bool SSLSocket::verifyKeyprint(const string& expKP, bool allowUntrusted) noexcept { if (!ssl) return true; if (expKP.empty() || expKP.find("/") == string::npos) return allowUntrusted; verifyData.reset(new CryptoManager::SSLVerifyData(allowUntrusted, expKP)); SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, verifyData.get()); SSL_CTX* ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); X509_STORE* store = X509_STORE_new(); bool result = false; int err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); if (ssl_ctx && store) { X509_STORE_CTX* vrfy_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); X509* cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); if (vrfy_ctx && cert && X509_STORE_CTX_init(vrfy_ctx, store, cert, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(vrfy_ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl); X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(vrfy_ctx, SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl_ctx)); int verify_result = 0; if ((verify_result = X509_verify_cert(vrfy_ctx)) >= 0) { err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(vrfy_ctx); // Watch out for weird library errors that might not set the context error code if (err == X509_V_OK && verify_result <= 0) err = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; // This is for people who don't restart their clients and have low expiration time on their cert result = (err == X509_V_OK || err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) || (allowUntrusted && err != X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION); } } if (cert) X509_free(cert); if (vrfy_ctx) X509_STORE_CTX_free(vrfy_ctx); if (store) X509_STORE_free(store); } // KeyPrint is a strong indicator of trust SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err); return result; }
bool SSLSocket::verifyKeyprint(const string& expKP, bool allowUntrusted) noexcept { if(!ssl) return true; if(expKP.empty() || expKP.find("/") == string::npos) return allowUntrusted; verifyData.reset(new CryptoManager::SSLVerifyData(allowUntrusted, expKP)); SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, verifyData.get()); SSL_CTX* ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); X509_STORE* store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); bool result = allowUntrusted; int err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); if(ssl_ctx && store) { X509_STORE_CTX* vrfy_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); X509* cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); if(vrfy_ctx && cert && X509_STORE_CTX_init(vrfy_ctx, store, cert, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) { auto vrfy_cb = SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl_ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(vrfy_ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl); X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(vrfy_ctx, vrfy_cb); if(X509_verify_cert(vrfy_ctx) >= 0) { err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(vrfy_ctx); // This is for people who don't restart their clients and have low expiration time on their cert result = (err == X509_V_OK) || (err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED); } } if(cert) X509_free(cert); if(vrfy_ctx) X509_STORE_CTX_free(vrfy_ctx); } // KeyPrint is a strong indicator of trust (TODO: check that this KeyPrint is mediated by a trusted hub) SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err); return result; }
int ssl_init_ssl_connection(conn_rec *c) { SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; SSL *ssl; SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c); char *vhost_md5; modssl_ctx_t *mctx; server_rec *server; if (!sslconn) { sslconn = ssl_init_connection_ctx(c); } server = sslconn->server; sc = mySrvConfig(server); /* * Seed the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) */ ssl_rand_seed(server, c->pool, SSL_RSCTX_CONNECT, ""); mctx = sslconn->is_proxy ? sc->proxy : sc->server; /* * Create a new SSL connection with the configured server SSL context and * attach this to the socket. Additionally we register this attachment * so we can detach later. */ if (!(ssl = SSL_new(mctx->ssl_ctx))) { ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, "Unable to create a new SSL connection from the SSL " "context"); ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, server); c->aborted = 1; return DECLINED; /* XXX */ } vhost_md5 = ap_md5_binary(c->pool, (unsigned char *)sc->vhost_id, sc->vhost_id_len); if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, (unsigned char *)vhost_md5, APR_MD5_DIGESTSIZE*2)) { ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, "Unable to set session id context to `%s'", vhost_md5); ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, server); c->aborted = 1; return DECLINED; /* XXX */ } SSL_set_app_data(ssl, c); SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, NULL); /* will be request_rec */ sslconn->ssl = ssl; /* * Configure callbacks for SSL connection */ SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpRSA); SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpDH); SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); ssl_io_filter_init(c, ssl); return APR_SUCCESS; }
static int openssl_ssl_set(lua_State*L) { SSL* s = CHECK_OBJECT(1, SSL, "openssl.ssl"); int i; int top = lua_gettop(L); int ret = 1; for (i = 2; i <= top; i += 2) { const char* what = luaL_checklstring(L, i, NULL); if (strcmp(what, "fd") == 0) { ret = SSL_set_fd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1)); } else if (strcmp(what, "rfd") == 0) { ret = SSL_set_wfd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1)); } else if (strcmp(what, "wfd") == 0) { ret = SSL_set_wfd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1)); } else if (strcmp(what, "client_CA") == 0) { X509* x = CHECK_OBJECT(i + 1, X509, "openssl.x509"); ret = SSL_add_client_CA(s, x); } else if (strcmp(what, "read_ahead") == 0) { int yes = auxiliar_checkboolean(L, i + 1); SSL_set_read_ahead(s, yes); } else if (strcmp(what, "cipher_list") == 0) { const char* list = lua_tostring(L, i + 1); ret = SSL_set_cipher_list(s, list); } else if (strcmp(what, "verify_depth") == 0) { int depth = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1); SSL_set_verify_depth(s, depth); } else if (strcmp(what, "purpose") == 0) { //FIX int purpose = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1); ret = SSL_set_purpose(s, purpose); } else if (strcmp(what, "trust") == 0) { //FIX int trust = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1); ret = SSL_set_trust(s, trust); } else if (strcmp(what, "verify_result") == 0) { int result = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1); SSL_set_verify_result(s, result); } else if (strcmp(what, "hostname") == 0) { const char* hostname = luaL_checkstring(L, i + 1); SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, hostname); } #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10000000L else if (strcmp(what, "state") == 0) { int l = luaL_checkint(L, 2); SSL_set_state(s, l); } #endif else luaL_argerror(L, i, "don't understand"); if (ret != 1) return openssl_pushresult(L, ret); } return 0; }
/* * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the * buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us, * so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process. */ TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props) { int sts; int protomask; const char *cipher_list; SSL_SESSION *session; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; X509 *peercert; TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx; VSTRING *myserverid; int log_mask = app_ctx->log_mask; /* * When certificate verification is required, log trust chain validation * errors even when disabled by default for opportunistic sessions. */ if (props->tls_level >= TLS_LEV_VERIFY) log_mask |= TLS_LOG_UNTRUSTED; if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", props->namaddr); /* * First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters * * The cipherlist will be applied to the global SSL context, where it can be * repeatedly reset if necessary, but the protocol restrictions will be * is applied to the SSL connection, because protocol restrictions in the * global context cannot be cleared. */ /* * OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we * do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol, * rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session. * * Still, we salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that * sessions found in the cache are always acceptable. */ protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols); if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) { /* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */ msg_warn("%s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session", props->namaddr, props->protocols); return (0); } myserverid = vstring_alloc(100); vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "%s&p=%d", props->serverid, protomask); /* * Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption * * By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to * re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must * not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the * session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the * cache are always acceptable. */ cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade, props->cipher_exclusions); if (cipher_list == 0) { msg_warn("%s: %s: aborting TLS session", props->namaddr, vstring_str(app_ctx->why)); vstring_free(myserverid); return (0); } if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE) msg_info("%s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"", props->namaddr, cipher_list); vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&c=%s", cipher_list); /* * Finally, salt the session key with the OpenSSL library version, * (run-time, rather than compile-time, just in case that matters). */ vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&l=%ld", (long) SSLeay()); /* * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve * the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback(). * * If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type * is stored in the client SSL context. */ TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(log_mask, props->namaddr); TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type; TLScontext->serverid = vstring_export(myserverid); TLScontext->stream = props->stream; if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) { msg_warn("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()"); tls_print_errors(); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) { msg_warn("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'"); tls_print_errors(); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* * Apply session protocol restrictions. */ if (protomask != 0) SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con, ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L)); /* * XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after * calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session * will be reused. */ if (TLScontext->cache_type) { session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext); if (session) { SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session); SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200411 */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L) /* * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify * result in sessions for the client side. We modify the session * directly which is version specific, but this bug is version * specific, too. * * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1 * have this bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a. * The development version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It * has been fixed on 2000/11/29. */ SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, session->verify_result); #endif } } /* * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit * more. */ tls_int_seed(); (void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes); /* * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library * and maintaining compatibility never hurts. */ SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con); /* * Connect the SSL connection with the network socket. */ if (SSL_set_fd(TLScontext->con, vstream_fileno(props->stream)) != 1) { msg_info("SSL_set_fd error to %s", props->namaddr); tls_print_errors(); uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* * Turn on non-blocking I/O so that we can enforce timeouts on network * I/O. */ non_blocking(vstream_fileno(props->stream), NON_BLOCKING); /* * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped: * TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS will dump the SSL negotiation, TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS will * dump everything. * * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called? * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes. */ if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS) BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb); /* * Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our * call-backs for certificate verification. * * Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message * and remove all TLS state concerning this session. */ sts = tls_bio_connect(vstream_fileno(props->stream), props->timeout, TLScontext); if (sts <= 0) { if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) { msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", props->namaddr, sts); tls_print_errors(); } else if (errno != 0) { msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %m", props->namaddr); } else { msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: lost connection", props->namaddr); } uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* Turn off packet dump if only dumping the handshake */ if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS) == 0) BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0); /* * The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new * session was negotiated. */ TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con); if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_CACHE) && TLScontext->session_reused) msg_info("%s: Reusing old session", TLScontext->namaddr); /* * Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information * from the certificate for later use. */ if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) { TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT; /* * Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested. * Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_fingerprint. */ verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props); verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props); if (TLScontext->log_mask & (TLS_LOG_CERTMATCH | TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_PEERCERT)) msg_info("%s: subject_CN=%s, issuer_CN=%s, " "fingerprint %s, pkey_fingerprint=%s", props->namaddr, TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN, TLScontext->peer_fingerprint, TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint); X509_free(peercert); } else { TLScontext->issuer_CN = mystrdup(""); TLScontext->peer_CN = mystrdup(""); TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = mystrdup(""); TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint = mystrdup(""); } /* * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging */ TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con); cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con); TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher, &(TLScontext->cipher_algbits)); /* * The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write() * functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions. */ tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext); /* * All the key facts in a single log entry. */ if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_SUMMARY) msg_info("%s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s " "(%d/%d bits)", TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" : TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted", props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name, TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits); tls_int_seed(); return (TLScontext); }
openssl_con * openssl_accept_fd(openssl_env *env, int fd, int timeout, struct redir_conn_t *conn) { openssl_con *c = (openssl_con *)calloc(1, sizeof(openssl_con)); int rc; if (!c) return 0; if (!env || !env->ready) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "SSL not available!"); openssl_free(c); return 0; } c->env = env; #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL c->con = (SSL *)SSL_new(env->ctx); #elif HAVE_MATRIXSSL c->con = (SSL *)SSL_new(env->keys, SSL_FLAGS_SERVER); #endif c->sock = fd; c->timeout = timeout; SSL_set_fd(c->con, c->sock); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE SSL_clear(c->con); #endif #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE SSL_set_app_data(c->con, c); #endif SSL_set_accept_state(c->con); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE SSL_set_verify_result(c->con, X509_V_OK); #endif if ((rc = openssl_check_accept(c, conn)) < 0) { SSL_set_shutdown(c->con, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); openssl_free(c); return 0; } #elif HAVE_MATRIXSSL /* ndelay_off(c->sock); */ matrixSslSetCertValidator(c->con->ssl, certValidator, c->con->keys); if ((rc = SSL_accept2(c->con)) < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: SSL accept failure %s", strerror(errno), c->con->status); openssl_free(c); return 0; } SSL_is_init_finished(c->con); /* ndelay_on(c->sock);*/ #else #error NO SSL SUPPORT #endif return c; }
/* * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the * buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us, * so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process. */ TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props) { const char *myname = "tls_client_start"; int sts; int protomask; const char *cipher_list; SSL_SESSION *session; SSL_CIPHER *cipher; X509 *peercert; TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext; TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx; ACL_VSTRING *myserverid; if (props->log_level >= 1) acl_msg_info("%s(%d): setting up TLS connection to %s", myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr); /* * First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters * * The cipherlist will be applied to the global SSL context, where it can be * repeatedly reset if necessary, but the protocol restrictions will be * is applied to the SSL connection, because protocol restrictions in the * global context cannot be cleared. */ /* * OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we * do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol, * rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session. * * Still, we salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that * sessions found in the cache are always acceptable. */ protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols); if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) { /* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */ acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): nameaddr: %s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session", myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, props->protocols); return (0); } myserverid = acl_vstring_alloc(100); acl_vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "%s&p=%d", props->serverid, protomask); /* * Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption * * By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to * re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must * not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the * session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the * cache are always acceptable. */ cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade, props->cipher_exclusions); if (cipher_list == 0) { acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): %s: %s: aborting TLS session", myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, acl_vstring_str(app_ctx->why)); acl_vstring_free(myserverid); return (0); } if (props->log_level >= 2) acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"", myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, cipher_list); acl_vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&c=%s", cipher_list); /* * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve * the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback(). * * If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type * is stored in the client SSL context. */ TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(props->log_level, props->namaddr); TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type; TLScontext->serverid = acl_vstring_export(myserverid); if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) { acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()", myname, __LINE__); tls_print_errors(); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) { acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'", myname, __LINE__); tls_print_errors(); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* * Apply session protocol restrictions. */ if (protomask != 0) SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con, ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L) | ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L)); /* * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair. * * XXX There is no need to make internal_bio a member of the TLScontext * structure. It will be attached to TLScontext->con, and destroyed along * with it. The network_bio, however, needs to be freed explicitly. */ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE, &TLScontext->network_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE)) { acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not obtain BIO_pair", myname, __LINE__); tls_print_errors(); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* * XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after * calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session * will be reused. */ if (TLScontext->cache_type) { session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext); if (session) { SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session); SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200411 */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L) /* * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify * result in sessions for the client side. We modify the session * directly which is version specific, but this bug is version * specific, too. * * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1 * have this bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a. * The development version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It * has been fixed on 2000/11/29. */ SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, session->verify_result); #endif } } /* * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit * more. */ tls_int_seed(); if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 0) (void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes); /* * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library * and maintaining compatibility never hurts. */ SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con); /* * Connect the SSL connection with the Postfix side of the BIO-pair for * reading and writing. */ SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio, TLScontext->internal_bio); /* * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped: * 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything. * * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called? * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes. */ if (props->log_level >= 3) BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb); /* * Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our * call-backs for certificate verification. * * Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message * and remove all TLS state concerning this session. */ sts = tls_bio_connect(ACL_VSTREAM_SOCK(props->stream), props->timeout, TLScontext); if (sts <= 0) { acl_msg_info("%s(%d): SSL_connect error to %s: %d", myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, sts); tls_print_errors(); uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext); tls_free_context(TLScontext); return (0); } /* Only log_level==4 dumps everything */ if (props->log_level < 4) BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0); /* * The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new * session was negotiated. */ TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con); if (props->log_level >= 2 && TLScontext->session_reused) acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s: Reusing old session", myname, __LINE__, TLScontext->namaddr); /* * Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information * from the certificate for later use. */ if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) { TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT; /* * Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested. * Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_fingerprint. */ verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props); verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props); X509_free(peercert); } else { TLScontext->issuer_CN = acl_mystrdup(""); TLScontext->peer_CN = acl_mystrdup(""); TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = acl_mystrdup(""); } /* * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging */ TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con); cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con); TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher); TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher, &(TLScontext->cipher_algbits)); /* * The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write() * functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions. */ tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext); /* * All the key facts in a single log entry. */ if (props->log_level >= 1) acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s " "(%d/%d bits)", myname, __LINE__, TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" : TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted", props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name, TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits); tls_int_seed(); return (TLScontext); }