/*******************************************************************************
*
* VERIFY_GCM_ENCRYPTION
*
* Handles block type 0: This is the first of the three routines, called by
* VERIFY_GCM, which reads the "gcm_test_vectors.bin" file block by block.
* It invokes the AES-GCM library "gcm_crypt_and_tag" function to encrypt
* the provided plaintext, then verifies the returned ciphertext and auth
* tag against the correct test vector data provided by the NIST file.
*/
int verify_gcm_encryption(
const uchar *key, // pointer to the cipher key
size_t key_len, // byte length of the key
const uchar *iv, // pointer to the initialization vector
size_t iv_len, // byte length of the initialization vector
const uchar *aad, // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data
size_t aad_len, // byte length of the additional AEAD data
const uchar *pt, // pointer to the plaintext SOURCE data
const uchar *ct, // pointer to the CORRECT cipher data
size_t ct_len, // byte length of the cipher data
const uchar *tag, // pointer to the CORRECT tag to be generated
size_t tag_len ) // byte length of the tag to be generated
{
int ret = 0; // our return value
gcm_context ctx; // includes the AES context structure
uchar ct_buf[256]; // cipher text results for comparison
uchar tag_buf[16]; // tag result buffer for comparison
gcm_setkey( &ctx, key, (const uint)key_len ); // setup our AES-GCM key
// encrypt the NIST-provided plaintext into the local ct_buf and
// tag_buf ciphertext and authentication tag buffers respectively.
ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, ENCRYPT, iv, iv_len, aad, aad_len,
pt, ct_buf, ct_len, tag_buf, tag_len);
ret |= memcmp( ct_buf, ct, ct_len ); // verify correct ciphertext
ret |= memcmp( tag_buf, tag, tag_len ); // verify correct authentication tag
gcm_zero_ctx( &ctx ); // not really necessary here, but good to do
return ( ret ); // return any error 'OR' generated above
}
/*
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes
*/
int cipher_auth_encrypt( cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C)
if( POLARSSL_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
*olen = ilen;
return( gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen,
iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output,
tag_len, tag ) );
}
#endif /* POLARSSL_GCM_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_CCM_C)
if( POLARSSL_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode )
{
*olen = ilen;
return( ccm_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen,
iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output,
tag, tag_len ) );
}
#endif /* POLARSSL_CCM_C */
return( POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
/**
* @Brief AES-GCM encrypt and tag buffer
*
* @param[in] key Encryption key
* @param[in] keyLength Key buffer length, in bytes, must be 16,24 or 32
* @param[in] plainText Buffer to be encrypted
* @param[in] plainTextLength Length in bytes of buffer to be encrypted
* @param[in] authenticatedData Buffer holding additional data to be used in tag computation
* @param[in] authenticatedDataLength Additional data length in bytes
* @param[in] initializationVector Buffer holding the initialisation vector
* @param[in] initializationVectorLength Initialisation vector length in bytes
* @param[out] tag Buffer holding the generated tag
* @param[in] tagLength Requested length for the generated tag
* @param[out] output Buffer holding the output, shall be at least the length of plainText buffer
*/
int32_t bctbx_aes_gcm_encrypt_and_tag(const uint8_t *key, size_t keyLength,
const uint8_t *plainText, size_t plainTextLength,
const uint8_t *authenticatedData, size_t authenticatedDataLength,
const uint8_t *initializationVector, size_t initializationVectorLength,
uint8_t *tag, size_t tagLength,
uint8_t *output) {
gcm_context gcmContext;
int ret;
ret = gcm_init(&gcmContext, key, keyLength*8);
if (ret != 0) return ret;
ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcmContext, GCM_ENCRYPT, plainTextLength, initializationVector, initializationVectorLength, authenticatedData, authenticatedDataLength, plainText, output, tagLength, tag);
return ret;
}
struct item *symmetric_encryption(struct item *key, struct item *payload)
/*@ requires [?f]world(?pub, ?key_clsfy) &*&
principal(?principal1, ?count1) &*&
[_]pub(nonce_item(principal1, count1 + 1, 0)) &*&
item(payload, ?pay, pub) &*& item(key, ?k, pub) &*&
k == symmetric_key_item(?principal2, ?count2); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]world(pub, key_clsfy) &*&
principal(principal1, count1 + 2) &*&
item(payload, pay, pub) &*& item(key, k, pub) &*&
item(result, ?enc, pub) &*&
col ? true :
enc == symmetric_encrypted_item(principal2, count2,
some(pay), ?ent); @*/
{
//@ open [f]world(pub, key_clsfy);
debug_print("ENCRYPTING:\n");
print_item(payload);
struct item* result;
result = malloc(sizeof(struct item));
if (result == 0) abort_crypto_lib("Malloc failed");
{
gcm_context gcm_context;
char iv_buffer[GCM_IV_SIZE];
char *iv;
char *result_cs;
char *encrypted;
//@ open item(key, k, pub);
//@ assert key->content |-> ?k_cont &*& key->size |-> ?k_size;
check_valid_symmetric_key_item_size(key->size);
//@ open [_]item_constraints(k, ?k_cs0, pub);
//@ assert [_]ic_parts(k)(?k_tag, ?k_cs);
//@ crypto_chars_limits(k_cont);
//@ crypto_chars_split(k_cont, TAG_LENGTH);
//@ WELL_FORMED(k_tag, k_cs, TAG_SYMMETRIC_KEY)
//@ assert crypto_chars(secret, k_cont, TAG_LENGTH, k_tag);
//@ assert crypto_chars(secret, k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs);
//@ cryptogram k_cg = cg_symmetric_key(principal2, count2);
//@ if (col) k_cg = chars_for_cg_sur(k_cs, tag_symmetric_key);
//@ if (col) crypto_chars_to_chars(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE);
//@ if (col) public_chars_extract(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, k_cg);
//@ if (col) chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE);
//@ close cryptogram(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs, k_cg);
//@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context);
if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, (key->content + TAG_LENGTH),
(unsigned int) GCM_KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0)
abort_crypto_lib("Init gcm failed");
//@ assert gcm_context_initialized(&gcm_context, ?p, ?c);
//@ assert col || (p == principal2 && c == count2);
//@ open cryptogram(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs, k_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(k_cont);
//@ close item(key, k, pub);
//@ open item(payload, pay, pub);
//@ open [_]item_constraints(pay, ?pay_cs, pub);
//@ assert payload->content |-> ?p_cont &*& payload->size |-> ?p_size;
//@ crypto_chars_limits(p_cont);
if (payload->size >= INT_MAX - TAG_LENGTH - GCM_IV_SIZE - GCM_MAC_SIZE ||
payload->size < MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE)
abort_crypto_lib("Gcm encryption failed: incorrect sizes");
result->size = TAG_LENGTH + GCM_IV_SIZE + GCM_MAC_SIZE + payload->size;
result->content = malloc(result->size);
//@ assert result->content |-> ?r_cont &*& result->size |-> ?r_size;
if (result->content == 0)
abort_crypto_lib("Malloc failed");
//@ chars_split(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH);
write_tag(result->content, TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC);
//@ assert chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH, ?tag_cs);
//@ public_chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH);
//@ assert tag_cs == full_tag(TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC);
//@ assert chars(r_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_IV_SIZE + p_size, _);
//@ chars_split(r_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_IV_SIZE);
iv = result->content + TAG_LENGTH;
//@ close nonce_request(principal1, 0);
//@ close [f]world(pub, key_clsfy);
create_havege_random(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE);
//@ open cryptogram(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE, ?iv_cs, ?iv_cg);
memcpy(iv_buffer, iv, GCM_IV_SIZE);
//@ close cryptogram(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cg);
//@ close polarssl_pub(pub)(iv_cg);
//@ leak polarssl_pub(pub)(iv_cg);
//@ public_cryptogram(iv, iv_cg);
//@ public_chars(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE);
encrypted = iv + GCM_IV_SIZE;
//@ chars_split(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE);
//@ open principal(principal1, count1 + 1);
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT,
(unsigned int) payload->size, iv_buffer,
GCM_IV_SIZE, NULL, 0, payload->content,
encrypted + GCM_MAC_SIZE,
GCM_MAC_SIZE, encrypted) != 0)
abort_crypto_lib("Gcm encryption failed");
//@ close principal(principal1, count1 + 2);
zeroize(iv_buffer, GCM_IV_SIZE);
//@ assert crypto_chars(secret, encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE, ?mac_cs);
//@ assert crypto_chars(secret, encrypted + GCM_MAC_SIZE, p_size, ?enc_cs);
//@ crypto_chars_join(encrypted);
//@ assert exists(?enc_cg);
//@ list<char> cg_cs = append(mac_cs, enc_cs);
//@ assert cg_cs == chars_for_cg(enc_cg);
//@ list<char> cont_cs = append(iv_cs, cg_cs);
//@ take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, cg_cs);
//@ drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, cg_cs);
//@ list<char> cs = append(tag_cs, cont_cs);
//@ take_append(TAG_LENGTH, tag_cs, cont_cs);
//@ drop_append(TAG_LENGTH, tag_cs, cont_cs);
//@ item enc;
//@ list<char> ent = append(iv_cs, iv_cs);
//@ take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cs);
//@ drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cs);
/*@ if (col)
{
enc_cg = chars_for_cg_sur(cg_cs, tag_auth_encrypted);
assert enc_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(?p0, ?c0, ?pay0, ?iv0);
ent = append(iv_cs, iv0);
take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv0);
drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv0);
enc = symmetric_encrypted_item(p0, c0, some(pay), ent);
public_chars(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE + p_size);
assert chars(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE + p_size, cg_cs);
chars_join(iv);
chars_join(r_cont);
assert chars(r_cont, r_size, cs);
public_chars(r_cont, r_size);
public_generated_split(polarssl_pub(pub), cs, TAG_LENGTH);
close ic_sym_enc(enc)(iv0, cg_cs);
}
else
{
assert enc_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(principal2, count2, pay_cs, iv_cs);
enc = symmetric_encrypted_item(principal2, count2, some(pay), ent);
close polarssl_pub(pub)(cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1));
leak polarssl_pub(pub)(cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1));
public_generated(polarssl_pub(pub), cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1));
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE);
crypto_chars_join(iv);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH);
crypto_chars_join(r_cont);
assert crypto_chars(secret, r_cont, r_size, cs);
close ic_sym_enc(enc)(iv_cs, cg_cs);
}
@*/
//@ well_formed_item_constraints(pay, enc);
//@ close ic_cg(enc)(cg_cs, enc_cg);
//@ close ic_parts(enc)(tag_cs, cont_cs);
//@ WELL_FORMED(tag_cs, cont_cs, TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC)
//@ close item_constraints(enc, cs, pub);
//@ leak item_constraints(enc, cs, pub);
//@ close item(result, enc, pub);
//@ close item(payload, pay, pub);
gcm_free(&gcm_context);
//@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context);
}
debug_print("ENCRYPTING RESULT:\n");
print_item(result);
return result;
}
void app_send(char *key, char *message, int message_len)
/*@ requires polarssl_generated_values(?creator, ?count1) &*&
[?f0]polarssl_world(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) &*&
[?f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == polarssl_symmetric_key(creator, ?key_id) &*&
[?f2]chars(message, message_len, ?m_cs) &*&
message_len >= POLARSSL_MIN_ENCRYPTED_BYTE_SIZE &*&
message_len < POLARSSL_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTE_SIZE - 84 &*&
bad(creator) ?
[_]polarssl_public_generated_chars(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)(m_cs)
:
true == app_send_event(creator, m_cs);
@*/
/*@ ensures polarssl_generated_values(creator, ?count2) &*& count2 > count1 &*&
[f0]polarssl_world(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) &*&
[f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
[f2]chars(message, message_len, m_cs);
@*/
{
int socket;
havege_state havege_state;
char iv[16];
// init
{
net_usleep(20000);
if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, APP_RECEIVE_PORT) != 0)
abort();
if(net_set_block(socket) != 0)
abort();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
}
// iv stuff
{
//@ close random_request(creator, 0, false);
if (havege_random(&havege_state, iv, 16) != 0) abort();
}
//@ open polarssl_cryptogram(iv, 16, ?iv_cs, _);
char* m = malloc(16 + message_len + 16);
if (m == 0) abort();
memcpy(m, iv, 16);
//@ assert chars(m, 16, iv_cs);
//@ assert chars(m + 16, message_len + 16, ?cs1);
//@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_assume(sc_auth_polarssl_pub, iv_cs);
// encrypt message
{
unsigned int temp;
gcm_context gcm_context;
//@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context);
//@ open [f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg);
//@ close polarssl_key_id(creator, key_id);
if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_AES_CIPHER_ID, key,
(unsigned int) KEY_BYTE_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort();
//@ close [f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg);
//@ chars_split(m + 16, message_len);
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_GCM_ENCRYPT,
(unsigned int) message_len,
iv, 16, NULL, 0, message, m + 16, 16,
(char*) ((m + 16) + message_len)) != 0)
abort();
gcm_free(&gcm_context);
//@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context);
}
//@ assert polarssl_cryptogram(m + 16, message_len, ?e_cs, ?e_cg);
/*@ assert e_cg == polarssl_auth_encrypted(
creator, key_id, ?t_cs, m_cs, iv_cs); @*/
//@ close sc_auth_polarssl_pub(e_cg);
//@ leak sc_auth_polarssl_pub(e_cg);
/*@ polarssl_public_message_from_cryptogram(
sc_auth_polarssl_pub, m + 16, message_len, e_cs, e_cg); @*/
/*@ open polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)
(m + 16, message_len, e_cs); @*/
//@ assert chars(m + 16 + message_len, 16, t_cs);
//@ chars_join(m);
//@ chars_join(m);
//@ assert chars(m, 16 + message_len + 16, ?cs);
//@ append_assoc(iv_cs, e_cs, t_cs);
//@ assert cs == append(iv_cs, append(e_cs, t_cs));
//@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_assume(sc_auth_polarssl_pub, t_cs);
/*@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_join(
sc_auth_polarssl_pub, iv_cs, e_cs); @*/
/*@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_join(
sc_auth_polarssl_pub, append(iv_cs, e_cs), t_cs); @*/
/*@ close polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)
(m, 16 + message_len + 16,
append(iv_cs, append(e_cs, t_cs))); @*/
net_send(&socket, m, (unsigned int) 16 + (unsigned int) message_len + 16);
//@ open polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)(m, _, _);
{
free(m);
havege_free(&havege_state);
//@ open havege_state(&havege_state);
net_close(socket);
}
}
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
int keysize, i;
unsigned char tmp[200];
char title[TITLE_LEN];
todo_list todo;
if( argc == 1 )
memset( &todo, 1, sizeof( todo ) );
else
{
memset( &todo, 0, sizeof( todo ) );
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
{
if( strcmp( argv[i], "md4" ) == 0 )
todo.md4 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "md5" ) == 0 )
todo.md5 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ripemd160" ) == 0 )
todo.ripemd160 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha1" ) == 0 )
todo.sha1 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha256" ) == 0 )
todo.sha256 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha512" ) == 0 )
todo.sha512 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "arc4" ) == 0 )
todo.arc4 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des3" ) == 0 )
todo.des3 = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des" ) == 0 )
todo.des = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_cbc" ) == 0 )
todo.aes_cbc = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_gcm" ) == 0 )
todo.aes_gcm = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "camellia" ) == 0 )
todo.camellia = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "blowfish" ) == 0 )
todo.blowfish = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "havege" ) == 0 )
todo.havege = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ctr_drbg" ) == 0 )
todo.ctr_drbg = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "hmac_drbg" ) == 0 )
todo.hmac_drbg = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "rsa" ) == 0 )
todo.rsa = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "dhm" ) == 0 )
todo.dhm = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdsa" ) == 0 )
todo.ecdsa = 1;
else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdh" ) == 0 )
todo.ecdh = 1;
else
{
printf( "Unrecognized option: %s\n", argv[i] );
printf( "Available options:" OPTIONS );
}
}
}
printf( "\n" );
memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) );
#if defined(POLARSSL_MD4_C)
if( todo.md4 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "MD4", md4( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
if( todo.md5 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "MD5", md5( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C)
if( todo.ripemd160 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "RIPEMD160", ripemd160( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
if( todo.sha1 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-1", sha1( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA256_C)
if( todo.sha256 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-256", sha256( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA512_C)
if( todo.sha512 )
TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-512", sha512( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) );
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_ARC4_C)
if( todo.arc4 )
{
arc4_context arc4;
arc4_setup( &arc4, tmp, 32 );
TIME_AND_TSC( "ARC4", arc4_crypt( &arc4, BUFSIZE, buf, buf ) );
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_DES_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
if( todo.des3 )
{
des3_context des3;
des3_set3key_enc( &des3, tmp );
TIME_AND_TSC( "3DES",
des3_crypt_cbc( &des3, DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
}
if( todo.des )
{
des_context des;
des_setkey_enc( &des, tmp );
TIME_AND_TSC( "DES",
des_crypt_cbc( &des, DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_AES_C)
#if defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
if( todo.aes_cbc )
{
aes_context aes;
for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 )
{
snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-CBC-%d", keysize );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
aes_setkey_enc( &aes, tmp, keysize );
TIME_AND_TSC( title,
aes_crypt_cbc( &aes, AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
}
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C)
if( todo.aes_gcm )
{
gcm_context gcm;
for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 )
{
snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-GCM-%d", keysize );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
gcm_init( &gcm, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, tmp, keysize );
TIME_AND_TSC( title,
gcm_crypt_and_tag( &gcm, GCM_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp,
12, NULL, 0, buf, buf, 16, tmp ) );
gcm_free( &gcm );
}
}
#endif
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
if( todo.camellia )
{
camellia_context camellia;
for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 )
{
snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "CAMELLIA-CBC-%d", keysize );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
camellia_setkey_enc( &camellia, tmp, keysize );
TIME_AND_TSC( title,
camellia_crypt_cbc( &camellia, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT,
BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) );
}
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
if( todo.blowfish )
{
blowfish_context blowfish;
for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 )
{
snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "BLOWFISH-CBC-%d", keysize );
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) );
blowfish_setkey( &blowfish, tmp, keysize );
TIME_AND_TSC( title,
blowfish_crypt_cbc( &blowfish, BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE,
tmp, buf, buf ) );
}
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C)
if( todo.havege )
{
havege_state hs;
havege_init( &hs );
TIME_AND_TSC( "HAVEGE", havege_random( &hs, buf, BUFSIZE ) );
}
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C)
if( todo.ctr_drbg )
{
ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg;
if( ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 )
exit(1);
TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (NOPR)",
if( ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) != 0 )
exit(1) );
if( ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 )
exit(1);
ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctr_drbg, CTR_DRBG_PR_ON );
TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (PR)",
if( ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) != 0 )
exit(1) );
}
void attacker_send_auth_encrypted(havege_state *havege_state, void* socket)
//@ requires attacker_invariant(?pub, ?pred, ?kc, havege_state, socket, ?attacker);
//@ ensures attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker);
{
int temp;
int size1;
int size2;
char buffer1[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE];
char buffer2[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE];
char buffer3[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE];
gcm_context gcm_context;
char iv[16];
//@ open attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker);
size1 = net_recv(socket, buffer1, MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
size2 = net_recv(socket, buffer2, MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE);
if (size1 <= 0 || size2 <= 16 || size2 > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE - 16 ||
(size1 != 16 && size1 != 24 && size1 != 32))
{
//@ close attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker);
return;
}
//@ assert chars(buffer1, size1, ?cs1);
//@ assert chars(buffer2, size2, ?cs2);
//@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context);
//@ interpret_symmetric_key(buffer1, size1);
//@ assert cryptogram(buffer1, size1, cs_to_ccs(cs1), ?cg_key);
//@ assert cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c);
if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES,
buffer1, (unsigned int) size1 * 8) == 0)
{
if (get_iv(havege_state, iv) == 0)
{
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer2, size2);
//@ chars_split(buffer3, 16);
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT,
(unsigned int) size2, iv, 16, NULL, 0,
buffer2, (void*) buffer3 + 16, 16, buffer3) == 0)
{
/*@
{
crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer2, size2);
public_chars(buffer2, size2);
chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer2, size2);
assert exists(?cg_enc);
assert is_public_auth_encryption_is_public(?proof2, pub, pred);
proof2(cg_enc);
assert crypto_chars(secret, buffer3, 16, ?ccs_tag);
assert crypto_chars(secret, (void*) buffer3 + 16, size2, ?ccs_enc);
public_cg_ccs(cg_enc);
public_ccs_split(append(ccs_tag, ccs_enc), 16);
take_append(16, ccs_tag, ccs_enc);
drop_append(16, ccs_tag, ccs_enc);
public_crypto_chars(buffer3, 16);
public_crypto_chars((void*) buffer3 + 16, size2);
}
@*/
net_send(socket, buffer3, (unsigned int) size2 + 16);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer3, 16);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars((void*) buffer3 + 16, size2);
}
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer2, size2);
//@ crypto_chars_join(buffer3);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer3, size2 + 16);
}
gcm_free(&gcm_context);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(iv, 16);
}
//@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context);
//@ close attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker);
//@ public_cryptogram(buffer1, cg_key);
}
