/******************************************************************************* * * VERIFY_GCM_ENCRYPTION * * Handles block type 0: This is the first of the three routines, called by * VERIFY_GCM, which reads the "gcm_test_vectors.bin" file block by block. * It invokes the AES-GCM library "gcm_crypt_and_tag" function to encrypt * the provided plaintext, then verifies the returned ciphertext and auth * tag against the correct test vector data provided by the NIST file. */ int verify_gcm_encryption( const uchar *key, // pointer to the cipher key size_t key_len, // byte length of the key const uchar *iv, // pointer to the initialization vector size_t iv_len, // byte length of the initialization vector const uchar *aad, // pointer to the non-ciphered additional data size_t aad_len, // byte length of the additional AEAD data const uchar *pt, // pointer to the plaintext SOURCE data const uchar *ct, // pointer to the CORRECT cipher data size_t ct_len, // byte length of the cipher data const uchar *tag, // pointer to the CORRECT tag to be generated size_t tag_len ) // byte length of the tag to be generated { int ret = 0; // our return value gcm_context ctx; // includes the AES context structure uchar ct_buf[256]; // cipher text results for comparison uchar tag_buf[16]; // tag result buffer for comparison gcm_setkey( &ctx, key, (const uint)key_len ); // setup our AES-GCM key // encrypt the NIST-provided plaintext into the local ct_buf and // tag_buf ciphertext and authentication tag buffers respectively. ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag( &ctx, ENCRYPT, iv, iv_len, aad, aad_len, pt, ct_buf, ct_len, tag_buf, tag_len); ret |= memcmp( ct_buf, ct, ct_len ); // verify correct ciphertext ret |= memcmp( tag_buf, tag, tag_len ); // verify correct authentication tag gcm_zero_ctx( &ctx ); // not really necessary here, but good to do return ( ret ); // return any error 'OR' generated above }
/* * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes */ int cipher_auth_encrypt( cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len ) { #if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C) if( POLARSSL_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { *olen = ilen; return( gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag_len, tag ) ); } #endif /* POLARSSL_GCM_C */ #if defined(POLARSSL_CCM_C) if( POLARSSL_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode ) { *olen = ilen; return( ccm_encrypt_and_tag( ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag, tag_len ) ); } #endif /* POLARSSL_CCM_C */ return( POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); }
/** * @Brief AES-GCM encrypt and tag buffer * * @param[in] key Encryption key * @param[in] keyLength Key buffer length, in bytes, must be 16,24 or 32 * @param[in] plainText Buffer to be encrypted * @param[in] plainTextLength Length in bytes of buffer to be encrypted * @param[in] authenticatedData Buffer holding additional data to be used in tag computation * @param[in] authenticatedDataLength Additional data length in bytes * @param[in] initializationVector Buffer holding the initialisation vector * @param[in] initializationVectorLength Initialisation vector length in bytes * @param[out] tag Buffer holding the generated tag * @param[in] tagLength Requested length for the generated tag * @param[out] output Buffer holding the output, shall be at least the length of plainText buffer */ int32_t bctbx_aes_gcm_encrypt_and_tag(const uint8_t *key, size_t keyLength, const uint8_t *plainText, size_t plainTextLength, const uint8_t *authenticatedData, size_t authenticatedDataLength, const uint8_t *initializationVector, size_t initializationVectorLength, uint8_t *tag, size_t tagLength, uint8_t *output) { gcm_context gcmContext; int ret; ret = gcm_init(&gcmContext, key, keyLength*8); if (ret != 0) return ret; ret = gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcmContext, GCM_ENCRYPT, plainTextLength, initializationVector, initializationVectorLength, authenticatedData, authenticatedDataLength, plainText, output, tagLength, tag); return ret; }
struct item *symmetric_encryption(struct item *key, struct item *payload) /*@ requires [?f]world(?pub, ?key_clsfy) &*& principal(?principal1, ?count1) &*& [_]pub(nonce_item(principal1, count1 + 1, 0)) &*& item(payload, ?pay, pub) &*& item(key, ?k, pub) &*& k == symmetric_key_item(?principal2, ?count2); @*/ /*@ ensures [f]world(pub, key_clsfy) &*& principal(principal1, count1 + 2) &*& item(payload, pay, pub) &*& item(key, k, pub) &*& item(result, ?enc, pub) &*& col ? true : enc == symmetric_encrypted_item(principal2, count2, some(pay), ?ent); @*/ { //@ open [f]world(pub, key_clsfy); debug_print("ENCRYPTING:\n"); print_item(payload); struct item* result; result = malloc(sizeof(struct item)); if (result == 0) abort_crypto_lib("Malloc failed"); { gcm_context gcm_context; char iv_buffer[GCM_IV_SIZE]; char *iv; char *result_cs; char *encrypted; //@ open item(key, k, pub); //@ assert key->content |-> ?k_cont &*& key->size |-> ?k_size; check_valid_symmetric_key_item_size(key->size); //@ open [_]item_constraints(k, ?k_cs0, pub); //@ assert [_]ic_parts(k)(?k_tag, ?k_cs); //@ crypto_chars_limits(k_cont); //@ crypto_chars_split(k_cont, TAG_LENGTH); //@ WELL_FORMED(k_tag, k_cs, TAG_SYMMETRIC_KEY) //@ assert crypto_chars(secret, k_cont, TAG_LENGTH, k_tag); //@ assert crypto_chars(secret, k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs); //@ cryptogram k_cg = cg_symmetric_key(principal2, count2); //@ if (col) k_cg = chars_for_cg_sur(k_cs, tag_symmetric_key); //@ if (col) crypto_chars_to_chars(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE); //@ if (col) public_chars_extract(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, k_cg); //@ if (col) chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE); //@ close cryptogram(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs, k_cg); //@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context); if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, (key->content + TAG_LENGTH), (unsigned int) GCM_KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort_crypto_lib("Init gcm failed"); //@ assert gcm_context_initialized(&gcm_context, ?p, ?c); //@ assert col || (p == principal2 && c == count2); //@ open cryptogram(k_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_KEY_SIZE, k_cs, k_cg); //@ crypto_chars_join(k_cont); //@ close item(key, k, pub); //@ open item(payload, pay, pub); //@ open [_]item_constraints(pay, ?pay_cs, pub); //@ assert payload->content |-> ?p_cont &*& payload->size |-> ?p_size; //@ crypto_chars_limits(p_cont); if (payload->size >= INT_MAX - TAG_LENGTH - GCM_IV_SIZE - GCM_MAC_SIZE || payload->size < MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE) abort_crypto_lib("Gcm encryption failed: incorrect sizes"); result->size = TAG_LENGTH + GCM_IV_SIZE + GCM_MAC_SIZE + payload->size; result->content = malloc(result->size); //@ assert result->content |-> ?r_cont &*& result->size |-> ?r_size; if (result->content == 0) abort_crypto_lib("Malloc failed"); //@ chars_split(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH); write_tag(result->content, TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC); //@ assert chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH, ?tag_cs); //@ public_chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH); //@ assert tag_cs == full_tag(TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC); //@ assert chars(r_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_IV_SIZE + p_size, _); //@ chars_split(r_cont + TAG_LENGTH, GCM_IV_SIZE); iv = result->content + TAG_LENGTH; //@ close nonce_request(principal1, 0); //@ close [f]world(pub, key_clsfy); create_havege_random(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); //@ open cryptogram(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE, ?iv_cs, ?iv_cg); memcpy(iv_buffer, iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); //@ close cryptogram(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cg); //@ close polarssl_pub(pub)(iv_cg); //@ leak polarssl_pub(pub)(iv_cg); //@ public_cryptogram(iv, iv_cg); //@ public_chars(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); encrypted = iv + GCM_IV_SIZE; //@ chars_split(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE); //@ open principal(principal1, count1 + 1); if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT, (unsigned int) payload->size, iv_buffer, GCM_IV_SIZE, NULL, 0, payload->content, encrypted + GCM_MAC_SIZE, GCM_MAC_SIZE, encrypted) != 0) abort_crypto_lib("Gcm encryption failed"); //@ close principal(principal1, count1 + 2); zeroize(iv_buffer, GCM_IV_SIZE); //@ assert crypto_chars(secret, encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE, ?mac_cs); //@ assert crypto_chars(secret, encrypted + GCM_MAC_SIZE, p_size, ?enc_cs); //@ crypto_chars_join(encrypted); //@ assert exists(?enc_cg); //@ list<char> cg_cs = append(mac_cs, enc_cs); //@ assert cg_cs == chars_for_cg(enc_cg); //@ list<char> cont_cs = append(iv_cs, cg_cs); //@ take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, cg_cs); //@ drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, cg_cs); //@ list<char> cs = append(tag_cs, cont_cs); //@ take_append(TAG_LENGTH, tag_cs, cont_cs); //@ drop_append(TAG_LENGTH, tag_cs, cont_cs); //@ item enc; //@ list<char> ent = append(iv_cs, iv_cs); //@ take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cs); //@ drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv_cs); /*@ if (col) { enc_cg = chars_for_cg_sur(cg_cs, tag_auth_encrypted); assert enc_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(?p0, ?c0, ?pay0, ?iv0); ent = append(iv_cs, iv0); take_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv0); drop_append(GCM_IV_SIZE, iv_cs, iv0); enc = symmetric_encrypted_item(p0, c0, some(pay), ent); public_chars(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE + p_size); assert chars(encrypted, GCM_MAC_SIZE + p_size, cg_cs); chars_join(iv); chars_join(r_cont); assert chars(r_cont, r_size, cs); public_chars(r_cont, r_size); public_generated_split(polarssl_pub(pub), cs, TAG_LENGTH); close ic_sym_enc(enc)(iv0, cg_cs); } else { assert enc_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(principal2, count2, pay_cs, iv_cs); enc = symmetric_encrypted_item(principal2, count2, some(pay), ent); close polarssl_pub(pub)(cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1)); leak polarssl_pub(pub)(cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1)); public_generated(polarssl_pub(pub), cg_nonce(principal1, count1 + 1)); chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(iv, GCM_IV_SIZE); crypto_chars_join(iv); chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(r_cont, TAG_LENGTH); crypto_chars_join(r_cont); assert crypto_chars(secret, r_cont, r_size, cs); close ic_sym_enc(enc)(iv_cs, cg_cs); } @*/ //@ well_formed_item_constraints(pay, enc); //@ close ic_cg(enc)(cg_cs, enc_cg); //@ close ic_parts(enc)(tag_cs, cont_cs); //@ WELL_FORMED(tag_cs, cont_cs, TAG_SYMMETRIC_ENC) //@ close item_constraints(enc, cs, pub); //@ leak item_constraints(enc, cs, pub); //@ close item(result, enc, pub); //@ close item(payload, pay, pub); gcm_free(&gcm_context); //@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context); } debug_print("ENCRYPTING RESULT:\n"); print_item(result); return result; }
void app_send(char *key, char *message, int message_len) /*@ requires polarssl_generated_values(?creator, ?count1) &*& [?f0]polarssl_world(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) &*& [?f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*& key_cg == polarssl_symmetric_key(creator, ?key_id) &*& [?f2]chars(message, message_len, ?m_cs) &*& message_len >= POLARSSL_MIN_ENCRYPTED_BYTE_SIZE &*& message_len < POLARSSL_MAX_MESSAGE_BYTE_SIZE - 84 &*& bad(creator) ? [_]polarssl_public_generated_chars(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)(m_cs) : true == app_send_event(creator, m_cs); @*/ /*@ ensures polarssl_generated_values(creator, ?count2) &*& count2 > count1 &*& [f0]polarssl_world(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) &*& [f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*& [f2]chars(message, message_len, m_cs); @*/ { int socket; havege_state havege_state; char iv[16]; // init { net_usleep(20000); if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, APP_RECEIVE_PORT) != 0) abort(); if(net_set_block(socket) != 0) abort(); //@ close havege_state(&havege_state); havege_init(&havege_state); } // iv stuff { //@ close random_request(creator, 0, false); if (havege_random(&havege_state, iv, 16) != 0) abort(); } //@ open polarssl_cryptogram(iv, 16, ?iv_cs, _); char* m = malloc(16 + message_len + 16); if (m == 0) abort(); memcpy(m, iv, 16); //@ assert chars(m, 16, iv_cs); //@ assert chars(m + 16, message_len + 16, ?cs1); //@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_assume(sc_auth_polarssl_pub, iv_cs); // encrypt message { unsigned int temp; gcm_context gcm_context; //@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context); //@ open [f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg); //@ close polarssl_key_id(creator, key_id); if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_AES_CIPHER_ID, key, (unsigned int) KEY_BYTE_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort(); //@ close [f1]polarssl_cryptogram(key, KEY_BYTE_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg); //@ chars_split(m + 16, message_len); if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_GCM_ENCRYPT, (unsigned int) message_len, iv, 16, NULL, 0, message, m + 16, 16, (char*) ((m + 16) + message_len)) != 0) abort(); gcm_free(&gcm_context); //@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context); } //@ assert polarssl_cryptogram(m + 16, message_len, ?e_cs, ?e_cg); /*@ assert e_cg == polarssl_auth_encrypted( creator, key_id, ?t_cs, m_cs, iv_cs); @*/ //@ close sc_auth_polarssl_pub(e_cg); //@ leak sc_auth_polarssl_pub(e_cg); /*@ polarssl_public_message_from_cryptogram( sc_auth_polarssl_pub, m + 16, message_len, e_cs, e_cg); @*/ /*@ open polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) (m + 16, message_len, e_cs); @*/ //@ assert chars(m + 16 + message_len, 16, t_cs); //@ chars_join(m); //@ chars_join(m); //@ assert chars(m, 16 + message_len + 16, ?cs); //@ append_assoc(iv_cs, e_cs, t_cs); //@ assert cs == append(iv_cs, append(e_cs, t_cs)); //@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_assume(sc_auth_polarssl_pub, t_cs); /*@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_join( sc_auth_polarssl_pub, iv_cs, e_cs); @*/ /*@ polarssl_public_generated_chars_join( sc_auth_polarssl_pub, append(iv_cs, e_cs), t_cs); @*/ /*@ close polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub) (m, 16 + message_len + 16, append(iv_cs, append(e_cs, t_cs))); @*/ net_send(&socket, m, (unsigned int) 16 + (unsigned int) message_len + 16); //@ open polarssl_public_message(sc_auth_polarssl_pub)(m, _, _); { free(m); havege_free(&havege_state); //@ open havege_state(&havege_state); net_close(socket); } }
int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) { int keysize, i; unsigned char tmp[200]; char title[TITLE_LEN]; todo_list todo; if( argc == 1 ) memset( &todo, 1, sizeof( todo ) ); else { memset( &todo, 0, sizeof( todo ) ); for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ ) { if( strcmp( argv[i], "md4" ) == 0 ) todo.md4 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "md5" ) == 0 ) todo.md5 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ripemd160" ) == 0 ) todo.ripemd160 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha1" ) == 0 ) todo.sha1 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha256" ) == 0 ) todo.sha256 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "sha512" ) == 0 ) todo.sha512 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "arc4" ) == 0 ) todo.arc4 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des3" ) == 0 ) todo.des3 = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "des" ) == 0 ) todo.des = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_cbc" ) == 0 ) todo.aes_cbc = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "aes_gcm" ) == 0 ) todo.aes_gcm = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "camellia" ) == 0 ) todo.camellia = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "blowfish" ) == 0 ) todo.blowfish = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "havege" ) == 0 ) todo.havege = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ctr_drbg" ) == 0 ) todo.ctr_drbg = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "hmac_drbg" ) == 0 ) todo.hmac_drbg = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "rsa" ) == 0 ) todo.rsa = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "dhm" ) == 0 ) todo.dhm = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdsa" ) == 0 ) todo.ecdsa = 1; else if( strcmp( argv[i], "ecdh" ) == 0 ) todo.ecdh = 1; else { printf( "Unrecognized option: %s\n", argv[i] ); printf( "Available options:" OPTIONS ); } } } printf( "\n" ); memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) ); #if defined(POLARSSL_MD4_C) if( todo.md4 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "MD4", md4( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C) if( todo.md5 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "MD5", md5( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C) if( todo.ripemd160 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "RIPEMD160", ripemd160( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C) if( todo.sha1 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-1", sha1( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_SHA256_C) if( todo.sha256 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-256", sha256( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_SHA512_C) if( todo.sha512 ) TIME_AND_TSC( "SHA-512", sha512( buf, BUFSIZE, tmp, 0 ) ); #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_ARC4_C) if( todo.arc4 ) { arc4_context arc4; arc4_setup( &arc4, tmp, 32 ); TIME_AND_TSC( "ARC4", arc4_crypt( &arc4, BUFSIZE, buf, buf ) ); } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_DES_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) if( todo.des3 ) { des3_context des3; des3_set3key_enc( &des3, tmp ); TIME_AND_TSC( "3DES", des3_crypt_cbc( &des3, DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); } if( todo.des ) { des_context des; des_setkey_enc( &des, tmp ); TIME_AND_TSC( "DES", des_crypt_cbc( &des, DES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_AES_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) if( todo.aes_cbc ) { aes_context aes; for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) { snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-CBC-%d", keysize ); memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); aes_setkey_enc( &aes, tmp, keysize ); TIME_AND_TSC( title, aes_crypt_cbc( &aes, AES_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); } } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_GCM_C) if( todo.aes_gcm ) { gcm_context gcm; for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) { snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "AES-GCM-%d", keysize ); memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); gcm_init( &gcm, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, tmp, keysize ); TIME_AND_TSC( title, gcm_crypt_and_tag( &gcm, GCM_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, 12, NULL, 0, buf, buf, 16, tmp ) ); gcm_free( &gcm ); } } #endif #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) if( todo.camellia ) { camellia_context camellia; for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) { snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "CAMELLIA-CBC-%d", keysize ); memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); camellia_setkey_enc( &camellia, tmp, keysize ); TIME_AND_TSC( title, camellia_crypt_cbc( &camellia, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); } } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C) && defined(POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) if( todo.blowfish ) { blowfish_context blowfish; for( keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64 ) { snprintf( title, sizeof( title ), "BLOWFISH-CBC-%d", keysize ); memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) ); memset( tmp, 0, sizeof( tmp ) ); blowfish_setkey( &blowfish, tmp, keysize ); TIME_AND_TSC( title, blowfish_crypt_cbc( &blowfish, BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, BUFSIZE, tmp, buf, buf ) ); } } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C) if( todo.havege ) { havege_state hs; havege_init( &hs ); TIME_AND_TSC( "HAVEGE", havege_random( &hs, buf, BUFSIZE ) ); } #endif #if defined(POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C) if( todo.ctr_drbg ) { ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; if( ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) exit(1); TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (NOPR)", if( ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) != 0 ) exit(1) ); if( ctr_drbg_init( &ctr_drbg, myrand, NULL, NULL, 0 ) != 0 ) exit(1); ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctr_drbg, CTR_DRBG_PR_ON ); TIME_AND_TSC( "CTR_DRBG (PR)", if( ctr_drbg_random( &ctr_drbg, buf, BUFSIZE ) != 0 ) exit(1) ); }
void attacker_send_auth_encrypted(havege_state *havege_state, void* socket) //@ requires attacker_invariant(?pub, ?pred, ?kc, havege_state, socket, ?attacker); //@ ensures attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker); { int temp; int size1; int size2; char buffer1[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE]; char buffer2[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE]; char buffer3[MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE]; gcm_context gcm_context; char iv[16]; //@ open attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker); size1 = net_recv(socket, buffer1, MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE); size2 = net_recv(socket, buffer2, MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE); if (size1 <= 0 || size2 <= 16 || size2 > MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE - 16 || (size1 != 16 && size1 != 24 && size1 != 32)) { //@ close attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker); return; } //@ assert chars(buffer1, size1, ?cs1); //@ assert chars(buffer2, size2, ?cs2); //@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context); //@ interpret_symmetric_key(buffer1, size1); //@ assert cryptogram(buffer1, size1, cs_to_ccs(cs1), ?cg_key); //@ assert cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c); if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, buffer1, (unsigned int) size1 * 8) == 0) { if (get_iv(havege_state, iv) == 0) { //@ chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer2, size2); //@ chars_split(buffer3, 16); if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT, (unsigned int) size2, iv, 16, NULL, 0, buffer2, (void*) buffer3 + 16, 16, buffer3) == 0) { /*@ { crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer2, size2); public_chars(buffer2, size2); chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer2, size2); assert exists(?cg_enc); assert is_public_auth_encryption_is_public(?proof2, pub, pred); proof2(cg_enc); assert crypto_chars(secret, buffer3, 16, ?ccs_tag); assert crypto_chars(secret, (void*) buffer3 + 16, size2, ?ccs_enc); public_cg_ccs(cg_enc); public_ccs_split(append(ccs_tag, ccs_enc), 16); take_append(16, ccs_tag, ccs_enc); drop_append(16, ccs_tag, ccs_enc); public_crypto_chars(buffer3, 16); public_crypto_chars((void*) buffer3 + 16, size2); } @*/ net_send(socket, buffer3, (unsigned int) size2 + 16); //@ chars_to_crypto_chars(buffer3, 16); //@ chars_to_crypto_chars((void*) buffer3 + 16, size2); } //@ crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer2, size2); //@ crypto_chars_join(buffer3); //@ crypto_chars_to_chars(buffer3, size2 + 16); } gcm_free(&gcm_context); //@ crypto_chars_to_chars(iv, 16); } //@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context); //@ close attacker_invariant(pub, pred, kc, havege_state, socket, attacker); //@ public_cryptogram(buffer1, cg_key); }