bool CommitmentProofOfKnowledge::Verify(const Bignum& A, const Bignum& B) const
{
// TODO: First verify that the values
// S1, S2 and S3 and "challenge" are in the correct ranges
if((this->challenge < Bignum(0)) || (this->challenge > (Bignum(2).pow(256) - Bignum(1)))){
return false;
}
// Compute T1 = g1^S1 * h1^S2 * inverse(A^{challenge}) mod p1
Bignum T1 = A.pow_mod(this->challenge, ap->modulus).inverse(ap->modulus).mul_mod(
(ap->g.pow_mod(S1, ap->modulus).mul_mod(ap->h.pow_mod(S2, ap->modulus), ap->modulus)),
ap->modulus);
// Compute T2 = g2^S1 * h2^S3 * inverse(B^{challenge}) mod p2
Bignum T2 = B.pow_mod(this->challenge, bp->modulus).inverse(bp->modulus).mul_mod(
(bp->g.pow_mod(S1, bp->modulus).mul_mod(bp->h.pow_mod(S3, bp->modulus), bp->modulus)),
bp->modulus);
// Hash T1 and T2 along with all of the public parameters
Bignum computedChallenge = calculateChallenge(A, B, T1, T2);
// Return success if the computed challenge matches the incoming challenge
if(computedChallenge == this->challenge){
return true;
}
// Otherwise return failure
return false;
}
IntegerGroupParams
deriveIntegerGroupFromOrder(Bignum &groupOrder)
{
IntegerGroupParams result;
// Set the order to "groupOrder"
result.groupOrder = groupOrder;
// Try possible values for "modulus" of the form "groupOrder * 2 * i" where
// "p" is prime and i is a counter starting at 1.
for (uint32_t i = 1; i < NUM_SCHNORRGEN_ATTEMPTS; i++) {
// Set modulus equal to "groupOrder * 2 * i"
result.modulus = (result.groupOrder * Bignum(i*2)) + Bignum(1);
// Test the result for primality
// TODO: This is a probabilistic routine and thus not the right choice
if (result.modulus.isPrime(256)) {
// Success.
//
// Calculate the generators "g", "h" using the process described in
// NIST FIPS 186-3, Appendix A.2.3. This algorithm takes ("p", "q",
// "domain_parameter_seed", "index"). We use "index" value 1
// to generate "g" and "index" value 2 to generate "h".
uint256 seed = calculateSeed(groupOrder, "", 128, "");
uint256 pSeed = calculateHash(seed);
uint256 qSeed = calculateHash(pSeed);
result.g = calculateGroupGenerator(seed, pSeed, qSeed, result.modulus, result.groupOrder, 1);
result.h = calculateGroupGenerator(seed, pSeed, qSeed, result.modulus, result.groupOrder, 2);
// Perform some basic tests to make sure we have good parameters
if (!(result.modulus.isPrime()) || // modulus is prime
!(result.groupOrder.isPrime()) || // order is prime
!((result.g.pow_mod(result.groupOrder, result.modulus)).isOne()) || // g^order mod modulus = 1
!((result.h.pow_mod(result.groupOrder, result.modulus)).isOne()) || // h^order mod modulus = 1
((result.g.pow_mod(Bignum(100), result.modulus)).isOne()) || // g^100 mod modulus != 1
((result.h.pow_mod(Bignum(100), result.modulus)).isOne()) || // h^100 mod modulus != 1
result.g == result.h || // g != h
result.g.isOne()) { // g != 1
// If any of the above tests fail, throw an exception
throw ZerocoinException("Group parameters are not valid");
}
return result;
}
}
// If we reached this point group generation has failed. Throw an exception.
throw ZerocoinException("Too many attempts to generate Schnorr group.");
}
Bignum
calculateGroupGenerator(Bignum serialNumber, uint256 seed, uint256 pSeed, uint256 qSeed, Bignum modulus, Bignum groupOrder, uint32_t index)
{
Bignum result;
// Verify that 0 <= index < 256
if (index > 255) {
throw ZerocoinException("Invalid index for group generation");
}
// Compute e = (modulus - 1) / groupOrder
Bignum e = (modulus - Bignum(1)) / groupOrder;
// Loop until we find a generator
for (uint32_t count = 1; count < MAX_GENERATOR_ATTEMPTS; count++) {
// hash = Hash(seed || pSeed || qSeed || “ggen” || index || count
uint256 hash = (serialNumber > 0) ? calculateGeneratorSeed(serialNumber, "ggen", index, count)
: calculateGeneratorSeed(seed, pSeed, qSeed, "ggen", index, count);
Bignum W(hash);
// Compute result = W^e mod p
result = W.pow_mod(e, modulus);
// If result > 1, we have a generator
if (result > 1) {
return result;
}
}
// We only get here if we failed to find a generator
throw ZerocoinException("Unable to find a generator, too many attempts");
}
void modulus(Bignum const & rhs, Bignum & D) const
{
D = Bignum(rhs.a.get(), rhs.n, rhs.n_max);
Bignum N(a.get(), n, n_max);
for (int i = int(N.n) - 1; i >= 0; --i)
{
a[n-1] = N.a[i];
std::rotate(a.get(), a.get() + n - 1, a.get() + n);
//this->remove_leading_zeros();
//*this -= D * d_in_r(*this, D);
}
//this->remove_leading_zeros();
}
/** Verifies that a commitment c is accumulated in accumulator a
*/
bool AccumulatorProofOfKnowledge:: Verify(const Accumulator& a, const Bignum& valueOfCommitmentToCoin) const {
Bignum sg = params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.g;
Bignum sh = params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.h;
Bignum g_n = params->accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.g;
Bignum h_n = params->accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.h;
//According to the proof, this hash should be of length k_prime bits. It is currently greater than that, which should not be a problem, but we should check this.
CHashWriter hasher(0,0);
hasher << *params << sg << sh << g_n << h_n << valueOfCommitmentToCoin << C_e << C_u << C_r << st_1 << st_2 << st_3 << t_1 << t_2 << t_3 << t_4;
Bignum c = Bignum(hasher.GetHash()); //this hash should be of length k_prime bits
Bignum st_1_prime = (valueOfCommitmentToCoin.pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * sg.pow_mod(s_alpha, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * sh.pow_mod(s_phi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
Bignum st_2_prime = (sg.pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * ((valueOfCommitmentToCoin * sg.inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)).pow_mod(s_gamma, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) * sh.pow_mod(s_psi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
Bignum st_3_prime = (sg.pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * (sg * valueOfCommitmentToCoin).pow_mod(s_sigma, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * sh.pow_mod(s_xi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
Bignum t_1_prime = (C_r.pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorModulus) * h_n.pow_mod(s_zeta, params->accumulatorModulus) * g_n.pow_mod(s_epsilon, params->accumulatorModulus)) % params->accumulatorModulus;
Bignum t_2_prime = (C_e.pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorModulus) * h_n.pow_mod(s_eta, params->accumulatorModulus) * g_n.pow_mod(s_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus)) % params->accumulatorModulus;
Bignum t_3_prime = ((a.getValue()).pow_mod(c, params->accumulatorModulus) * C_u.pow_mod(s_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus) * ((h_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(s_beta, params->accumulatorModulus))) % params->accumulatorModulus;
Bignum t_4_prime = (C_r.pow_mod(s_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus) * ((h_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(s_delta, params->accumulatorModulus)) * ((g_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(s_beta, params->accumulatorModulus))) % params->accumulatorModulus;
bool result = false;
bool result_st1 = (st_1 == st_1_prime);
bool result_st2 = (st_2 == st_2_prime);
bool result_st3 = (st_3 == st_3_prime);
bool result_t1 = (t_1 == t_1_prime);
bool result_t2 = (t_2 == t_2_prime);
bool result_t3 = (t_3 == t_3_prime);
bool result_t4 = (t_4 == t_4_prime);
bool result_range = ((s_alpha >= -(params->maxCoinValue * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime + 1))) && (s_alpha <= (params->maxCoinValue * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime + 1))));
result = result_st1 && result_st2 && result_st3 && result_t1 && result_t2 && result_t3 && result_t4 && result_range;
return result;
}
IntegerGroupParams
deriveIntegerGroupParams(uint256 seed, uint32_t pLen, uint32_t qLen)
{
IntegerGroupParams result;
Bignum p;
Bignum q;
uint256 pSeed, qSeed;
// Calculate "p" and "q" and "domain_parameter_seed" from the
// "seed" buffer above, using the procedure described in NIST
// FIPS 186-3, Appendix A.1.2.
calculateGroupModulusAndOrder(seed, pLen, qLen, &(result.modulus),
&(result.groupOrder), &pSeed, &qSeed);
// Calculate the generators "g", "h" using the process described in
// NIST FIPS 186-3, Appendix A.2.3. This algorithm takes ("p", "q",
// "domain_parameter_seed", "index"). We use "index" value 1
// to generate "g" and "index" value 2 to generate "h".
result.g(calculateGroupGenerator(Bignum(0), seed, pSeed, qSeed, result.modulus, result.groupOrder, 1));
result.h(calculateGroupGenerator(Bignum(0), seed, pSeed, qSeed, result.modulus, result.groupOrder, 2));
// Perform some basic tests to make sure we have good parameters
if ((uint32_t)(result.modulus.bitSize()) < pLen || // modulus is pLen bits long
(uint32_t)(result.groupOrder.bitSize()) < qLen || // order is qLen bits long
!(result.modulus.isPrime()) || // modulus is prime
!(result.groupOrder.isPrime()) || // order is prime
!((result.g().pow_mod(result.groupOrder, result.modulus)).isOne()) || // g^order mod modulus = 1
!((result.h().pow_mod(result.groupOrder, result.modulus)).isOne()) || // h^order mod modulus = 1
((result.g().pow_mod(Bignum(100), result.modulus)).isOne()) || // g^100 mod modulus != 1
((result.h().pow_mod(Bignum(100), result.modulus)).isOne()) || // h^100 mod modulus != 1
result.g() == result.h() || // g != h
result.g().isOne()) { // g != 1
// If any of the above tests fail, throw an exception
throw ZerocoinException("Group parameters are not valid");
}
return result;
}
Bignum
generateIntegerFromSeed(uint32_t numBits, uint256 seed, uint32_t *numIterations)
{
Bignum result(0);
uint32_t iterations = ceil((double)numBits / (double)HASH_OUTPUT_BITS);
#ifdef ZEROCOIN_DEBUG
cout << "numBits = " << numBits << endl;
cout << "iterations = " << iterations << endl;
#endif
// Loop "iterations" times filling up the value "result" with random bits
for (uint32_t count = 0; count < iterations; count++) {
// result += ( H(pseed + count) * 2^{count * p0len} )
result += Bignum(calculateHash(seed + count)) * Bignum(2).pow(count * HASH_OUTPUT_BITS);
}
result = Bignum(2).pow(numBits - 1) + (result % (Bignum(2).pow(numBits - 1)));
// Return the number of iterations and the result
*numIterations = iterations;
return result;
}
const Bignum CommitmentProofOfKnowledge::calculateChallenge(const Bignum& a, const Bignum& b, const Bignum &commitOne, const Bignum &commitTwo) const {
CHashWriter hasher(0,0);
hasher << std::string(ZEROCOIN_COMMITMENT_EQUALITY_PROOF);
hasher << commitOne;
hasher << std::string("||");
hasher << commitTwo;
hasher << std::string("||");
hasher << a;
hasher << std::string("||");
hasher << b;
hasher << std::string("||");
hasher << *(this->ap);
hasher << std::string("||");
hasher << *(this->bp);
return Bignum(hasher.GetHash());
}
Bignum
calculateRawUFO(uint32_t ufoIndex, uint32_t numBits) {
Bignum result(0);
uint32_t hashes = numBits / HASH_OUTPUT_BITS;
if (numBits != HASH_OUTPUT_BITS * hashes) {
throw ZerocoinException("numBits must be divisible by HASH_OUTPUT_BITS"); // not implemented
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < hashes; i++) {
CHashWriter hasher(0,0);
hasher << ufoIndex;
hasher << string("||");
hasher << numBits;
hasher << string("||");
hasher << i;
uint256 hash = hasher.GetHash();
result <<= HASH_OUTPUT_BITS;
result += Bignum(hash);
}
return result;
}
AccumulatorProofOfKnowledge::AccumulatorProofOfKnowledge(const AccumulatorAndProofParams* p,
const Commitment& commitmentToCoin, const AccumulatorWitness& witness,
Accumulator& a): params(p) {
Bignum sg = params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.g;
Bignum sh = params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.h;
Bignum g_n = params->accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.g;
Bignum h_n = params->accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.h;
Bignum e = commitmentToCoin.getContents();
Bignum r = commitmentToCoin.getRandomness();
Bignum r_1 = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorModulus/4);
Bignum r_2 = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorModulus/4);
Bignum r_3 = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorModulus/4);
this->C_e = g_n.pow_mod(e, params->accumulatorModulus) * h_n.pow_mod(r_1, params->accumulatorModulus);
this->C_u = witness.getValue() * h_n.pow_mod(r_2, params->accumulatorModulus);
this->C_r = g_n.pow_mod(r_2, params->accumulatorModulus) * h_n.pow_mod(r_3, params->accumulatorModulus);
Bignum r_alpha = Bignum::randBignum(params->maxCoinValue * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_alpha = 0-r_alpha;
}
Bignum r_gamma = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus);
Bignum r_phi = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus);
Bignum r_psi = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus);
Bignum r_sigma = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus);
Bignum r_xi = Bignum::randBignum(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus);
Bignum r_epsilon = Bignum::randBignum((params->accumulatorModulus/4) * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_epsilon = 0-r_epsilon;
}
Bignum r_eta = Bignum::randBignum((params->accumulatorModulus/4) * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_eta = 0-r_eta;
}
Bignum r_zeta = Bignum::randBignum((params->accumulatorModulus/4) * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_zeta = 0-r_zeta;
}
Bignum r_beta = Bignum::randBignum((params->accumulatorModulus/4) * params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_beta = 0-r_beta;
}
Bignum r_delta = Bignum::randBignum((params->accumulatorModulus/4) * params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus * Bignum(2).pow(params->k_prime + params->k_dprime));
if(!(Bignum::randBignum(Bignum(3)) % 2)) {
r_delta = 0-r_delta;
}
this->st_1 = (sg.pow_mod(r_alpha, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * sh.pow_mod(r_phi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
this->st_2 = (((commitmentToCoin.getCommitmentValue() * sg.inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)).pow_mod(r_gamma, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) * sh.pow_mod(r_psi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
this->st_3 = ((sg * commitmentToCoin.getCommitmentValue()).pow_mod(r_sigma, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus) * sh.pow_mod(r_xi, params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus)) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.modulus;
this->t_1 = (h_n.pow_mod(r_zeta, params->accumulatorModulus) * g_n.pow_mod(r_epsilon, params->accumulatorModulus)) % params->accumulatorModulus;
this->t_2 = (h_n.pow_mod(r_eta, params->accumulatorModulus) * g_n.pow_mod(r_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus)) % params->accumulatorModulus;
this->t_3 = (C_u.pow_mod(r_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus) * ((h_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(r_beta, params->accumulatorModulus))) % params->accumulatorModulus;
this->t_4 = (C_r.pow_mod(r_alpha, params->accumulatorModulus) * ((h_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(r_delta, params->accumulatorModulus)) * ((g_n.inverse(params->accumulatorModulus)).pow_mod(r_beta, params->accumulatorModulus))) % params->accumulatorModulus;
CHashWriter hasher(0,0);
hasher << *params << sg << sh << g_n << h_n << commitmentToCoin.getCommitmentValue() << C_e << C_u << C_r << st_1 << st_2 << st_3 << t_1 << t_2 << t_3 << t_4;
//According to the proof, this hash should be of length k_prime bits. It is currently greater than that, which should not be a problem, but we should check this.
Bignum c = Bignum(hasher.GetHash());
this->s_alpha = r_alpha - c*e;
this->s_beta = r_beta - c*r_2*e;
this->s_zeta = r_zeta - c*r_3;
this->s_sigma = r_sigma - c*((e+1).inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.groupOrder));
this->s_eta = r_eta - c*r_1;
this->s_epsilon = r_epsilon - c*r_2;
this->s_delta = r_delta - c*r_3*e;
this->s_xi = r_xi + c*r*((e+1).inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.groupOrder));
this->s_phi = (r_phi - c*r) % params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.groupOrder;
this->s_gamma = r_gamma - c*((e-1).inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.groupOrder));
this->s_psi = r_psi + c*r*((e-1).inverse(params->accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup.groupOrder));
}
Bignum
generateRandomPrime(uint32_t primeBitLen, uint256 in_seed, uint256 *out_seed,
uint32_t *prime_gen_counter)
{
// Verify that primeBitLen is not too small
if (primeBitLen < 2) {
throw ZerocoinException("Prime length is too short");
}
// If primeBitLen < 33 bits, perform the base case.
if (primeBitLen < 33) {
Bignum result(0);
// Set prime_seed = in_seed, prime_gen_counter = 0.
uint256 prime_seed = in_seed;
(*prime_gen_counter) = 0;
// Loop up to "4 * primeBitLen" iterations.
while ((*prime_gen_counter) < (4 * primeBitLen)) {
// Generate a pseudorandom integer "c" of length primeBitLength bits
uint32_t iteration_count;
Bignum c = generateIntegerFromSeed(primeBitLen, prime_seed, &iteration_count);
#ifdef ZEROCOIN_DEBUG
cout << "generateRandomPrime: primeBitLen = " << primeBitLen << endl;
cout << "Generated c = " << c << endl;
#endif
prime_seed += (iteration_count + 1);
(*prime_gen_counter)++;
// Set "intc" to be the least odd integer >= "c" we just generated
uint32_t intc = c.getulong();
intc = (2 * floor(intc / 2.0)) + 1;
#ifdef ZEROCOIN_DEBUG
cout << "Should be odd. c = " << intc << endl;
cout << "The big num is: c = " << c << endl;
#endif
// Perform trial division on this (relatively small) integer to determine if "intc"
// is prime. If so, return success.
if (primalityTestByTrialDivision(intc)) {
// Return "intc" converted back into a Bignum and "prime_seed". We also updated
// the variable "prime_gen_counter" in previous statements.
result = intc;
*out_seed = prime_seed;
// Success
return result;
}
} // while()
// If we reached this point there was an error finding a candidate prime
// so throw an exception.
throw ZerocoinException("Unable to find prime in Shawe-Taylor algorithm");
// END OF BASE CASE
}
// If primeBitLen >= 33 bits, perform the recursive case.
else {
// Recurse to find a new random prime of roughly half the size
uint32_t newLength = ceil((double)primeBitLen / 2.0) + 1;
Bignum c0 = generateRandomPrime(newLength, in_seed, out_seed, prime_gen_counter);
// Generate a random integer "x" of primeBitLen bits using the output
// of the previous call.
uint32_t numIterations;
Bignum x = generateIntegerFromSeed(primeBitLen, *out_seed, &numIterations);
(*out_seed) += numIterations + 1;
// Compute "t" = ⎡x / (2 * c0⎤
// TODO no Ceiling call
Bignum t = x / (Bignum(2) * c0);
// Repeat the following procedure until we find a prime (or time out)
for (uint32_t testNum = 0; testNum < MAX_PRIMEGEN_ATTEMPTS; testNum++) {
// If ((2 * t * c0) + 1 > 2^{primeBitLen}),
// then t = ⎡2^{primeBitLen} – 1 / (2 * c0)⎤.
if ((Bignum(2) * t * c0) > (Bignum(2).pow(Bignum(primeBitLen)))) {
t = ((Bignum(2).pow(Bignum(primeBitLen))) - Bignum(1)) / (Bignum(2) * c0);
}
// Set c = (2 * t * c0) + 1
Bignum c = (Bignum(2) * t * c0) + Bignum(1);
// Increment prime_gen_counter
(*prime_gen_counter)++;
// Test "c" for primality as follows:
// 1. First pick an integer "a" in between 2 and (c - 2)
Bignum a = generateIntegerFromSeed(c.bitSize(), (*out_seed), &numIterations);
a = Bignum(2) + (a % (c - Bignum(3)));
(*out_seed) += (numIterations + 1);
// 2. Compute "z" = a^{2*t} mod c
Bignum z = a.pow_mod(Bignum(2) * t, c);
// 3. Check if "c" is prime.
// Specifically, verify that gcd((z-1), c) == 1 AND (z^c0 mod c) == 1
// If so we return "c" as our result.
if (c.gcd(z - Bignum(1)).isOne() && z.pow_mod(c0, c).isOne()) {
// Return "c", out_seed and prime_gen_counter
// (the latter two of which were already updated)
return c;
}
// 4. If the test did not succeed, increment "t" and loop
t = t + Bignum(1);
} // end of test loop
}
// We only reach this point if the test loop has iterated MAX_PRIMEGEN_ATTEMPTS
// and failed to identify a valid prime. Throw an exception.
throw ZerocoinException("Unable to generate random prime (too many tests)");
}
void
CalculateParams(Params ¶ms, Bignum N, string aux, uint32_t securityLevel)
{
cout << "GNOSIS DEBUG: CalculateParams in ParamGeneration.cpp" << endl;
params.initialized = false;
params.accumulatorParams.initialized = false;
cout << "GNOSIS DEBUG: aux is " << aux << endl;
// Verify that |N| is > 1023 bits.
uint32_t NLen = N.bitSize();
cout << "GNOSIS DEBUG: NLen is " << NLen << endl;
if (NLen < 1023) {
throw ZerocoinException("Modulus must be at least 1023 bits");
}
// Verify that "securityLevel" is at least 80 bits (minimum).
if (securityLevel < 80) {
throw ZerocoinException("Security level must be at least 80 bits.");
}
cout << "GNOSIS DEBUG: securityLevel is " << securityLevel << endl;
// Set the accumulator modulus to "N".
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorModulus = N;
// Calculate the required size of the field "F_p" into which
// we're embedding the coin commitment group. This may throw an
// exception if the securityLevel is too large to be supported
// by the current modulus.
uint32_t pLen = 0;
uint32_t qLen = 0;
calculateGroupParamLengths(NLen - 2, securityLevel, &pLen, &qLen);
// Calculate candidate parameters ("p", "q") for the coin commitment group
// using a deterministic process based on "N", the "aux" string, and
// the dedicated string "COMMITMENTGROUP".
params.coinCommitmentGroup = deriveIntegerGroupParams(calculateSeed(N, aux, securityLevel, STRING_COMMIT_GROUP),
pLen, qLen);
// g and h are invalid, since they are now different for each coin; see
// "Rational Zero" by Garman et al., section 4.4.
params.coinCommitmentGroup.invalidateGenerators();
PRINT_BIGNUM("params.coinCommitmentGroup.groupOrder", params.coinCommitmentGroup.groupOrder);
PRINT_BIGNUM("params.coinCommitmentGroup.modulus", params.coinCommitmentGroup.modulus);
// Next, we derive parameters for a second Accumulated Value commitment group.
// This is a Schnorr group with the specific property that the order of the group
// must be exactly equal to "q" from the commitment group. We set
// the modulus of the new group equal to "2q+1" and test to see if this is prime.
params.serialNumberSoKCommitmentGroup = deriveIntegerGroupFromOrder(params.coinCommitmentGroup.modulus);
PRINT_GROUP_PARAMS(params.serialNumberSoKCommitmentGroup);
// Calculate the parameters for the internal commitment
// using the same process.
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup = deriveIntegerGroupParams(calculateSeed(N, aux, securityLevel, STRING_AIC_GROUP),
qLen + 300, qLen + 1);
PRINT_GROUP_PARAMS(params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorPoKCommitmentGroup);
// Calculate the parameters for the accumulator QRN commitment generators. This isn't really
// a whole group, just a pair of random generators in QR_N.
uint32_t resultCtr;
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.g(generateIntegerFromSeed(NLen - 1,
calculateSeed(N, aux, securityLevel, STRING_QRNCOMMIT_GROUPG),
&resultCtr).pow_mod(Bignum(2), N));
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.h(generateIntegerFromSeed(NLen - 1,
calculateSeed(N, aux, securityLevel, STRING_QRNCOMMIT_GROUPH),
&resultCtr).pow_mod(Bignum(2), N));
PRINT_BIGNUM("params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.g", params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.g());
PRINT_BIGNUM("params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.h", params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorQRNCommitmentGroup.h());
// Calculate the accumulator base, which we calculate as "u = C**2 mod N"
// where C is an arbitrary value. In the unlikely case that "u = 1" we increment
// "C" and repeat.
Bignum constant(ACCUMULATOR_BASE_CONSTANT);
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorBase = Bignum(1);
for (uint32_t count = 0; count < MAX_ACCUMGEN_ATTEMPTS && params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorBase.isOne(); count++) {
params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorBase = constant.pow_mod(Bignum(2), params.accumulatorParams.accumulatorModulus);
}
// Compute the accumulator range. The upper range is the largest possible coin commitment value.
// The lower range is sqrt(upper range) + 1. Since OpenSSL doesn't have
// a square root function we use a slightly higher approximation.
params.accumulatorParams.maxCoinValue = params.coinCommitmentGroup.modulus;
params.accumulatorParams.minCoinValue = Bignum(2).pow((params.coinCommitmentGroup.modulus.bitSize() / 2) + 3);
// If all went well, mark params as successfully initialized.
params.accumulatorParams.initialized = true;
// If all went well, mark params as successfully initialized.
params.initialized = true;
}
void
calculateGroupModulusAndOrder(uint256 seed, uint32_t pLen, uint32_t qLen,
Bignum *resultModulus, Bignum *resultGroupOrder,
uint256 *resultPseed, uint256 *resultQseed)
{
// Verify that the seed length is >= qLen
if (qLen > (sizeof(seed)) * 8) {
// TODO: The use of 256-bit seeds limits us to 256-bit group orders. We should probably change this.
// throw ZerocoinException("Seed is too short to support the required security level.");
}
#ifdef ZEROCOIN_DEBUG
cout << "calculateGroupModulusAndOrder: pLen = " << pLen << endl;
#endif
// Generate a random prime for the group order.
// This may throw an exception, which we'll pass upwards.
// Result is the value "resultGroupOrder", "qseed" and "qgen_counter".
uint256 qseed;
uint32_t qgen_counter;
*resultGroupOrder = generateRandomPrime(qLen, seed, &qseed, &qgen_counter);
// Using ⎡pLen / 2 + 1⎤ as the length and qseed as the input_seed, use the random prime
// routine to obtain p0 , pseed, and pgen_counter. We pass exceptions upward.
uint32_t p0len = ceil((pLen / 2.0) + 1);
uint256 pseed;
uint32_t pgen_counter;
Bignum p0 = generateRandomPrime(p0len, qseed, &pseed, &pgen_counter);
// Set x = 0, old_counter = pgen_counter
uint32_t old_counter = pgen_counter;
// Generate a random integer "x" of pLen bits
uint32_t iterations;
Bignum x = generateIntegerFromSeed(pLen, pseed, &iterations);
pseed += (iterations + 1);
// Set x = 2^{pLen−1} + (x mod 2^{pLen–1}).
Bignum powerOfTwo = Bignum(2).pow(pLen-1);
x = powerOfTwo + (x % powerOfTwo);
// t = ⎡x / (2 * resultGroupOrder * p0)⎤.
// TODO: we don't have a ceiling function
Bignum t = x / (Bignum(2) * (*resultGroupOrder) * p0);
// Now loop until we find a valid prime "p" or we fail due to
// pgen_counter exceeding ((4*pLen) + old_counter).
for ( ; pgen_counter <= ((4*pLen) + old_counter) ; pgen_counter++) {
// If (2 * t * resultGroupOrder * p0 + 1) > 2^{pLen}, then
// t = ⎡2^{pLen−1} / (2 * resultGroupOrder * p0)⎤.
powerOfTwo = Bignum(2).pow(pLen);
Bignum prod = (Bignum(2) * t * (*resultGroupOrder) * p0) + Bignum(1);
if (prod > powerOfTwo) {
// TODO: implement a ceil function
t = Bignum(2).pow(pLen-1) / (Bignum(2) * (*resultGroupOrder) * p0);
}
// Compute a candidate prime resultModulus = 2tqp0 + 1.
*resultModulus = (Bignum(2) * t * (*resultGroupOrder) * p0) + Bignum(1);
// Verify that resultModulus is prime. First generate a pseudorandom integer "a".
Bignum a = generateIntegerFromSeed(pLen, pseed, &iterations);
pseed += iterations + 1;
// Set a = 2 + (a mod (resultModulus–3)).
a = Bignum(2) + (a % ((*resultModulus) - Bignum(3)));
// Set z = a^{2 * t * resultGroupOrder} mod resultModulus
Bignum z = a.pow_mod(Bignum(2) * t * (*resultGroupOrder), (*resultModulus));
// If GCD(z–1, resultModulus) == 1 AND (z^{p0} mod resultModulus == 1)
// then we have found our result. Return.
if ((resultModulus->gcd(z - Bignum(1))).isOne() &&
(z.pow_mod(p0, (*resultModulus))).isOne()) {
// Success! Return the seeds and primes.
*resultPseed = pseed;
*resultQseed = qseed;
return;
}
// This prime did not work out. Increment "t" and try again.
t = t + Bignum(1);
} // loop continues until pgen_counter exceeds a limit
// We reach this point only if we exceeded our maximum iteration count.
// Throw an exception.
throw ZerocoinException("Unable to generate a prime modulus for the group");
}
