// method = 0 for normal auth response from game server // method = 1 for reauth response originating from keymaster void gcd_compute_response(char *cdkey, char *challenge, char response[RESPONSE_SIZE], CDResponseMethod method) { char rawout[RAWSIZE]; unsigned int anyrandom; char randstr[9]; /* check to make sure we weren't passed a huge cd key/challenge */ if (strlen(cdkey) * 2 + strlen(challenge) + 8 >= RAWSIZE) { strcpy(response,"CD Key or challenge too long"); return; } /* make sure we are randomized */ srand(time(NULL) ^ 0x33333333); /* Since RAND_MAX is 16 bit on many systems, make sure we get a 32 bit number */ anyrandom = (rand() << 16 | rand()); sprintf(randstr,"%.8x",anyrandom); /* auth response = MD5(cdkey + random mod 0xffff + challenge) */ /* reauth response = MD5(challenge + random mode 0xffff + cdkey) */ if (method == 0) sprintf(rawout, "%s%d%s",cdkey, anyrandom % 0xFFFF , challenge ); else sprintf(rawout, "%s%d%s",challenge, anyrandom % 0xFFFF, cdkey); /* do the cd key md5 */ MD5Digest((unsigned char *)cdkey, strlen(cdkey), response); /* add the random value */ strcpy(&response[32], randstr); /* do the response md5 */ MD5Digest((unsigned char *)rawout, strlen(rawout), &response[40]); }
void Crypt::ComputeMD5(unsigned char digest[16], void const* bytesIn, unsigned int inputLen) { MD5 md5; MD5Open(&md5); MD5Digest(&md5, bytesIn, inputLen); MD5Close(&md5, digest); }
// PKCS#1 v2.1, B.2.1 MGF1, mask generation function // modification: generates mask and applies in place gsi_bool gsiCryptRSAMaskData(unsigned char *data, gsi_u32 dataLen, const unsigned char* seed, gsi_u32 seedLen) { int i=0; int k=0; // The datablock may be used as the seed unsigned char hashValue[GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE]; // in integer form, NOT HEXSTRING // seed should never be larger than the data block size (but it may be less) if (seedLen > GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE) return gsi_false; for (i=0; (gsi_u32)i<dataLen;i+=GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE) { // Perform the hash #if (GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE==GS_CRYPT_MD5_HASHSIZE) { gsi_u32 temp=0; // concatenate byte value of i onto seed char seedPlusIter[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE+4]; // seed||i char hashHexStr[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE*2+1]; // hexstr of hash "A1" rather than 0xA1 memcpy(&seedPlusIter[0], seed, seedLen); seedPlusIter[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE+0] = 0x00; seedPlusIter[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE+1] = 0x00; seedPlusIter[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE+2] = 0x00; seedPlusIter[GS_CRYPT_RSA_DATABLOCKSIZE+3] = (gsi_u8)(i/GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE); MD5Digest(seedPlusIter, seedLen+sizeof(gsi_u32), hashHexStr); // convert from hexstr to integer form for(k=0; k<seedLen+sizeof(gsi_u32)) { gsi_u32 temp; temp = sscanf(&hashHexStr[k*2], "%02X", &temp); hashValue[k] = (gsi_u8)temp; } } #elif (GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE==GS_CRYPT_SHA1_HASHSIZE) { gsi_u8 counter[4] = { 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; GSSHA1Context sha; counter[3] = (gsi_u8)(i/GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE); // ensure little endian int GSSHA1Reset(&sha); GSSHA1Input(&sha, (const unsigned char*)seed, seedLen); GSSHA1Input(&sha, counter, 4); GSSHA1Result(&sha, hashValue); } #endif // apply the mask to data for (k=0; k<GS_CRYPT_HASHSIZE; k++) { if ((gsi_u32)(i+k) >= dataLen) return gsi_true; data[i+k] ^= (gsi_u8)hashValue[k]; } } return gsi_true; }
/* return true if digest calculated */ int get_file_digest(const char * filename, Uint8 digest[16]) { MD5 md5; el_file_ptr file = NULL; file = el_open(filename); memset (digest, 0, 16); if (file == NULL) { LOG_ERROR("MD5Digest: Unable to open %s (%d)", filename, errno); return 0; } if (el_get_pointer(file) == NULL) { el_close(file); return 0; } MD5Open(&md5); MD5Digest(&md5, el_get_pointer(file), el_get_size(file)); MD5Close(&md5, digest); el_close(file); return 1; }
float get_bag_tilt(float pos_x, float pos_y, int bag_id, int map_x, int map_y) { char str[64]; MD5 md5; Uint8 digest[16]; memset(digest, 0, 16); safe_snprintf(str, 40, "%f%f%f%f%f", pos_x, pos_y, (float) bag_id, (float) map_x, (float) map_y); MD5Open(&md5); MD5Digest(&md5, str, strlen(str)); MD5Close(&md5, digest); // the sum of 5 cos operations can be between -5 and +5 // normalize them to -1.0 ... +1.0 // multiply with 15 (-15.0 ... +15.0 degrees) return ((cosf(digest[3]) + cosf(digest[4]) + cosf(digest[5]) + cosf( digest[6]) + cosf(digest[7])) / 5.0f) * 30; }
float get_bag_rotation(float pos_x, float pos_y, int bag_id, int map_x, int map_y) { char str[64]; MD5 md5; Uint8 digest[16]; memset(digest, 0, 16); safe_snprintf(str, 40, "%f%f%f%f%f", pos_x, pos_y, (float) bag_id, (float) map_x, (float) map_y); MD5Open(&md5); MD5Digest(&md5, str, strlen(str)); MD5Close(&md5, digest); // the sum of 5 sin operations can be between -5 and +5 // normalize them to -0.5 ... +0.5 // multiply with 360 (-180.0 ... +180.0 degrees) return ((sinf(digest[2]) + sinf(digest[3]) + sinf(digest[4]) + sinf( digest[5]) + sinf(digest[6])) / 10.0f) * 360; }
static JSVAL fs_md5(JSARGS args) { HandleScope scope; String::Utf8Value path(args[0]->ToString()); unsigned char buf[1024]; int bytes; MD5_CTX mdContext; MD5Init(&mdContext); FILE *fp = fopen(*path, "rb"); if (fp == NULL) { return scope.Close(False()); } while ((bytes = fread(buf, 1, 1024, fp)) != 0) { MD5Update(&mdContext, buf, bytes); } fclose(fp); MD5Final(&mdContext); MD5Digest(&mdContext, (char *)buf); return scope.Close(String::New((char *)buf)); }
status_t POP3Protocol::Login(const char *uid, const char *password, int method) { status_t err; BString error_msg; error_msg << MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE("Error while authenticating user ", "ユーザー認証中にエラーが発生しました ") << uid; if (method == 1) { //APOP int32 index = fLog.FindFirst("<"); if(index != B_ERROR) { runner->ReportProgress(0, 0, MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE( "Sending APOP authentication...", "APOP認証情報を送信中...")); int32 end = fLog.FindFirst(">",index); BString timestamp(""); fLog.CopyInto(timestamp, index, end - index + 1); timestamp += password; char md5sum[33]; MD5Digest((unsigned char*)timestamp.String(), md5sum); BString cmd = "APOP "; cmd += uid; cmd += " "; cmd += md5sum; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { error_msg << MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE(". The server said:\n", "サーバのメッセージです\n") << fLog; runner->ShowError(error_msg.String()); return err; } return B_OK; } else { error_msg << MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE(": The server does not support APOP.", "サーバはAPOPをサポートしていません"); runner->ShowError(error_msg.String()); return B_NOT_ALLOWED; } } runner->ReportProgress(0, 0, MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE("Sending username...", "ユーザーID送信中...")); BString cmd = "USER "; cmd += uid; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { error_msg << MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE(". The server said:\n", "サーバのメッセージです\n") << fLog; runner->ShowError(error_msg.String()); return err; } runner->ReportProgress(0, 0, MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE("Sending password...", "パスワード送信中...")); cmd = "PASS "; cmd += password; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { error_msg << MDR_DIALECT_CHOICE(". The server said:\n", "サーバのメッセージです\n") << fLog; runner->ShowError(error_msg.String()); return err; } return B_OK; }
GPResult gpiProcessConnect( GPConnection * connection, GPIOperation * operation, const char * input ) { char buffer[512]; char check[33]; char uniquenick[GP_UNIQUENICK_LEN]; GPIConnectData * data; GPIConnection * iconnection = (GPIConnection*)*connection; GPICallback callback; GPIProfile * profile; char userBuffer[GP_NICK_LEN + GP_EMAIL_LEN]; char partnerBuffer[11]; char * user; // Check for an error. ////////////////////// if(gpiCheckForError(connection, input, GPIFalse)) { // Is this a deleted profile? ///////////////////////////// if((iconnection->errorCode == GP_LOGIN_PROFILE_DELETED) && iconnection->profileid) { // Remove this profile object. ////////////////////////////// gpiRemoveProfileByID(connection, iconnection->profileid); // If we have the profileid/userid cached, lose them. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////// iconnection->userid = 0; iconnection->profileid = 0; } // Check for creating an existing profile. ////////////////////////////////////////// else if(iconnection->errorCode == GP_NEWUSER_BAD_NICK) { // Store the pid. ///////////////// if(gpiValueForKey(input, "\\pid\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) iconnection->profileid = atoi(buffer); } // Call the callbacks. ////////////////////// CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_SERVER_ERROR, iconnection->errorCode, iconnection->errorString); } // Get a pointer to the data. ///////////////////////////// data = (GPIConnectData*)operation->data; switch(operation->state) { case GPI_CONNECTING: // This should be \lc\1. //////////////////////// if(strncmp(input, "\\lc\\1", 5) != 0) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexpected data was received from the server."); // Get the server challenge. //////////////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\challenge\\", data->serverChallenge, sizeof(data->serverChallenge))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexpected data was received from the server."); // Check if this is a new user. /////////////////////////////// if(data->newuser) { // Send a new user message. /////////////////////////// CHECK_RESULT(gpiSendNewuser(connection, data)); // Update the operation's state. //////////////////////////////// operation->state = GPI_REQUESTING; } else { // Send a login message. //////////////////////// CHECK_RESULT(gpiSendLogin(connection, data)); // Update the operation's state. //////////////////////////////// operation->state = GPI_LOGIN; } break; case GPI_REQUESTING: // This should be \nur\. //////////////////////// if(strncmp(input, "\\nur\\", 5) != 0) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexpected data was received from the server."); // Get the userid. ////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\userid\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); iconnection->userid = atoi(buffer); // Get the profileid. ///////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\profileid\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); iconnection->profileid = atoi(buffer); // Send a login request. //////////////////////// CHECK_RESULT(gpiSendLogin(connection, data)); // Update the operation's state. //////////////////////////////// operation->state = GPI_LOGIN; break; case GPI_LOGIN: // This should be \lc\2. //////////////////////// if(strncmp(input, "\\lc\\2", 5) != 0) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexpected data was received from the server."); // Get the sesskey. /////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\sesskey\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); iconnection->sessKey = atoi(buffer); // Get the userid. ////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\userid\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); iconnection->userid = atoi(buffer); // Get the profileid. ///////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\profileid\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); iconnection->profileid = atoi(buffer); // Get the uniquenick. ////////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\uniquenick\\", uniquenick, sizeof(uniquenick))) uniquenick[0] = '\0'; // Get the loginticket. ////////////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\lt\\", iconnection->loginTicket, sizeof(iconnection->loginTicket))) iconnection->loginTicket[0] = '\0'; // Construct the user. ////////////////////// if(iconnection->partnerID != GP_PARTNERID_GAMESPY) { sprintf(partnerBuffer, "%d@", iconnection->partnerID); } else { // GS ID's do not stash the partner ID in the auth challenge to support legacy clients. strcpy(partnerBuffer, ""); } if(data->authtoken[0]) user = data->authtoken; else if(iconnection->uniquenick[0]) { sprintf(userBuffer, "%s%s", partnerBuffer, iconnection->uniquenick); user = userBuffer; } else { sprintf(userBuffer, "%s%s@%s", partnerBuffer, iconnection->nick, iconnection->email); user = userBuffer; } // Construct the check. /////////////////////// sprintf(buffer, "%s%s%s%s%s%s", data->passwordHash, " ", user, data->serverChallenge, data->userChallenge, data->passwordHash); MD5Digest((unsigned char *)buffer, strlen(buffer), check); // Get the proof. ///////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(input, "\\proof\\", buffer, sizeof(buffer))) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_PARSE, "Unexepected data was received from the server."); // Check the server authentication. /////////////////////////////////// if(memcmp(check, buffer, 32) != 0) CallbackFatalError(connection, GP_NETWORK_ERROR, GP_LOGIN_SERVER_AUTH_FAILED, "Could not authenticate server."); // Add the local profile to the list. ///////////////////////////////////// if(iconnection->infoCaching) { profile = gpiProfileListAdd(connection, iconnection->profileid); profile->profileId = iconnection->profileid; profile->userId = iconnection->userid; } // Set the connect state. ///////////////////////// iconnection->connectState = GPI_CONNECTED; // Call the connect-response callback. ////////////////////////////////////// callback = operation->callback; if(callback.callback != NULL) { GPConnectResponseArg * arg; arg = (GPConnectResponseArg *)gsimalloc(sizeof(GPConnectResponseArg)); if(arg == NULL) Error(connection, GP_MEMORY_ERROR, "Out of memory."); memset(arg, 0, sizeof(GPConnectResponseArg)); arg->profile = (GPProfile)iconnection->profileid; arg->result = GP_NO_ERROR; #ifndef GSI_UNICODE strzcpy(arg->uniquenick, uniquenick, GP_UNIQUENICK_LEN); #else UTF8ToUCS2StringLen(uniquenick, arg->uniquenick, GP_UNIQUENICK_LEN); #endif CHECK_RESULT(gpiAddCallback(connection, callback, arg, operation, 0)); } // This operation is complete. ////////////////////////////// gpiRemoveOperation(connection, operation); // Get the local profile's info. //////////////////////////////// #if 0 gpiAddOperation(connection, GPI_GET_INFO, NULL, &operation, GP_NON_BLOCKING, NULL, NULL); gpiSendGetInfo(connection, iconnection->profileid, operation->id); #endif #ifdef _PS3 // We just connected, so setup buddy sync && start NP init // For future, we can limit syncs by setting flags to turn on/off here ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// iconnection->npPerformBuddySync = gsi_true; iconnection->npPerformBlockSync = gsi_true; iconnection->loginTime = current_time(); if (!iconnection->npInitialized) gpiInitializeNpBasic(connection); #endif break; default: break; } return GP_NO_ERROR; }
static GPResult gpiSendLogin( GPConnection * connection, GPIConnectData * data ) { char buffer[512]; char response[33]; GPIConnection * iconnection = (GPIConnection*)*connection; GPIProfile * profile; char * passphrase; char userBuffer[GP_NICK_LEN + GP_EMAIL_LEN]; char partnerBuffer[11]; char * user; // Construct the user challenge. //////////////////////////////// randomString(data->userChallenge, sizeof(data->userChallenge) - 1); // Hash the password. ///////////////////// if(data->partnerchallenge[0]) passphrase = data->partnerchallenge; else passphrase = iconnection->password; MD5Digest((unsigned char*)passphrase, strlen(passphrase), data->passwordHash); // Construct the user. ////////////////////// if(iconnection->partnerID != GP_PARTNERID_GAMESPY) { sprintf(partnerBuffer, "%d@", iconnection->partnerID); } else { // GS ID's do not stash the partner ID in the auth challenge to support legacy clients. strcpy(partnerBuffer, ""); } if(data->authtoken[0]) user = data->authtoken; else if(iconnection->uniquenick[0]) { sprintf(userBuffer, "%s%s", partnerBuffer, iconnection->uniquenick); user = userBuffer; } else { sprintf(userBuffer, "%s%s@%s", partnerBuffer, iconnection->nick, iconnection->email); user = userBuffer; } // Construct the response. ////////////////////////// sprintf(buffer, "%s%s%s%s%s%s", data->passwordHash, " ", user, data->userChallenge, data->serverChallenge, data->passwordHash); MD5Digest((unsigned char *)buffer, strlen(buffer), response); // Check for an existing profile. ///////////////////////////////// if(iconnection->infoCaching) { gpiFindProfileByUser(connection, iconnection->nick, iconnection->email, &profile); if(profile != NULL) { // Get the userid and profileid. //////////////////////////////// iconnection->userid = profile->userId; iconnection->profileid = profile->profileId; } } // Construct the outgoing message. ////////////////////////////////// gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\login\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\challenge\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, data->userChallenge); if(data->authtoken[0]) { gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\authtoken\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, data->authtoken); } else if(iconnection->uniquenick[0]) { gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\uniquenick\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->uniquenick); } else { gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\user\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->nick); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "@"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->email); } if(iconnection->userid != 0) { gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\userid\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->userid); } if(iconnection->profileid != 0) { gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\profileid\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->profileid); } gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\partnerid\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->partnerID); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\response\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, response); if(iconnection->firewall == GP_FIREWALL) gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\firewall\\1"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\port\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->peerPort); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\productid\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->productID); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\gamename\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, __GSIACGamename); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\namespaceid\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->namespaceID); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\sdkrevision\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, GPI_SDKREV); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\quiet\\"); gpiAppendIntToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, iconnection->quietModeFlags); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\id\\1"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &iconnection->outputBuffer, "\\final\\"); return GP_NO_ERROR; }
status_t POP3Protocol::Login(const char* uid, const char* password, int method) { status_t err; BString errorMessage(B_TRANSLATE("Error while authenticating user %user")); errorMessage.ReplaceFirst("%user", uid); if (method == 1) { //APOP int32 index = fLog.FindFirst("<"); if(index != B_ERROR) { ReportProgress(0, 0, B_TRANSLATE("Sending APOP authentication" B_UTF8_ELLIPSIS)); int32 end = fLog.FindFirst(">", index); BString timestamp(""); fLog.CopyInto(timestamp, index, end - index + 1); timestamp += password; char md5sum[33]; MD5Digest((unsigned char*)timestamp.String(), md5sum); BString cmd = "APOP "; cmd += uid; cmd += " "; cmd += md5sum; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { errorMessage << B_TRANSLATE(". The server said:\n") << fLog; ShowError(errorMessage.String()); return err; } return B_OK; } else { errorMessage << B_TRANSLATE(": The server does not support APOP."); ShowError(errorMessage.String()); return B_NOT_ALLOWED; } } ReportProgress(0, 0, B_TRANSLATE("Sending username" B_UTF8_ELLIPSIS)); BString cmd = "USER "; cmd += uid; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { errorMessage << B_TRANSLATE(". The server said:\n") << fLog; ShowError(errorMessage.String()); return err; } ReportProgress(0, 0, B_TRANSLATE("Sending password" B_UTF8_ELLIPSIS)); cmd = "PASS "; cmd += password; cmd += CRLF; err = SendCommand(cmd.String()); if (err != B_OK) { errorMessage << B_TRANSLATE(". The server said:\n") << fLog; ShowError(errorMessage.String()); return err; } return B_OK; }
static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) /* apply for connection authorization */ { int ok; char *start,*end; char *msg; #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE char *challenge; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef SSL_ENABLE flag connection_may_have_tls_errors = FALSE; flag got_tls = FALSE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ done_capa = FALSE; #if defined(GSSAPI) has_gssapi = FALSE; #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ #if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) has_kerberos = FALSE; #endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */ has_cram = FALSE; #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE has_otp = FALSE; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef SSL_ENABLE has_stls = FALSE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ /* Set this up before authentication quits early. */ set_peek_capable(ctl); /* Hack: allow user to force RETR. */ if (peek_capable && getenv("FETCHMAIL_POP3_FORCE_RETR")) { peek_capable = 0; } /* * The "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server" deliberately truncates * TOP replies after c. 64 or 80 kByte (we have varying reports), so * disable TOP. Comcast once spewed marketing babble to the extent * of protecting Outlook -- pretty overzealous to break a protocol * for that that Microsoft could have read, too. Comcast aren't * alone in using this software though. * <http://lists.ccil.org/pipermail/fetchmail-friends/2004-April/008523.html> * (Thanks to Ed Wilts for reminding me of that.) * * The warning is printed once per server, until fetchmail exits. * It will be suppressed when --fetchall or other circumstances make * us use RETR anyhow. * * Matthias Andree */ if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) { if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) { report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n")); ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP; } peek_capable = 0; } if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH) { return PS_SUCCESS; } #ifdef SDPS_ENABLE /* * This needs to catch both demon.co.uk and demon.net. * If we see either, and we're in multidrop mode, try to use * the SDPS *ENV extension. */ if (!(ctl->server.sdps) && MULTIDROP(ctl) && strstr(greeting, "demon.")) ctl->server.sdps = TRUE; #endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */ switch (ctl->server.protocol) { case P_POP3: #ifdef RPA_ENABLE /* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */ /* CompuServe POP3 Servers as of 990730 want AUTH first for RPA */ if (strstr(ctl->remotename, "@compuserve.com")) { /* AUTH command should return a list of available mechanisms */ if (gen_transact(sock, "AUTH") == 0) { char buffer[10]; flag has_rpa = FALSE; while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) == 0) { if (DOTLINE(buffer)) break; if (strncasecmp(buffer, "rpa", 3) == 0) has_rpa = TRUE; } if (has_rpa && !POP3_auth_rpa(ctl->remotename, ctl->password, sock)) return(PS_SUCCESS); } return(PS_AUTHFAIL); } #endif /* RPA_ENABLE */ /* * CAPA command may return a list including available * authentication mechanisms and STLS capability. * * If it doesn't, no harm done, we just fall back to a plain * login -- if the user allows it. * * Note that this code latches the server's authentication type, * so that in daemon mode the CAPA check only needs to be done * once at start of run. * * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to * PASSWORD, switch off opportunistic and repoll immediately. * If TLS is mandatory, fail up front. */ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY) || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) || maybe_tls(ctl)) { if ((ok = capa_probe(sock)) != PS_SUCCESS) /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH => failure is PS_AUTHFAIL! */ if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL || /* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we * have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA * must have succeeded. In that case, treat this as a * genuine socket error and do not change the auth method. */ (ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed)) { #ifdef SSL_ENABLE if (must_tls(ctl)) { /* fail with mandatory STLS without repoll */ report(stderr, GT_("TLS is mandatory for this session, but server refused CAPA command.\n")); report(stderr, GT_("The CAPA command is however necessary for TLS.\n")); return ok; } else if (maybe_tls(ctl)) { /* defeat opportunistic STLS */ xfree(ctl->sslproto); ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); } #endif /* If strong authentication was opportunistic, retry without, else fail. */ switch (ctl->server.authenticate) { case A_ANY: ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case A_PASSWORD: /* this should only happen with TLS enabled */ return PS_REPOLL; default: return PS_AUTHFAIL; } } } #ifdef SSL_ENABLE if (maybe_tls(ctl)) { char *commonname; commonname = ctl->server.pollname; if (ctl->server.via) commonname = ctl->server.via; if (ctl->sslcommonname) commonname = ctl->sslcommonname; if (has_stls) { /* Use "tls1" rather than ctl->sslproto because tls1 is the only * protocol that will work with STARTTLS. Don't need to worry * whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails * (see below). */ if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS && SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname, ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename) != -1) { /* * RFC 2595 says this: * * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities * after STARTTLS." * * Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can * guarantee a secure capability re-probe. */ got_tls = TRUE; done_capa = FALSE; ok = capa_probe(sock); if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) { return ok; } if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { report(stdout, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS succeeded.\n"), commonname); } } } if (!got_tls) { if (must_tls(ctl)) { /* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must * stop. */ report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname); return PS_SOCKET; } else { /* We don't know whether the connection is usable, and there's * no command we can reasonably issue to test it (NOOP isn't * allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown * state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things * go wrong when we try to authenticate. */ connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { report(stdout, GT_("%s: opportunistic upgrade to TLS failed, trying to continue.\n"), commonname); } } } } /* maybe_tls() */ #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ /* * OK, we have an authentication type now. */ #if defined(KERBEROS_V4) /* * Servers doing KPOP have to go through a dummy login sequence * rather than doing SASL. */ if (has_kerberos && ctl->server.service && (strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT)!=0) && (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4 || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5 || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTH", ctl->server.truename); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } #endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */ #if defined(GSSAPI) if (has_gssapi && (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI || (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY && check_gss_creds("pop", ctl->server.truename) == PS_SUCCESS))) { ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH","pop",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE if (has_otp && (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTH", ctl); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef NTLM_ENABLE /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */ if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0); if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } #else if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) { report(stderr, GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); } #endif if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 || (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } /* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename))) break; #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE /* see RFC1938: A One-Time Password System */ if ((challenge = strstr(lastok, "otp-"))) { char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1]; int i; char *n = xstrdup(""); i = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? n : ctl->password, response); free(n); if ((i == -2) && !run.poll_interval) { char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1]; fprintf(stderr, GT_("Secret pass phrase: ")); if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0)) i = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response); memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); }; if (i) { ok = PS_ERROR; break; }; ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", response); break; } #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ /* KPOP uses out-of-band authentication and does not check what * we send here, so send some random fixed string, to avoid * users switching *to* KPOP accidentally revealing their * password */ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4 || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) && (ctl->server.service != NULL && strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT) == 0)) { ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS krb_ticket"); break; } /* check if we are actually allowed to send the password */ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) { strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud)); ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password); } else { report(stderr, GT_("We've run out of allowed authenticators and cannot continue.\n")); ok = PS_AUTHFAIL; } memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud)); shroud[0] = '\0'; break; case P_APOP: /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */ /* find start of timestamp */ for (start = greeting; *start != 0 && *start != '<'; start++) continue; if (*start == 0) { report(stderr, GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n")); return(PS_AUTHFAIL); } /* find end of timestamp */ for (end = start; *end != 0 && *end != '>'; end++) continue; if (*end == 0 || end == start + 1) { report(stderr, GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n")); return(PS_AUTHFAIL); } else *++end = '\0'; /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17 * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822 * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation * harder[1] * * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication", * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */ if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) { report(stderr, GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n")); return PS_AUTHFAIL; } /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */ msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1); strcpy(msg,start); strcat(msg,ctl->password); strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg)); free(msg); ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest); break; case P_RPOP: if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0) { strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud)); ok = gen_transact(sock, "RPOP %s", ctl->password); memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud)); shroud[0] = '\0'; } break; default: report(stderr, GT_("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n")); ok = PS_ERROR; } #ifdef SSL_ENABLE /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually * don't! */ if (connection_may_have_tls_errors && (ok == PS_SOCKET || ok == PS_PROTOCOL)) { xfree(ctl->sslproto); ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); /* repoll immediately without TLS */ ok = PS_REPOLL; } #endif if (ok != 0) { /* maybe we detected a lock-busy condition? */ if (ok == PS_LOCKBUSY) report(stderr, GT_("lock busy! Is another session active?\n")); return(ok); } /* Disable the sleep. Based on patch by Brian Candler 2004-04-19/2004-11-08, * accepted by Matthias Andree. * * Rationale: the server must have locked the spool before returning +OK; * this sleep just wastes time and hence, for modem and GSM CSD users, money. */ #ifdef WANT_BOGUS /* * Empirical experience shows some server/OS combinations * may need a brief pause even after any lockfiles on the * server are released, to give the server time to finish * copying back very large mailfolders from the temp-file... * this is only ever an issue with extremely large mailboxes. */ sleep(3); /* to be _really_ safe, probably need sleep(5)! */ #endif /* we're approved */ return(PS_SUCCESS); }
void MD5Sum::update(const char* buffer, const int bufferLength) { // Process data buffer const unsigned char* bTmp = reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(buffer); MD5Digest(&md5_, bTmp, bufferLength); }
static GPResult gpiProcessPeerAcceptingConnection( GPConnection * connection, GPIPeer * peer ) { GPIConnection * iconnection = (GPIConnection*)*connection; GSUdpPeerState aPeerState; char * str; //int len; GPIBool connClosed; char intValue[16]; int pid; char nick[GP_NICK_LEN]; char sig[33]; char sigCheck[33]; char buffer[256]; // Check the state. /////////////////// GS_ASSERT(peer->state == GPI_PEER_WAITING); if (peer->state != GPI_PEER_WAITING) return GP_NETWORK_ERROR; // Read any pending info. ///////////////////////// //CHECK_RESULT(gpiRecvToBuffer(connection, peer->sock, &peer->inputBuffer, &len, &connClosed, "PR")); gsUdpEngineGetPeerState(peer->ip, peer->port, &aPeerState); // Check for a closed connection. ///////////////////////////////// if(aPeerState == GS_UDP_PEER_CLOSED) { peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } // Check for a final. ///////////////////// str = strstr(peer->inputBuffer.buffer, "\\final\\"); if(str != NULL) { str[0] = '\0'; str += 7; // Is it an auth? ///////////////// if(strncmp(peer->inputBuffer.buffer, "\\auth\\", 6) == 0) { // Get the pid. /////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(peer->inputBuffer.buffer, "\\pid\\", intValue, sizeof(intValue))) { peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } pid = atoi(intValue); // Get the nick. //////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(peer->inputBuffer.buffer, "\\nick\\", nick, sizeof(nick))) { peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } // Get the sig. /////////////// if(!gpiValueForKey(peer->inputBuffer.buffer, "\\sig\\", sig, sizeof(sig))) { peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } // Compute what the sig should be. ////////////////////////////////// sprintf(buffer, "%s%d%d", iconnection->password, iconnection->profileid, pid); MD5Digest((unsigned char *)buffer, strlen(buffer), sigCheck); // Check the sig. ///////////////// if(strcmp(sig, sigCheck) != 0) { // Bad sig. /////////// gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &peer->outputBuffer, "\\anack\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &peer->outputBuffer, "\\final\\"); gpiSendBufferToPeer(connection, peer->ip, peer->port, &peer->outputBuffer, &connClosed, GPITrue); peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } // Send an ack. /////////////// gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &peer->outputBuffer, "\\aack\\"); gpiAppendStringToBuffer(connection, &peer->outputBuffer, "\\final\\"); peer->state = GPI_PEER_CONNECTED; peer->profile = (GPProfile)pid; } else { // Unrecognized command. //////////////////////// peer->state = GPI_PEER_DISCONNECTED; return GP_NO_ERROR; } // Update the buffer length. //////////////////////////// peer->inputBuffer.len = 0; } return GP_NO_ERROR; }