/*
* System call to query whether the process is in capability mode.
*/
int
sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap)
{
u_int i;
i = (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) ? 1 : 0;
return (copyout(&i, uap->modep, sizeof(i)));
}
int
sysarch(struct thread *td, struct sysarch_args *uap)
{
int error;
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* When adding new operations, add a new case statement here to
* explicitly indicate whether or not the operation is safe to
* perform in capability mode.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) {
switch (uap->op) {
case ARM_SYNC_ICACHE:
case ARM_DRAIN_WRITEBUF:
case ARM_SET_TP:
case ARM_GET_TP:
break;
default:
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_CAPFAIL))
ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_SYSCALL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
return (ECAPMODE);
}
}
#endif
switch (uap->op) {
case ARM_SYNC_ICACHE:
error = arm32_sync_icache(td, uap->parms);
break;
case ARM_DRAIN_WRITEBUF:
error = arm32_drain_writebuf(td, uap->parms);
break;
case ARM_SET_TP:
error = arm32_set_tp(td, uap->parms);
break;
case ARM_GET_TP:
error = arm32_get_tp(td, uap->parms);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
return (error);
}
/*
* System call to enter capability mode for the process.
*/
int
sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap)
{
struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred;
struct proc *p;
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td))
return (0);
newcred = crget();
p = td->td_proc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = crcopysafe(p, newcred);
newcred->cr_flags |= CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE;
proc_set_cred(p, newcred);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
}
int
sysarch(struct thread *td, struct sysarch_args *uap)
{
int error;
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* When adding new operations, add a new case statement here to
* explicitly indicate whether or not the operation is safe to
* perform in capability mode.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) {
switch (uap->op) {
case SPARC_SIGTRAMP_INSTALL:
case SPARC_UTRAP_INSTALL:
break;
default:
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_CAPFAIL))
ktrcapfail(CAPFAIL_SYSCALL, NULL, NULL);
#endif
return (ECAPMODE);
}
}
#endif
mtx_lock(&Giant);
switch (uap->op) {
case SPARC_SIGTRAMP_INSTALL:
error = sparc_sigtramp_install(td, uap->parms);
break;
case SPARC_UTRAP_INSTALL:
error = sparc_utrap_install(td, uap->parms);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
return (error);
}
static inline int
syscallenter(struct thread *td, struct syscall_args *sa)
{
struct proc *p;
int error, traced;
PCPU_INC(cnt.v_syscall);
p = td->td_proc;
td->td_pticks = 0;
if (td->td_ucred != p->p_ucred)
cred_update_thread(td);
if (p->p_flag & P_TRACED) {
traced = 1;
PROC_LOCK(p);
td->td_dbgflags &= ~TDB_USERWR;
td->td_dbgflags |= TDB_SCE;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
} else
traced = 0;
error = (p->p_sysent->sv_fetch_syscall_args)(td, sa);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_SYSCALL))
ktrsyscall(sa->code, sa->narg, sa->args);
#endif
CTR6(KTR_SYSC,
"syscall: td=%p pid %d %s (%#lx, %#lx, %#lx)",
td, td->td_proc->p_pid, syscallname(p, sa->code),
sa->args[0], sa->args[1], sa->args[2]);
if (error == 0) {
STOPEVENT(p, S_SCE, sa->narg);
if (p->p_flag & P_TRACED && p->p_stops & S_PT_SCE) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
ptracestop((td), SIGTRAP);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
if (td->td_dbgflags & TDB_USERWR) {
/*
* Reread syscall number and arguments if
* debugger modified registers or memory.
*/
error = (p->p_sysent->sv_fetch_syscall_args)(td, sa);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (KTRPOINT(td, KTR_SYSCALL))
ktrsyscall(sa->code, sa->narg, sa->args);
#endif
if (error != 0)
goto retval;
}
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* In capability mode, we only allow access to system calls
* flagged with SYF_CAPENABLED.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td) &&
!(sa->callp->sy_flags & SYF_CAPENABLED)) {
error = ECAPMODE;
goto retval;
}
#endif
error = syscall_thread_enter(td, sa->callp);
if (error != 0)
goto retval;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
/*
* If the systrace module has registered it's probe
* callback and if there is a probe active for the
* syscall 'entry', process the probe.
*/
if (systrace_probe_func != NULL && sa->callp->sy_entry != 0)
(*systrace_probe_func)(sa->callp->sy_entry, sa->code,
sa->callp, sa->args, 0);
#endif
AUDIT_SYSCALL_ENTER(sa->code, td);
error = (sa->callp->sy_call)(td, sa->args);
AUDIT_SYSCALL_EXIT(error, td);
/* Save the latest error return value. */
td->td_errno = error;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
/*
* If the systrace module has registered it's probe
* callback and if there is a probe active for the
* syscall 'return', process the probe.
*/
if (systrace_probe_func != NULL && sa->callp->sy_return != 0)
(*systrace_probe_func)(sa->callp->sy_return, sa->code,
sa->callp, NULL, (error) ? -1 : td->td_retval[0]);
#endif
syscall_thread_exit(td, sa->callp);
CTR4(KTR_SYSC, "syscall: p=%p error=%d return %#lx %#lx",
p, error, td->td_retval[0], td->td_retval[1]);
}
retval:
if (traced) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
td->td_dbgflags &= ~TDB_SCE;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
(p->p_sysent->sv_set_syscall_retval)(td, error);
return (error);
}
/* System calls. */
int
sys_shm_open(struct thread *td, struct shm_open_args *uap)
{
struct filedesc *fdp;
struct shmfd *shmfd;
struct file *fp;
char *path;
Fnv32_t fnv;
mode_t cmode;
int fd, error;
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* shm_open(2) is only allowed for anonymous objects.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td) && (uap->path != SHM_ANON))
return (ECAPMODE);
#endif
if ((uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY &&
(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDWR)
return (EINVAL);
if ((uap->flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC)) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
cmode = (uap->mode & ~fdp->fd_cmask) & ACCESSPERMS;
error = falloc(td, &fp, &fd, 0);
if (error)
return (error);
/* A SHM_ANON path pointer creates an anonymous object. */
if (uap->path == SHM_ANON) {
/* A read-only anonymous object is pointless. */
if ((uap->flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (EINVAL);
}
shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode);
} else {
path = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_SHMFD, M_WAITOK);
error = copyinstr(uap->path, path, MAXPATHLEN, NULL);
/* Require paths to start with a '/' character. */
if (error == 0 && path[0] != '/')
error = EINVAL;
if (error) {
fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
free(path, M_SHMFD);
return (error);
}
fnv = fnv_32_str(path, FNV1_32_INIT);
sx_xlock(&shm_dict_lock);
shmfd = shm_lookup(path, fnv);
if (shmfd == NULL) {
/* Object does not yet exist, create it if requested. */
if (uap->flags & O_CREAT) {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_create(td->td_ucred,
path);
if (error == 0) {
#endif
shmfd = shm_alloc(td->td_ucred, cmode);
shm_insert(path, fnv, shmfd);
#ifdef MAC
}
#endif
} else {
free(path, M_SHMFD);
error = ENOENT;
}
} else {
/*
* Object already exists, obtain a new
* reference if requested and permitted.
*/
free(path, M_SHMFD);
if ((uap->flags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) ==
(O_CREAT | O_EXCL))
error = EEXIST;
else {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_open(td->td_ucred,
shmfd, FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE));
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = shm_access(shmfd, td->td_ucred,
FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE));
}
/*
* Truncate the file back to zero length if
* O_TRUNC was specified and the object was
* opened with read/write.
*/
if (error == 0 &&
(uap->flags & (O_ACCMODE | O_TRUNC)) ==
(O_RDWR | O_TRUNC)) {
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_posixshm_check_truncate(
td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred, shmfd);
if (error == 0)
#endif
shm_dotruncate(shmfd, 0);
}
if (error == 0)
shm_hold(shmfd);
}
sx_xunlock(&shm_dict_lock);
if (error) {
fdclose(fdp, fp, fd, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
}
finit(fp, FFLAGS(uap->flags & O_ACCMODE), DTYPE_SHM, shmfd, &shm_ops);
FILEDESC_XLOCK(fdp);
if (fdp->fd_ofiles[fd] == fp)
fdp->fd_ofileflags[fd] |= UF_EXCLOSE;
FILEDESC_XUNLOCK(fdp);
td->td_retval[0] = fd;
fdrop(fp, td);
return (0);
}
/*
* In-kernel implementation of execve(). All arguments are assumed to be
* userspace pointers from the passed thread.
*/
static int
do_execve(struct thread *td, struct image_args *args, struct mac *mac_p)
{
struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
struct nameidata nd;
struct ucred *oldcred;
struct uidinfo *euip = NULL;
register_t *stack_base;
int error, i;
struct image_params image_params, *imgp;
struct vattr attr;
int (*img_first)(struct image_params *);
struct pargs *oldargs = NULL, *newargs = NULL;
struct sigacts *oldsigacts = NULL, *newsigacts = NULL;
#ifdef KTRACE
struct vnode *tracevp = NULL;
struct ucred *tracecred = NULL;
#endif
struct vnode *oldtextvp = NULL, *newtextvp;
int credential_changing;
int textset;
#ifdef MAC
struct label *interpvplabel = NULL;
int will_transition;
#endif
#ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS
struct pmckern_procexec pe;
#endif
static const char fexecv_proc_title[] = "(fexecv)";
imgp = &image_params;
/*
* Lock the process and set the P_INEXEC flag to indicate that
* it should be left alone until we're done here. This is
* necessary to avoid race conditions - e.g. in ptrace() -
* that might allow a local user to illicitly obtain elevated
* privileges.
*/
PROC_LOCK(p);
KASSERT((p->p_flag & P_INEXEC) == 0,
("%s(): process already has P_INEXEC flag", __func__));
p->p_flag |= P_INEXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
/*
* Initialize part of the common data
*/
bzero(imgp, sizeof(*imgp));
imgp->proc = p;
imgp->attr = &attr;
imgp->args = args;
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_execve_enter(imgp, mac_p);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
#endif
/*
* Translate the file name. namei() returns a vnode pointer
* in ni_vp among other things.
*
* XXXAUDIT: It would be desirable to also audit the name of the
* interpreter if this is an interpreted binary.
*/
if (args->fname != NULL) {
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, ISOPEN | LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW | SAVENAME
| AUDITVNODE1, UIO_SYSSPACE, args->fname, td);
}
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec, args->fname);
interpret:
if (args->fname != NULL) {
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
/*
* While capability mode can't reach this point via direct
* path arguments to execve(), we also don't allow
* interpreters to be used in capability mode (for now).
* Catch indirect lookups and return a permissions error.
*/
if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) {
error = ECAPMODE;
goto exec_fail;
}
#endif
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
newtextvp = nd.ni_vp;
imgp->vp = newtextvp;
} else {
AUDIT_ARG_FD(args->fd);
/*
* Descriptors opened only with O_EXEC or O_RDONLY are allowed.
*/
error = fgetvp_exec(td, args->fd, &cap_fexecve_rights, &newtextvp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail;
vn_lock(newtextvp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(newtextvp);
imgp->vp = newtextvp;
}
/*
* Check file permissions (also 'opens' file)
*/
error = exec_check_permissions(imgp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
imgp->object = imgp->vp->v_object;
if (imgp->object != NULL)
vm_object_reference(imgp->object);
/*
* Set VV_TEXT now so no one can write to the executable while we're
* activating it.
*
* Remember if this was set before and unset it in case this is not
* actually an executable image.
*/
textset = VOP_IS_TEXT(imgp->vp);
VOP_SET_TEXT(imgp->vp);
error = exec_map_first_page(imgp);
if (error)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
imgp->proc->p_osrel = 0;
imgp->proc->p_fctl0 = 0;
/*
* Implement image setuid/setgid.
*
* Determine new credentials before attempting image activators
* so that it can be used by process_exec handlers to determine
* credential/setid changes.
*
* Don't honor setuid/setgid if the filesystem prohibits it or if
* the process is being traced.
*
* We disable setuid/setgid/etc in capability mode on the basis
* that most setugid applications are not written with that
* environment in mind, and will therefore almost certainly operate
* incorrectly. In principle there's no reason that setugid
* applications might not be useful in capability mode, so we may want
* to reconsider this conservative design choice in the future.
*
* XXXMAC: For the time being, use NOSUID to also prohibit
* transitions on the file system.
*/
credential_changing = 0;
credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) &&
oldcred->cr_uid != attr.va_uid;
credential_changing |= (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID) &&
oldcred->cr_gid != attr.va_gid;
#ifdef MAC
will_transition = mac_vnode_execve_will_transition(oldcred, imgp->vp,
interpvplabel, imgp);
credential_changing |= will_transition;
#endif
/* Don't inherit PROC_PDEATHSIG_CTL value if setuid/setgid. */
if (credential_changing)
imgp->proc->p_pdeathsig = 0;
if (credential_changing &&
#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
((oldcred->cr_flags & CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE) == 0) &&
#endif
(imgp->vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_NOSUID) == 0 &&
(p->p_flag & P_TRACED) == 0) {
imgp->credential_setid = true;
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred);
if (attr.va_mode & S_ISUID) {
euip = uifind(attr.va_uid);
change_euid(imgp->newcred, euip);
}
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
if (attr.va_mode & S_ISGID)
change_egid(imgp->newcred, attr.va_gid);
/*
* Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior.
*
* XXXMAC: Note that the current logic will save the
* uid and gid if a MAC domain transition occurs, even
* though maybe it shouldn't.
*/
change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid);
change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid);
} else {
/*
* Implement correct POSIX saved-id behavior.
*
* XXX: It's not clear that the existing behavior is
* POSIX-compliant. A number of sources indicate that the
* saved uid/gid should only be updated if the new ruid is
* not equal to the old ruid, or the new euid is not equal
* to the old euid and the new euid is not equal to the old
* ruid. The FreeBSD code always updates the saved uid/gid.
* Also, this code uses the new (replaced) euid and egid as
* the source, which may or may not be the right ones to use.
*/
if (oldcred->cr_svuid != oldcred->cr_uid ||
oldcred->cr_svgid != oldcred->cr_gid) {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
imgp->newcred = crdup(oldcred);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
change_svuid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_uid);
change_svgid(imgp->newcred, imgp->newcred->cr_gid);
}
}
/* The new credentials are installed into the process later. */
/*
* Do the best to calculate the full path to the image file.
*/
if (args->fname != NULL && args->fname[0] == '/')
imgp->execpath = args->fname;
else {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
if (vn_fullpath(td, imgp->vp, &imgp->execpath,
&imgp->freepath) != 0)
imgp->execpath = args->fname;
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
}
/*
* If the current process has a special image activator it
* wants to try first, call it. For example, emulating shell
* scripts differently.
*/
error = -1;
if ((img_first = imgp->proc->p_sysent->sv_imgact_try) != NULL)
error = img_first(imgp);
/*
* Loop through the list of image activators, calling each one.
* An activator returns -1 if there is no match, 0 on success,
* and an error otherwise.
*/
for (i = 0; error == -1 && execsw[i]; ++i) {
if (execsw[i]->ex_imgact == NULL ||
execsw[i]->ex_imgact == img_first) {
continue;
}
error = (*execsw[i]->ex_imgact)(imgp);
}
if (error) {
if (error == -1) {
if (textset == 0)
VOP_UNSET_TEXT(imgp->vp);
error = ENOEXEC;
}
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
/*
* Special interpreter operation, cleanup and loop up to try to
* activate the interpreter.
*/
if (imgp->interpreted) {
exec_unmap_first_page(imgp);
/*
* VV_TEXT needs to be unset for scripts. There is a short
* period before we determine that something is a script where
* VV_TEXT will be set. The vnode lock is held over this
* entire period so nothing should illegitimately be blocked.
*/
VOP_UNSET_TEXT(imgp->vp);
/* free name buffer and old vnode */
if (args->fname != NULL)
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
#ifdef MAC
mac_execve_interpreter_enter(newtextvp, &interpvplabel);
#endif
if (imgp->opened) {
VOP_CLOSE(newtextvp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td);
imgp->opened = 0;
}
vput(newtextvp);
vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object);
imgp->object = NULL;
imgp->credential_setid = false;
if (imgp->newcred != NULL) {
crfree(imgp->newcred);
imgp->newcred = NULL;
}
imgp->execpath = NULL;
free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP);
imgp->freepath = NULL;
/* set new name to that of the interpreter */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, LOCKLEAF | FOLLOW | SAVENAME,
UIO_SYSSPACE, imgp->interpreter_name, td);
args->fname = imgp->interpreter_name;
goto interpret;
}
/*
* NB: We unlock the vnode here because it is believed that none
* of the sv_copyout_strings/sv_fixup operations require the vnode.
*/
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
if (disallow_high_osrel &&
P_OSREL_MAJOR(p->p_osrel) > P_OSREL_MAJOR(__FreeBSD_version)) {
error = ENOEXEC;
uprintf("Osrel %d for image %s too high\n", p->p_osrel,
imgp->execpath != NULL ? imgp->execpath : "<unresolved>");
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
/* ABI enforces the use of Capsicum. Switch into capabilities mode. */
if (SV_PROC_FLAG(p, SV_CAPSICUM))
sys_cap_enter(td, NULL);
/*
* Copy out strings (args and env) and initialize stack base.
*/
stack_base = (*p->p_sysent->sv_copyout_strings)(imgp);
/*
* Stack setup.
*/
error = (*p->p_sysent->sv_fixup)(&stack_base, imgp);
if (error != 0) {
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
}
if (args->fdp != NULL) {
/* Install a brand new file descriptor table. */
fdinstall_remapped(td, args->fdp);
args->fdp = NULL;
} else {
/*
* Keep on using the existing file descriptor table. For
* security and other reasons, the file descriptor table
* cannot be shared after an exec.
*/
fdunshare(td);
/* close files on exec */
fdcloseexec(td);
}
/*
* Malloc things before we need locks.
*/
i = exec_args_get_begin_envv(imgp->args) - imgp->args->begin_argv;
/* Cache arguments if they fit inside our allowance */
if (ps_arg_cache_limit >= i + sizeof(struct pargs)) {
newargs = pargs_alloc(i);
bcopy(imgp->args->begin_argv, newargs->ar_args, i);
}
/*
* For security and other reasons, signal handlers cannot
* be shared after an exec. The new process gets a copy of the old
* handlers. In execsigs(), the new process will have its signals
* reset.
*/
if (sigacts_shared(p->p_sigacts)) {
oldsigacts = p->p_sigacts;
newsigacts = sigacts_alloc();
sigacts_copy(newsigacts, oldsigacts);
}
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (oldsigacts)
p->p_sigacts = newsigacts;
/* Stop profiling */
stopprofclock(p);
/* reset caught signals */
execsigs(p);
/* name this process - nameiexec(p, ndp) */
bzero(p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm));
if (args->fname)
bcopy(nd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, p->p_comm,
min(nd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen, MAXCOMLEN));
else if (vn_commname(newtextvp, p->p_comm, sizeof(p->p_comm)) != 0)
bcopy(fexecv_proc_title, p->p_comm, sizeof(fexecv_proc_title));
bcopy(p->p_comm, td->td_name, sizeof(td->td_name));
#ifdef KTR
sched_clear_tdname(td);
#endif
/*
* mark as execed, wakeup the process that vforked (if any) and tell
* it that it now has its own resources back
*/
p->p_flag |= P_EXEC;
if ((p->p_flag2 & P2_NOTRACE_EXEC) == 0)
p->p_flag2 &= ~P2_NOTRACE;
if (p->p_flag & P_PPWAIT) {
p->p_flag &= ~(P_PPWAIT | P_PPTRACE);
cv_broadcast(&p->p_pwait);
/* STOPs are no longer ignored, arrange for AST */
signotify(td);
}
/*
* Implement image setuid/setgid installation.
*/
if (imgp->credential_setid) {
/*
* Turn off syscall tracing for set-id programs, except for
* root. Record any set-id flags first to make sure that
* we do not regain any tracing during a possible block.
*/
setsugid(p);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (p->p_tracecred != NULL &&
priv_check_cred(p->p_tracecred, PRIV_DEBUG_DIFFCRED))
ktrprocexec(p, &tracecred, &tracevp);
#endif
/*
* Close any file descriptors 0..2 that reference procfs,
* then make sure file descriptors 0..2 are in use.
*
* Both fdsetugidsafety() and fdcheckstd() may call functions
* taking sleepable locks, so temporarily drop our locks.
*/
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
fdsetugidsafety(td);
error = fdcheckstd(td);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
if (error != 0)
goto exec_fail_dealloc;
PROC_LOCK(p);
#ifdef MAC
if (will_transition) {
mac_vnode_execve_transition(oldcred, imgp->newcred,
imgp->vp, interpvplabel, imgp);
}
#endif
} else {
if (oldcred->cr_uid == oldcred->cr_ruid &&
oldcred->cr_gid == oldcred->cr_rgid)
p->p_flag &= ~P_SUGID;
}
/*
* Set the new credentials.
*/
if (imgp->newcred != NULL) {
proc_set_cred(p, imgp->newcred);
crfree(oldcred);
oldcred = NULL;
}
/*
* Store the vp for use in procfs. This vnode was referenced by namei
* or fgetvp_exec.
*/
oldtextvp = p->p_textvp;
p->p_textvp = newtextvp;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
/*
* Tell the DTrace fasttrap provider about the exec if it
* has declared an interest.
*/
if (dtrace_fasttrap_exec)
dtrace_fasttrap_exec(p);
#endif
/*
* Notify others that we exec'd, and clear the P_INEXEC flag
* as we're now a bona fide freshly-execed process.
*/
KNOTE_LOCKED(p->p_klist, NOTE_EXEC);
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
/* clear "fork but no exec" flag, as we _are_ execing */
p->p_acflag &= ~AFORK;
/*
* Free any previous argument cache and replace it with
* the new argument cache, if any.
*/
oldargs = p->p_args;
p->p_args = newargs;
newargs = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
#ifdef HWPMC_HOOKS
/*
* Check if system-wide sampling is in effect or if the
* current process is using PMCs. If so, do exec() time
* processing. This processing needs to happen AFTER the
* P_INEXEC flag is cleared.
*/
if (PMC_SYSTEM_SAMPLING_ACTIVE() || PMC_PROC_IS_USING_PMCS(p)) {
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
pe.pm_credentialschanged = credential_changing;
pe.pm_entryaddr = imgp->entry_addr;
PMC_CALL_HOOK_X(td, PMC_FN_PROCESS_EXEC, (void *) &pe);
vn_lock(imgp->vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
}
#endif
/* Set values passed into the program in registers. */
(*p->p_sysent->sv_setregs)(td, imgp, (u_long)(uintptr_t)stack_base);
vfs_mark_atime(imgp->vp, td->td_ucred);
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__success, args->fname);
exec_fail_dealloc:
if (imgp->firstpage != NULL)
exec_unmap_first_page(imgp);
if (imgp->vp != NULL) {
if (args->fname)
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (imgp->opened)
VOP_CLOSE(imgp->vp, FREAD, td->td_ucred, td);
if (error != 0)
vput(imgp->vp);
else
VOP_UNLOCK(imgp->vp, 0);
}
if (imgp->object != NULL)
vm_object_deallocate(imgp->object);
free(imgp->freepath, M_TEMP);
if (error == 0) {
if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
if (p->p_ptevents & PTRACE_EXEC)
td->td_dbgflags |= TDB_EXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
/*
* Stop the process here if its stop event mask has
* the S_EXEC bit set.
*/
STOPEVENT(p, S_EXEC, 0);
} else {
exec_fail:
/* we're done here, clear P_INEXEC */
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_flag &= ~P_INEXEC;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
SDT_PROBE1(proc, , , exec__failure, error);
}
if (imgp->newcred != NULL && oldcred != NULL)
crfree(imgp->newcred);
#ifdef MAC
mac_execve_exit(imgp);
mac_execve_interpreter_exit(interpvplabel);
#endif
exec_free_args(args);
/*
* Handle deferred decrement of ref counts.
*/
if (oldtextvp != NULL)
vrele(oldtextvp);
#ifdef KTRACE
if (tracevp != NULL)
vrele(tracevp);
if (tracecred != NULL)
crfree(tracecred);
#endif
pargs_drop(oldargs);
pargs_drop(newargs);
if (oldsigacts != NULL)
sigacts_free(oldsigacts);
if (euip != NULL)
uifree(euip);
if (error && imgp->vmspace_destroyed) {
/* sorry, no more process anymore. exit gracefully */
exit1(td, 0, SIGABRT);
/* NOT REACHED */
}
#ifdef KTRACE
if (error == 0)
ktrprocctor(p);
#endif
/*
* We don't want cpu_set_syscall_retval() to overwrite any of
* the register values put in place by exec_setregs().
* Implementations of cpu_set_syscall_retval() will leave
* registers unmodified when returning EJUSTRETURN.
*/
return (error == 0 ? EJUSTRETURN : error);
}