/* * System call to query whether the process is in capability mode. */ int sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap) { u_int i; i = (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) ? 1 : 0; return (copyout(&i, uap->modep, sizeof(i))); }
int sysarch(struct thread *td, struct sysarch_args *uap) { int error; #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE /* * When adding new operations, add a new case statement here to * explicitly indicate whether or not the operation is safe to * perform in capability mode. */ if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) { switch (uap->op) { case ARM_SYNC_ICACHE: case ARM_DRAIN_WRITEBUF: case ARM_SET_TP: case ARM_GET_TP: break; default: #ifdef KTRACE if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_CAPFAIL)) ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_SYSCALL, NULL, NULL); #endif return (ECAPMODE); } } #endif switch (uap->op) { case ARM_SYNC_ICACHE: error = arm32_sync_icache(td, uap->parms); break; case ARM_DRAIN_WRITEBUF: error = arm32_drain_writebuf(td, uap->parms); break; case ARM_SET_TP: error = arm32_set_tp(td, uap->parms); break; case ARM_GET_TP: error = arm32_get_tp(td, uap->parms); break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } return (error); }
/* * System call to enter capability mode for the process. */ int sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap) { struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; struct proc *p; if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) return (0); newcred = crget(); p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred); newcred->cr_flags |= CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE; proc_set_cred(p, newcred); PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); }
int sysarch(struct thread *td, struct sysarch_args *uap) { int error; #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE /* * When adding new operations, add a new case statement here to * explicitly indicate whether or not the operation is safe to * perform in capability mode. */ if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) { switch (uap->op) { case SPARC_SIGTRAMP_INSTALL: case SPARC_UTRAP_INSTALL: break; default: #ifdef KTRACE if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_CAPFAIL)) ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_SYSCALL, NULL, NULL); #endif return (ECAPMODE); } } #endif mtx_lock(&Giant); switch (uap->op) { case SPARC_SIGTRAMP_INSTALL: error = sparc_sigtramp_install(td, uap->parms); break; case SPARC_UTRAP_INSTALL: error = sparc_utrap_install(td, uap->parms); break; default: error = EINVAL; break; } mtx_unlock(&Giant); return (error); }
static inline int syscallenter(struct thread *td, struct syscall_args *sa) { struct proc *p; int error, traced; PCPU_INC(cnt.v_syscall); p = td->td_proc; td->td_pticks = 0; if (td->td_ucred != p->p_ucred) cred_update_thread(td); if (p->p_flag & P_TRACED) { traced = 1; PROC_LOCK(p); td->td_dbgflags &= ~TDB_USERWR; td->td_dbgflags |= TDB_SCE; PROC_UNLOCK(p); } else traced = 0; error = (p->p_sysent->sv_fetch_syscall_args)(td, sa); #ifdef KTRACE if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_SYSCALL)) ktrsyscall(sa->code, sa->narg, sa->args); #endif CTR6(KTR_SYSC, "syscall: td=%p pid %d %s (%#lx, %#lx, %#lx)", td, td->td_proc->p_pid, syscallname(p, sa->code), sa->args[0], sa->args[1], sa->args[2]); if (error == 0) { STOPEVENT(p, S_SCE, sa->narg); if (p->p_flag & P_TRACED && p->p_stops & S_PT_SCE) { PROC_LOCK(p); ptracestop((td), SIGTRAP); PROC_UNLOCK(p); } if (td->td_dbgflags & TDB_USERWR) { /* * Reread syscall number and arguments if * debugger modified registers or memory. */ error = (p->p_sysent->sv_fetch_syscall_args)(td, sa); #ifdef KTRACE if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_SYSCALL)) ktrsyscall(sa->code, sa->narg, sa->args); #endif if (error != 0) goto retval; } #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE /* * In capability mode, we only allow access to system calls * flagged with SYF_CAPENABLED. */ if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td) && !(sa->callp->sy_flags & SYF_CAPENABLED)) { error = ECAPMODE; goto retval; } #endif error = syscall_thread_enter(td, sa->callp); if (error != 0) goto retval; #ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS /* * If the systrace module has registered it's probe * callback and if there is a probe active for the * syscall 'entry', process the probe. */ if (systrace_probe_func != NULL && sa->callp->sy_entry != 0) (*systrace_probe_func)(sa->callp->sy_entry, sa->code, sa->callp, sa->args, 0); #endif AUDIT_SYSCALL_ENTER(sa->code, td); error = (sa->callp->sy_call)(td, sa->args); AUDIT_SYSCALL_EXIT(error, td); /* Save the latest error return value. */ td->td_errno = error; #ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS /* * If the systrace module has registered it's probe * callback and if there is a probe active for the * syscall 'return', process the probe. */ if (systrace_probe_func != NULL && sa->callp->sy_return != 0) (*systrace_probe_func)(sa->callp->sy_return, sa->code, sa->callp, NULL, (error) ? -1 : td->td_retval[0]); #endif syscall_thread_exit(td, sa->callp); CTR4(KTR_SYSC, "syscall: p=%p error=%d return %#lx %#lx", p, error, td->td_retval[0], td->td_retval[1]); } retval: if (traced) { PROC_LOCK(p); td->td_dbgflags &= ~TDB_SCE; PROC_UNLOCK(p); } (p->p_sysent->sv_set_syscall_retval)(td, error); return (error); }
/* System calls. */ int sys_shm_open(struct thread *td, struct shm_open_args *uap) { struct filedesc *fdp; struct shmfd *shmfd; struct file *fp; char *path; Fnv32_t fnv; mode_t cmode; int fd, error; #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE /* * shm_open(2) is only allowed for anonymous objects. */ if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td) && (uap->path != SHM_ANON)) return (ECAPMODE); #endif if ((uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY && (uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDWR) return (EINVAL); if ((uap->flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC)) != 0) return (EINVAL); fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd; cmode = (uap->mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ACCESSPERMS; error = falloc(td, &fp, &fd, 0); if (error) return (error); /* A SHM_ANON path pointer creates an anonymous object. */ if (uap->path == SHM_ANON) { /* A read-only anonymous object is pointless. */ if ((uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) { fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td); fdrop(fp, td); return (EINVAL); } shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode); } else { path = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_SHMFD, M_WAITOK); error = copyinstr(uap->path, path, MAXPATHLEN, NULL); /* Require paths to start with a '/' character. */ if (error == 0 && path[0] != '/') error = EINVAL; if (error) { fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td); fdrop(fp, td); free(path, M_SHMFD); return (error); } fnv = fnv_32_str(path, FNV1_32_INIT); sx_xlock(&shm_dict_lock); shmfd = shm_lookup(path, fnv); if (shmfd == NULL) { /* Object does not yet exist, create it if requested. */ if (uap->flags & O_CREAT) { #ifdef MAC error = mac_posixshm_check_create(td->td_ucred, path); if (error == 0) { #endif shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode); shm_insert(path, fnv, shmfd); #ifdef MAC } #endif } else { free(path, M_SHMFD); error = ENOENT; } } else { /* * Object already exists, obtain a new * reference if requested and permitted. */ free(path, M_SHMFD); if ((uap->flags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) error = EEXIST; else { #ifdef MAC error = mac_posixshm_check_open(td->td_ucred, shmfd, FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE)); if (error == 0) #endif error = shm_access(shmfd, td->td_ucred, FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE)); } /* * Truncate the file back to zero length if * O_TRUNC was specified and the object was * opened with read/write. */ if (error == 0 && (uap->flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_TRUNC)) == (O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)) { #ifdef MAC error = mac_posixshm_check_truncate( td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred, shmfd); if (error == 0) #endif shm_dotruncate(shmfd, 0); } if (error == 0) shm_hold(shmfd); } sx_xunlock(&shm_dict_lock); if (error) { fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td); fdrop(fp, td); return (error); } } finit(fp, FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE), DTYPE_SHM, shmfd, &shm_ops); FILEDESC_XLOCK(fdp); if (fdp->fd_ofiles[fd] == fp) fdp->fd_ofileflags[fd] |= UF_EXCLOSE; FILEDESC_XUNLOCK(fdp); td->td_retval[0] = fd; fdrop(fp, td); return (0); }
/* * In-kernel implementation of execve(). All arguments are assumed to be * userspace pointers from the passed thread. */ static int do_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args, struct mac *mac_p) { struct proc *p = td->td_proc; struct nameidata nd; struct ucred *oldcred; struct uidinfo *euip = NULL; register_t *stack_base; int error, i; struct image_params image_params, *imgp; struct vattr attr; int (*img_first)(struct image_params *); struct pargs *oldargs = NULL, *newargs = NULL; struct sigacts *oldsigacts = NULL, *newsigacts = NULL; #ifdef KTRACE struct vnode *tracevp = NULL; struct ucred *tracecred = NULL; #endif struct vnode *oldtextvp = NULL, *newtextvp; int credential_changing; int textset; #ifdef MAC struct label *interpvplabel = NULL; int will_transition; #endif #ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS struct pmckern_procexec pe; #endif static const char fexecv_proc_title[] = "(fexecv)"; imgp = &image_params; /* * Lock the process and set the P_INEXEC flag to indicate that * it should be left alone until we're done here. This is * necessary to avoid race conditions - e.g. in ptrace() - * that might allow a local user to illicitly obtain elevated * privileges. */ PROC_LOCK(p); KASSERT((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) == 0, ("%s(): process already has P_INEXEC flag", __func__)); p->p_flag |= P_INEXEC; PROC_UNLOCK(p); /* * Initialize part of the common data */ bzero(imgp, sizeof(*imgp)); imgp->proc = p; imgp->attr = &attr; imgp->args = args; oldcred = p->p_ucred; #ifdef MAC error = mac_execve_enter(imgp, mac_p); if (error) goto exec_fail; #endif /* * Translate the file name. namei() returns a vnode pointer * in ni_vp among other things. * * XXXAUDIT: It would be desirable to also audit the name of the * interpreter if this is an interpreted binary. */ if (args->fname != NULL) { NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, ISOPEN | LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW | SAVENAME | AUDITVNODE1, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->fname, td); } SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec, args->fname); interpret: if (args->fname != NULL) { #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE /* * While capability mode can't reach this point via direct * path arguments to execve(), we also don't allow * interpreters to be used in capability mode (for now). * Catch indirect lookups and return a permissions error. */ if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) { error = ECAPMODE; goto exec_fail; } #endif error = namei(&nd); if (error) goto exec_fail; newtextvp = nd.ni_vp; imgp->vp = newtextvp; } else { AUDIT_ARG_FD(args->fd); /* * Descriptors opened only with O_EXEC or O_RDONLY are allowed. */ error = fgetvp_exec(td, args->fd, &cap_fexecve_rights, &newtextvp); if (error) goto exec_fail; vn_lock(newtextvp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(newtextvp); imgp->vp = newtextvp; } /* * Check file permissions (also 'opens' file) */ error = exec_check_permissions(imgp); if (error) goto exec_fail_dealloc; imgp->object = imgp->vp->v_object; if (imgp->object != NULL) vm_object_reference(imgp->object); /* * Set VV_TEXT now so no one can write to the executable while we're * activating it. * * Remember if this was set before and unset it in case this is not * actually an executable image. */ textset = VOP_IS_TEXT(imgp->vp); VOP_SET_TEXT(imgp->vp); error = exec_map_first_page(imgp); if (error) goto exec_fail_dealloc; imgp->proc->p_osrel = 0; imgp->proc->p_fctl0 = 0; /* * Implement image setuid/setgid. * * Determine new credentials before attempting image activators * so that it can be used by process_exec handlers to determine * credential/setid changes. * * Don't honor setuid/setgid if the filesystem prohibits it or if * the process is being traced. * * We disable setuid/setgid/etc in capability mode on the basis * that most setugid applications are not written with that * environment in mind, and will therefore almost certainly operate * incorrectly. In principle there's no reason that setugid * applications might not be useful in capability mode, so we may want * to reconsider this conservative design choice in the future. * * XXXMAC: For the time being, use NOSUID to also prohibit * transitions on the file system. */ credential_changing = 0; credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) && oldcred->cr_uid != attr.va_uid; credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID) && oldcred->cr_gid != attr.va_gid; #ifdef MAC will_transition = mac_vnode_execve_will_transition(oldcred, imgp->vp, interpvplabel, imgp); credential_changing |= will_transition; #endif /* Don't inherit PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL value if setuid/setgid. */ if (credential_changing) imgp->proc->p_pdeathsig = 0; if (credential_changing && #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE ((oldcred->cr_flags & CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE) == 0) && #endif (imgp->vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) == 0 && (p->p_flag & P_TRACED) == 0) { imgp->credential_setid = true; VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred); if (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) { euip = uifind(attr.va_uid); change_euid(imgp->newcred, euip); } vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); if (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID) change_egid(imgp->newcred, attr.va_gid); /* * Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior. * * XXXMAC: Note that the current logic will save the * uid and gid if a MAC domain transition occurs, even * though maybe it shouldn't. */ change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid); change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid); } else { /* * Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior. * * XXX: It's not clear that the existing behavior is * POSIX-compliant. A number of sources indicate that the * saved uid/gid should only be updated if the new ruid is * not equal to the old ruid, or the new euid is not equal * to the old euid and the new euid is not equal to the old * ruid. The FreeBSD code always updates the saved uid/gid. * Also, this code uses the new (replaced) euid and egid as * the source, which may or may not be the right ones to use. */ if (oldcred->cr_svuid != oldcred->cr_uid || oldcred->cr_svgid != oldcred->cr_gid) { VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred); vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid); change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid); } } /* The new credentials are installed into the process later. */ /* * Do the best to calculate the full path to the image file. */ if (args->fname != NULL && args->fname[0] == '/') imgp->execpath = args->fname; else { VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); if (vn_fullpath(td, imgp->vp, &imgp->execpath, &imgp->freepath) != 0) imgp->execpath = args->fname; vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); } /* * If the current process has a special image activator it * wants to try first, call it. For example, emulating shell * scripts differently. */ error = -1; if ((img_first = imgp->proc->p_sysent->sv_imgact_try) != NULL) error = img_first(imgp); /* * Loop through the list of image activators, calling each one. * An activator returns -1 if there is no match, 0 on success, * and an error otherwise. */ for (i = 0; error == -1 && execsw[i]; ++i) { if (execsw[i]->ex_imgact == NULL || execsw[i]->ex_imgact == img_first) { continue; } error = (*execsw[i]->ex_imgact)(imgp); } if (error) { if (error == -1) { if (textset == 0) VOP_UNSET_TEXT(imgp->vp); error = ENOEXEC; } goto exec_fail_dealloc; } /* * Special interpreter operation, cleanup and loop up to try to * activate the interpreter. */ if (imgp->interpreted) { exec_unmap_first_page(imgp); /* * VV_TEXT needs to be unset for scripts. There is a short * period before we determine that something is a script where * VV_TEXT will be set. The vnode lock is held over this * entire period so nothing should illegitimately be blocked. */ VOP_UNSET_TEXT(imgp->vp); /* free name buffer and old vnode */ if (args->fname != NULL) NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); #ifdef MAC mac_execve_interpreter_enter(newtextvp, &interpvplabel); #endif if (imgp->opened) { VOP_CLOSE(newtextvp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td); imgp->opened = 0; } vput(newtextvp); vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object); imgp->object = NULL; imgp->credential_setid = false; if (imgp->newcred != NULL) { crfree(imgp->newcred); imgp->newcred = NULL; } imgp->execpath = NULL; free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP); imgp->freepath = NULL; /* set new name to that of the interpreter */ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW | SAVENAME, UIO_SYSSPACE, imgp->interpreter_name, td); args->fname = imgp->interpreter_name; goto interpret; } /* * NB: We unlock the vnode here because it is believed that none * of the sv_copyout_strings/sv_fixup operations require the vnode. */ VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); if (disallow_high_osrel && P_OSREL_MAJOR(p->p_osrel) > P_OSREL_MAJOR(__FreeBSD_version)) { error = ENOEXEC; uprintf("Osrel %d for image %s too high\n", p->p_osrel, imgp->execpath != NULL ? imgp->execpath : "<unresolved>"); vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); goto exec_fail_dealloc; } /* ABI enforces the use of Capsicum. Switch into capabilities mode. */ if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_CAPSICUM)) sys_cap_enter(td, NULL); /* * Copy out strings (args and env) and initialize stack base. */ stack_base = (*p->p_sysent->sv_copyout_strings)(imgp); /* * Stack setup. */ error = (*p->p_sysent->sv_fixup)(&stack_base, imgp); if (error != 0) { vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); goto exec_fail_dealloc; } if (args->fdp != NULL) { /* Install a brand new file descriptor table. */ fdinstall_remapped(td, args->fdp); args->fdp = NULL; } else { /* * Keep on using the existing file descriptor table. For * security and other reasons, the file descriptor table * cannot be shared after an exec. */ fdunshare(td); /* close files on exec */ fdcloseexec(td); } /* * Malloc things before we need locks. */ i = exec_args_get_begin_envv(imgp->args) - imgp->args->begin_argv; /* Cache arguments if they fit inside our allowance */ if (ps_arg_cache_limit >= i + sizeof(struct pargs)) { newargs = pargs_alloc(i); bcopy(imgp->args->begin_argv, newargs->ar_args, i); } /* * For security and other reasons, signal handlers cannot * be shared after an exec. The new process gets a copy of the old * handlers. In execsigs(), the new process will have its signals * reset. */ if (sigacts_shared(p->p_sigacts)) { oldsigacts = p->p_sigacts; newsigacts = sigacts_alloc(); sigacts_copy(newsigacts, oldsigacts); } vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); PROC_LOCK(p); if (oldsigacts) p->p_sigacts = newsigacts; /* Stop profiling */ stopprofclock(p); /* reset caught signals */ execsigs(p); /* name this process - nameiexec(p, ndp) */ bzero(p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm)); if (args->fname) bcopy(nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, p->p_comm, min(nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen, MAXCOMLEN)); else if (vn_commname(newtextvp, p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm)) != 0) bcopy(fexecv_proc_title, p->p_comm, sizeof(fexecv_proc_title)); bcopy(p->p_comm, td->td_name, sizeof(td->td_name)); #ifdef KTR sched_clear_tdname(td); #endif /* * mark as execed, wakeup the process that vforked (if any) and tell * it that it now has its own resources back */ p->p_flag |= P_EXEC; if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE_EXEC) == 0) p->p_flag2 &= ~P2_NOTRACE; if (p->p_flag & P_PPWAIT) { p->p_flag &= ~(P_PPWAIT | P_PPTRACE); cv_broadcast(&p->p_pwait); /* STOPs are no longer ignored, arrange for AST */ signotify(td); } /* * Implement image setuid/setgid installation. */ if (imgp->credential_setid) { /* * Turn off syscall tracing for set-id programs, except for * root. Record any set-id flags first to make sure that * we do not regain any tracing during a possible block. */ setsugid(p); #ifdef KTRACE if (p->p_tracecred != NULL && priv_check_cred(p->p_tracecred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED)) ktrprocexec(p, &tracecred, &tracevp); #endif /* * Close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs, * then make sure file descriptors 0..2 are in use. * * Both fdsetugidsafety() and fdcheckstd() may call functions * taking sleepable locks, so temporarily drop our locks. */ PROC_UNLOCK(p); VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); fdsetugidsafety(td); error = fdcheckstd(td); vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); if (error != 0) goto exec_fail_dealloc; PROC_LOCK(p); #ifdef MAC if (will_transition) { mac_vnode_execve_transition(oldcred, imgp->newcred, imgp->vp, interpvplabel, imgp); } #endif } else { if (oldcred->cr_uid == oldcred->cr_ruid && oldcred->cr_gid == oldcred->cr_rgid) p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID; } /* * Set the new credentials. */ if (imgp->newcred != NULL) { proc_set_cred(p, imgp->newcred); crfree(oldcred); oldcred = NULL; } /* * Store the vp for use in procfs. This vnode was referenced by namei * or fgetvp_exec. */ oldtextvp = p->p_textvp; p->p_textvp = newtextvp; #ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS /* * Tell the DTrace fasttrap provider about the exec if it * has declared an interest. */ if (dtrace_fasttrap_exec) dtrace_fasttrap_exec(p); #endif /* * Notify others that we exec'd, and clear the P_INEXEC flag * as we're now a bona fide freshly-execed process. */ KNOTE_LOCKED(p->p_klist, NOTE_EXEC); p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC; /* clear "fork but no exec" flag, as we _are_ execing */ p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK; /* * Free any previous argument cache and replace it with * the new argument cache, if any. */ oldargs = p->p_args; p->p_args = newargs; newargs = NULL; PROC_UNLOCK(p); #ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS /* * Check if system-wide sampling is in effect or if the * current process is using PMCs. If so, do exec() time * processing. This processing needs to happen AFTER the * P_INEXEC flag is cleared. */ if (PMC_SYSTEM_SAMPLING_ACTIVE() || PMC_PROC_IS_USING_PMCS(p)) { VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); pe.pm_credentialschanged = credential_changing; pe.pm_entryaddr = imgp->entry_addr; PMC_CALL_HOOK_X(td, PMC_FN_PROCESS_EXEC, (void *) &pe); vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY); } #endif /* Set values passed into the program in registers. */ (*p->p_sysent->sv_setregs)(td, imgp, (u_long)(uintptr_t)stack_base); vfs_mark_atime(imgp->vp, td->td_ucred); SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__success, args->fname); exec_fail_dealloc: if (imgp->firstpage != NULL) exec_unmap_first_page(imgp); if (imgp->vp != NULL) { if (args->fname) NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF); if (imgp->opened) VOP_CLOSE(imgp->vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td); if (error != 0) vput(imgp->vp); else VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0); } if (imgp->object != NULL) vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object); free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP); if (error == 0) { if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC) { PROC_LOCK(p); if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC) td->td_dbgflags |= TDB_EXEC; PROC_UNLOCK(p); } /* * Stop the process here if its stop event mask has * the S_EXEC bit set. */ STOPEVENT(p, S_EXEC, 0); } else { exec_fail: /* we're done here, clear P_INEXEC */ PROC_LOCK(p); p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC; PROC_UNLOCK(p); SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__failure, error); } if (imgp->newcred != NULL && oldcred != NULL) crfree(imgp->newcred); #ifdef MAC mac_execve_exit(imgp); mac_execve_interpreter_exit(interpvplabel); #endif exec_free_args(args); /* * Handle deferred decrement of ref counts. */ if (oldtextvp != NULL) vrele(oldtextvp); #ifdef KTRACE if (tracevp != NULL) vrele(tracevp); if (tracecred != NULL) crfree(tracecred); #endif pargs_drop(oldargs); pargs_drop(newargs); if (oldsigacts != NULL) sigacts_free(oldsigacts); if (euip != NULL) uifree(euip); if (error && imgp->vmspace_destroyed) { /* sorry, no more process anymore. exit gracefully */ exit1(td, 0, SIGABRT); /* NOT REACHED */ } #ifdef KTRACE if (error == 0) ktrprocctor(p); #endif /* * We don't want cpu_set_syscall_retval() to overwrite any of * the register values put in place by exec_setregs(). * Implementations of cpu_set_syscall_retval() will leave * registers unmodified when returning EJUSTRETURN. */ return (error == 0 ? EJUSTRETURN : error); }