示例#1
0
文件: backtrace.c 项目: 80Z/Stealth
/** Log a message <b>msg</b> at <b>severity</b> in <b>domain</b>, and follow
 * that with a backtrace log. */
void
log_backtrace(int severity, int domain, const char *msg)
{
  int depth;
  char **symbols;
  int i;

  tor_mutex_acquire(&cb_buf_mutex);

  depth = backtrace(cb_buf, MAX_DEPTH);
  symbols = backtrace_symbols(cb_buf, depth);

  tor_log(severity, domain, "%s. Stack trace:", msg);
  if (!symbols) {
    tor_log(severity, domain, "    Unable to generate backtrace.");
    goto done;
  }
  for (i=0; i < depth; ++i) {
    tor_log(severity, domain, "    %s", symbols[i]);
  }
  free(symbols);

 done:
  tor_mutex_release(&cb_buf_mutex);
}
示例#2
0
/** Log a message <b>msg</b> at <b>severity</b> in <b>domain</b>, and follow
 * that with a backtrace log. */
void
log_backtrace(int severity, int domain, const char *msg)
{
  size_t depth;
  char **symbols;
  size_t i;

  tor_mutex_acquire(&cb_buf_mutex);

  depth = backtrace(cb_buf, MAX_DEPTH);
  symbols = backtrace_symbols(cb_buf, (int)depth);

  tor_log(severity, domain, "%s. Stack trace:", msg);
  if (!symbols) {
    /* LCOV_EXCL_START -- we can't provoke this. */
    tor_log(severity, domain, "    Unable to generate backtrace.");
    goto done;
    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
  }
  for (i=0; i < depth; ++i) {
    tor_log(severity, domain, "    %s", symbols[i]);
  }
  raw_free(symbols);

 done:
  tor_mutex_release(&cb_buf_mutex);
}
示例#3
0
/* XXXX copied from crypto.c */
static void
crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing)
{
  unsigned long err;
  const char *msg, *lib, *func;
  while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
    msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
    lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
    func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
    if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
    if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
    if (!func) func = "(null)";
    if (doing) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)",
              doing, msg, lib, func);
    } else {
      tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error: %s (in %s:%s)",
              msg, lib, func);
    }
  }
}
示例#4
0
文件: meminfo.c 项目: jfrazelle/tor
/** Call the platform malloc info function, and dump the results to the log at
 * level <b>severity</b>.  If no such function exists, do nothing. */
void
tor_log_mallinfo(int severity)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MALLINFO
  struct mallinfo mi;
  memset(&mi, 0, sizeof(mi));
  mi = mallinfo();
  tor_log(severity, LD_MM,
      "mallinfo() said: arena=%d, ordblks=%d, smblks=%d, hblks=%d, "
      "hblkhd=%d, usmblks=%d, fsmblks=%d, uordblks=%d, fordblks=%d, "
      "keepcost=%d",
      mi.arena, mi.ordblks, mi.smblks, mi.hblks,
      mi.hblkhd, mi.usmblks, mi.fsmblks, mi.uordblks, mi.fordblks,
      mi.keepcost);
#else /* !(defined(HAVE_MALLINFO)) */
  (void)severity;
#endif /* defined(HAVE_MALLINFO) */
}
示例#5
0
文件: procmon.c 项目: ageis/tor
/** Libevent callback to poll for the existence of the process
 * monitored by <b>procmon_</b>. */
static void
tor_process_monitor_poll_cb(evutil_socket_t unused1, short unused2,
                            void *procmon_)
{
  tor_process_monitor_t *procmon = (tor_process_monitor_t *)(procmon_);
  int its_dead_jim;

  (void)unused1; (void)unused2;

  tor_assert(procmon != NULL);

#ifdef _WIN32
  if (procmon->poll_hproc) {
    DWORD exit_code;
    if (!GetExitCodeProcess(procmon->hproc, &exit_code)) {
      char *errmsg = format_win32_error(GetLastError());
      log_warn(procmon->log_domain, "Error \"%s\" occurred while polling "
               "handle for monitored process "PID_T_FORMAT"; assuming "
               "it's dead.",
               errmsg, procmon->pid);
      tor_free(errmsg);
      its_dead_jim = 1;
    } else {
      its_dead_jim = (exit_code != STILL_ACTIVE);
    }
  } else {
    /* All we can do is try to open the process, and look at the error
     * code if it fails again. */
    procmon->hproc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE,
                                 FALSE,
                                 procmon->pid);

    if (procmon->hproc != NULL) {
      log_info(procmon->log_domain, "Successfully opened handle to monitored "
               "process "PID_T_FORMAT".",
               procmon->pid);
      its_dead_jim = 0;
      procmon->poll_hproc = 1;
    } else {
      DWORD err_code = GetLastError();
      char *errmsg = format_win32_error(err_code);

      /* When I tested OpenProcess's error codes on Windows 7, I
       * received error code 5 (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) for PIDs of
       * existing processes that I could not open and error code 87
       * (ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER) for PIDs that were not in use.
       * Since the nonexistent-process error code is sane, I'm going
       * to assume that all errors other than ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER
       * mean that the process we are monitoring is still alive. */
      its_dead_jim = (err_code == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER);

      if (!its_dead_jim)
        log_info(procmon->log_domain, "Failed to open handle to monitored "
                 "process "PID_T_FORMAT", and error code %lu (%s) is not "
                 "'invalid parameter' -- assuming the process is still alive.",
                 procmon->pid,
                 err_code, errmsg);

      tor_free(errmsg);
    }
  }
#else /* !(defined(_WIN32)) */
  /* Unix makes this part easy, if a bit racy. */
  its_dead_jim = kill(procmon->pid, 0);
  its_dead_jim = its_dead_jim && (errno == ESRCH);
#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */

  tor_log(its_dead_jim ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO,
      procmon->log_domain, "Monitored process "PID_T_FORMAT" is %s.",
      procmon->pid,
      its_dead_jim ? "dead" : "still alive");

  if (its_dead_jim) {
    procmon->cb(procmon->cb_arg);
  }
}
示例#6
0
/**
 * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
 * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>.  On failure, return
 * NULL; on success return the keypair.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
 * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
 * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>.  Fail if the cert can't be
 * found/created.  To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
 * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
 * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
 * whether we can read the old one or not.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
 * flag when creating the secret key.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
 * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
 * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
 * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
 * secret key unless no public key is found.  Do not return a secret key. (but
 * create and save one if needed).
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_LOAD_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, don't try to load
 * a secret key, no matter what.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
 * and consider encrypting any new secret key.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
 * from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
 * replace them.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
 * refer to the --keygen option.
 *
 * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
 * secret key file, encrypted or not.
 */
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
                      int severity,
                      const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
                      time_t now,
                      time_t lifetime,
                      uint8_t cert_type,
                      struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
{
  char *secret_fname = NULL;
  char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
  char *public_fname = NULL;
  char *cert_fname = NULL;
  const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
  int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
  const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
  const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
  const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
  const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
  const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
  const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
  const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);

  /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
  tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
                      (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));

  char tag[8];
  tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);

  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
  char *got_tag = NULL;
  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));

  if (explicit_fname) {
    secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
    encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
  } else {
    tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
    tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
  }
  tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
  tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);

  /* Try to read the secret key. */
  int have_secret = 0;
  int load_secret = try_to_load &&
    !offline_secret &&
    (!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
  if (load_secret) {
    int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
                                           &got_tag, secret_fname);
    if (rv == 0) {
      have_secret = 1;
      loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
      tor_assert(got_tag);
    } else {
      if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
        tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
                strerror(errno));
        goto err;
      }
    }
  }

  /* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
  int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
  if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
    int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
                                      encrypted_secret_fname);
    if (r > 0) {
      have_secret = 1;
      have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
      tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
      got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
      loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
    } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
              encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
      goto err;
    }
  } else {
    if (try_to_load) {
      /* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
      if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
        have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
    }
  }

  if (have_secret) {
    if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
      goto err;
    }
    /* Derive the public key */
    if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
              loaded_secret_fname);
      goto err;
    }
  }

  /* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
  int found_public = 0;
  if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
    ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
    tor_free(got_tag);
    found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
                                                 &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
    if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
              strerror(errno));
      goto err;
    }
    if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
      goto err;
    }
    if (found_public) {
      if (have_secret) {
        /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
         * the key must match! */
        if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s!  If you are trying "
                  "to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
                  "key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
                  "key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
                  public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
                  loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
          goto err;
        }
      } else {
        /* We only have the public key; better use that. */
        tor_assert(split);
        memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
      }
    } else {
      /* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
       * public key file! */
      if (have_secret) {
        if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
            < 0) {
          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
          goto err;
        } else {
          tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
                  "Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
                  public_fname);
        }
      }
    }
  }

  /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
  if (!have_secret && found_public &&
      !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
    if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
              "but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
              "can enter the passphrase.",
              secret_fname);
    } else {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
              "but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
              (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
              "If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
              "need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
              "Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
              "signing key material?");
    }
    goto err;
  }

  /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
  if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
    if (split) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
              secret_fname, public_fname);
    } else {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
    }
    goto err;
  }

  /* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
   * that's an error */
  if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
    tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
            "but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
    goto err;
  }

  /* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
  if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
    tor_free(keypair);
    keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
                         cert_type, &cert);
    if (!keypair) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
      goto err;
    }
    created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
  }

  /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
   * we just created it. */
  if (created_sk || (have_secret && get_options()->change_key_passphrase)) {
    if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
                         encrypt_key,
                         secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
        ||
        (split &&
         ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
        ||
        (cert &&
         crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
                                 tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
      goto err;
    }
    goto done;
  }

  /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
    goto done;

  /* Read a cert. */
  tor_free(got_tag);
  uint8_t certbuf[256];
  ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
                 cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
                 &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
  if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
    cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);

  /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
  int bad_cert = 0;

  if (! cert) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
    bad_cert = 1;
  } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
                        ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
    bad_cert = 1;
  } else if (signing_key &&
             tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate");
    bad_cert = 1;
  } else if (cert->cert_expired) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
    bad_cert = 1;
  } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
             ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
    bad_cert = 1;
  }

  if (bad_cert) {
    tor_cert_free(cert);
    cert = NULL;
  }

  /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
  if (cert)
    goto done;

  /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
  if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
    goto err;
  }

  /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
  cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
                         &keypair->pubkey,
                         now, lifetime,
                         cert_flags);

  if (! cert) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
    goto err;
  }

  /* Write it to disk. */
  created_cert = 1;
  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
                             tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
    goto err;
  }

 done:
  if (cert_out)
    *cert_out = cert;
  else
    tor_cert_free(cert);

  goto cleanup;

 err:
  if (keypair)
    memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
  tor_free(keypair);
  tor_cert_free(cert);
  if (cert_out)
    *cert_out = NULL;
  if (created_sk)
    unlink(secret_fname);
  if (created_pk)
    unlink(public_fname);
  if (created_cert)
    unlink(cert_fname);

 cleanup:
  tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
  tor_free(secret_fname);
  tor_free(public_fname);
  tor_free(cert_fname);
  tor_free(got_tag);

  return keypair;
}
示例#7
0
文件: backtrace.c 项目: 80Z/Stealth
void
log_backtrace(int severity, int domain, const char *msg)
{
  tor_log(severity, domain, "%s. (Stack trace not available)", msg);
}
示例#8
0
/** See whether the headers we were built against differ from the library we
 * linked against so much that we're likely to crash.  If so, warn the
 * user. */
void
tor_check_libevent_header_compatibility(void)
{
  (void) le_versions_compatibility;
  (void) tor_decode_libevent_version;

  /* In libevent versions before 2.0, it's hard to keep binary compatibility
   * between upgrades, and unpleasant to detect when the version we compiled
   * against is unlike the version we have linked against. Here's how. */
#if defined(HEADER_VERSION) && defined(HAVE_EVENT_GET_VERSION)
  /* We have a header-file version and a function-call version. Easy. */
  if (strcmp(HEADER_VERSION, event_get_version())) {
    le_version_t v1, v2;
    int compat1 = -1, compat2 = -1;
    int verybad;
    v1 = tor_decode_libevent_version(HEADER_VERSION);
    v2 = tor_decode_libevent_version(event_get_version());
    compat1 = le_versions_compatibility(v1);
    compat2 = le_versions_compatibility(v2);

    verybad = compat1 != compat2;

    tor_log(verybad ? LOG_WARN : LOG_NOTICE,
        LD_GENERAL, "We were compiled with headers from version %s "
        "of Libevent, but we're using a Libevent library that says it's "
        "version %s.", HEADER_VERSION, event_get_version());
    if (verybad)
      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "This will almost certainly make Tor crash.");
    else
      log_info(LD_GENERAL, "I think these versions are binary-compatible.");
  }
#elif defined(HAVE_EVENT_GET_VERSION)
  /* event_get_version but no _EVENT_VERSION.  We might be in 1.4.0-beta or
     earlier, where that's normal.  To see whether we were compiled with an
     earlier version, let's see whether the struct event defines MIN_HEAP_IDX.
  */
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_EVENT_MIN_HEAP_IDX
  /* The header files are 1.4.0-beta or later. If the version is not
   * 1.4.0-beta, we are incompatible. */
  {
    if (strcmp(event_get_version(), "1.4.0-beta")) {
      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "It's a little hard to tell, but you seem to have "
               "Libevent 1.4.0-beta header files, whereas you have linked "
               "against Libevent %s.  This will probably make Tor crash.",
               event_get_version());
    }
  }
#else
  /* Our headers are 1.3e or earlier. If the library version is not 1.4.x or
     later, we're probably fine. */
  {
    const char *v = event_get_version();
    if ((v[0] == '1' && v[2] == '.' && v[3] > '3') || v[0] > '1') {
      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "It's a little hard to tell, but you seem to have "
               "Libevent header file from 1.3e or earlier, whereas you have "
               "linked against Libevent %s.  This will probably make Tor "
               "crash.", event_get_version());
    }
  }
#endif

#elif defined(HEADER_VERSION)
#warn "_EVENT_VERSION is defined but not get_event_version(): Libevent is odd."
#else
  /* Your libevent is ancient. */
#endif
}