
This implementation requires the entire SSL record to be in the 'in' buffer
before we parse it. This is because we need to MAC the entire record before
allowing it to be used by the caller. The only alternative would be to
copy the partial record to an internal buffer, but that would require more
memory usage, which we're trying to keep low.
*/
if (end - c < ssl->rec.len) {
return SSL_PARTIAL;
}
/*
Make sure we have enough room to hold the decoded record
*/
if ((out->buf + out->size) - out->end < ssl->rec.len) {
return SSL_FULL;
}
/*
Decrypt the entire record contents. The record length should be
a multiple of block size, or decrypt will return an error
If we're still handshaking and sending plaintext, the decryption
callback will point to a null provider that passes the data unchanged
*/
if (ssl->decrypt(&ssl->sec.decryptCtx, c, out->end, ssl->rec.len) < 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto encodeResponse;
}
c += ssl->rec.len;
/*
If we're reading a secure message, we need to validate the MAC and
padding (if using a block cipher). Insecure messages do not have
a trailing MAC or any padding.
SECURITY - There are several vulnerabilities in block cipher padding
that we handle in the below code. For more information see:
http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_READ_SECURE) {
/*
Verify the record is at least as big as the MAC
Start tracking MAC errors, rather then immediately catching them to
stop timing and alert description attacks that differentiate between
a padding error and a MAC error.
*/
if (ssl->rec.len < ssl->deMacSize) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Record length too short for MAC\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
macError = 0;
/*
Decode padding only if blocksize is > 0 (we're using a block cipher),
otherwise no padding will be present, and the mac is the last
macSize bytes of the record.
*/
if (ssl->deBlockSize <= 1) {
mac = out->end + ssl->rec.len - ssl->deMacSize;
} else {
/*
Verify the pad data for block ciphers
c points within the cipher text, p points within the plaintext
The last byte of the record is the pad length
*/
p = out->end + ssl->rec.len;
padLen = *(p - 1);
/*
SSL3.0 requires the pad length to be less than blockSize
TLS can have a pad length up to 255 for obfuscating the data len
*/
if (ssl->majVer == SSL3_MAJ_VER && ssl->minVer == SSL3_MIN_VER &&
padLen >= ssl->deBlockSize) {
macError++;
}
/*
The minimum record length is the size of the mac, plus pad bytes
plus one length byte
*/
if (ssl->rec.len < ssl->deMacSize + padLen + 1) {
macError++;
}
/*
The mac starts macSize bytes before the padding and length byte.
If we have a macError, just fake the mac as the last macSize bytes
of the record, so we are sure to have enough bytes to verify
against, we'll fail anyway, so the actual contents don't matter.
*/
if (!macError) {
mac = p - padLen - 1 - ssl->deMacSize;
} else {
mac = out->end + ssl->rec.len - ssl->deMacSize;
}
}
/*
Verify the MAC of the message by calculating our own MAC of the message
and comparing it to the one in the message. We do this step regardless
of whether or not we've already set macError to stop timing attacks.
Clear the mac in the callers buffer if we're successful
*/
if (ssl->verifyMac(ssl, ssl->rec.type, out->end,
(int32)(mac - out->end), mac) < 0 || macError) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Couldn't verify MAC or pad of record data\n",
NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
memset(mac, 0x0, ssl->deMacSize);
/*
Record data starts at out->end and ends at mac
*/
p = out->end;
pend = mac;
} else {
/*
The record data is the entire record as there is no MAC or padding
*/
p = out->end;
pend = mac = out->end + ssl->rec.len;
}
/*
Check now for maximum plaintext length of 16kb. No appropriate
SSL alert for this
*/
if ((int32)(pend - p) > SSL_MAX_PLAINTEXT_LEN) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Record overflow\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
/*
Take action based on the actual record type we're dealing with
'p' points to the start of the data, and 'pend' points to the end
*/
switch (ssl->rec.type) {
case SSL_RECORD_TYPE_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
/*
Body is single byte with value 1 to indicate that the next message
will be encrypted using the negotiated cipher suite
*/
if (pend - p < 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid length for CipherSpec\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
if (*p == 1) {
p++;
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid value for CipherSpec\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
/*
If we're expecting finished, then this is the right place to get
this record. It is really part of the handshake but it has its
own record type.
Activate the read cipher callbacks, so we will decrypt incoming
data from now on.
*/
if (ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_FINISHED) {
sslActivateReadCipher(ssl);
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Invalid CipherSpec order: %d\n", ssl->hsState);
goto encodeResponse;
}
in->start = c;
goto decodeMore;
case SSL_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT:
/*
1 byte alert level (warning or fatal)
1 byte alert description corresponding to SSL_ALERT_*
*/
if (pend - p < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error in length of alert record\n", NULL);
goto encodeResponse;
}
*alertLevel = *p; p++;
*alertDescription = *p; p++;
/*
If the alert is fatal, or is a close message (usually a warning),
flag the session with ERROR so it cannot be used anymore.
Caller can decide whether or not to close on other warnings.
*/
if (*alertLevel == SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) {
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_ERROR;
}
if (*alertDescription == SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_CLOSED;
}
return SSL_ALERT;
case SSL_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE:
/*
We've got one or more handshake messages in the record data.
The handshake parsing function will take care of all messages
and return an error if there is any problem.
If there is a response to be sent (either a return handshake
or an error alert, send it). If the message was parsed, but no
response is needed, loop up and try to parse another message
*/
rc = parseSSLHandshake(ssl, (char*)p, (int32)(pend - p));
switch (rc) {
case SSL_SUCCESS:
in->start = c;
return SSL_SUCCESS;
case SSL_PROCESS_DATA:
in->start = c;
goto encodeResponse;
case SSL_ERROR:
if (ssl->err == SSL_ALERT_NONE) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
goto encodeResponse;
}
break;
case SSL_RECORD_TYPE_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
Data is in the out buffer, let user handle it
Don't allow application data until handshake is complete, and we are
secure. It is ok to let application data through on the client
if we are in the SERVER_HELLO state because this could mean that
the client has sent a CLIENT_HELLO message for a rehandshake
and is awaiting reply.
*/
if ((ssl->hsState != SSL_HS_DONE && ssl->hsState != SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO)
|| !(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_READ_SECURE)) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Incomplete handshake: %d\n", ssl->hsState);
goto encodeResponse;
}
/*
SECURITY - If the mac is at the current out->end, then there is no data
in the record. These records are valid, but are usually not sent by
the application layer protocol. Rather, they are initiated within the
remote SSL protocol implementation to avoid some types of attacks when
using block ciphers. For more information see:
http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
We eat these records here rather than passing them on to the caller.
The rationale behind this is that if the caller's application protocol
is depending on zero length SSL messages, it will fail anyway if some of
those messages are initiated within the SSL protocol layer. Also
this clears up any confusion where the caller might interpret a zero
length read as an end of file (EOF) or would block (EWOULDBLOCK) type
scenario.
SECURITY - Looping back up and ignoring the message has the potential
for denial of service, because we are not changing the state of the
system in any way when processing these messages. To counteract this,
we maintain a counter that we share with other types of ignored messages
*/
in->start = c;
if (out->end == mac) {
if (ssl->ignoredMessageCount++ < SSL_MAX_IGNORED_MESSAGE_COUNT) {
goto decodeMore;
}
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Exceeded limit on ignored messages: %d\n",
SSL_MAX_IGNORED_MESSAGE_COUNT);
goto encodeResponse;
}
if (ssl->ignoredMessageCount > 0) {
ssl->ignoredMessageCount--;
}
out->end = mac;
return SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
}
/*
Should not get here
*/
matrixIntDebugMsg("Invalid record type in matrixSslDecode: %d\n",
ssl->rec.type);
return SSL_ERROR;
encodeResponse:
/*
We decoded a record that needs a response, either a handshake response
or an alert if we've detected an error.
SECURITY - Clear the decoded incoming record from outbuf before encoding
the response into outbuf. rec.len could be invalid, clear the minimum
of rec.len and remaining outbuf size
*/
rc = min (ssl->rec.len, (int32)((out->buf + out->size) - out->end));
if (rc > 0) {
memset(out->end, 0x0, rc);
}
if (ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) {
/*
Don't clear the session info. If receiving a HELLO_REQUEST from a
MatrixSSL enabled server the determination on whether to reuse the
session is made on that side, so always send the current session
*/
rc = matrixSslEncodeClientHello(ssl, out, ssl->cipher->id);
} else {
rc = sslEncodeResponse(ssl, out);
}
if (rc == SSL_SUCCESS) {
if (ssl->err != SSL_ALERT_NONE) {
*error = (unsigned char)ssl->err;
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_ERROR;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
return SSL_SEND_RESPONSE;
}
if (rc == SSL_FULL) {
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_NEED_ENCODE;
return SSL_FULL;
}
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
The workhorse for parsing handshake messages. Also enforces the state
machine for proper ordering of handshake messages.
Parameters:
ssl - ssl context
inbuf - buffer to read handshake message from
len - data length for the current ssl record. The ssl record
can contain multiple handshake messages, so we may need to parse
them all here.
Return:
SSL_SUCCESS
SSL_PROCESS_DATA
SSL_ERROR - see ssl->err for details
*/
static int32 parseSSLHandshake(ssl_t *ssl, char *inbuf, int32 len)
{
unsigned char *c;
unsigned char *end;
unsigned char hsType;
int32 hsLen, rc, parseLen = 0;
uint32 cipher = 0;
unsigned char hsMsgHash[SSL_MD5_HASH_SIZE + SSL_SHA1_HASH_SIZE];
#ifdef USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL
unsigned char *p;
int32 suiteLen, challengeLen, pubKeyLen, extLen;
#endif /* USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL */
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
int32 sessionIdLen, certMatch, certTypeLen, i;
sslRsaCert_t *subjectCert;
int32 valid, certLen, certChainLen, anonCheck;
sslRsaCert_t *cert, *currentCert;
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
rc = SSL_SUCCESS;
c = (unsigned char*)inbuf;
end = (unsigned char*)(inbuf + len);
parseHandshake:
if (end - c < 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid length of handshake message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
hsType = *c; c++;
/*
hsType is the received handshake type and ssl->hsState is the expected
handshake type. If it doesn't match, there are some possible cases
that are not errors. These are checked here.
*/
if (hsType != ssl->hsState &&
(hsType != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || ssl->hsState != SSL_HS_DONE)) {
/*
A mismatch is possible in the client authentication case.
The optional CERTIFICATE_REQUEST may be appearing instead of
SERVER_HELLO_DONE.
*/
if ((hsType == SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) &&
(ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE)) {
/*
This is where the client is first aware of requested client
authentication so we set the flag here.
*/
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_CLIENT_AUTH;
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
} else {
/*
The final possible mismatch allowed is for a HELLO_REQEST message.
Indicates a rehandshake initiated from the server.
*/
if ((hsType == SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
(ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_DONE) &&
!(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER)) {
sslResetContext(ssl);
ssl->hsState = hsType;
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Invalid type of handshake message: %d\n",
hsType);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
}
}
if (hsType == SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
sslInitHSHash(ssl);
if (ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_DONE) {
/*
Rehandshake. Server receiving client hello on existing connection
*/
sslResetContext(ssl);
ssl->hsState = hsType;
}
}
/*
We need to get a copy of the message hashes to compare to those sent
in the finished message (which does not include a hash of itself)
before we update the handshake hashes
*/
if (ssl->hsState == SSL_HS_FINISHED) {
sslSnapshotHSHash(ssl, hsMsgHash,
(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) ? 0 : SSL_FLAGS_SERVER);
}
/*
Process the handshake header and update the ongoing handshake hash
SSLv3:
1 byte type
3 bytes length
SSLv2:
1 byte type
*/
if (ssl->rec.majVer >= SSL3_MAJ_VER) {
if (end - c < 3) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid length of handshake message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
hsLen = *c << 16; c++;
hsLen += *c << 8; c++;
hsLen += *c; c++;
if (end - c < hsLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid handshake length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
sslUpdateHSHash(ssl, c - ssl->hshakeHeadLen,
hsLen + ssl->hshakeHeadLen);
} else if (ssl->rec.majVer == SSL2_MAJ_VER) {
/*
Assume that the handshake len is the same as the incoming ssl record
length minus 1 byte (type), this is verified in SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO
*/
hsLen = len - 1;
sslUpdateHSHash(ssl, (unsigned char*)inbuf, len);
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Invalid record version: %d\n", ssl->rec.majVer);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Finished with header. Process each type of handshake message.
*/
switch(ssl->hsState) {
#ifdef USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL
case SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO:
/*
First two bytes are the highest supported major and minor SSL versions
We support only 3.0 (support 3.1 in commercial version)
*/
if (end - c < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid ssl header version length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
ssl->reqMajVer = *c; c++;
ssl->reqMinVer = *c; c++;
if (ssl->reqMajVer >= SSL3_MAJ_VER) {
ssl->majVer = ssl->reqMajVer;
ssl->minVer = SSL3_MIN_VER;
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Unsupported ssl version: %d\n", ssl->reqMajVer);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Support SSLv3 and SSLv2 ClientHello messages. Browsers usually send v2
messages for compatibility
*/
if (ssl->rec.majVer > SSL2_MAJ_VER) {
/*
Next is a 32 bytes of random data for key generation
and a single byte with the session ID length
*/
if (end - c < SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid length of random data\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(ssl->sec.clientRandom, c, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
c += SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE;
ssl->sessionIdLen = *c; c++;
/*
If a session length was specified, the client is asking to
resume a previously established session to speed up the handshake.
*/
if (ssl->sessionIdLen > 0) {
if (ssl->sessionIdLen > SSL_MAX_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
end - c < ssl->sessionIdLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(ssl->sessionId, c, ssl->sessionIdLen);
c += ssl->sessionIdLen;
/*
Look up the session id for ssl session resumption. If found, we
load the pre-negotiated masterSecret and cipher.
A resumed request must meet the following restrictions:
The id must be present in the lookup table
The requested version must match the original version
The cipher suite list must contain the original cipher suite
*/
if (matrixResumeSession(ssl) >= 0) {
ssl->flags &= ~SSL_FLAGS_CLIENT_AUTH;
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED;
} else {
memset(ssl->sessionId, 0, SSL_MAX_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
ssl->sessionIdLen = 0;
}
} else {
/*
Always clear the RESUMED flag if no client session id specified
*/
ssl->flags &= ~SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED;
}
/*
Next is the two byte cipher suite list length, network byte order.
It must not be zero, and must be a multiple of two.
*/
if (end - c < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid cipher suite list length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
suiteLen = *c << 8; c++;
suiteLen += *c; c++;
if (suiteLen == 0 || suiteLen & 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Unable to parse cipher suite list: %d\n",
suiteLen);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Now is 'suiteLen' bytes of the supported cipher suite list,
listed in order of preference. Loop through and find the
first cipher suite we support.
*/
if (end - c < suiteLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
p = c + suiteLen;
while (c < p) {
cipher = *c << 8; c++;
cipher += *c; c++;
/*
A resumed session can only match the cipher originally
negotiated. Otherwise, match the first cipher that we support
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
sslAssert(ssl->cipher);
if (ssl->cipher->id == cipher) {
c = p;
break;
}
} else {
if ((ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(cipher)) != NULL) {
c = p;
break;
}
}
}
/*
If we fell to the default cipher suite, we didn't have
any in common with the client, or the client is being bad
and requesting the null cipher!
*/
if (ssl->cipher == NULL || ssl->cipher->id != cipher ||
cipher == SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't support requested cipher\n", NULL);
ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL);
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Decode the compression parameters. Always length one (first byte)
and value 0 (second byte). There are no compression schemes defined
for SSLv3
*/
if (end - c < 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid compression header length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
extLen = *c++;
if (end - c < extLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid compression header length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
c += extLen;
if (ssl->reqMinVer == SSL3_MIN_VER && extLen != 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid compression header\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
This might be TLS. If so, there could be extension data
to parse here: Two byte length and extension info.
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3546.html
*/
if (ssl->reqMinVer >= TLS_MIN_VER && c != end) {
if (end - c < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid extension header len\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
extLen = *c << 8; c++;
extLen += *c; c++;
if (end - c < extLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid extension header len\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
At this point, c points to the first byte of the extension field
and extLen is the number of extension bytes. Parsing of
individual extension values would happen here, but for now we
just skip over all extensions, ignoring them.
*/
c += extLen;
}
} else {
/*
Parse a SSLv2 ClientHello message. The same information is
conveyed but the order and format is different.
First get the cipher suite length, session id length and challenge
(client random) length - all two byte values, network byte order.
*/
if (end - c < 6) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't parse hello message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
suiteLen = *c << 8; c++;
suiteLen += *c; c++;
if (suiteLen == 0 || suiteLen % 3 != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't parse hello message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
ssl->sessionIdLen = *c << 8; c++;
ssl->sessionIdLen += *c; c++;
/*
A resumed session would use a SSLv3 ClientHello, not SSLv2.
*/
if (ssl->sessionIdLen != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Bad resumption request\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
challengeLen = *c << 8; c++;
challengeLen += *c; c++;
if (challengeLen < 16 || challengeLen > 32) {
matrixStrDebugMsg("Bad challenge length\n", NULL);
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Validate the three lengths that were just sent to us, don't
want any buffer overflows while parsing the remaining data
*/
if (end - c != suiteLen + ssl->sessionIdLen + challengeLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Parse the cipher suite list similar to the SSLv3 method, except
each suite is 3 bytes, instead of two bytes. We define the suite
as an integer value, so either method works for lookup.
We don't support session resumption from V2 handshakes, so don't
need to worry about matching resumed cipher suite.
*/
p = c + suiteLen;
while (c < p) {
cipher = *c << 16; c++;
cipher += *c << 8; c++;
cipher += *c; c++;
if ((ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(cipher)) != NULL) {
c = p;
break;
}
}
if (ssl->cipher == NULL ||
ssl->cipher->id == SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) {
ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL);
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't support requested cipher\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
We don't allow session IDs for v2 ClientHellos
*/
if (ssl->sessionIdLen > 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("SSLv2 sessions not allowed\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
The client random (between 16 and 32 bytes) fills the least
significant bytes in the (always) 32 byte SSLv3 client random field.
*/
memset(ssl->sec.clientRandom, 0x0, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(ssl->sec.clientRandom + (SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE - challengeLen),
c, challengeLen);
c += challengeLen;
}
/*
ClientHello should be the only one in the record.
*/
if (c != end) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid final client hello length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
If we're resuming a handshake, then the next handshake message we
expect is the finished message. Otherwise we do the full handshake.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_FINISHED;
} else {
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
}
/*
Now that we've parsed the ClientHello, we need to tell the caller that
we have a handshake response to write out.
The caller should call sslWrite upon receiving this return code.
*/
rc = SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
break;
case SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
/*
RSA: This message contains the premaster secret encrypted with the
server's public key (from the Certificate). The premaster
secret is 48 bytes of random data, but the message may be longer
than that because the 48 bytes are padded before encryption
according to PKCS#1v1.5. After encryption, we should have the
correct length.
*/
if (end - c < hsLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid ClientKeyExchange length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
sslActivatePublicCipher(ssl);
pubKeyLen = hsLen;
/*
Now have a handshake pool to allocate the premaster storage
*/
ssl->sec.premasterSize = SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE;
ssl->sec.premaster = psMalloc(ssl->hsPool,
SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE);
if (ssl->decryptPriv(ssl->hsPool, ssl->keys->cert.privKey, c,
pubKeyLen, ssl->sec.premaster, ssl->sec.premasterSize) !=
ssl->sec.premasterSize) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Failed to decrypt premaster\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
The first two bytes of the decrypted message should be the client's
requested version number (which may not be the same as the final
negotiated version). The other 46 bytes - pure random!
SECURITY -
Some SSL clients (Including Microsoft IE 6.0) incorrectly set the
first two bytes to the negotiated version rather than the requested
version. This is known in OpenSSL as the SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
We allow this to slide only if we don't support TLS, TLS was
requested and the negotiated versions match.
*/
if (*ssl->sec.premaster != ssl->reqMajVer) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Incorrect version in ClientKeyExchange\n",
NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (*(ssl->sec.premaster + 1) != ssl->reqMinVer) {
if (ssl->reqMinVer < TLS_MIN_VER ||
*(ssl->sec.premaster + 1) != ssl->minVer) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Incorrect version in ClientKeyExchange\n",
NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
}
/*
Now that we've got the premaster secret, derive the various
symmetric keys using it and the client and server random values.
Update the cached session (if found) with the masterSecret and
negotiated cipher.
*/
sslDeriveKeys(ssl);
matrixUpdateSession(ssl);
c += pubKeyLen;
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_FINISHED;
break;
#endif /* USE_SERVER_SIDE_SSL */
case SSL_HS_FINISHED:
/*
Before the finished handshake message, we should have seen the
CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC message come through in the record layer, which
would have activated the read cipher, and set the READ_SECURE flag.
This is the first handshake message that was sent securely.
*/
if (!(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_READ_SECURE)) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Finished before ChangeCipherSpec\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
The contents of the finished message is a 16 byte MD5 hash followed
by a 20 byte sha1 hash of all the handshake messages so far, to verify
that nothing has been tampered with while we were still insecure.
Compare the message to the value we calculated at the beginning of
this function.
*/
if (hsLen != SSL_MD5_HASH_SIZE + SSL_SHA1_HASH_SIZE) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Finished length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (end - c < hsLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Finished length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (memcmp(c, hsMsgHash, hsLen) != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid handshake msg hash\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
c += hsLen;
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_DONE;
/*
Now that we've parsed the Finished message, if we're a resumed
connection, we're done with handshaking, otherwise, we return
SSL_PROCESS_DATA to get our own cipher spec and finished messages
sent out by the caller.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) {
if (!(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED)) {
rc = SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
}
} else {
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
rc = SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
}
}
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
/*
Free handshake pool, of which the cert is the primary member.
There is also an attempt to free the handshake pool during
the sending of the finished message to deal with client
and server and differing handshake types. Both cases are
attempted keep the lifespan of this pool as short as possible.
This is the default case for the server side.
*/
if (ssl->sec.cert) {
matrixX509FreeCert(ssl->sec.cert);
ssl->sec.cert = NULL;
}
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE */
break;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
case SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST:
/*
No body message and the only one in record flight
*/
if (end - c != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid hello request message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Intentionally not changing state here to SERVER_HELLO. The
encodeResponse case this will fall into needs to distinguish
between calling the normal sslEncodeResponse or encodeClientHello.
The HELLO_REQUEST state is used to make that determination and the
writing of CLIENT_HELLO will properly move the state along itself.
*/
rc = SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
break;
case SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO:
/*
First two bytes are the negotiated SSL version
We support only 3.0 (other options are 2.0 or 3.1)
*/
if (end - c < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid ssl header version length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
ssl->reqMajVer = *c; c++;
ssl->reqMinVer = *c; c++;
if (ssl->reqMajVer != ssl->majVer) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
matrixIntDebugMsg("Unsupported ssl version: %d\n", ssl->reqMajVer);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Next is a 32 bytes of random data for key generation
and a single byte with the session ID length
*/
if (end - c < SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid length of random data\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
memcpy(ssl->sec.serverRandom, c, SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE);
c += SSL_HS_RANDOM_SIZE;
sessionIdLen = *c; c++;
if (sessionIdLen > SSL_MAX_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
end - c < sessionIdLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
If a session length was specified, the server has sent us a
session Id. We may have requested a specific session, and the
server may or may not agree to use that session.
*/
if (sessionIdLen > 0) {
if (ssl->sessionIdLen > 0) {
if (memcmp(ssl->sessionId, c, sessionIdLen) == 0) {
ssl->flags |= SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED;
} else {
ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL);
memset(ssl->sec.masterSecret, 0x0, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
ssl->sessionIdLen = sessionIdLen;
memcpy(ssl->sessionId, c, sessionIdLen);
ssl->flags &= ~SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED;
}
} else {
ssl->sessionIdLen = sessionIdLen;
memcpy(ssl->sessionId, c, sessionIdLen);
}
c += sessionIdLen;
} else {
if (ssl->sessionIdLen > 0) {
ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL);
memset(ssl->sec.masterSecret, 0x0, SSL_HS_MASTER_SIZE);
ssl->sessionIdLen = 0;
memset(ssl->sessionId, 0x0, SSL_MAX_SESSION_ID_SIZE);
ssl->flags &= ~SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED;
}
}
/*
Next is the two byte cipher suite
*/
if (end - c < 2) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid cipher suite length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
cipher = *c << 8; c++;
cipher += *c; c++;
/*
A resumed session can only match the cipher originally
negotiated. Otherwise, match the first cipher that we support
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
sslAssert(ssl->cipher);
if (ssl->cipher->id != cipher) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't support resumed cipher\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
} else {
if ((ssl->cipher = sslGetCipherSpec(cipher)) == NULL) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't support requested cipher\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
}
/*
Decode the compression parameters. Always zero.
There are no compression schemes defined for SSLv3
*/
if (end - c < 1 || *c != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid compression value\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
At this point, if we're resumed, we have all the required info
to derive keys. The next handshake message we expect is
the Finished message.
*/
c++;
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_RESUMED) {
sslDeriveKeys(ssl);
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_FINISHED;
} else {
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE;
}
break;
case SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE:
if (end - c < 3) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Certificate message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
certChainLen = *c << 16; c++;
certChainLen |= *c << 8; c++;
certChainLen |= *c; c++;
if (certChainLen == 0) {
if (ssl->majVer == SSL3_MAJ_VER && ssl->minVer == SSL3_MIN_VER) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE;
} else {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
}
matrixStrDebugMsg("No certificate sent to verify\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (end - c < 3) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Certificate message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (!(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER)) {
/*
As a client, we are aware we are in an RSA authentication state
at this point. And now that we have a handshake pool, storage
for the known premaster secret can be allocated.
*/
ssl->sec.premasterSize = SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE;
ssl->sec.premaster = psMalloc(ssl->hsPool,
SSL_HS_RSA_PREMASTER_SIZE);
}
i = 0;
while (certChainLen > 0) {
certLen = *c << 16; c++;
certLen |= *c << 8; c++;
certLen |= *c; c++;
if (end - c < certLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid certificate length\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Extract the binary cert message into the cert structure
*/
if ((parseLen = matrixX509ParseCert(ssl->hsPool, c, certLen, &cert)) < 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't parse certificate\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
c += parseLen;
if (i++ == 0) {
ssl->sec.cert = cert;
currentCert = ssl->sec.cert;
} else {
currentCert->next = cert;
currentCert = currentCert->next;
}
certChainLen -= (certLen + 3);
}
/*
May have received a chain of certs in the message. Spec says they
must be in order so that each subsequent one is the parent of the
previous. Confirm this now.
*/
if (matrixX509ValidateCertChain(ssl->hsPool, ssl->sec.cert,
&subjectCert, &valid) < 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Couldn't validate certificate chain\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
There may not be a caCert set. The validate implemenation will just
take the subject cert and make sure it is a self signed cert.
*/
if (matrixX509ValidateCert(ssl->hsPool, subjectCert,
ssl->keys == NULL ? NULL : ssl->keys->caCerts,
&subjectCert->valid) < 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Error validating certificate\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
if (subjectCert->valid < 0) {
matrixStrDebugMsg(
"Warning: Cert did not pass default validation checks\n", NULL);
/*
If there is no user callback, fail on validation check because there
will be no intervention to give it a second look.
*/
if (ssl->sec.validateCert == NULL) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
}
/*
Call the user validation function with the entire cert chain. The user
will proabably want to drill down to the last cert to make sure it
has been properly validated by a CA on this side.
Need to return from user validation space with knowledge
that this is an ANONYMOUS connection.
*/
if ((anonCheck = matrixX509UserValidator(ssl->hsPool, ssl->sec.cert,
ssl->sec.validateCert, ssl->sec.validateCertArg)) < 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Set the flag that is checked by the matrixSslGetAnonStatus API
*/
if (anonCheck == SSL_ALLOW_ANON_CONNECTION) {
ssl->sec.anon = 1;
} else {
ssl->sec.anon = 0;
}
/*
Either a client or server could have been processing the cert as part of
the authentication process. If server, we move to the client key
exchange state.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_SERVER) {
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
} else {
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
}
break;
case SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
if (hsLen != 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can't validate certificate\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_FINISHED;
rc = SSL_PROCESS_DATA;
break;
case SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
if (hsLen < 4) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Certificate Request message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
We only have RSA_SIGN types. Make sure server can accept them
*/
certMatch = 0;
certTypeLen = *c++;
if (end - c < certTypeLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Certificate Request message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
while (certTypeLen-- > 0) {
if (*c++ == RSA_SIGN) {
certMatch = 1;
}
}
if (certMatch == 0) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Can only support RSA_SIGN cert authentication\n",
NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
certChainLen = *c << 8; c++;
certChainLen |= *c; c++;
if (end - c < certChainLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid Certificate Request message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
Check the passed in DNs against our cert issuer to see if they match.
Only supporting a single cert on the client side.
*/
ssl->sec.certMatch = 0;
while (certChainLen > 0) {
certLen = *c << 8; c++;
certLen |= *c; c++;
if (end - c < certLen) {
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
matrixStrDebugMsg("Invalid CertificateRequest message\n", NULL);
return SSL_ERROR;
}
c += certLen;
certChainLen -= (2 + certLen);
}
ssl->hsState = SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
break;
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
case SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return SSL_ERROR;
default:
ssl->err = SSL_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return SSL_ERROR;
}
/*
if we've got more data in the record, the sender has packed
multiple handshake messages in one record. Parse the next one.
*/
if (c < end) {
goto parseHandshake;
}
return rc;
}
