static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } /* make data into a big number */ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } /* do the decrypt */ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; p = buf; j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); break; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); break; # endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); }
int ec_GFp_simple_cmp (const EC_GROUP * group, const EC_POINT * a, const EC_POINT * b, BN_CTX * ctx) { /* return values: * -1 error * 0 equal (in affine coordinates) * 1 not equal */ int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp1, *tmp2, *Za23, *Zb23; const BIGNUM *tmp1_, *tmp2_; int ret = -1; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, a)) { return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, b) ? 0 : 1; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, b)) return 1; if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one) { return ((BN_cmp (&a->X, &b->X) == 0) && BN_cmp (&a->Y, &b->Y) == 0) ? 0 : 1; } field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new (); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start (ctx); tmp1 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); tmp2 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); Za23 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); Zb23 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (Zb23 == NULL) goto end; /* We have to decide whether * (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3), * or equivalently, whether * (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3). */ if (!b->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr (group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul (group, tmp1, &a->X, Zb23, ctx)) goto end; tmp1_ = tmp1; } else tmp1_ = &a->X; if (!a->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr (group, Za23, &a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul (group, tmp2, &b->X, Za23, ctx)) goto end; tmp2_ = tmp2; } else tmp2_ = &b->X; /* compare X_a*Z_b^2 with X_b*Z_a^2 */ if (BN_cmp (tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { ret = 1; /* points differ */ goto end; } if (!b->Z_is_one) { if (!field_mul (group, Zb23, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul (group, tmp1, &a->Y, Zb23, ctx)) goto end; /* tmp1_ = tmp1 */ } else tmp1_ = &a->Y; if (!a->Z_is_one) { if (!field_mul (group, Za23, Za23, &a->Z, ctx)) goto end; if (!field_mul (group, tmp2, &b->Y, Za23, ctx)) goto end; /* tmp2_ = tmp2 */ } else tmp2_ = &b->Y; /* compare Y_a*Z_b^3 with Y_b*Z_a^3 */ if (BN_cmp (tmp1_, tmp2_) != 0) { ret = 1; /* points differ */ goto end; } /* points are equal */ ret = 0; end: BN_CTX_end (ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free (new_ctx); return ret; }
int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve (EC_GROUP * group, const BIGNUM * p, const BIGNUM * a, const BIGNUM * b, BN_CTX * ctx) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp_a; /* p must be a prime > 3 */ if (BN_num_bits (p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd (p)) { ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); return 0; } if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new (); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start (ctx); tmp_a = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (tmp_a == NULL) goto err; /* group->field */ if (!BN_copy (&group->field, p)) goto err; BN_set_negative (&group->field, 0); /* group->a */ if (!BN_nnmod (tmp_a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) { if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, &group->a, tmp_a, ctx)) goto err; } else if (!BN_copy (&group->a, tmp_a)) goto err; /* group->b */ if (!BN_nnmod (&group->b, b, p, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_encode) if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, &group->b, &group->b, ctx)) goto err; /* group->a_is_minus3 */ if (!BN_add_word (tmp_a, 3)) goto err; group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp (tmp_a, &group->field)); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end (ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free (new_ctx); return ret; }
/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r. * point can not equal r. * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). * * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap, * avoiding conditional branches. */ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *x1, *x2, *z1, *z2; int ret = 0, i; BN_ULONG mask, word; if (r == point) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, EC_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } /* if result should be point at infinity */ if ((scalar == NULL) || BN_is_zero(scalar) || (point == NULL) || EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point) > 0) { return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r); } /* only support affine coordinates */ if (!point->Z_is_one) return 0; /* Since point_multiply is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((x1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((z1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; x2 = &r->X; z2 = &r->Y; bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top); bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top); bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top); bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top); if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */ if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(x2, x2, &group->b)) goto err; /* x2 = x^4 + b */ /* find top most bit and go one past it */ i = scalar->top - 1; mask = BN_TBIT; word = scalar->d[i]; while (!(word & mask)) mask >>= 1; mask >>= 1; /* if top most bit was at word break, go to next word */ if (!mask) { i--; mask = BN_TBIT; } for (; i >= 0; i--) { word = scalar->d[i]; while (mask) { BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top); BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top); if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top); BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top); mask >>= 1; } mask = BN_TBIT; } /* convert out of "projective" coordinates */ i = gf2m_Mxy(group, &point->X, &point->Y, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx); if (i == 0) goto err; else if (i == 1) { if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one(&r->Z)) goto err; r->Z_is_one = 1; } /* GF(2^m) field elements should always have BIGNUM::neg = 0 */ BN_set_negative(&r->X, 0); BN_set_negative(&r->Y, 0); ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; }
int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx) { int r = 0; BIGNUM *a1, *a2, *a3, *b1, *b2, *b3; BN_CTX *ctx_new = NULL; /* compare the field types*/ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) != EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b))) return 1; /* compare the curve name (if present) */ if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) return 0; if (!ctx) ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (!ctx) return -1; BN_CTX_start(ctx); a1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); a3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!b3) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } /* XXX This approach assumes that the external representation * of curves over the same field type is the same. */ if (!a->meth->group_get_curve(a, a1, a2, a3, ctx) || !b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx)) r = 1; if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3)) r = 1; /* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */ if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a), EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx)) r = 1; if (!r) { /* compare the order and cofactor */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(a, a1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_order(b, b1, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(a, a2, ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(b, b2, ctx)) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return -1; } if (BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2)) r = 1; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (ctx_new) BN_CTX_free(ctx); return r; }
static int encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); BIGNUM *f, *result; uint8_t *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int i, ret = 0; if (rsa_size > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (max_out < rsa_size) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return 0; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS && BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return 0; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); if (!f || !result || !buf) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); break; case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: /* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len); break; default: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) { goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) { goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) { if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { goto err; } /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the * modulus */ if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *out_len = rsa_size; ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return ret; }
int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { int ret = -1, i; BN_CTX *ctx; const BIGNUM *order; BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X; EC_POINT *point = NULL; const EC_GROUP *group; const EC_POINT *pub_key; /* check input values */ if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL || (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL || sig == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return -1; } if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING); return -1; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m = BN_CTX_get(ctx); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (X == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (order == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) || BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ret = 0; /* signature is invalid */ goto err; } /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */ if (!BN_mod_inverse(u2, sig->s, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* digest -> m */ i = BN_num_bits(order); /* * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes. */ if (8 * dgst_len > i) dgst_len = (i + 7) / 8; if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, m)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */ if ((8 * dgst_len > i) && !BN_rshift(m, m, 8 - (i & 0x7))) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* u2 = r * w mod q */ if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if ((point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */ ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) == 0); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ret; }
BN_BLINDING *rsa_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx) { BIGNUM local_n; BIGNUM *e, *n; BN_CTX *ctx; BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont_ctx = NULL; if (in_ctx == NULL) { ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { return 0; } } else { ctx = in_ctx; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (e == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (rsa->e == NULL) { e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx); if (e == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); goto err; } } else { e = rsa->e; } n = &local_n; BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) { mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx); if (mont_ctx == NULL) { goto err; } } ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, mont_ctx); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, rsa_setup_blinding, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (in_ctx == NULL) { BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (rsa->e == NULL) { BN_free(e); } return ret; }
int dh_im_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) { int ret = 0; BUF_MEM * x_mem = NULL; BIGNUM * x_bn = NULL, *a = NULL, *p_1 = NULL, *q = NULL; DH *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL; check((ctx && in && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments"); if (in->length < (size_t) EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ctx->ka_ctx->cipher) || !ctx->static_key) goto err; BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx); static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(ctx->static_key); if (!static_key) goto err; /* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */ ephemeral_key = DHparams_dup_with_q(static_key); if (!ephemeral_key) goto err; /* Perform the actual mapping */ x_mem = cipher_no_pad(ctx->ka_ctx, NULL, in, s, 1); if (!x_mem) goto err; x_bn = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) x_mem->data, x_mem->length, x_bn); a = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); q = DH_get_q(static_key, bn_ctx); p_1 = BN_dup(static_key->p); if (!x_bn || !a || !q || !p_1 || /* p_1 = p-1 */ !BN_sub_word(p_1, 1) || /* a = p-1 / q */ !BN_div(a, NULL, p_1, q, bn_ctx) || /* g~ = x^a mod p */ !BN_mod_exp(ephemeral_key->g, x_bn, a, static_key->p, bn_ctx)) goto err; /* check if g~ != 1 */ check((!BN_is_one(ephemeral_key->g)), "Bad DH generator"); /* Copy ephemeral key to context structure */ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (q) BN_clear_free(q); if (p_1) BN_clear_free(p_1); if (x_bn) BN_clear_free(x_bn); if (x_mem) BUF_MEM_free(x_mem); /* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */ if (static_key) DH_free(static_key); if (ephemeral_key) DH_free(ephemeral_key); BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx); return ret; }
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator. * It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the * order-q subgroup. */ DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator, void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg) { BIGNUM *p=NULL,*t1,*t2; DH *ret=NULL; int g,ok= -1; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; ret=DH_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ctx=BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; if (generator <= 1) goto err; if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) { if (!BN_set_word(t1,24)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,11)) goto err; g=2; } else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) { if (!BN_set_word(t1,10)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,3)) goto err; /* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss * out on these ones :-( */ g=5; } else { /* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a * generator or not: since we are using safe primes, * it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group, * which both is OK */ if (!BN_set_word(t1,2)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,1)) goto err; g=generator; } p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,prime_len,1,t1,t2,callback,cb_arg); if (p == NULL) goto err; if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg); ret->p=p; ret->g=BN_new(); if (!BN_set_word(ret->g,g)) goto err; ok=1; err: if (ok == -1) ok=0; if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (!ok && (ret != NULL)) { DH_free(ret); ret=NULL; } return(ret); }
int RSA_recover_crt_params(RSA *rsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *totient, *rem, *multiple, *p_plus_q, *p_minus_q; int ok = 0; if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (rsa->p || rsa->q || rsa->dmp1 || rsa->dmq1 || rsa->iqmp) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN); return 0; } /* This uses the algorithm from section 9B of the RSA paper: * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf */ ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx); rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx); multiple = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p_plus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p_minus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (totient == NULL || rem == NULL || multiple == NULL || p_plus_q == NULL || p_minus_q == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* ed-1 is a small multiple of φ(n). */ if (!BN_mul(totient, rsa->e, rsa->d, ctx) || !BN_sub_word(totient, 1) || /* φ(n) = * pq - p - q + 1 = * n - (p + q) + 1 * * Thus n is a reasonable estimate for φ(n). So, (ed-1)/n will be very * close. But, when we calculate the quotient, we'll be truncating it * because we discard the remainder. Thus (ed-1)/multiple will be >= n, * which the totient cannot be. So we add one to the estimate. * * Consider ed-1 as: * * multiple * (n - (p+q) + 1) = * multiple*n - multiple*(p+q) + multiple * * When we divide by n, the first term becomes multiple and, since * multiple and p+q is tiny compared to n, the second and third terms can * be ignored. Thus I claim that subtracting one from the estimate is * sufficient. */ !BN_div(multiple, NULL, totient, rsa->n, ctx) || !BN_add_word(multiple, 1) || !BN_div(totient, rem, totient, multiple, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS); goto err; } rsa->p = BN_new(); rsa->q = BN_new(); rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); rsa->iqmp = BN_new(); if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL || rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 == NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* φ(n) = n - (p + q) + 1 => * n - totient + 1 = p + q */ if (!BN_sub(p_plus_q, rsa->n, totient) || !BN_add_word(p_plus_q, 1) || /* p - q = sqrt((p+q)^2 - 4n) */ !BN_sqr(rem, p_plus_q, ctx) || !BN_lshift(multiple, rsa->n, 2) || !BN_sub(rem, rem, multiple) || !BN_sqrt(p_minus_q, rem, ctx) || /* q is 1/2 (p+q)-(p-q) */ !BN_sub(rsa->q, p_plus_q, p_minus_q) || !BN_rshift1(rsa->q, rsa->q) || !BN_div(rsa->p, NULL, rsa->n, rsa->q, ctx) || !BN_mul(multiple, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_cmp(multiple, rsa->n) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!BN_sub(rem, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || !BN_sub(rem, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || !BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ok = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (!ok) { bn_free_and_null(&rsa->p); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->q); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmp1); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmq1); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->iqmp); } return ok; }
BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx) { BIGNUM local_n; BIGNUM *e,*n; BN_CTX *ctx; BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL; if (in_ctx == NULL) { if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; } else ctx = in_ctx; BN_CTX_start(ctx); e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (e == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (rsa->e == NULL) { e = rsa_get_public_exp(rsa->d, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx); if (e == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); goto err; } } else e = rsa->e; if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL) { /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret * exponent as unpredictable seed */ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0); } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ n = &local_n; BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else n = rsa->n; ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx, rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n); if (ret == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } CRYPTO_THREADID_current(BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)); err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (in_ctx == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if(rsa->e == NULL) BN_free(e); return ret; }
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; int ret = 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); { BIGNUM local_p, local_q; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; /* * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_p); p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_init(&local_q); q = &local_q; BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else { p = rsa->p; q = rsa->q; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) goto err; } } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; /* compute I mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmq1 = &local_dmq1; BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; /* compute I mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; } /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmp1 = &local_dmp1; BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) goto err; /* * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) goto err; /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { pr1 = &local_r1; BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else pr1 = r1; if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) goto err; /* * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p' * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can * break the private key operations: the following second correction * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve] */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) goto err; if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; /* * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for * absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { /* * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and * return that instead. */ BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return (ret); }
/* signature verification */ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret; int i, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return -1; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return -1; } } if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the * top '0' bytes */ if (flen > num) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; p = buf; i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); break; default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); }
static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1; BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1; int ret = 0; size_t i, num_additional_primes = 0; if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) { num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes); } BN_CTX_start(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); { BIGNUM local_p, local_q; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) */ BN_init(&local_p); p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_init(&local_q); q = &local_q; BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, &rsa->lock, p, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, &rsa->lock, q, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } } } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) { if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } } /* compute I mod q */ c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) { goto err; } /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ dmq1 = &local_dmq1; BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) { goto err; } /* compute I mod p */ c = &local_c; BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) { goto err; } /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ dmp1 = &local_dmp1; BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p)) { goto err; } if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) { goto err; } /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) { if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) { goto err; } /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ pr1 = &local_r1; BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) { goto err; } /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because * they ensure p > q [steve] */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) { if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) { goto err; } if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) { goto err; } for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) { /* multi-prime RSA. */ BIGNUM local_exp, local_prime; BIGNUM *exp = &local_exp, *prime = &local_prime; RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i); BN_with_flags(exp, ap->exp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); BN_with_flags(prime, ap->prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* c will already point to a BIGNUM with the correct flags. */ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, prime, ctx)) { goto err; } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) && !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&ap->method_mod, &rsa->lock, prime, ctx)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, exp, prime, ctx, ap->method_mod)) { goto err; } BN_set_flags(m1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_sub(m1, m1, r0) || !BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->coeff, ctx) || !BN_mod(m1, m1, prime, ctx) || (BN_is_negative(m1) && !BN_add(m1, m1, prime)) || !BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->r, ctx) || !BN_add(r0, r0, m1)) { goto err; } } if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { goto err; } /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) { goto err; } if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) { goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) { if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) * mod_exp and return that instead. */ BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { goto err; } } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; }
int ecdh_gm_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) { int ret = 0; BUF_MEM * mem_h = NULL; BIGNUM * bn_s = NULL, *order = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; EC_POINT * ecp_h = NULL, *ecp_g = NULL; const ECDH_METHOD *default_method; EC_GROUP *group = NULL; EC_KEY *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL; BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx); check((ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments"); static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(ctx->static_key); check(static_key, "could not get key object"); /* Extract group parameters */ group = EC_GROUP_dup(EC_KEY_get0_group(static_key)); order = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); cofactor = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); check(group && cofactor, "internal error"); if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bn_ctx) || !EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(group, cofactor, bn_ctx)) goto err; /* Convert nonce to BIGNUM */ bn_s = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) s->data, s->length, bn_s); if (!bn_s) goto err; default_method = ECDH_get_default_method(); ECDH_set_default_method(ECDH_OpenSSL_Point()); /* complete the ECDH and get the resulting point h */ mem_h = ecdh_compute_key(ctx->static_key, in, bn_ctx); ECDH_set_default_method(default_method); ecp_h = EC_POINT_new(group); if (!mem_h || !ecp_h || !EC_POINT_oct2point(group, ecp_h, (unsigned char *) mem_h->data, mem_h->length, bn_ctx)) goto err; /* map to new generator */ ecp_g = EC_POINT_new(group); /* g' = g*s + h*1 */ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, ecp_g, bn_s, ecp_h, BN_value_one(), bn_ctx)) goto err; /* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */ ephemeral_key = EC_KEY_dup(static_key); if (!ephemeral_key) goto err; EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key); /* configure the new EC_KEY */ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, ecp_g, order, cofactor) || !EC_GROUP_check(group, bn_ctx) || !EC_KEY_set_group(ephemeral_key, group)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (ecp_g) EC_POINT_clear_free(ecp_g); if (ecp_h) EC_POINT_clear_free(ecp_h); if (mem_h) BUF_MEM_free(mem_h); if (bn_s) BN_clear_free(bn_s); BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx); /* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */ if (static_key) EC_KEY_free(static_key); if (ephemeral_key) EC_KEY_free(ephemeral_key); if (group) EC_GROUP_clear_free(group); return ret; }
static int keygen_multiprime(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp; BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p; BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p; int prime_bits, ok = -1, n = 0, i, j; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL; if (num_primes < 2) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES); goto err; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) { goto err; } if (num_primes > 2) { additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null(); if (additional_primes == NULL) { goto err; } } for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime)); if (ap == NULL) { goto err; } memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime)); ap->prime = BN_new(); ap->exp = BN_new(); ap->coeff = BN_new(); ap->r = BN_new(); if (ap->prime == NULL || ap->exp == NULL || ap->coeff == NULL || ap->r == NULL || !sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap)) { RSA_additional_prime_free(ap); goto err; } } /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) { goto err; } if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) { goto err; } /* generate p and q */ prime_bits = (bits + (num_primes - 1)) / num_primes; for (;;) { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) || !BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) || !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { goto err; } if (BN_is_one(r1)) { break; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) { goto err; } prime_bits = ((bits - prime_bits) + (num_primes - 2)) / (num_primes - 1); for (;;) { /* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for * this and bail if it happens 3 times. */ unsigned int degenerate = 0; do { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { goto err; } } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3)); if (degenerate == 3) { ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) || !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { goto err; } if (BN_is_one(r1)) { break; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1) || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) { goto err; } for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) + (num_primes - (i + 1))) / (num_primes - i); for (;;) { if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) { goto err; } if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0 || BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0) { continue; } for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++) { if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime, ap->prime) == 0) { break; } } if (j != i - 2) { continue; } if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) { goto err; } if (!BN_is_one(r1)) { continue; } if (i != num_primes - 1) { break; } /* For the last prime we'll check that it makes n large enough. In the * two prime case this isn't a problem because we generate primes with * the top two bits set and so the product is always of the expected * size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't follow. */ if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) { goto err; } if (BN_num_bits(r1) == bits) { break; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) { goto err; } } /* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the current one * (including p and q). */ if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n)) { goto err; } if (i == num_primes - 1) { /* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n as |r1| in the loop * above. */ if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1)) { goto err; } } else if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) { goto err; } if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) { goto err; } } if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { tmp = rsa->p; rsa->p = rsa->q; rsa->q = tmp; } /* calculate d */ if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) { goto err; /* p-1 */ } if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) { goto err; /* q-1 */ } if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) { goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ } for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx)) { goto err; } } pr0 = &local_r0; BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { goto err; /* d */ } /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) { goto err; } /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { goto err; } /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ p = &local_p; BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) { goto err; } for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) { RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2); if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx) || !BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx)) { goto err; } } ok = 1; rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes; additional_primes = NULL; err: if (ok == -1) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN); ok = 0; } if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes, RSA_additional_prime_free); return ok; }
int ecdh_im_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) { int ret = 0; BUF_MEM * x_mem = NULL; BIGNUM * a = NULL, *b = NULL, *p = NULL; BIGNUM * x = NULL, *y = NULL, *v = NULL, *u = NULL; BIGNUM * tmp = NULL, *tmp2 = NULL, *bn_inv = NULL; BIGNUM * two = NULL, *three = NULL, *four = NULL, *six = NULL; BIGNUM * twentyseven = NULL; EC_KEY *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL; EC_POINT *g = NULL; BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx); check((ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx), "Invalid arguments"); static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(ctx->static_key); if (!static_key) goto err; /* Setup all the variables*/ a = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); p = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); v = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); two = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); three = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); four = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); six = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); twentyseven = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); bn_inv = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); if (!bn_inv) goto err; /* Encrypt the Nonce using the symmetric key in */ x_mem = cipher_no_pad(ctx->ka_ctx, NULL, in, s, 1); if (!x_mem) goto err; /* Fetch the curve parameters */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(static_key), p, a, b, bn_ctx)) goto err; /* Assign constants */ if ( !BN_set_word(two,2)|| !BN_set_word(three,3)|| !BN_set_word(four,4)|| !BN_set_word(six,6)|| !BN_set_word(twentyseven,27) ) goto err; /* Check prerequisites for curve parameters */ check( /* p > 3;*/ (BN_cmp(p, three) == 1) && /* p mod 3 = 2; (p has the form p=q^n, q prime) */ BN_nnmod(tmp, p, three, bn_ctx) && (BN_cmp(tmp, two) == 0), "Unsuited curve"); /* Convert encrypted nonce to BIGNUM */ u = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) x_mem->data, x_mem->length, u); if (!u) goto err; if ( /* v = (3a - u^4) / 6u mod p */ !BN_mod_mul(tmp, three, a, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_exp(tmp2, u, four, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_sub(v, tmp, tmp2, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_mul(tmp, u, six, p, bn_ctx) || /* For division within a galois field we need to compute * the multiplicative inverse of a number */ !BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, tmp, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_mul(v, v, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) || /* x = (v^2 - b - ((u^6)/27)) */ !BN_mod_sqr(tmp, v, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_sub(tmp2, tmp, b, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_exp(tmp, u, six, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, twentyseven, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_sub(x, tmp2, tmp, p, bn_ctx) || /* x -> x^(1/3) = x^((2p^n -1)/3) */ !BN_mul(tmp, two, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_sub(tmp, tmp, BN_value_one()) || /* Division is defined, because p^n = 2 mod 3 */ !BN_div(tmp, y, tmp, three, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_exp(tmp2, x, tmp, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_copy(x, tmp2) || /* x += (u^2)/3 */ !BN_mod_sqr(tmp, u, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_inverse(bn_inv, three, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_mul(tmp2, tmp, bn_inv, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_add(tmp, x, tmp2, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_copy(x, tmp) || /* y = ux + v */ !BN_mod_mul(y, u, x, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_mod_add(tmp, y, v, p, bn_ctx) || !BN_copy(y, tmp) ) goto err; /* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */ ephemeral_key = EC_KEY_dup(static_key); if (!ephemeral_key) goto err; EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key); /* configure the new EC_KEY */ g = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral_key)); if (!g) goto err; if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ephemeral_key), g, x, y, bn_ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (x_mem) BUF_MEM_free(x_mem); if (u) BN_free(u); BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx); if (g) EC_POINT_clear_free(g); /* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */ if (static_key) EC_KEY_free(static_key); if (ephemeral_key) EC_KEY_free(ephemeral_key); return ret; }
// Perform ECDSA key recovery (see SEC1 4.1.6) for curves over (mod p)-fields // recid selects which key is recovered // if check is non-zero, additional checks are performed int ECDSA_SIG_recover_key_GFp(EC_KEY *eckey, ECDSA_SIG *ecsig, const unsigned char *msg, int msglen, int recid, int check) { if (!eckey) return 0; int ret = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *x = NULL; BIGNUM *e = NULL; BIGNUM *order = NULL; BIGNUM *sor = NULL; BIGNUM *eor = NULL; BIGNUM *field = NULL; EC_POINT *R = NULL; EC_POINT *O = NULL; EC_POINT *Q = NULL; BIGNUM *rr = NULL; BIGNUM *zero = NULL; int n = 0; int i = recid / 2; const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); order = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx)) { ret = -2; goto err; } x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_copy(x, order)) { ret=-1; goto err; } if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; } if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; } field = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(group, field, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } if (BN_cmp(x, field) >= 0) { ret=0; goto err; } if ((R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, R, x, recid % 2, ctx)) { ret=0; goto err; } if (check) { if ((O = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, O, NULL, R, order, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, O)) { ret = 0; goto err; } } if ((Q = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = -2; goto err; } n = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); e = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_bin2bn(msg, msglen, e)) { ret=-1; goto err; } if (8*msglen > n) BN_rshift(e, e, 8-(n & 7)); zero = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_zero(zero)) { ret=-1; goto err; } if (!BN_mod_sub(e, zero, e, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_mod_inverse(rr, ecsig->r, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } sor = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_mod_mul(sor, ecsig->s, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } eor = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (!BN_mod_mul(eor, e, rr, order, ctx)) { ret=-1; goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, eor, R, sor, ctx)) { ret=-2; goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, Q)) { ret=-2; goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (R != NULL) EC_POINT_free(R); if (O != NULL) EC_POINT_free(O); if (Q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(Q); return ret; }
int dh_gm_compute_key(PACE_CTX * ctx, const BUF_MEM * s, const BUF_MEM * in, BN_CTX *bn_ctx) { int ret = 0; BUF_MEM * mem_h = NULL; BIGNUM * bn_s = NULL, *bn_h = NULL, *bn_g = NULL; DH *static_key = NULL, *ephemeral_key = NULL; check(ctx && ctx->static_key && s && ctx->ka_ctx, "Invalid arguments"); BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx); static_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(ctx->static_key); if (!static_key) goto err; /* Convert nonce to BIGNUM */ bn_s = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) s->data, s->length, bn_s); if (!bn_s) goto err; /* complete the DH and convert the result to a BIGNUM */ mem_h = dh_compute_key(ctx->static_key, in, bn_ctx); if (!mem_h) goto err; bn_h = BN_bin2bn((unsigned char *) mem_h->data, mem_h->length, bn_h); if (!bn_h) goto err; /* Initialize ephemeral parameters with parameters from the static key */ ephemeral_key = DHparams_dup_with_q(static_key); if (!ephemeral_key) goto err; /* map to new generator */ bn_g = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx); if (!bn_g || /* bn_g = g^s mod p */ !BN_mod_exp(bn_g, static_key->g, bn_s, static_key->p, bn_ctx) || /* ephemeral_key->g = bn_g * h mod p = g^s * h mod p */ !BN_mod_mul(ephemeral_key->g, bn_g, bn_h, static_key->p, bn_ctx)) goto err; /* Copy ephemeral key to context structure */ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ctx->ka_ctx->key, ephemeral_key)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (mem_h) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mem_h->data, mem_h->max); BUF_MEM_free(mem_h); } if (bn_h) BN_clear_free(bn_h); if (bn_s) BN_clear_free(bn_s); /* Decrement reference count, keys are still available via PACE_CTX */ if (static_key) DH_free(static_key); if (ephemeral_key) DH_free(ephemeral_key); BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx); return ret; }
/* Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2) * using Montgomery point multiplication algorithm Mxy() in appendix of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). * Returns: * 0 on error * 1 if return value should be the point at infinity * 2 otherwise */ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *x1, BIGNUM *z1, BIGNUM *x2, BIGNUM *z2, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *t3, *t4, *t5; int ret = 0; if (BN_is_zero(z1)) { BN_zero(x2); BN_zero(z2); return 1; } if (BN_is_zero(z2)) { if (!BN_copy(x2, x)) return 0; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x, y)) return 0; return 2; } /* Since Mxy is static we can guarantee that ctx != NULL. */ BN_CTX_start(ctx); if ((t3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((t4 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((t5 = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_one(t5)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, z1, z2, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z1, z1, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z1, z1, x1)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x1, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, x2)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, z1, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, y)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t4, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(t4, t4, z2)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t3, x, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_div(group, t3, t5, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t3, t4, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, x2, x1, t3, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, x2, x)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, z2, z2, t4, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_GF2m_add(z2, z2, y)) goto err; ret = 2; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; }
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator. * It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the * order-q subgroup. */ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) { BIGNUM *t1,*t2; int g,ok= -1; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; ctx=BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err; /* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */ if(!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if(!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err; if (generator <= 1) { /*Begin: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */ #if 0 DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR); #endif /*End: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */ goto err; } if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) { if (!BN_set_word(t1,24)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,11)) goto err; g=2; } #if 0 /* does not work for safe primes */ else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_3) { if (!BN_set_word(t1,12)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,5)) goto err; g=3; } #endif else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) { if (!BN_set_word(t1,10)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,3)) goto err; /* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss * out on these ones :-( */ g=5; } else { /* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a * generator or not: since we are using safe primes, * it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group, * which both is OK */ if (!BN_set_word(t1,2)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(t2,1)) goto err; g=generator; } if(prime_len==3072) get_rfc3526_prime_3072(ret->p); else if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p,prime_len,1,t1,t2,cb)) goto err; if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(ret->g,g)) goto err; ok=1; err: if (ok == -1) { /*Begin: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */ #if 0 DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS,ERR_R_BN_LIB); #endif /*End: comment out , 17Aug2006, Chris */ ok=0; } if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } return ok; }
int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *Ri, *R; BIGNUM tmod; BN_ULONG buf[2]; if (BN_is_zero(mod)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO); return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Ri == NULL) { goto err; } R = &mont->RR; /* grab RR as a temp */ if (!BN_copy(&mont->N, mod)) { goto err; /* Set N */ } mont->N.neg = 0; BN_init(&tmod); tmod.d = buf; tmod.dmax = 2; tmod.neg = 0; BN_zero(R); if (!BN_set_bit(R, BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)) { goto err; } tmod.top = 0; buf[0] = mod->d[0]; if (buf[0] != 0) { tmod.top = 1; } buf[1] = 0; if (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2 && mod->top > 1 && mod->d[1] != 0) { buf[1] = mod->d[1]; tmod.top = 2; } if (BN_mod_inverse(Ri, R, &tmod, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } if (!BN_lshift(Ri, Ri, BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)) { goto err; /* R*Ri */ } const BIGNUM *Ri_dividend; if (!BN_is_zero(Ri)) { if (!BN_sub_word(Ri, 1)) { goto err; } Ri_dividend = Ri; } else { /* Ri == 0 so Ri - 1 == -1. -1 % tmod == 0xff..ff. */ static const BN_ULONG kMinusOneLimbs[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS] = { BN_MASK2, #if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2 BN_MASK2 #endif }; STATIC_BIGNUM_DIAGNOSTIC_PUSH static const BIGNUM kMinusOne = STATIC_BIGNUM(kMinusOneLimbs); STATIC_BIGNUM_DIAGNOSTIC_POP Ri_dividend = &kMinusOne; } if (!BN_div(Ri, NULL, Ri_dividend, &tmod, ctx)) { goto err; } mont->n0[0] = 0; if (Ri->top > 0) { mont->n0[0] = Ri->d[0]; } mont->n0[1] = 0; if (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2 && Ri->top > 1) { mont->n0[1] = Ri->d[1]; } /* RR = (2^ri)^2 == 2^(ri*2) == 1 << (ri*2), which has its (ri*2)th bit set. */ int ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2; BN_zero(&(mont->RR)); if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), ri * 2)) { goto err; } if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) { goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; }
DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T bits, unsigned char *seed_in, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg) { int ok=0; unsigned char seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char buf[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH],buf2[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; BIGNUM *r0,*W,*X,*c,*test; BIGNUM *g=NULL,*q=NULL,*p=NULL; BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL; int k,n=0,i,b,m=0; int counter=0; int r=0; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL,*ctx3=NULL; unsigned int h=2; DSA *ret=NULL; unsigned char *seed_out=seed_in; if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) { FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); goto err; } if (bits < 512) bits=512; bits=(bits+63)/64*64; if (seed_len < 20) seed_in = NULL; /* seed buffer too small -- ignore */ if (seed_len > 20) seed_len = 20; /* App. 2.2 of FIPS PUB 186 allows larger SEED, * but our internal buffers are restricted to 160 bits*/ if ((seed_in != NULL) && (seed_len == 20)) memcpy(seed,seed_in,seed_len); if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx2=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ctx3=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret=DSA_new()) == NULL) goto err; if ((mont=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx2); r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); g = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); W = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); X = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); c = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); p = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); test = BN_CTX_get(ctx2); BN_lshift(test,BN_value_one(),bits-1); for (;;) { for (;;) /* find q */ { int seed_is_random; /* step 1 */ if (callback != NULL) callback(0,m++,cb_arg); if (!seed_len) { if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0) goto err; seed_is_random = 1; } else { seed_is_random = 0; seed_len=0; /* use random seed if 'seed_in' turns out to be bad*/ } memcpy(buf,seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); memcpy(buf2,seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); /* precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7: */ for (i=SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } /* step 2 */ EVP_Digest(seed,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,md,NULL,HASH, NULL); EVP_Digest(buf,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,buf2,NULL,HASH, NULL); for (i=0; i<SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) md[i]^=buf2[i]; /* step 3 */ md[0]|=0x80; md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1]|=0x01; if (!BN_bin2bn(md,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,q)) goto err; /* step 4 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest(q, DSS_prime_checks, callback, ctx3, cb_arg, seed_is_random); if (r > 0) break; if (r != 0) goto err; /* do a callback call */ /* step 5 */ } if (callback != NULL) callback(2,0,cb_arg); if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg); /* step 6 */ counter=0; /* "offset = 2" */ n=(bits-1)/160; b=(bits-1)-n*160; for (;;) { if (callback != NULL && counter != 0) callback(0,counter,cb_arg); /* step 7 */ BN_zero(W); /* now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1" */ for (k=0; k<=n; k++) { /* obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing: */ for (i=SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH-1; i >= 0; i--) { buf[i]++; if (buf[i] != 0) break; } EVP_Digest(buf,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,md,NULL,HASH, NULL); /* step 8 */ if (!BN_bin2bn(md,SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,r0)) goto err; BN_lshift(r0,r0,160*k); BN_add(W,W,r0); } /* more of step 8 */ BN_mask_bits(W,bits-1); BN_copy(X,W); /* this should be ok */ BN_add(X,X,test); /* this should be ok */ /* step 9 */ BN_lshift1(r0,q); BN_mod(c,X,r0,ctx); BN_sub(r0,c,BN_value_one()); BN_sub(p,X,r0); /* step 10 */ if (BN_cmp(p,test) >= 0) { /* step 11 */ r = BN_is_prime_fasttest(p, DSS_prime_checks, callback, ctx3, cb_arg, 1); if (r > 0) goto end; /* found it */ if (r != 0) goto err; } /* step 13 */ counter++; /* "offset = offset + n + 1" */ /* step 14 */ if (counter >= 4096) break; } } end: if (callback != NULL) callback(2,1,cb_arg); /* We now need to generate g */ /* Set r0=(p-1)/q */ BN_sub(test,p,BN_value_one()); BN_div(r0,NULL,test,q,ctx); BN_set_word(test,h); BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont,p,ctx); for (;;) { /* g=test^r0%p */ BN_mod_exp_mont(g,test,r0,p,ctx,mont); if (!BN_is_one(g)) break; BN_add(test,test,BN_value_one()); h++; } if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg); ok=1; err: if (!ok) { if (ret != NULL) DSA_free(ret); } else { ret->p=BN_dup(p); ret->q=BN_dup(q); ret->g=BN_dup(g); if(seed_out != NULL) memcpy(seed_out,seed,20); if (counter_ret != NULL) *counter_ret=counter; if (h_ret != NULL) *h_ret=h; } if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (ctx2 != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx2); BN_CTX_free(ctx2); } if (ctx3 != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx3); if (mont != NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); return(ok?ret:NULL); }
int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve (const EC_GROUP * group, const EC_POINT * point, BN_CTX * ctx) { int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); const BIGNUM *p; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *rh, *tmp, *Z4, *Z6; int ret = -1; if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity (group, point)) return 1; field_mul = group->meth->field_mul; field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr; p = &group->field; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new (); if (ctx == NULL) return -1; } BN_CTX_start (ctx); rh = BN_CTX_get (ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get (ctx); Z4 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); Z6 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (Z6 == NULL) goto err; /* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b. * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates * where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3). * Substituting this and multiplying by Z^6 transforms the above equation into * Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6. * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'. */ /* rh := X^2 */ if (!field_sqr (group, rh, &point->X, ctx)) goto err; if (!point->Z_is_one) { if (!field_sqr (group, tmp, &point->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_sqr (group, Z4, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!field_mul (group, Z6, Z4, tmp, ctx)) goto err; /* rh := (rh + a*Z^4)*X */ if (group->a_is_minus3) { if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick (tmp, Z4, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick (tmp, tmp, Z4, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sub_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!field_mul (group, tmp, Z4, &group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) goto err; } /* rh := rh + b*Z^6 */ if (!field_mul (group, tmp, &group->b, Z6, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, tmp, p)) goto err; } else { /* point->Z_is_one */ /* rh := (rh + a)*X */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, &group->a, p)) goto err; if (!field_mul (group, rh, rh, &point->X, ctx)) goto err; /* rh := rh + b */ if (!BN_mod_add_quick (rh, rh, &group->b, p)) goto err; } /* 'lh' := Y^2 */ if (!field_sqr (group, tmp, &point->Y, ctx)) goto err; ret = (0 == BN_ucmp (tmp, rh)); err: BN_CTX_end (ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free (new_ctx); return ret; }
static int verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); BIGNUM *f, *result; int ret = 0; int r = -1; uint8_t *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return 0; } if (max_out < rsa_size) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS && BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); return 0; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { buf = out; } else { /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); if (buf == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!f || !result) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (in_len != rsa_size) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) { goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) { if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { goto err; } if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r = rsa_size; break; default: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (r < 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); } else { *out_len = r; ret = 1; } err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return ret; }
int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (const EC_GROUP * group, size_t num, EC_POINT * points[], BN_CTX * ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z; BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL; size_t i; int ret = 0; if (num == 0) return 1; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new (); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; } BN_CTX_start (ctx); tmp = BN_CTX_get (ctx); tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err; prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc (num * sizeof prod_Z[0]); if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { prod_Z[i] = BN_new (); if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err; } /* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z, * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */ if (!BN_is_zero (&points[0]->Z)) { if (!BN_copy (prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err; } else { if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one (group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one (prod_Z[0])) goto err; } } for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { if (!BN_is_zero (&points[i]->Z)) { if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_copy (prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err; } } /* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_mod_inverse (tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx)) { ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (group->meth->field_encode != 0) { /* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) * into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */ if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_encode (group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; } for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) { /* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */ if (!BN_is_zero (&points[i]->Z)) { /* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */ if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; /* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */ if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_copy (&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err; } } if (!BN_is_zero (&points[0]->Z)) { /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */ if (!BN_copy (&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err; } /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { EC_POINT *p = points[i]; if (!BN_is_zero (&p->Z)) { /* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr (group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_mul (group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err; if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one (group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_one (&p->Z)) goto err; } p->Z_is_one = 1; } } ret = 1; err: BN_CTX_end (ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free (new_ctx); if (prod_Z != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break; BN_clear_free (prod_Z[i]); } OPENSSL_free (prod_Z); } return ret; }
static int private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { BIGNUM *f, *result; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; unsigned blinding_index = 0; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; int ret = 0; ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { goto err; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); result = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (f == NULL || result == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) { goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* Usually the padding functions would catch this. */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, blinding, ctx)) { goto err; } } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) { goto err; } } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) { if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) { goto err; } } if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(result, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) { goto err; } } if (blinding) { if (!BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(result, NULL, blinding, ctx)) { goto err; } } if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (blinding != NULL) { rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index); } return ret; }
int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant (const EC_GROUP * group, BN_CTX * ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *a, *b, *order, *tmp_1, *tmp_2; const BIGNUM *p = &group->field; BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; if (ctx == NULL) { ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new (); if (ctx == NULL) { ECerr (EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } BN_CTX_start (ctx); a = BN_CTX_get (ctx); b = BN_CTX_get (ctx); tmp_1 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); tmp_2 = BN_CTX_get (ctx); order = BN_CTX_get (ctx); if (order == NULL) goto err; if (group->meth->field_decode) { if (!group->meth->field_decode (group, a, &group->a, ctx)) goto err; if (!group->meth->field_decode (group, b, &group->b, ctx)) goto err; } else { if (!BN_copy (a, &group->a)) goto err; if (!BN_copy (b, &group->b)) goto err; } /* check the discriminant: * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p) * 0 =< a, b < p */ if (BN_is_zero (a)) { if (BN_is_zero (b)) goto err; } else if (!BN_is_zero (b)) { if (!BN_mod_sqr (tmp_1, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_mul (tmp_2, tmp_1, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_lshift (tmp_1, tmp_2, 2)) goto err; /* tmp_1 = 4*a^3 */ if (!BN_mod_sqr (tmp_2, b, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul_word (tmp_2, 27)) goto err; /* tmp_2 = 27*b^2 */ if (!BN_mod_add (a, tmp_1, tmp_2, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_is_zero (a)) goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_end (ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free (new_ctx); return ret; }
/* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; unsigned char *buf = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; int local_blinding = 0; /* * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (!f || !ret || !buf) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); break; case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: default: RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); goto err; } if (i <= 0) goto err; if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (blinding != NULL) { if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; } if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err; } else { BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) res = f; else res = ret; } else res = ret; /* * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the * modulus */ j = BN_num_bytes(res); i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++) to[k] = 0; r = num; err: if (ctx != NULL) { BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); OPENSSL_free(buf); } return (r); }