bool SSLSocket::verifyKeyprint(const string& expKP, bool allowUntrusted) noexcept
{
if (!ssl)
return true;
if (expKP.empty() || expKP.find("/") == string::npos)
return allowUntrusted;
verifyData.reset(new CryptoManager::SSLVerifyData(allowUntrusted, expKP));
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, verifyData.get());
SSL_CTX* ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
X509_STORE* store = X509_STORE_new();
bool result = false;
int err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if (ssl_ctx && store)
{
X509_STORE_CTX* vrfy_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509* cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (vrfy_ctx && cert && X509_STORE_CTX_init(vrfy_ctx, store, cert, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)))
{
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(vrfy_ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(vrfy_ctx, SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl_ctx));
int verify_result = 0;
if ((verify_result = X509_verify_cert(vrfy_ctx)) >= 0)
{
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(vrfy_ctx);
// Watch out for weird library errors that might not set the context error code
if (err == X509_V_OK && verify_result <= 0)
err = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
// This is for people who don't restart their clients and have low expiration time on their cert
result = (err == X509_V_OK || err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED) || (allowUntrusted && err != X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
}
}
if (cert) X509_free(cert);
if (vrfy_ctx) X509_STORE_CTX_free(vrfy_ctx);
if (store) X509_STORE_free(store);
}
// KeyPrint is a strong indicator of trust
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err);
return result;
}
bool SSLSocket::verifyKeyprint(const string& expKP, bool allowUntrusted) noexcept {
if(!ssl)
return true;
if(expKP.empty() || expKP.find("/") == string::npos)
return allowUntrusted;
verifyData.reset(new CryptoManager::SSLVerifyData(allowUntrusted, expKP));
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, verifyData.get());
SSL_CTX* ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
X509_STORE* store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
bool result = allowUntrusted;
int err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if(ssl_ctx && store) {
X509_STORE_CTX* vrfy_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
X509* cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if(vrfy_ctx && cert && X509_STORE_CTX_init(vrfy_ctx, store, cert, SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) {
auto vrfy_cb = SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl_ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(vrfy_ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(vrfy_ctx, vrfy_cb);
if(X509_verify_cert(vrfy_ctx) >= 0) {
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(vrfy_ctx);
// This is for people who don't restart their clients and have low expiration time on their cert
result = (err == X509_V_OK) || (err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
}
}
if(cert) X509_free(cert);
if(vrfy_ctx) X509_STORE_CTX_free(vrfy_ctx);
}
// KeyPrint is a strong indicator of trust (TODO: check that this KeyPrint is mediated by a trusted hub)
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err);
return result;
}
int ssl_init_ssl_connection(conn_rec *c)
{
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
SSL *ssl;
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
char *vhost_md5;
modssl_ctx_t *mctx;
server_rec *server;
if (!sslconn) {
sslconn = ssl_init_connection_ctx(c);
}
server = sslconn->server;
sc = mySrvConfig(server);
/*
* Seed the Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
*/
ssl_rand_seed(server, c->pool, SSL_RSCTX_CONNECT, "");
mctx = sslconn->is_proxy ? sc->proxy : sc->server;
/*
* Create a new SSL connection with the configured server SSL context and
* attach this to the socket. Additionally we register this attachment
* so we can detach later.
*/
if (!(ssl = SSL_new(mctx->ssl_ctx))) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c,
"Unable to create a new SSL connection from the SSL "
"context");
ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, server);
c->aborted = 1;
return DECLINED; /* XXX */
}
vhost_md5 = ap_md5_binary(c->pool, (unsigned char *)sc->vhost_id,
sc->vhost_id_len);
if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, (unsigned char *)vhost_md5,
APR_MD5_DIGESTSIZE*2))
{
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c,
"Unable to set session id context to `%s'", vhost_md5);
ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, server);
c->aborted = 1;
return DECLINED; /* XXX */
}
SSL_set_app_data(ssl, c);
SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, NULL); /* will be request_rec */
sslconn->ssl = ssl;
/*
* Configure callbacks for SSL connection
*/
SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpRSA);
SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpDH);
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
ssl_io_filter_init(c, ssl);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
static int openssl_ssl_set(lua_State*L)
{
SSL* s = CHECK_OBJECT(1, SSL, "openssl.ssl");
int i;
int top = lua_gettop(L);
int ret = 1;
for (i = 2; i <= top; i += 2)
{
const char* what = luaL_checklstring(L, i, NULL);
if (strcmp(what, "fd") == 0)
{
ret = SSL_set_fd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1));
}
else if (strcmp(what, "rfd") == 0)
{
ret = SSL_set_wfd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1));
}
else if (strcmp(what, "wfd") == 0)
{
ret = SSL_set_wfd(s, luaL_checkint(L, i + 1));
}
else if (strcmp(what, "client_CA") == 0)
{
X509* x = CHECK_OBJECT(i + 1, X509, "openssl.x509");
ret = SSL_add_client_CA(s, x);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "read_ahead") == 0)
{
int yes = auxiliar_checkboolean(L, i + 1);
SSL_set_read_ahead(s, yes);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "cipher_list") == 0)
{
const char* list = lua_tostring(L, i + 1);
ret = SSL_set_cipher_list(s, list);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "verify_depth") == 0)
{
int depth = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1);
SSL_set_verify_depth(s, depth);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "purpose") == 0)
{
//FIX
int purpose = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1);
ret = SSL_set_purpose(s, purpose);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "trust") == 0)
{
//FIX
int trust = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1);
ret = SSL_set_trust(s, trust);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "verify_result") == 0)
{
int result = luaL_checkint(L, i + 1);
SSL_set_verify_result(s, result);
}
else if (strcmp(what, "hostname") == 0)
{
const char* hostname = luaL_checkstring(L, i + 1);
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, hostname);
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x10000000L
else if (strcmp(what, "state") == 0)
{
int l = luaL_checkint(L, 2);
SSL_set_state(s, l);
}
#endif
else
luaL_argerror(L, i, "don't understand");
if (ret != 1)
return openssl_pushresult(L, ret);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the
* buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us,
* so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process.
*/
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
int sts;
int protomask;
const char *cipher_list;
SSL_SESSION *session;
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
X509 *peercert;
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx;
VSTRING *myserverid;
int log_mask = app_ctx->log_mask;
/*
* When certificate verification is required, log trust chain validation
* errors even when disabled by default for opportunistic sessions.
*/
if (props->tls_level >= TLS_LEV_VERIFY)
log_mask |= TLS_LOG_UNTRUSTED;
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE)
msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", props->namaddr);
/*
* First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters
*
* The cipherlist will be applied to the global SSL context, where it can be
* repeatedly reset if necessary, but the protocol restrictions will be
* is applied to the SSL connection, because protocol restrictions in the
* global context cannot be cleared.
*/
/*
* OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we
* do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol,
* rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session.
*
* Still, we salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that
* sessions found in the cache are always acceptable.
*/
protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols);
if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) {
/* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */
msg_warn("%s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session",
props->namaddr, props->protocols);
return (0);
}
myserverid = vstring_alloc(100);
vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "%s&p=%d", props->serverid, protomask);
/*
* Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption
*
* By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to
* re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must
* not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the
* session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the
* cache are always acceptable.
*/
cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade,
props->cipher_exclusions);
if (cipher_list == 0) {
msg_warn("%s: %s: aborting TLS session",
props->namaddr, vstring_str(app_ctx->why));
vstring_free(myserverid);
return (0);
}
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_VERBOSE)
msg_info("%s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"", props->namaddr, cipher_list);
vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&c=%s", cipher_list);
/*
* Finally, salt the session key with the OpenSSL library version,
* (run-time, rather than compile-time, just in case that matters).
*/
vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&l=%ld", (long) SSLeay());
/*
* Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
* structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve
* the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback().
*
* If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type
* is stored in the client SSL context.
*/
TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(log_mask, props->namaddr);
TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type;
TLScontext->serverid = vstring_export(myserverid);
TLScontext->stream = props->stream;
if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) {
msg_warn("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
msg_warn("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply session protocol restrictions.
*/
if (protomask != 0)
SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con,
((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L));
/*
* XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after
* calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session
* will be reused.
*/
if (TLScontext->cache_type) {
session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext);
if (session) {
SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session);
SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200411 */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
/*
* Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
* result in sessions for the client side. We modify the session
* directly which is version specific, but this bug is version
* specific, too.
*
* READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1
* have this bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a.
* The development version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It
* has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
*/
SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, session->verify_result);
#endif
}
}
/*
* Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
* more.
*/
tls_int_seed();
(void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
/*
* Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
* necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
* and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
*/
SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
/*
* Connect the SSL connection with the network socket.
*/
if (SSL_set_fd(TLScontext->con, vstream_fileno(props->stream)) != 1) {
msg_info("SSL_set_fd error to %s", props->namaddr);
tls_print_errors();
uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Turn on non-blocking I/O so that we can enforce timeouts on network
* I/O.
*/
non_blocking(vstream_fileno(props->stream), NON_BLOCKING);
/*
* If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped:
* TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS will dump the SSL negotiation, TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS will
* dump everything.
*
* We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
* Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
* created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
*/
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_TLSPKTS)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb);
/*
* Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our
* call-backs for certificate verification.
*
* Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message
* and remove all TLS state concerning this session.
*/
sts = tls_bio_connect(vstream_fileno(props->stream), props->timeout,
TLScontext);
if (sts <= 0) {
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", props->namaddr, sts);
tls_print_errors();
} else if (errno != 0) {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %m", props->namaddr);
} else {
msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: lost connection",
props->namaddr);
}
uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/* Turn off packet dump if only dumping the handshake */
if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_ALLPKTS) == 0)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0);
/*
* The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new
* session was negotiated.
*/
TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con);
if ((log_mask & TLS_LOG_CACHE) && TLScontext->session_reused)
msg_info("%s: Reusing old session", TLScontext->namaddr);
/*
* Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information
* from the certificate for later use.
*/
if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) {
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT;
/*
* Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested.
* Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_fingerprint.
*/
verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props);
verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props);
if (TLScontext->log_mask &
(TLS_LOG_CERTMATCH | TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_PEERCERT))
msg_info("%s: subject_CN=%s, issuer_CN=%s, "
"fingerprint %s, pkey_fingerprint=%s", props->namaddr,
TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN,
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint,
TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint);
X509_free(peercert);
} else {
TLScontext->issuer_CN = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_CN = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_pkey_fprint = mystrdup("");
}
/*
* Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
*/
TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
&(TLScontext->cipher_algbits));
/*
* The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write()
* functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions.
*/
tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext);
/*
* All the key facts in a single log entry.
*/
if (log_mask & TLS_LOG_SUMMARY)
msg_info("%s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s "
"(%d/%d bits)", TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);
tls_int_seed();
return (TLScontext);
}
openssl_con *
openssl_accept_fd(openssl_env *env, int fd, int timeout, struct redir_conn_t *conn) {
openssl_con *c = (openssl_con *)calloc(1, sizeof(openssl_con));
int rc;
if (!c) return 0;
if (!env || !env->ready) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "SSL not available!");
openssl_free(c);
return 0;
}
c->env = env;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
c->con = (SSL *)SSL_new(env->ctx);
#elif HAVE_MATRIXSSL
c->con = (SSL *)SSL_new(env->keys, SSL_FLAGS_SERVER);
#endif
c->sock = fd;
c->timeout = timeout;
SSL_set_fd(c->con, c->sock);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
SSL_clear(c->con);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
SSL_set_app_data(c->con, c);
#endif
SSL_set_accept_state(c->con);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
SSL_set_verify_result(c->con, X509_V_OK);
#endif
if ((rc = openssl_check_accept(c, conn)) < 0) {
SSL_set_shutdown(c->con, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
openssl_free(c);
return 0;
}
#elif HAVE_MATRIXSSL
/* ndelay_off(c->sock); */
matrixSslSetCertValidator(c->con->ssl, certValidator, c->con->keys);
if ((rc = SSL_accept2(c->con)) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: SSL accept failure %s", strerror(errno), c->con->status);
openssl_free(c);
return 0;
}
SSL_is_init_finished(c->con);
/* ndelay_on(c->sock);*/
#else
#error NO SSL SUPPORT
#endif
return c;
}
/*
* This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect that the
* buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was received by us,
* so that we can immediately start the TLS handshake process.
*/
TLS_SESS_STATE *tls_client_start(const TLS_CLIENT_START_PROPS *props)
{
const char *myname = "tls_client_start";
int sts;
int protomask;
const char *cipher_list;
SSL_SESSION *session;
SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
X509 *peercert;
TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext;
TLS_APPL_STATE *app_ctx = props->ctx;
ACL_VSTRING *myserverid;
if (props->log_level >= 1)
acl_msg_info("%s(%d): setting up TLS connection to %s",
myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr);
/*
* First make sure we have valid protocol and cipher parameters
*
* The cipherlist will be applied to the global SSL context, where it can be
* repeatedly reset if necessary, but the protocol restrictions will be
* is applied to the SSL connection, because protocol restrictions in the
* global context cannot be cleared.
*/
/*
* OpenSSL will ignore cached sessions that use the wrong protocol. So we
* do not need to filter out cached sessions with the "wrong" protocol,
* rather OpenSSL will simply negotiate a new session.
*
* Still, we salt the session lookup key with the protocol list, so that
* sessions found in the cache are always acceptable.
*/
protomask = tls_protocol_mask(props->protocols);
if (protomask == TLS_PROTOCOL_INVALID) {
/* tls_protocol_mask() logs no warning. */
acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): nameaddr: %s: Invalid TLS protocol list \"%s\": aborting TLS session",
myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, props->protocols);
return (0);
}
myserverid = acl_vstring_alloc(100);
acl_vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "%s&p=%d", props->serverid, protomask);
/*
* Per session cipher selection for sessions with mandatory encryption
*
* By the time a TLS client is negotiating ciphers it has already offered to
* re-use a session, it is too late to renege on the offer. So we must
* not attempt to re-use sessions whose ciphers are too weak. We salt the
* session lookup key with the cipher list, so that sessions found in the
* cache are always acceptable.
*/
cipher_list = tls_set_ciphers(app_ctx, "TLS", props->cipher_grade,
props->cipher_exclusions);
if (cipher_list == 0) {
acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): %s: %s: aborting TLS session",
myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, acl_vstring_str(app_ctx->why));
acl_vstring_free(myserverid);
return (0);
}
if (props->log_level >= 2)
acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s: TLS cipher list \"%s\"",
myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, cipher_list);
acl_vstring_sprintf_append(myserverid, "&c=%s", cipher_list);
/*
* Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
* structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later retrieve
* the information inside the tls_verify_certificate_callback().
*
* If session caching was enabled when TLS was initialized, the cache type
* is stored in the client SSL context.
*/
TLScontext = tls_alloc_sess_context(props->log_level, props->namaddr);
TLScontext->cache_type = app_ctx->cache_type;
TLScontext->serverid = acl_vstring_export(myserverid);
if ((TLScontext->con = SSL_new(app_ctx->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) {
acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()",
myname, __LINE__);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'",
myname, __LINE__);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* Apply session protocol restrictions.
*/
if (protomask != 0)
SSL_set_options(TLScontext->con,
((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_TLSv1) ? SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv3) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 : 0L)
| ((protomask & TLS_PROTOCOL_SSLv2) ? SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 : 0L));
/*
* The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
*
* XXX There is no need to make internal_bio a member of the TLScontext
* structure. It will be attached to TLScontext->con, and destroyed along
* with it. The network_bio, however, needs to be freed explicitly.
*/
if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE,
&TLScontext->network_bio, TLS_BIO_BUFSIZE)) {
acl_msg_warn("%s(%d): Could not obtain BIO_pair", myname, __LINE__);
tls_print_errors();
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/*
* XXX To avoid memory leaks we must always call SSL_SESSION_free() after
* calling SSL_set_session(), regardless of whether or not the session
* will be reused.
*/
if (TLScontext->cache_type) {
session = load_clnt_session(TLScontext);
if (session) {
SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, session);
SSL_SESSION_free(session); /* 200411 */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
/*
* Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
* result in sessions for the client side. We modify the session
* directly which is version specific, but this bug is version
* specific, too.
*
* READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before beta1
* have this bug, it has been fixed during development of 0.9.6a.
* The development version of 0.9.7 can have this bug, too. It
* has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
*/
SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, session->verify_result);
#endif
}
}
/*
* Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
* more.
*/
tls_int_seed();
if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 0)
(void) tls_ext_seed(var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
/*
* Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
* necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
* and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
*/
SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
/*
* Connect the SSL connection with the Postfix side of the BIO-pair for
* reading and writing.
*/
SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio, TLScontext->internal_bio);
/*
* If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is dumped:
* 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
*
* We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
* Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
* created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
*/
if (props->log_level >= 3)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), tls_bio_dump_cb);
/*
* Start TLS negotiations. This process is a black box that invokes our
* call-backs for certificate verification.
*
* Error handling: If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message
* and remove all TLS state concerning this session.
*/
sts = tls_bio_connect(ACL_VSTREAM_SOCK(props->stream), props->timeout,
TLScontext);
if (sts <= 0) {
acl_msg_info("%s(%d): SSL_connect error to %s: %d",
myname, __LINE__, props->namaddr, sts);
tls_print_errors();
uncache_session(app_ctx->ssl_ctx, TLScontext);
tls_free_context(TLScontext);
return (0);
}
/* Only log_level==4 dumps everything */
if (props->log_level < 4)
BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), 0);
/*
* The caller may want to know if this session was reused or if a new
* session was negotiated.
*/
TLScontext->session_reused = SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con);
if (props->log_level >= 2 && TLScontext->session_reused)
acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s: Reusing old session",
myname, __LINE__, TLScontext->namaddr);
/*
* Do peername verification if requested and extract useful information
* from the certificate for later use.
*/
if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con)) != 0) {
TLScontext->peer_status |= TLS_CERT_FLAG_PRESENT;
/*
* Peer name or fingerprint verification as requested.
* Unconditionally set peer_CN, issuer_CN and peer_fingerprint.
*/
verify_extract_name(TLScontext, peercert, props);
verify_extract_print(TLScontext, peercert, props);
X509_free(peercert);
} else {
TLScontext->issuer_CN = acl_mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_CN = acl_mystrdup("");
TLScontext->peer_fingerprint = acl_mystrdup("");
}
/*
* Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
*/
TLScontext->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
TLScontext->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
TLScontext->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
&(TLScontext->cipher_algbits));
/*
* The TLS engine is active. Switch to the tls_timed_read/write()
* functions and make the TLScontext available to those functions.
*/
tls_stream_start(props->stream, TLScontext);
/*
* All the key facts in a single log entry.
*/
if (props->log_level >= 1)
acl_msg_info("%s(%d): %s TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s "
"(%d/%d bits)", myname, __LINE__,
TLS_CERT_IS_MATCHED(TLScontext) ? "Verified" :
TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(TLScontext) ? "Trusted" : "Untrusted",
props->namaddr, TLScontext->protocol, TLScontext->cipher_name,
TLScontext->cipher_usebits, TLScontext->cipher_algbits);
tls_int_seed();
return (TLScontext);
}
